Question About Western Contribution to the War

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Richard Anderson » 03 Jan 2018 19:38

ljadw wrote:
Richard Anderson wrote:
No, those "38 divisions" as of June you plucked from the AH compendium


Not correct


Really?

The Western Front (France and the Low Countries) as of c. 1 June 1941:

Befh.d.Dt.Tp.i.Denmark:
218 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East February 1942
82 Inf.Div. (6. Welle bew) - to East June 1942
719 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo)

OB WEST- and HEERESGRUPPE-D:

AOK-7:
XXXI Hoh.Kdo.:
223 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East November 1941
708 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo)
88 Inf.Div. (6. Welle bew) - to East January 1942
212 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East November 1941
333 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 1 February 1943
LIX Hoh.Kdo.:
81 Inf.Div. (6. Welle bew) - to East 28 December 1941
305 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division May 1942
246 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East February 1942
715 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo) - to Italy as a mot-division February 1943
XXV Armeekorps:
709 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo)
211 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East 12 January 1942
205 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East February 1942
712 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo) - to East February 1945

AOK-1:
XXXXV Hoh.Kdo.:
260. Inf. Div. (4. Welle bew) - to East 26 June 1941
339 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to East 23 August 1941
215 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East December 1941
342 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to Yugoslavia October 1941
XXVII Armeekorps:
94. Inf.Div. (5. Welle bew) - to East 1 July 1941
98. Inf.Div. (5 Welle bew) - to East in July 1941
337 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 20 October 1942
327 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 9 February 1943
335 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bewodivision February 1943

AOK-15:
96 Inf.Div. (5. Welle bew) - to East Prussia in July and Novgorod in August 1941
711 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo)
LX Hoh.Kdo.:
323 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 2 May 1942
83 Inf.Div. (6. Welle bew) - to East 17 December 1941
216 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East 23 December 1941
319 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo)
XXXII Hoh.Kdo.:
93. Inf. Div. (5. Welle bew) - to East 2 July
336 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 14 May 1942
302 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 6 January 1943 - it was the Dieppe division and began reorganizing 10 October 1942
225 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East December 1941
332 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division March 1942
716 Inf.Div. (15. Welle bo) -
XXXVII Hoh.Kdo.:
320 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division January 1943
321 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division January 1943
208 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East January 1942
304 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division January 1943
340 Inf.Div. (14. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 12 May 1942
306 Inf.Div. (13. Welle bo) - to East as bew-division 27 November 1942
227 Inf.Div. (3. Welle bew) - to East October 1941

44 divisions, not 38. 24 were bo.

ljadw
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby ljadw » 03 Jan 2018 21:26

You said that I plucked them from the AH compendium : that's not correct .

From Nigel Askey's Operation Barbarossa Volume IIB

Heeresgruppe D

7 army : 13 divisions

1 army :9 divisions

15 army : 19 divisions

Hgrp reserves : 2 divisions

Total 43

Other sources give a lower number .,but that's not important : the important is that Germany had on 22 june some 40 divisions in the West, although there was no danger for a landing, and that in the winter of 41/42 there were still 30 divisions in the West although the danger for a landing was inexistent and there was a crisis in the East .

June 1942 : no danger for landing : still 27 divisions (3 PzD):there was no danger for a landing because there were 27 divisions in the West .

The fact is that the threat of a landing and the danger of a general insurrection ,although there would be no allied landing before the spring of 1944, prevented Germany to transfer divisions from the West to other theaters of operation,and that in november 1943 Hitler ordered to reinforce OBW .
Occupied territories needed occupation forces and the weaker these were, the easier it would be for the enemy to land . That's why it would not be possible to withdraw considerable forces from the West,if Overlord had failed .The Germans could take no risk .Thus the claim that after a failed Overlord,the germans would send sufficient forces to the East to prevent the debacle of Bagration, is not correct :besides, as they didn't know of the danger of an attack against AGC, there was no reason to send reinforcements to AGC.

The British also were taking no risks; after 1940 considerable forces were still tied by the protection of the south coast against a possible Sealion .

The French also did not take risks :when there was still no war with Italy, French forces were stationed on the border with Italy .

The Belgian also did not take any risks : between september 1939 and may 1940 they stationed forces on the border with France .

US also would not take risks : if after PH there was no war with Germany, they would not strip the east coast and the Atlantic from all forces .

Richard Anderson
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2018 05:27

Indeed, denial is not just a river in Africa. :roll:

ljadw wrote:You said that I plucked them from the AH compendium : that's not correct .

From Nigel Askey's Operation Barbarossa Volume IIB
Total 43


So you "plucked them" from Askey's work, but first decided to not give a source and also decided to use your own figure of '38' instead of Askey's figure of 43.

How truly honest of you.

Other sources give a lower number


Which ones? Whose? What numbers? Note that Askey's and my figures are off by one, which is dependent on dates.

.,but that's not important :


Of course it's not. What is important is that yet again you are attempting to cover your tracks by obfuscating the issue.

the important is that Germany had on 22 june some 40 divisions in the West, although there was no danger for a landing, and that in the winter of 41/42 there were still 30 divisions in the West although the danger for a landing was inexistent and there was a crisis in the East .


Sigh...WHO says there "was no danger" in the west? YOU? :roll:

In the winter of 41/42 there were:

December - 42
January - 36
February - 32

Divisions in the west. Plus 6, 8, and 7 respectively in the Heimat. SOMEBODY thought there was "danger" in the west.

June 1942 : no danger for landing : still 27 divisions (3 PzD):there was no danger for a landing because there were 27 divisions in the West .


No. What there was was a drawdown of all forces in the West, including former bodenstandiges divisionen converted to bewegungs in order to meet the critical requirement in the East after the Soviet winter counteroffensive and in order to prepare for the German summer offensive.

The fact is that the threat of a landing and the danger of a general insurrection ,although there would be no allied landing before the spring of 1944, prevented Germany to transfer divisions from the West to other theaters of operation,and that in november 1943 Hitler ordered to reinforce OBW .


Really? Except they did in fact "transfer divisions from the West to other theaters of operation". So there is a major hole in the assumption you are pretending is a "fact".

Occupied territories needed occupation forces and the weaker these were, the easier it would be for the enemy to land . That's why it would not be possible to withdraw considerable forces from the West,if Overlord had failed .The Germans could take no risk .Thus the claim that after a failed Overlord,the germans would send sufficient forces to the East to prevent the debacle of Bagration, is not correct :besides, as they didn't know of the danger of an attack against AGC, there was no reason to send reinforcements to AGC.


You really do know how to spin out assumptions and pretend they are facts. The "occupation forces" were the bodenstandiges divisionen, the Reserve einheiten, and the security forces.

The British also were taking no risks; after 1940 considerable forces were still tied by the protection of the south coast against a possible Sealion .


Which is why 7 RTR went to Egypt in August 1940...yeah, right. :roll:

The French also did not take risks :when there was still no war with Italy, French forces were stationed on the border with Italy .

The Belgian also did not take any risks : between september 1939 and may 1940 they stationed forces on the border with France .

US also would not take risks : if after PH there was no war with Germany, they would not strip the east coast and the Atlantic from all forces .


Seriously? :lol: :lol: :lol:

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby antwony » 04 Jan 2018 07:42

ljadw wrote:June 1942 : no danger for landing : still 27 divisions (3 PzD):there was no danger for a landing because there were 27 divisions in the West .


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-291-1205-14,_Dieppe,_Landungsversuch,_alliierte_Soldaten.jpg

ljadw
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby ljadw » 04 Jan 2018 08:56

antwony wrote:
ljadw wrote:June 1942 : no danger for landing : still 27 divisions (3 PzD):there was no danger for a landing because there were 27 divisions in the West .


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-291-1205-14,_Dieppe,_Landungsversuch,_alliierte_Soldaten.jpg


Landing = something as Overlord . The Germans knew that a landing on the scale of Overlord was excluded in the summer of 1942, but they still had 27 divisions in France ; if they had only 17 divisions in France ,the threat of a big landing would be greater .


Dieppe was handled by the forces in the West, there was no need to send reinforcements from elsewhere, nor were such reinforcements available,as Blau demanded all available resources .

The stronger the forces in the West, the more divisions the Allies would need for a landing,and the less likely such a landing would be . At the end,the Germans lost the race and the Allied forces were strong enough for a landing .

What is difficult to understand for some people (I don't know why ) is that a landing was not required to tie German forces;the danger of a landing was sufficient, the possibility of a landing was sufficient .When there were rumours of a landing in Norway, the Germans sent reinforcements .In 1943 the Germans did fortify the coasts of Greece, not because there was a danger of a landing, but because without these fortifications, a landing could happen .The weakest regions were the most threatened.

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Sheldrake
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Sheldrake » 04 Jan 2018 10:51

ljadw wrote:
antwony wrote:
ljadw wrote:June 1942 : no danger for landing : still 27 divisions (3 PzD):there was no danger for a landing because there were 27 divisions in the West .


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-291-1205-14,_Dieppe,_Landungsversuch,_alliierte_Soldaten.jpg


#1 Landing = something as Overlord . The Germans knew that a landing on the scale of Overlord was excluded in the summer of 1942, but they still had 27 divisions in France ; if they had only 17 divisions in France ,the threat of a big landing would be greater .

#2 Dieppe was handled by the forces in the West, there was no need to send reinforcements from elsewhere, nor were such reinforcements available,as Blau demanded all available resources .

#3 The stronger the forces in the West, the more divisions the Allies would need for a landing,and the less likely such a landing would be . At the end,the Germans lost the race and the Allied forces were strong enough for a landing .



Rel;eating nonesense does not make it true.

Hitler did have a plan to win the war and make the threat of a landing in the west go away in 1944. He ordered a massive investment in revenge weapons with the aim of terrorising the British into surrender. It was the same thinking that lay behind the western development and use of the atomic bomb. Hitler planned to deluge London with enough high explosive to force the British to seek an armistice. At the same time he was supporting the development of wonder weapons that would change the balance in the air and at sea - jet fighters and bombers and super fast submarines that did not need to surface. In Hitler's mind at least, there was a plan to win the war in the west and transfer forces back to the east

Re #1. If the Germans garrisoned France with 27 Divisions in 1942 when the threat was low, and increased the garrison to 40+ divisions in 1944, includin full strength armoured formations when the threat was high. If the threat went away it would release some 20 divisions including full strength armoured formation. You have not acknowledged this but keep insisting that this varying number of Germans was always needed.

#2 You are ignoring the OKW directive dated 9th July when Hitler ordered the transfer of formations to the West specifically because of the threat the Germans identified of a landing in summer 1942. Here is a copy of the text received 9th July

Hitler Fuehrer order sent by telegram 9 Jul. 1942
OKW/WFSt 551213/42 Gkdos. Chefs.1/Ski. l296/42 Gkdos. Chefs.
Top secret
(Concerning the strengthening of defense measures in the West)*

1. Our rapid and great victories may place Great Britain before the alternative of either staging a large-scale invasion with the object of opening a second front, or seeing Russia eliminated as a political and military factor. It is therefore highly probable that enemy landings will shortly take place in the area of the Commanding General Armed Forces, West. The indications in detail are as follows:
a. An increasing number of statements from agents to that effect, and other data obtained by the Intelligence Service.
b. Heavy concentration of ferrying vessels along the southern coast of England.
c. Holding back of the R.A.F. during the last few days.

2. The following areas are to be regarded as particularly threatened:
a.. In the first place, the Channel coast, the area between Dieppe and Le Hiavre, and Normandy, since these sectors can be reached by enemy fighter planes and also because they lie within range of a large portion of the ferrying vessels.
b. Next, the southern part of the Netherlands coast and Brittany.
c. The main transportation routes, airfields, and staff head-quarters are in particular danger from paratroop and air-borne units as well as from sabotage.

3. I therefore order that the following measures be carried out immediately:
a. Army General Staff:
(1) The available units of the SS Reich Division are to be transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, without waiting to finish organization of the reinforced regiments, and before full mobility has been attained. (See OKW/WFSt/op (H) Nr. 002199/42 G.K. of1 Jul.)
(2). The S5 Adolf Hitler Division is to be transferred to the West at once.
(3) The SS Motorized Command is to be organized speedily and transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. All SS unitsin the West, if possible also the Goering Brigade, are to be combinedunder this command.
(4) For the time being the transfer of 1 regiment of the 23rd Infantry Division to Denmark is postponed.

b. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the Replacement Army:
(1) Three Walkuere II units are to be organized at once, andarter brief training in the specified areas of home territory are to be transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. The first units of the division are to leave the training areas between 18 and 20 Jul. l942'. These units are to be concentrated primarily in the south-western part of Holland and behind the Belgian coastal sector.
(2) The transports designated for replacement of personnel and materiel are to be sent to the West as quickly as possible.
c. _The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West directs the Armed Forces Commanders, France and Belgium-Northern France to safeguard at least one railroad line and one main highway to each of the especially endangered areas as set forth under 2 a and 2 b, in order to avoid destruction and sabotage. In the vicinity of important railroad stations and especially endangered traffic installations, hostages are to be picked from among the nearby inhabitants, and it is to be announced publicaly that these will answer with their lives for the safety of these installations, if the inhabitants should participate in or tolerate their destruction. All Dutch, Belgian, and French communities are re-quired,under pain of very severe reprisals, to arrest and report at once to the nearest military station any unknown person appearing in the com-munity. The number of hostages is to be sufficient to accomplish the purpose. Near especially important and greatly endangered objectives,personnel and equipment is to be held in readiness for quick repair.
4. By agreement with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, the Air Force will gather all available forces of the 7th Airborne Division and of the Goering Brigade in their assembly areas and form them into units for immediate commitment; the' Air Force will also transfer to France two bomber groups from the eastern reserves of the Commander in Chief, Air Force as per the latter's recommendation.

5. The Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, the Commanding General, Armed For~ces, West, and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the Replacement Army will report to me dailyat 0800 through the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff the progress with regard to measures under paragraphs 3 and 4. These re-ports will set forth the state of affairs as of 1900 at the close of the previous day.

6. In the event of an enemy landing I personally will proceed to the West and assume charge of operations from there.signed in draft form: Adolf Hitler


You can quibble about the fighting power represented in the formations, but you cannot claim that additional troops were not ordered to be transferred because of the perceived threat.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby jesk » 04 Jan 2018 11:16

It is necessary to divide Germans and Hitler whose instructions had comedy character.

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http://dlx.b-ok.org/genesis/905000/363c ... b6410/_as/

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby ljadw » 04 Jan 2018 12:40

Sheldrake wrote:
ljadw wrote:
antwony wrote:
ljadw wrote:June 1942 : no danger for landing : still 27 divisions (3 PzD):there was no danger for a landing because there were 27 divisions in the West .


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-291-1205-14,_Dieppe,_Landungsversuch,_alliierte_Soldaten.jpg



#1 If the threat went away it would release some 20 divisions including full strength armoured formation. You have not acknowledged this but keep insisting that this varying number of Germans was always needed.

#2 You are ignoring the OKW directive dated 9th July when Hitler ordered the transfer of formations to the West specifically because of the threat the Germans identified of a landing in summer 1942. Here is a copy of the text received 9th July

Hitler Fuehrer order sent by telegram 9 Jul. 1942
OKW/WFSt 551213/42 Gkdos. Chefs.1/Ski. l296/42 Gkdos. Chefs.
Top secret
(Concerning the strengthening of defense measures in the West)*

1. Our rapid and great victories may place Great Britain before the alternative of either staging a large-scale invasion with the object of opening a second front, or seeing Russia eliminated as a political and military factor. It is therefore highly probable that enemy landings will shortly take place in the area of the Commanding General Armed Forces, West. The indications in detail are as follows:
a. An increasing number of statements from agents to that effect, and other data obtained by the Intelligence Service.
b. Heavy concentration of ferrying vessels along the southern coast of England.
c. Holding back of the R.A.F. during the last few days.

2. The following areas are to be regarded as particularly threatened:
a.. In the first place, the Channel coast, the area between Dieppe and Le Hiavre, and Normandy, since these sectors can be reached by enemy fighter planes and also because they lie within range of a large portion of the ferrying vessels.
b. Next, the southern part of the Netherlands coast and Brittany.
c. The main transportation routes, airfields, and staff head-quarters are in particular danger from paratroop and air-borne units as well as from sabotage.

3. I therefore order that the following measures be carried out immediately:
a. Army General Staff:
(1) The available units of the SS Reich Division are to be transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, without waiting to finish organization of the reinforced regiments, and before full mobility has been attained. (See OKW/WFSt/op (H) Nr. 002199/42 G.K. of1 Jul.)
(2). The S5 Adolf Hitler Division is to be transferred to the West at once.
(3) The SS Motorized Command is to be organized speedily and transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. All SS unitsin the West, if possible also the Goering Brigade, are to be combinedunder this command.
(4) For the time being the transfer of 1 regiment of the 23rd Infantry Division to Denmark is postponed.

b. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the Replacement Army:
(1) Three Walkuere II units are to be organized at once, andarter brief training in the specified areas of home territory are to be transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. The first units of the division are to leave the training areas between 18 and 20 Jul. l942'. These units are to be concentrated primarily in the south-western part of Holland and behind the Belgian coastal sector.
(2) The transports designated for replacement of personnel and materiel are to be sent to the West as quickly as possible.
c. _The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West directs the Armed Forces Commanders, France and Belgium-Northern France to safeguard at least one railroad line and one main highway to each of the especially endangered areas as set forth under 2 a and 2 b, in order to avoid destruction and sabotage. In the vicinity of important railroad stations and especially endangered traffic installations, hostages are to be picked from among the nearby inhabitants, and it is to be announced publicaly that these will answer with their lives for the safety of these installations, if the inhabitants should participate in or tolerate their destruction. All Dutch, Belgian, and French communities are re-quired,under pain of very severe reprisals, to arrest and report at once to the nearest military station any unknown person appearing in the com-munity. The number of hostages is to be sufficient to accomplish the purpose. Near especially important and greatly endangered objectives,personnel and equipment is to be held in readiness for quick repair.
4. By agreement with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, the Air Force will gather all available forces of the 7th Airborne Division and of the Goering Brigade in their assembly areas and form them into units for immediate commitment; the' Air Force will also transfer to France two bomber groups from the eastern reserves of the Commander in Chief, Air Force as per the latter's recommendation.

5. The Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, the Commanding General, Armed For~ces, West, and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the Replacement Army will report to me dailyat 0800 through the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff the progress with regard to measures under paragraphs 3 and 4. These re-ports will set forth the state of affairs as of 1900 at the close of the previous day.

6. In the event of an enemy landing I personally will proceed to the West and assume charge of operations from there.signed in draft form: Adolf Hitler


You can quibble about the fighting power represented in the formations, but you cannot claim that additional troops were not ordered to be transferred because of the perceived threat.

On #1 : I disagree : what you are saying is impossible ,because the threat would go only away if MORE ,MUCH MORE units would be stationed in the West . And he would go away only temporarily, because the enemy would also increase his forces . If the same number of forces remained in the West, initially the threat would remain at the same level, and later /soon, he would increase his forces and the threat also would increase . If the Germans were diminishing their forces, this would be an invitation to the Allies to come .

You can't discuss the threat of an Allied landing in the West by talking only about what could/would do the Germans : what could/would do the Germans was depending on what could/would do the Allies who had the initiative :they were leading the dance, the Germans followed .

If in 1942 the Allies had the forces of 1943 they would have landed, if in 1943 they had the forces of 1944 they would have landed and in both cases, the landing would be successful.

On 2# : I will reply later, but I will only observe that Hitler was talking nonsense as he ordered the transfer of the remainings of the LSS and DR to the West,forgetting that they were already in transfer to be refitted :P .Figures about these remainings are available on WW2 Stats com. that is archived somewhere . The Eastern FRont was not weakened by this transfer . And, both units were not committed during Jubilee .

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby MarkN » 04 Jan 2018 13:07

ljadw wrote: On #1 : I disagree : what you are saying is impossible ,because the threat would go only away if MORE ,MUCH MORE units would be stationed in the West . And he would go away only temporarily, because the enemy would also increase his forces . If the same number of forces remained in the West, initially the threat would remain at the same level, and later /soon, he would increase his forces and the threat also would increase . If the Germans were diminishing their forces, this would be an invitation to the Allies to come .

Absolute garbage!!!!

ljadw wrote: You can't discuss the threat of an Allied landing in the West by talking only about what could/would do the Germans : what could/would do the Germans was depending on what could/would do the Allies who had the initiative :they were leading the dance, the Germans followed .

Garbage that doesn't even make sense.

ljadw wrote: If in 1942 the Allies had the forces of 1943 they would have landed, if in 1943 they had the forces of 1944 they would have landed and in both cases, the landing would be successful.

Yet more garbage.

In June 1940, Germany had lots and lots and lots of divisions in France and Belgium. I cannot be bothered to look up the correct number, but let's just say it was 100 for the sake of argument. A 100 divisions of "first rate" quality - fully equipped, fully, manned, fully trained. At the same time, Britain had about 30 divisions who were, at best, "fourth rang" given that there was only enough equipment to properly equip about 3-4 divisions.

Germany had the forces. Germany had a massive numbers superiority. Germany had a massive superiority in divisional quality - according to your arbitrary qualifications.

But they didn't land...... They didn't even attempt to.

Why?

Once again ljadw you are demonstrating an abysmal understanding of the subject matter despite having granted yourself 'expert' status.

Are you an amateur wargamer by profession?

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2018 18:53

ljadw wrote:Landing = something as Overlord . The Germans knew that a landing on the scale of Overlord was excluded in the summer of 1942, but they still had 27 divisions in France ; if they had only 17 divisions in France ,the threat of a big landing would be greater .


LOOK at what they were... :roll:

Yes, 27 divisions in the West as of c. 1 June 1942. 17 of the divisions there 22 June remained...16 of them bodenstandiges and 82. Inf.Div., the lone bewegungs division, was about to leave too. Otherwise, there were the burnt-out shells of 6. Pz.Div., 7. Pz.Div., and 10. Pz.Div., the four divisions of the recently organized 19. Welle (370., 371., 376., and 377. Inf.Div.), most of which were about to entrain for the East in exchange for other burnt out infantry divisions, while the rest were burnt out shells of infantry divisions transferred from the east...

Dieppe was handled by the forces in the West, there was no need to send reinforcements from elsewhere, nor were such reinforcements available,as Blau demanded all available resources .


Dieppe was "handled" by 302. Inf.Div., one of the original 13. Welle bodenstandiges divisionen created specifically for defense of the French coast. It seemed to prove that the concept of immobile coast defense divisions, backed by a small number of mobile divisions was viable. However, when sent to the East two months later it had been re-configured as a bewegungs division, because the reinforcements for the East needed to be mobile. Meanwhile, the divisions sent West for rebuilding were effectively immobile until rebuilt.

The stronger the forces in the West, the more divisions the Allies would need for a landing,and the less likely such a landing would be . At the end,the Germans lost the race and the Allied forces were strong enough for a landing .


Yes, hindsight is a perfect mirror isn't it? :roll:

What is difficult to understand for some people (I don't know why ) is that a landing was not required to tie German forces;the danger of a landing was sufficient, the possibility of a landing was sufficient .When there were rumours of a landing in Norway, the Germans sent reinforcements .In 1943 the Germans did fortify the coasts of Greece, not because there was a danger of a landing, but because without these fortifications, a landing could happen .The weakest regions were the most threatened.


What is difficult to understand for some people (I don't know why) is that the Germans understood that and continuously tried to balance the commitment of static and mobile forces in the West to what they expected Allied capabilities were and to what their requirements in the East were. I also don't know why it is difficult to understand for some people that the deployments and expectations of June 1941 were different from June 1942, which were different for June 1943, which were different for June 1944. The Germans continued to build up the defenses of the West, while also using the West as a training ground, with the belief that defeating an Allied invasion would then release those mobile forces for commitment to the East. It was delusional - particularly on Guderian's part in the spring of 1944 - but it was still the way their thinking trended.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2018 18:56

jesk wrote:It is necessary to divide Germans and Hitler whose instructions had comedy character.


It is more necessary to divide posters whose posts have comedy character.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2018 19:02

MarkN wrote:Are you an amateur wargamer by profession?


No, incoherence appears to be his profession.

jesk
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Location: Belarus

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby jesk » 04 Jan 2018 19:13

Richard Anderson wrote:
jesk wrote:It is necessary to divide Germans and Hitler whose instructions had comedy character.


It is more necessary to divide posters whose posts have comedy character.

But you can not really object. Your meaningless figures, unfortunately, have nothing to do with history. History is what you missed as inessential.

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Germans couldn't not take the Caucasus, and... figures, documents aren't necessary. Just Hitler has stolen the whole army.

jesk
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Posts: 591
Joined: 04 Aug 2017 08:19
Location: Belarus

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby jesk » 04 Jan 2018 19:18

Richard Anderson wrote:
What is difficult to understand for some people (I don't know why) is that the Germans understood that and continuously tried to balance the commitment of static and mobile forces in the West to what they expected Allied capabilities were and to what their requirements in the East were. I also don't know why it is difficult to understand for some people that the deployments and expectations of June 1941 were different from June 1942, which were different for June 1943, which were different for June 1944. The Germans continued to build up the defenses of the West, while also using the West as a training ground, with the belief that defeating an Allied invasion would then release those mobile forces for commitment to the East. It was delusional - particularly on Guderian's part in the spring of 1944 - but it was still the way their thinking trended.

There is no sense in statements. All these divisions scattered throughout Europe must form the components of combat operations. And there are some mistakes and meaninglessness. You described plasticine, but not products from them.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Postby Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2018 19:49

jesk wrote:But you can not really object. Your meaningless figures, unfortunately, have nothing to do with history. History is what you missed as inessential.


Didn't your Momma ever teach you not to interrupt the conversations of adults?

Germans couldn't not take the Caucasus, and... figures, documents aren't necessary. Just Hitler has stolen the whole army.


Utter nonsense. In the summer of 1942, Inf.Div. (mot) Grossdeustschland (it did not become a Panzergrenadier division until 19 May 1943) was in reserve at the disposal of HG-Sued in June, before it was attached to XXXXVIII A.K. of 2. A.O.K. in July. It was then assigned to 1 Pz.A.O.K. of HG-A in August in preparation for the exploitation into the Caucasus. However, it was then diverted to 9. A.O.K. on 26 August because of the threat presented by the First Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive Operation. The division remained with 9. Armee, aiding in defeating the two Rzhev-Sychevka offensives, until 16 January 1943 when it went into OKH-Reserve before it was committed to shore up 8. Italian Army.

The bit regarding SS-LSAH is also nonsense. On 1 July 1942 it was on its way to France in order to be rebuilt as a division. On 6 July 1942 the first elements were just arriving in France. It wasn't a division until November 1942 when it completed rebuilding.


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