Question About Western Contribution to the War

Discussions on WW2 in Eastern Europe.
Kelvin
Member
Posts: 2284
Joined: 06 Apr 2007 14:49

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Kelvin » 28 Dec 2017 08:26

ljadw wrote:
Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:
1) Most of these divisions were second rang units
No. 29 of the divisions were classed as bodenständigen. The remainder were classed as either bewegung (16), FJ (4), or schnelltruppen (12), which by definition were .
Mobile division does not mean first rate :

116 Pz and Das Reich were not first rate on 6 june; the LSS was not operational : the remainings of Das Reich and the LSS were transferred to the west for refitting,which means that they were not first rate . 116 Pz was not operational on 6 june, thus not first rate .

9 Pz was not combat ready on 6 june (Normandy 1944 P 291)
9.Pz division was just lack of training in cohesion and lack of some equipment in June 1944. Given German efficency, they should train their force in much more better if they had enough time.
9. Pz division had sent back to West in mid April and this division had 7,500 battle-hardened veterans in cruel battlefield in the East. Another 1,600 convalescents joined the division, also old warriors and she absorbed another 3,400 soldiers in 155. Reserve Panzer division, though inexperienced in war but had long time training in the rear.
And 9. Pz division had a complete battalion of Pz IV. Panther abteilung is on training in June 1944. But don't compare it with Pz Lehr, 2.Pz and HJ. Looking back to the East at this moment, most of Pz divisions seldom had two battlaion of Pz and nor did they had numbers matched to their authorzied figure. By the standard of Eastern Front, 9. Pz division fairly well in June 1944 in comparsion with most of division. Its Pz.Gren btl (gep) is fully equipped. She had a full set of Luchs Aufk.Pz. on hand. What she lack were Flak Abteilung, Panther abteilung and soft-skinned vehicles and it was prepared as back up force for other Pz division once the allies launched their offensive.

Old 16.Pz Gren division also had 7100 veteran came from East and received 1600 convalescents, 1000 new recruits and 3000 soldiers from 179.Res Pz division. And she I./Pz.Regt GD attached to it stand in for Panther battalion.

I only agree LAH was rather weak. She was bled white in the East and received 2000 new recruit who badly needed training. She neither had a single SPW on June 1 1944.

And even many infanterie divisions were good : like 243, 326, 331, 343, 348, 352 and 353 all were equipped with StuG and Marder and thousand of soft-skinned vehicles and several thousand horses.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 08:43

Zetterling has an other opinion about 9 PzD.If 9 Pz was not that bad, why was it going to Normandy only at the end of july ?

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 10:30

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:Mobile division does not mean first rate :
Really? What then means "first rate"? What is your criteria?
116 Pz and Das Reich were not first rate on 6 june; the LSS was not operational : the remainings of Das Reich and the LSS were transferred to the west for refitting,which means that they were not first rate . 116 Pz was not operational on 6 june, thus not first rate .

9 Pz was not combat ready on 6 june (Normandy 1944 P 291)
You are describing their condition, not whether or not they were "first rate". Meanwhile, why were they in the West? Because they were being rebuilt for commitment in the East - well, at least that was Guderian's reason - they were in the West to be rebuilt in order to defeat the invasion - at least that was Hitler's reason.
I am only saying that being a mobile division does not mean being first rate . On 6 june there were ID that were "better" than the LSS and 9 PzD ;2 PzD , PL and 12 SS were first rate, LSS and 9 PzD not .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 10:42

krimsonglass51 wrote:ljadw, what do you think were the West's greatest contributions to the war in Europe?
This is impossible to answer as these contributions are not measurable and can not be compared one to another and also not to the Soviet contributions .
I would say that the least important contribution to the war in the east was LL.

For the other 2 contributions : the air war and the ground war ,there is no answer possible as you can't compare both . The only thing one can say is that their importance was relative and that without the Western participation to the war (= DoW and fighting ) the SU still would have won. It is also the same for the Soviet contribution : without a Soviet participation, the West would have won . Germany was doomed when in june 1940 Britain decided to continue the war .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 11:01

Sheldrake wrote:
ljadw wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:
ljadw wrote:
Kelvin wrote:
60 divisions in the western Europe was German 's strong reserves remained intact in 1944 and western offensive destroyed it and made it no longer had capacity to resist Soviet offensive.
1) Most of these divisions were second rang units

2) They could not be transferred to the east .

3) It is the same for the men who were manning the anti-aircraft units
In Furher directive 51 Hitler 3rd Nove 1943 set the West as Germany's strategic priority for 1944. The opening paragraphs explain that in the East Germany can trade space for time. There isn't enough space on the west and the cross channel assault had to be defeated. The rationale for the V weapons programme was to terrorise the British into surrender. The same directive states that he can no longer tolerate weakening the western front.

This is followed on 27th Dec by OKW instructions to deploy troops from the replacement army to France and for OB Soputh West (Italy) to transfer the Herman Goering division and the 90th PG division to France.

and on 28th Dec by a telegram forbidding any transfer of troops from the West.
What Kelvin said is not correct : the 60 western divisions were not Germany's reserve and could not be used for the war in the east : Germany could not strip the west of forces , even if there was no war with France and Britain .In 1942 there was no war between the SU and Japan, but there were still considerable Soviet forces in the Far East .

Directive 51 had as result that forces from the Ersatzheer were going to the west, not forces from the Ostheer . Later there was a going and coming from forces from the west to the east and vice versa .But this would also happen if there was no war with France and Britain.

There are three cases for the west : no war, not longer war, war, and in all three considerable German forces would be tied in the west .

The same situation would occur if there was war with the west and peace, or no longer war in the east : the situation for Germany would not be better : considerable forces would be tied in the east .

Between september 1939 and may 1940 considerable French forces were tied at the borders with Spain, Italy and Libya, although France was not at war with these countries . When USA were fighting in Vietnam, considerable forces were still in Europe, although there was no war in Europe .

The neutral of today is the possible enemy of tomorrow, thus one can' let the border with a neutral country undefended .
Lj,

I think you misunderstand the nature of military force. Formations and units: divisions and regiments are receptacles for the physical components of fighting power. War is a dynamic act. Every day burns resources: men,equipment and munitions. Even doing nothing costs thousands of casualties a day. Switching the Erzatz Heer to fill the containers on the west front was switching resources. The force comparisons between 1943 and 44 shows an additional 10-15 divisions. Its an extra army.

Formations are more than mere containers and labels. Good formations with strong leadership, tactical competence and fighting ethos are the brains and heart of the military machine. A lot of good German leadership was posted to the western Front. I & II SS Panzer Corps, and the Heer Panzer forces were the best cadres they had. These were empty containers to be refilled.

German efforts were frustrated by allied actions on the East and Italian fronts The fronts were related.
A lot of good German leadership would always be posted in the West, even if there was no war with F + B , and especially if there was no longer a war with F + B.

3 examples :

1 september 1939 : peace in the west :39 German divisions (12 active ) stationed on the western border. War in the east : 53 divisions (40 active ) .

More than 40 % of the German divisions were stationed in the west where there was peace .

22 june 1941: 152 divisions for Barbarossa; 56 divisions elsewhere (= less than 25 %) Question : if there was peace with Britain, how many of these 56 divisions would be available for Barbarossa ? Answer : netto : the Ostheer would lose 20 divisions, as peace with Britain would mean occupation of Britaib and occupation of Britain would demand additional forces . And where would Germany get these additional forces ? From the Ostheer .

6 june 1944 : 60 divisions in the west; 70 elsewhere; 170 (a lot existing only on paper= Kampfgruppen) in the East . Question : if there was no landing , how many of the 60 divisions in the west would be available for the east ? Answer : 1 or 2 ,because : the less forces in the west ,the greater the probability of a landing .

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 1868
Joined: 28 Apr 2013 17:14
Location: London

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Sheldrake » 28 Dec 2017 12:41

ljadw wrote: 6 june 1944 : 60 divisions in the west; 70 elsewhere; 170 (a lot existing only on paper= Kampfgruppen) in the East . Question : if there was no landing , how many of the 60 divisions in the west would be available for the east ? Answer : 1 or 2 ,because : the less forces in the west ,the greater the probability of a landing .
`
Hitler rightly identified 1944 as the year that the Western allies would attempt a cross channel invasion. There was a political and strategic imperative for the allies to mount an invasion. The allies could not maintain an army of 100 divisions indefinitely. Any added time would allow the Germans to perfect their revenge weapons

The question you pose is a counter factual. The most likely circumstance under which the allies did not mount a successful cross channel invasion might be:-

1. The cross channel assault is defeated with the loss of around ten divisions. If this happens the Germans have a breathing space. Much depends on the allied reaction. If the Americans switch to a Japan first Pacific focus the threat of a second assault is much diminished. The Germans could release all full strength Panzer formations from the West and twenty full strength infantry formations, to be replaced by cadres for rebuilding.

2. The German V weapons achieve their intended effects. Ten tons of HE a minute on London forces the British to agree an armistice and the repatriation of US troops who focus on the Pacific war. Release the bulk of the Wehrmacht apart from internal security troops for a glorious victory parade through the Brandenburg gate en route for the east.

No one knows how close the Red Army was to breaking point in 1944. Would a reverse Kaiserschlacht have resulted in a Soviet Armistice?

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 18:01

Sheldrake wrote:
ljadw wrote: 6 june 1944 : 60 divisions in the west; 70 elsewhere; 170 (a lot existing only on paper= Kampfgruppen) in the East . Question : if there was no landing , how many of the 60 divisions in the west would be available for the east ? Answer : 1 or 2 ,because : the less forces in the west ,the greater the probability of a landing .
`
Hitler rightly identified 1944 as the year that the Western allies would attempt a cross channel invasion. There was a political and strategic imperative for the allies to mount an invasion. The allies could not maintain an army of 100 divisions indefinitely. Any added time would allow the Germans to perfect their revenge weapons

The question you pose is a counter factual. The most likely circumstance under which the allies did not mount a successful cross channel invasion might be:-

1. The cross channel assault is defeated with the loss of around ten divisions. If this happens the Germans have a breathing space. Much depends on the allied reaction. If the Americans switch to a Japan first Pacific focus the threat of a second assault is much diminished. The Germans could release all full strength Panzer formations from the West and twenty full strength infantry formations, to be replaced by cadres for rebuilding.

2. The German V weapons achieve their intended effects. Ten tons of HE a minute on London forces the British to agree an armistice and the repatriation of US troops who focus on the Pacific war. Release the bulk of the Wehrmacht apart from internal security troops for a glorious victory parade through the Brandenburg gate en route for the east.

No one knows how close the Red Army was to breaking point in 1944. Would a reverse Kaiserschlacht have resulted in a Soviet Armistice?
All full strength PzD from the West ? Which means : 2Pzd, PzL, 21 PzD, 12 SS .The others left the east to be rebuilt .

And if these 4 divisions left France, the Allies would land very easily ,because the less German units in France, the less Allied units would be needed for a successfull landing .

20 full strength ID ? There were no 20 full strength ID in France on 6 june 1944 .

There is no proof at all that the Red Army was to breaking point in 1944 .

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 1631
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Dec 2017 20:50

ljadw wrote:All full strength PzD from the West ? Which means : 2Pzd, PzL, 21 PzD, 12 SS .The others left the east to be rebuilt .
Your point is? The west was used to build and rebuild divisions. 2. PzD was rebuilt there, arriving 15 January 1944. Lehr was built there, beginning on 10 January. 12. 21. PzD was built there, beginning 15 July 1943. SS was built there, beginning 20 July 1943. So what?

Meanwhile, as of 30 May there were c. 1,200 Panzer in the West (excluding c. 250 in training establishments) for nine divisions. So c. 133 each. In Norway there was one with 146. In Italy there was one with 115. In the East there were 23. With c. 1,479. So c. 64 each.

Essentially, there were NO "full strength PzD" or any even close to it OTHER than those in the West on 30 May 1944.
And if these 4 divisions left France, the Allies would land very easily ,because the less German units in France, the less Allied units would be needed for a successfull landing .
Indeed, but that is not the way Guderian saw it. Nor does it have much to do with the discussion, other than to restate the bleeding obvious.
20 full strength ID ? There were no 20 full strength ID in France on 6 june 1944 .
Yet again you seem to be substituting opinion for data.

3. FJD full strength
16. FD (LW) probably full strength
17. FD (LW) probably full strength
18. FD (LW) probably full strength
47. ID probably full strength
48. ID probably full strength
49. ID probably full strength
77. ID over-strength
84. ID over-strength
85. ID over-strength
242. ID probably full strength
243. ID full strength
245. ID probably full strength
265. ID full strength (well, short four officers)
266. ID probably full strength
271. ID probably full strength
272. ID probably full strength
275. ID probably full strength
276. ID probably full strength
319. ID over-strength
326. ID probably full strength
346. ID probably full strength
352. ID over-strength
353. ID over-strength
363. ID probably full strength
There is no proof at all that the Red Army was to breaking point in 1944 .
Which fact owes a lot, of course, to the "Western Contribution to the War".
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 1631
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Dec 2017 21:23

ljadw wrote:I would say that the least important contribution to the war in the east was LL.
Really? The Kharkov Model V-2 tank engine was of aluminum construction. So were most aircraft engines as were many aircraft components. Each used about four to six tons of aluminum to produce a one-ton engine, albeit scrap aluminum was reused it required smelter time, which was in low supply. You see, the Soviet aluminum industry was based on four major plants, the Volkhov smelter in Leningrad, the Dneprovsky smelter in Ukraine, the Tikhvin smelter (online in 1938), and the Urals smelter (online in 1940). Of those, the Volkhov and Tikhvin complexes were evacuated to the Urals and the Dneprovsky plant was overrun. The equipment evacuated went to two new plants, one of which went online in 1943 and the other on 9 May 1945. Thus, from c. July 1941 to sometime in 1943, Soviet aluminum production was solely from the Ural smelter. In 1942 the Soviets managed to produce 51,700 tons, in 1943 62,300 tons, in 1944 82,700 tons, and in 1945 86,300 tons. The U.S. supplied the USSR with 350,000 tons of aluminum in the same period.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 21:32

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:All full strength PzD from the West ? Which means : 2Pzd, PzL, 21 PzD, 12 SS .The others left the east to be rebuilt .
Your point is? The west was used to build and rebuild divisions. 2. PzD was rebuilt there, arriving 15 January 1944. Lehr was built there, beginning on 10 January. 12. 21. PzD was built there, beginning 15 July 1943. SS was built there, beginning 20 July 1943. So what?

Meanwhile, as of 30 May there were c. 1,200 Panzer in the West (excluding c. 250 in training establishments) for nine divisions. So c. 133 each. In Norway there was one with 146. In Italy there was one with 115. In the East there were 23. With c. 1,479. So c. 64 each.

Essentially, there were NO "full strength PzD" or any even close to it OTHER than those in the West on 30 May 1944.
And if these 4 divisions left France, the Allies would land very easily ,because the less German units in France, the less Allied units would be needed for a successfull landing .
Indeed, but that is not the way Guderian saw it. Nor does it have much to do with the discussion, other than to restate the bleeding obvious.
20 full strength ID ? There were no 20 full strength ID in France on 6 june 1944 .
Yet again you seem to be substituting opinion for data.

3. FJD full strength
16. FD (LW) probably full strength
17. FD (LW) probably full strength
18. FD (LW) probably full strength
47. ID probably full strength
48. ID probably full strength
49. ID probably full strength
77. ID over-strength
84. ID over-strength
85. ID over-strength
242. ID probably full strength
243. ID full strength
245. ID probably full strength
265. ID full strength (well, short four officers)
266. ID probably full strength
271. ID probably full strength
272. ID probably full strength
275. ID probably full strength
276. ID probably full strength
319. ID over-strength
326. ID probably full strength
346. ID probably full strength
352. ID over-strength
353. ID over-strength
363. ID probably full strength
There is no proof at all that the Red Army was to breaking point in 1944 .
Which fact owes a lot, of course, to the "Western Contribution to the War".
Full strength does not mean full strength in manpower .A division which was full strength in manpower could have a big shortage in mobility,or firepower .

The LSS had on 1 june a manpower of 19,618 (overstrength) but was not a full stength division: there were shortages of NCO', tanks, trucks, ........

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 1631
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Dec 2017 21:48

ljadw wrote:The LSS had on 1 june a manpower of 19,618 (overstrength) but was not a full stength division: there were shortages of NCO', tanks, trucks, ........
I wonder if everyone else is as tired as me of the repeated moving of goalposts? And the constant re-posting a giant block of text in order to provide a nonsensical one-line non-response? :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll:

By your implied definition no military unit is ever at "full strength" and thus never can be. For example, all the Allied assault divisions in Normandy were landed about 15% over strength in manpower, except that since about 25% of the strength remained as residuals in England, they actually landed under strength by about 10%. Ditto for mobility, wheeled vehicles were largely left behind and not landed until D+2 or even later.

Meanwhile, please respond to the actual points I made instead of to your imagination. :x
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 21:59

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:I would say that the least important contribution to the war in the east was LL.
Really? The Kharkov Model V-2 tank engine was of aluminum construction. So were most aircraft engines as were many aircraft components. Each used about four to six tons of aluminum to produce a one-ton engine, albeit scrap aluminum was reused it required smelter time, which was in low supply. You see, the Soviet aluminum industry was based on four major plants, the Volkhov smelter in Leningrad, the Dneprovsky smelter in Ukraine, the Tikhvin smelter (online in 1938), and the Urals smelter (online in 1940). Of those, the Volkhov and Tikhvin complexes were evacuated to the Urals and the Dneprovsky plant was overrun. The equipment evacuated went to two new plants, one of which went online in 1943 and the other on 9 May 1945. Thus, from c. July 1941 to sometime in 1943, Soviet aluminum production was solely from the Ural smelter. In 1942 the Soviets managed to produce 51,700 tons, in 1943 62,300 tons, in 1944 82,700 tons, and in 1945 86,300 tons. The U.S. supplied the USSR with 350,000 tons of aluminum in the same period.
I have seen the figure of 229000 ton of LL aluminium.

But whatever the real figure, raw figures do not prove anything , the same for the Soviet production ;what is important is not the Soviet production or the US deliveries, but the aluminium consumption . It is perfectly possible that the SU could produce enough aircraft /tank engines without the LL deliveries :the USSR produced 158000 aircraft and 87000 tanks and 280000 ton of aluminium , not including the reserves . . How many of them had engines of LL aluminium ?


Alexander Hill said that the Soviet aluminium production in 1941 was 67000 tons,which brings the total on 350000 tons, as much,or more than the LL deliveries .
I stick to my claim that LL was for the Soviets less important than the Allied ground and air warfare against Germany .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 8616
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by ljadw » 28 Dec 2017 22:02

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:The LSS had on 1 june a manpower of 19,618 (overstrength) but was not a full stength division: there were shortages of NCO', tanks, trucks, ........
I wonder if everyone else is as tired as me of the repeated moving of goalposts? And the constant re-posting a giant block of text in order to provide a nonsensical one-line non-response? :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll:

By your implied definition no military unit is ever at "full strength" and thus never can be. For example, all the Allied assault divisions in Normandy were landed about 15% over strength in manpower, except that since about 25% of the strength remained as residuals in England, they actually landed under strength by about 10%. Ditto for mobility, wheeled vehicles were largely left behind and not landed until D+2 or even later.

Meanwhile, please respond to the actual points I made instead of to your imagination. :x
There is no moving of goalposts : the initial claim was that there were in France 20 full strength ID that could go to the east . Sufficient manpower does not mean full strength : the LSS had more than sufficient manpower, but no one will say that the LSS was full strength .

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 1631
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Dec 2017 23:21

ljadw wrote:I have seen the figure of 229000 ton of LL aluminium.
And I have seen the nonsense.

166,348.5 MT of alloys, ingots, and slabs
6,234.5 MT of rods and bars
56,259.4 MT of plates, sheets, and strips
185.8 MT of foil
99.7 MT of powders and pastes
An unspecified weight of finished aluminum parts
229,127.9 MT total or 252,570 U.S. tons. I typed a "3" instead of a "2" by mistake when I rounded. So sorry.
But whatever the real figure, raw figures do not prove anything , the same for the Soviet production ;what is important is not the Soviet production or the US deliveries, but the aluminium consumption . It is perfectly possible that the SU could produce enough aircraft /tank engines without the LL deliveries :the USSR produced 158000 aircraft and 87000 tanks and 280000 ton of aluminium , not including the reserves . . How many of them had engines of LL aluminium ?
Um, according to Boris V. Sokolov and Alla Paperno's research into the Soviet archives, 80.3% of finished aluminum products in the Soviet Union derived from Lend-Lease shipments. That is the high, but on average, Lend-Lease supplied 50 to 80% of metal goods produced in the Soviet Union December 1941-August 1945. Ordnance, including propellants, explosives, finished and ordnance was 53%. For AVGAS and other hi-octane fuels, imports made up 96% of Soviet stocks prior to 22 June 1941 and was 57.8% of the AVGAS consumed during the war. Lend-Lease shipments also comprised about 30% of the production line machinery employed in Soviet factories after June 1941. And so on...
Alexander Hill said that the Soviet aluminium production in 1941 was 67000 tons,which brings the total on 350000 tons, as much,or more than the LL deliveries .
It was closer to 68,000 and represented an increase of 112.5% year-to-year from the 60,000 in 1940. Of course, that also means that 1942's 51,700 represented a 24% decrease and all were well below the 70,000 ton Soviet objective as planned in 1939...in peacetime.
I stick to my claim that LL was for the Soviets less important than the Allied ground and air warfare against Germany .
Yes, we all know that you stick to your claims despite all evidence to the contrary and despite your inability to bring in any relevant facts to support your claims.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 1631
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Dec 2017 23:30

ljadw wrote:There is no moving of goalposts : the initial claim was that there were in France 20 full strength ID that could go to the east . Sufficient manpower does not mean full strength : the LSS had more than sufficient manpower, but no one will say that the LSS was full strength .
Nonsense. There was no such "initial claim". The initial statement made was:

"The most likely circumstance under which the allies did not mount a successful cross channel invasion might be:-

1. The cross channel assault is defeated with the loss of around ten divisions. If this happens the Germans have a breathing space. Much depends on the allied reaction. If the Americans switch to a Japan first Pacific focus the threat of a second assault is much diminished. The Germans could release all full strength Panzer formations from the West and twenty full strength infantry formations, to be replaced by cadres for rebuilding."

You deleted the "if this happens" proviso thus, indeed, grossly moving the goalposts.

Yes, if NEPTUNE were defeated that is exactly what was planned. In that case, all the bewegungs divisionen would likely have been sent East...and to Italy (one "full-strength" division, 19. FD (LW) was already on its way to Italy as of 6 June and continued there despite the invasion). In term of the Schnell divisionen it was Guderian's expectation the invasion - if the Allies ever attempted it (he did not believe they had the capability to conduct an invasion on the scale he thought neccessary) - would be defeated and then all ten of the divisions then in France, plus II. SS-Panzerkorps would be committed in mass in the East to the decisive battle which would defeat the Soviets. It was pie-in-the-sky madness, but it was what was planned.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Return to “WW2 in Eastern Europe”