German and Soviet manpower

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5GTA
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German and Soviet manpower

Post by 5GTA » 22 Sep 2017 18:53

I'm looking for the total manpower of the German forces in the East at various points in the war, such as January 1943. The same for Axis Allied and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front. What would be the most reliable sources?

Art
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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 23 Sep 2017 09:49

5GTA wrote:I'm looking for the total manpower of the German forces in the East at various points in the war, such as January 1943.
Take a look at this topic:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=219452

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 23 Sep 2017 19:59

From the link above we have 2 945 thous. men (in rounded numbers) between Leningrad and Caucasus in the German Army and SS as of 1 January 1943. Probably including Luftwaffe field divisions. One should also add:
20 Mountain Army in Lapland/Arctic - some 150-170 thous. men
Luftwaffe - ? About 400 thous. ration strength on the Eastern Front in January 43
Kriegsmarine - ?
Hiwis and collaborationist formations not included in Army numbers - ?
Personnel in civil organizations -?
There are many missing pieces as you can see.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Stiltzkin » 23 Sep 2017 23:06

Do note that it is difficult to compare Soviet and German manpower. What you generally want is Verbände & Fechtende Heerestruppen, comparing Tagesstärke with Soviet figures. Those are from my experience at least in the range between daily and actual strengths.
A good place to look is /viewtopic.php?f=48&t=223939 the NARA T78 Rolls around 400-420, they are unfortunately not all included in the series. Or here http://wwii-microfilm.blogspot.de/
It is actually of little relevance, it is far more important to know how much more men can be fed into battle.
Hiwis and collaborationist formations not included in Army numbers - ?
They are, usually in Verpflegungsstärke (ration). What is often missing are non GHQ units and those directly under command of the GHQ.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 24 Sep 2017 09:01

German Allies on EF:

Romania - some 300 000 men in the operational area (Stalingrad, Caucasus) in November 1942. By 1.1.43 huge losses were suffered at Stalingrad. Remaining strength - ? Also
Romanian occupational forces in Crimea (2 divisions) - ?
Romanian occupational forces in Transnistria (4 divisions) - ?
Romanian Navy in the Black Sea - ?
According to Axworthy Romanian operational strength deployed outside Romania between 1.11.42 and 31.12.42 was 490 000 men

Italia - 230 000 men in the 8 Army in the summer 1942. By 1.1.43 huge losses suffered at the Don River. Remaining strength - ?

Hungary - about 210 000 men in the 2 Army (Don) by January 1942.
Also Hungarian security forces in the occupied area (3 divisions) - ?

Finland - 400 000 men in the Armed forces as of 1.12.42. Of them operational strength:
Field Army - 270 000
Navy - 25 000
Air Force - 10 000
The rest in the home area, hospitals, construction units etc.

Slovakia - one mobile division in Caucasus, probably some 10 000 men. Also one security division in Ukraine/Belorussia.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 24 Sep 2017 09:17

Soviet Armed Forces:
Red Army (including army air force) in the operational area on 1.1.43 - 6 191 000 military personnel (as reported by E.Tschadenko on 14.2.42). Which must include forces in Caucasus on the Turkish border and in Iran.
Red Army's civil personnel - 158 000 men in the operational area as of 1.1.43 (Krivosheev)
Operational Navy - 255 000 as of 15.1.43
NKVD troops in the operational area - ?
NKPS railroad engineers - 113 000 men in the operational area
Other civil organizations - ? (must be a small number)
Irregular forces in the frontline zone (militia etc) - ?

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losna
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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by losna » 02 Oct 2017 08:15

Art wrote:Soviet Armed Forces:
Red Army (including army air force) in the operational area on 1.1.43 - 6 191 000 military personnel (as reported by E.Tschadenko on 14.2.42). Which must include forces in Caucasus on the Turkish border and in Iran.
Red Army's civil personnel - 158 000 men in the operational area as of 1.1.43 (Krivosheev)
Operational Navy - 255 000 as of 15.1.43
NKVD troops in the operational area - ?
NKPS railroad engineers - 113 000 men in the operational area
Other civil organizations - ? (must be a small number)
Irregular forces in the frontline zone (militia etc) - ?
Good day Art, do you have figures for the total manpower pool available to the Soviets in 1942 - thus excluding people living under German occupation?

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 02 Oct 2017 17:32

What exactly? Total civil population, military-age men, number of active military?

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losna
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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by losna » 03 Oct 2017 08:35

Art wrote:What exactly? Total civil population, military-age men, number of active military?
Military-age men, I think, maybe with numbers on exemptions and troops that could't be used against the Germans. Thanks in advance.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 04 Oct 2017 21:08

There is a couple of known documents. Namely a report from general Shchadenko to Stalin from 10.9.42 with a review of situation by September 1942:
A number of men liable to military service (classes of 1890-1925) estimated as 31 500 000, of them:
- 18 069 000 taken to the military (*)
- 5 631 000 lost on occupied territory
- 250 000 ethnic German, Finns etc exempt from military service
- 880 000 called up in August-September (mostly a class of 1924)
- a remainder: 6 623 000 (or 6 563 000 if you do the math correctly - reserved in economy, transferred to labor columns, older ages, limited fitness, Central Asia natives etc.
Also not included in the numbers above 1 156 000 men in GULAG and prisons.

(*) including:
11 055 700 men in Army, Navy, NKVD troops as of 1.9.42
766 000 men in hospitals
1 150 000 - discharged or on leave for medical reasons
5 097 300 - irrevocable casualties (killed, missing, prisoners, died of wounds).

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Art » 04 Oct 2017 21:26

The second report from Tschadenko submitted on 14 February 1943, situation as of 1.1.43:

In Army, Navy, NKVD troops - 10 947 000 (*) men plus 851 000 in hospitals
class of 1925 in process of call-up - 817 000
recruits transferred to industry work - 2 541 000
discharged or on leave for medical reasons - 982 000
nationalities exempt from military service - 250 000
irrevocable causalities - 5 950 000
lost on occupied territory - 5 631 000 + 965 000 (classes of 1924-1925)
A remainder (not called up yet) - 3 724 576 (of them about 2.5 million reserved in economy)

GULAG, NKPS troops and other minor military seem to be forgotten

(*) Breakdown of military:
On the front - 6 191 350 men
Far East - 1 131 696
internal military districts - 1 932 995 (including 1 422 659 in replacement, training units, and military schools)
others - 744 901 (reserves, units in transfer, airborne forces, separate air force and air defense elements)
Total Red Army - 10 000 942
About 946 000 in Navy and NKVD (calculated from the difference)

Those data were not necessary accurate and must contain some guesstimates and double counting, still they provide the general idea.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by losna » 12 Oct 2017 09:51

Art wrote:The second report from Tschadenko submitted on 14 February 1943, situation as of 1.1.43:

In Army, Navy, NKVD troops - 10 947 000 (*) men plus 851 000 in hospitals
class of 1925 in process of call-up - 817 000
recruits transferred to industry work - 2 541 000
discharged or on leave for medical reasons - 982 000
nationalities exempt from military service - 250 000
irrevocable causalities - 5 950 000
lost on occupied territory - 5 631 000 + 965 000 (classes of 1924-1925)
A remainder (not called up yet) - 3 724 576 (of them about 2.5 million reserved in economy)

GULAG, NKPS troops and other minor military seem to be forgotten

(*) Breakdown of military:
On the front - 6 191 350 men
Far East - 1 131 696
internal military districts - 1 932 995 (including 1 422 659 in replacement, training units, and military schools)
others - 744 901 (reserves, units in transfer, airborne forces, separate air force and air defense elements)
Total Red Army - 10 000 942
About 946 000 in Navy and NKVD (calculated from the difference)

Those data were not necessary accurate and must contain some guesstimates and double counting, still they provide the general idea.
Thanks a lot Art.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Counter » 08 Mar 2019 20:25

I found this thread, with this valuable information, particularly about reports of general Tschadenko. I see there is this other one viewtopic.php?f=55&t=219452&start=30 but anyway I want here just to ponder what about whether it is right or not some estimates on the germans were winning the atrittion war previous to the battle of Stalingrad (so Stalingrad would be actually the "turning point" of the war).

My suspicion comes from realizing that, although the german situation of manpower has always been considered much worse than that of the russians, the mobilization rate of the german power previous to Stalingrad was much lower...

I got this chart from Frieser´s Book "Germany and Second world war" (Vol VIII), about german manpower:


(Birth Years 1888–1925)
Total male population originally available 19.8 (100.0)
Unfit for military service 3.6 (18.2%)
Exemptions 5.3 (26.8%)
Total losses since 1939 2.4 (12.1%)
Actual strength of land army on the German–Soviet front 2.7 (13.6%)
Other combat troops 5.3 (26.8%)
Remaining human reserves fit for military service at 1 March 1943 0.5 (2.5%)



"Unfit+Exceptions" amount to 43% of total male population. But, according to Frieser (based, I think, on estimates of the FHO at that time), the soviet figure would be around 26 %. A large gap. Specially if we keep in mind that germans could use foreign troops (and soviet renegades!) and they were also using foreign workers in the factories.

According to this tally, after Stalingrad, germans only counted on 0.5 men for manpower reserve. But previous to July 1943 (Kursk) they jump from the figure of 2.2 millions soldiers in Eastern Front to 3.4 Obviously they did a very strong effort of mobilization, similar, probably, to that done by the russians in 1941, as they were invaded.


So, if Stalingrad not being a terrible defeat for the nazis, they could have mobilized 0.5+0.2 ("extra" casualties in Stalingrad) + around another 2 millions from passing 43% exemptions to, let´s say, 30% (women in factories, more foreign workers...)

According to the Tschadenko´s figures, Russians had 3.7 million men as manpower reserve (and most of them necessary in economy)
Art wrote:The second report from Tschadenko submitted on 14 February 1943, situation as of 1.1.43:

In Army, Navy, NKVD troops - 10 947 000 (*) men plus 851 000 in hospitals
class of 1925 in process of call-up - 817 000
recruits transferred to industry work - 2 541 000
discharged or on leave for medical reasons - 982 000
nationalities exempt from military service - 250 000
irrevocable causalities - 5 950 000
lost on occupied territory - 5 631 000 + 965 000 (classes of 1924-1925)
A remainder (not called up yet) - 3 724 576 (of them about 2.5 million reserved in economy)
Considering what happened after Stalingrad, those 3.7 millions were more than enough (on coming months, fewer casualties, more "booty troops" and more partisans-fewer defectors). But what about if Stalingrad would have been just a strategic withdrawal of the germans, as the withdrawal from Rostov was in December 1941? No final disaster inside the "Cauldron", no loss of so much conquered territory... just to keep tight the hard winter and, again, in the next summertime will come the revenge...

Each year (if 1943 would have bien for russians as 1942 was), the russians suffered over 3 millions irrevocable casualties (killed and missing) plus maybe another million of irrecoverable wounded (disable). New recruits were only 1.5 million (nearly half of the boys were in the occupied area) at the most: they required, at least 2.5 million people from reserves. At the end of 1944, they would be finished?

The germans bear 0.5 irrevocable casualties... may be 0.8 counting on disabled people. New recruits, being 0.5... Reserves around 3 millions (with higher mobilization), so maybe manpower reserves for six o seven years long...

Of course, there are more factors to ponder, but is not sensible the view of that previous to Stalingrad, the russians were losing the atrition war in the East?

Thanks

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Nautilus » 10 Mar 2019 01:46

Counter wrote:
08 Mar 2019 20:25
is not sensible the view of that previous to Stalingrad, the russians were losing the atrition war in the East?
They were. This is why the Soviet Generals' grand plan was to lure the Germans into a trap, to whittle them down. Retreating as during Napoleonic times meant loss of valuable resources, land, railways, which was nastier for each mile lost.

So they used their power in numbers and the grand-strategic ability in which the Soviets were superior to mount the "Planet" operations (Uranus, Mars and Saturn). All of them linked one to each other and derived one from each other, at Zhukov's initiative, to break the front in the South.

Which didn't happen as expected, as the German Generals (and von Manstein in the first place) reacted just in time.

Stalin's grand plan aimed the Uranus offensive to cut the Caucasus Front altogether from the Reich and besiege it to destruction. While other 2 "Planets" were to whittle down German armies and distract valuable units away from the breaking point. This meant loss of 1.5 million German troops on the Southern fronts, plus Romanians, Hungarians and Italians, a deadly, unrepairable blow. It meant crushing the Wehrmacht entirely and winning the war in just one campaign of 3 months, from November to January.

But it didn't happen in practice, as it wasn't unexpected on the German side, both Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein and Generaloberst Paulus were fully convinced this is what the Soviets planned to do. So the vast majority of the German units did not fall into the trap.

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Re: German and Soviet manpower

Post by Max Payload » 10 Mar 2019 12:01

Counter wrote:
08 Mar 2019 20:25
Of course, there are more factors to ponder, but is not sensible the view of that previous to Stalingrad, the russians were losing the atrition war in the East?
Attrition rates in 1942 can’t be projected into 1943 and beyond because one of the factors to ponder is that both sides were on a learning curve of how to gain maximum advantage and inflict maximum damage at least cost. The Soviets continued to make costly and inept errors in 1943, (Sokolovsky’s abortive offensives against AG Centre, and Timoshenko’s botched Polar Star offensive) but the Red Army was proving itself increasingly capable, organisationally and operationally, of successfully confronting a still tactically superior opponent. Stalin allowed his more successful generals greater operational independence and the best of them used the numerical advantage that they still possessed to greater effect. Avoidance of the loss of Sixth Army would have had who knows what consequences, but it would not have changed those fundamentals.

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