Part of the change in the dynamics of the Eastern Front wasn't simply Soviet improvements, but German degradation in quality, which the loss of 6th army jump started. The loss of 200k veterans of the most powerful field army of the Ostheer was a very serious loss to the German war effort, not to mention all their equipment too, as well as all the Luftwaffe aircraft and crew lost trying to sustain them in the pocket. Avoid that and the Soviets have a much harder row to hoe in 1943.Max Payload wrote: ↑10 Mar 2019, 13:01Attrition rates in 1942 can’t be projected into 1943 and beyond because one of the factors to ponder is that both sides were on a learning curve of how to gain maximum advantage and inflict maximum damage at least cost. The Soviets continued to make costly and inept errors in 1943, (Sokolovsky’s abortive offensives against AG Centre, and Timoshenko’s botched Polar Star offensive) but the Red Army was proving itself increasingly capable, organisationally and operationally, of successfully confronting a still tactically superior opponent. Stalin allowed his more successful generals greater operational independence and the best of them used the numerical advantage that they still possessed to greater effect. Avoidance of the loss of Sixth Army would have had who knows what consequences, but it would not have changed those fundamentals.
German and Soviet manpower
Re: German and Soviet manpower
Re: German and Soviet manpower
Art wrote: ↑24 Sep 2017, 10:01German Allies on EF:
Romania - some 300 000 men in the operational area (Stalingrad, Caucasus) in November 1942. By 1.1.43 huge losses were suffered at Stalingrad. Remaining strength - ? Also
Romanian occupational forces in Crimea (2 divisions) - ?
Romanian occupational forces in Transnistria (4 divisions) - ?
Romanian Navy in the Black Sea - ?
According to Axworthy Romanian operational strength deployed outside Romania between 1.11.42 and 31.12.42 was 490 000 men
Last edited by Yuri on 15 Mar 2019, 21:47, edited 1 time in total.
Re: German and Soviet manpower
Manpower Wehrmacht in Osten November 1942
in Caucasus, the incompetence of Generals and the replacement of some of them,
in particular the replacement of Jodl to Paulus after the capture of Stalingrad. Total according to the Keitel's data in the autumn of 1942 in East Wehrmacht:
page from 1 to 57, the conversation between Hitler and Keitel about the failures in Caucasus, the incompetence of Generals and the replacement of some of them,
in particular the replacement of Jodl to Paulus after the capture of Stalingrad. Total according to the Keitel's data in the autumn of 1942 in East Wehrmacht: