Question About Western Contribution to the War

[jesk]

When Busch pointed out the threat to Hitler? When Busch or any from his Staff said: there are 14 armies preparing a BIG offensive position, we can't oppose it, please let me reatreat. WHEN? Primary sources, please.

Unfortunately, there are no primary sources. Only links to sources. Maybe I'll get acquainted with the material and scan some moments.

http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-05-27/1_10tom.html
The Military-Historical Research Department of the Bundeswehr (MGFA) in Potsdam hosted a presentation of two books of the final 10th volume of the series "The German Reich and the Second World War". Thus ended more than thirty years of work of historians of Germany. It resulted in 10 volumes, including 13 books with a total volume of 12,260 pages. Over it there were 67 authors.

Released in 2000 after a ten-year hiatus, Volume 7 is fully devoted to the events of the Western Theater of Hostilities in 1943-1944.

In 2007 came the 8th volume, which tells of military operations on the Eastern Front in 1943-1944. According to the authors, it is fundamental to understanding the military defeat of the German Reich. In Germany there were relatively few historical works about the Wehrmacht's defeats on the Eastern Front in 1943-1944, and at the same time there was a lot of literature on the Western Front.

Ziemke

The army believes that, even under the present conditions, it would be possible to stop the enemy offensive, but not under the present directives which require an absolutely rigid defense

That's right, but Hitler's orders to stay in the cauldrons led to defeat.

Ziemke

On 12 May the Eastern Intelligence Branch revised its estimate: the main effort would still be in the south, between the Carpathians and the Black Sea, toward the Balkans, but a large offensive force was also being assembled between the Carpathians and the Pripyat Marshes to attack toward L'vov, Lublin, and Brest.

So it was. The Russians attacked in Ukraine.

Ziemke

Thereafter the signs multiplied rapidly as the deployment went into high gear, but they were not enough to divert the OKH's attention from Army Group North Ukraine, where Model was readying his "offensive solution" under the appropriate cover name SCHILD UND SCHWERT. The Eastern Intelligence Branch dismissed the activity opposite Army Group Center as "apparently a deception."

This point is controversial. There are no primary sources. Ziemke's opinion is how Boby refers to himself. He died in the year when the volume of the Encyclopaedia of the Eastern Front of 1943/1944 was published in Germany. Friezer spoke about relatively new documents from the archives. Ziemke could not have them.

Earl Frederick Ziemke (December 16, 1922 – October 15, 2007) was an American military historian whose work was mainly on World War II and especially the Soviet-German clash in Eastern Europe.

Ziemke

On 14 June, Zeitzler called the army group and army chiefs of staff to a conference. In advance he stated that what was to be said "would not particularly concern Army Group Center." The expected offensive against Army Group North Ukraine continued to preoccupy the OKH; even the predicted Balkan operation had receded into the background. At the meeting the chief of the Eastern Intelligence Branch warned that simultaneous attacks on Army Groups Center and South Ukraine could be expected as preliminaries to the big offensive against Army Group North Ukraine.

The FHO have his own intelligence system. There was no interference by Hitler.

Disputable. It isn't sure that didn't interfere.

Nonsense. Hitler was not alone directing the war.

Hitler is the only director. This is exactly your gap in history. Hundreds of Hitler's orders and all the wrong.

That there were 14 armies is irrelevant. Look at the map: the FHO also counted

12 armies, 78 infantry and 6 Panzer against Heeresgruppe Nord
9 armies, 80 infantry, 4 cavalry corps, 10 Panzer/mechanized corps, 15 panzer and 10 other against North Ukraine.
12 armies, 3 panzer armies, 99 infantry, 12 panzer/mechanized corps, 2 cavalry corps, 17 panzer against South Ukraine.

I have already quoted a Russian source. It indicates the offensive plan is not best. The reason for the defeat in the exclusive unpreparedness of the group "Center" and the ban on Hitler in the early days cut the front. He is a director of defeat.

http://pawet.net/library/history/bel_hi ... он%27.html

By that time, the Soviet command had abandoned the method of "deep operation" (after a failed strategic offensive "from sea to sea" in the first half of 1942) in favor of another, which can be christened "wide hacking". One of the first to use it was the commander of the Western Front, Ivan Konev during Operation Mars. Subsequently, it began to be used everywhere - the welfare of the Wehrmacht contributed to it.

The use of the "wide hacking" method was a logical decision, applied to the realities of the Eastern Front. The Germans, who were far behind their enemy in strength, could not ensure the reliability of defense throughout the front. As early as the Soviet troops of the Luban offensive operation (January-April 1942), German observers in the Volkhov Front band noted that only one platoon with one machine gun provided 1 km of German defense - this is the density.

That is, the breakthrough of the first line of the German defense was a relatively simple matter, the difficulties started later.

The main problem of the "wide hacking" method was precisely this: spraying the troops along the entire front, it is difficult to create sufficient reserves of the day for the development of success in depth.

In addition, the tactical preparation of the troops for the purpose of "building up" units and fighting interaction was insufficient, and such training was extremely necessary for the parts crowded with new recruits.

The operation "Bagration" was planned exclusively on the map. And if the command of the German group "Center" had adequate reserves, it would have ended at best in Berezina, and at worst 50-100 km from the turn of the offensive.

[Boby]

You are, temporarily, on ignore.

Please start providing sources for your claims (I asked you many times). If you don't have or don't know, stop all this useless copy-and-pase that adds nothing to the discussion.

[jesk]

You are, temporarily, on ignore.

Please start providing sources for your claims (I asked you many times). If you don't have or don't know, stop all this useless copy-and-pase that adds nothing to the discussion.

The dispute is only about plans before Bagration. You wanted to shift some of the guilt to generals. Previously, before my quotations, you believed that there was no chance and the crossover of the front would lead to nothing. Now the picture clears up. The scheme, which was posted on the forum, as a miscalculation of German intelligence. In fact, intelligence was not in the least mistaken.



Allocated by the Russian forces, the preparation of attacks on the entire front, it was suggested that an offensive with the aim of stifling forces. There was no concentration of forces in the rear for the development of success. This was noticed by German intelligence and the source, quoted above.
Why, with a weak offensive, the Germans were defeated. Since the Russians possessed the initiative and attacked, defense breakthroughs were expected in some places. If there are no necessary reserves, you should at least temporarily retreat in order to avoid encirclement. Hitler on June 23-26 under Vitebsk and Bobruisk ordered to keep every meter of territory, not a step back. This was the reason for encirclement and defeat. It was necessary to shorten the front a little, wait for some reserves and on this the Russian offensive was exhausted.
There were no errors of intelligence, Hitler's order not to give the enemy a single meter, the city-fortress was the cause of the defeat.



In an environment 4 divisions, permission to break have come in a day. 206 ID through two. Literally in trifles accident has arisen. If in the morning on June 24, withdrawal in which would take part all troops on a ledge has begun, there can be a course of operation it has developed differently.

http://www.evitebsk.com/wiki/Город-крепость_Витебск

Vitebsk was one of the most powerful of the 11 "fortress cities" created by the army group "Center" [2].
In Vitebsk there was a permanent security garrison in the number of one battalion, which, if necessary, was replenished by forces of filling-three infantry divisions.
The commandant of the fortress of Vitebsk was appointed general from the infantry of Holvitzer.
All the military units of the "fortress" of Vitebsk belonged to the 3rd Panzer Army (TA).

Commander of the 3rd Tank Army Colonel-General GG Reinhardt wrote about the impossibility of establishing a "fortress" in a report dated April 15, 1944:

The construction of shelters and the strengthening of existing cellars for the storage of 6,000 tons of ammunition, 12,000 tons of food (3 ammunition and food for 21 days for 3 surrounded divisions), and 400 cubic meters of fuel will require forces that the 3rd TA can only allocate if stopped All construction works at the front and in the rear in the entire strip of the army
In this connection, the command of the tank army proposed, immediately before the start of the Soviet offensive operation, to leave Vitebsk, thus compelling the enemy to deliver his first blow to the empty spot, and to retreat and keep the defenses on the line "Tiger".
This boundary was proposed to be established west of Vitebsk, in the area of ​​lakes, where a smaller number of troops would be required to defend against the Soviet summer offensive.
The commander of the "Center" GA, Field Marshal Bush rejected this plan, referring to the order of the Fuhrer.

"Fortress" during the Soviet offensive
On June 24, on the second day of the Vitebsk operation, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, Reinhardt, sent a request to the commander-in-chief for a retreat from Vitebsk. At 15.35 the answer came: "Hitler decided to keep Vitebsk as a" fortress "
Then Reinhardt turns to the chief of staff of Army Group Center Krebs and insists that the withdrawal of the LIII Corps from Vitebsk is necessary in order to close the gap between the IX and VI army corps. Krebs himself calls back to the bet.
At 6.30 pm the command of the Fuhrer came to the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army, which read: "The LIII Army Corps, leaving one of the divisions in Vitebsk as a garrison, the others make their way westward to join our troops. It is necessary to inform the name of the commandant of the city. On the radio, he should be notified that he is appointed "commandant of the fortress." It is necessary to obtain confirmation of receipt of this order from him "

It was decided to leave the 206th Infantry Division of Lieutenant-General Hitter as the garrison of the fortress in Vitebsk, although it was clear that one infantry division was not enough to hold the 20-kilometer perimeter of the city.

But in fact, this curtailed order of Hitler was ignored. As the captive General Hitter explained during the interrogation: "The commander of the LIII Corps (Golwitzer), however, decided to add 206 pd to the group he planned for a breakthrough in the south-west direction. Thus, as it was ordered, on June 26, at 3 am, leaving my rear guard posts on Luces and Dvina, my division began to retreat along the two indicated roads of retreat first in a southerly direction. To the west, other divisions of the corps were to withdraw "

It must be said that Field Marshal Bush demanded in a telephone conversation with Reinhardt that he assured that this division would not take part in the breakthrough from Vitebsk. However, by the time the LIII corps was only a radio link, and clear instructions Holvitzer did not receive or did not want to hear.

"Fortress" remained without defenders.

Already on June 26th the radio broadcast the congratulations of the capital to the troops liberating Vitebsk, reported on the solemn salute with 20 artillery salvos of 224 guns. The Supreme Commander in the order declared gratitude to the military formations and units that took part in the liberation of the city.

The columns of the 206th Division that emerged from the city could not participate in the breakthrough, since they were on the road under the continuous air strikes of Soviet storm troopers. German aviation was not, in the air was the full domination of the Air Force of the Red Army.

[jesk]

http://www.pobeda.witebsk.by/land/epizode/43a_2/

On June 27, 1944, the 306th and 357th Infantry Divisions, with the support of tanks and artillery, entered the battle to liberate Lepel. The battle lasted day and night, and only by the evening of June 28 the city of Lepel was completely liberated from the German invaders.

On the western outskirts of Lepel was a large concentration camp of Soviet prisoners of war and partisans. The soldiers of the 357th SD destroyed his protection, and all 40,000 prisoners were released from the death camp.

During the seven days of uninterrupted military operations, the troops of the 43rd Army achieved significant success. On an average of 17 kilometers a day, the army advanced 125 kilometers in that time, defeated some of the main enemy forces from Army Group Center, on June 26, 1944, liberated the regional center of Vitebsk, crossed the Western Dvina (see Chart 1 Oa ).

In total, in the Vitebsk operation, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies captured more than 10,000 German soldiers and officers. Fascists lost about 20 thousand killed and wounded. Only the 43rd Army captured a large number of trophies, including 310 guns and mortars. At the same time, the losses of the 43rd Army amounted to 4 anti-tank guns and 8 mortars (CA МО USSR, f. 938, d. 812, l-211).

[jesk]

Ziemke

On 12 May the Eastern Intelligence Branch revised its estimate: the main effort would still be in the south, between the Carpathians and the Black Sea, toward the Balkans, but a large offensive force was also being assembled between the Carpathians and the Pripyat Marshes to attack toward L'vov, Lublin, and Brest.

Carpathians, Lvov, Lublin, the Balkans. This is a superficial analysis of events. I wanted to pay attention to this. For 15-20 minutes of search in google Boby "delves into the topic" and even criticizes Frieser. This is not serious. To fully understand the picture of the operation "Bagration" need a scrupulous, without laziness analysis of sources. For example, the material below.
But same it is boring. 90% and more interest in history are cut after need to spend more than 30 minutes for the analysis of a source.

http://pawet.net/library/history/bel_hi ... сть_1.html

EXTRACTION FROM THE MAGAZINE OF MILITARY ACTIONS OF THE 3 PANZER ARMY

June 23, 1944

Today, at the front of the 3rd Tank Army, as a result of fighting to the south-east and north-west of Vitebsk, a critical situation has been created. Continuing its offensive, supported by significant tank and air forces, the enemy prevented the creation of a new closed frontier of resistance.

The enemy gained freedom of movement in a number of directions, since we do not have any reserves. In the strip of the 6th Army Corps, near the road to the north of Bogushevskoe, the enemy advances to the west and south. In the strip of the 9th Army Corps, in the area to the south of Shumilino. The enemy is moving south towards the Dvina River. The coverage of the Vitebsk region was indicated.

At 4.00, the chief of staff of the 6th Army Corps informs the deputy chief of the operational department about the situation that has been created. The Russians carry out the strongest attacks throughout the night. Strong artillery and mortar training is being conducted along the entire front between the left flank of the 256th Infantry Division and the Makarovs (197th Infantry Division). The 278th Infantry Regiment, thrown in a counter-attack to close the gap in the Starobobylye area, is moving ahead, but has not yet reached the highway. Due to the fact that the enemy managed to break through between Shmitki and Lepeshino to the road in the Yushkovo region, the command of the corps requested that the reinforced 95th Fusilier Battalion be placed at its disposal.

A few minutes later, the reinforced 95th Fusilier Battalion was transferred to the 6th Army Corps, indicating that there were no more reserves. The command of the corps also does not have any reserves in this sector.

As the enemy today continues his offensive at the breakout site and, apparently, with more significant forces than 22.6.44, then in the absence of any reserves one can not count on the successful outcome of today's battles. Reserves in the location of the 6th Army Corps - the combined battalion of the 197th Infantry Division (corps reserve) and the 280th Infantry Regiment (reserve of the 3rd Tank Army) - can be transferred from areas occupied by them only if the Russian the offensive on their site will be repulsed. However, in connection with the concentration of enemy forces in this sector, it is hardly possible to count on the transfer of these units.

At 5.00, negotiations are held with the chief of staff of the 53rd Army Corps on the issue of creating reserves by means of a possible retreat to the second line of defense. Some forces (more than two battalions) can be released, provided they retire to the second defensive line. In this case, with the preservation of defensive capability, it would be possible to free up completely one division. The first units of this division could have been at the disposal of the command in the morning of 24.6.44.

Even with the systematic implementation of operations during the present day, no forces can be released from the 9th Army Corps, including the 279th Infantry Regiment. This regiment could be released if the 234th Infantry Regiment, which had been freed from the right flank of the 9th Army Corps, arrived in its place and only if the fights within 23.6 pass safely in this area. This regiment can be sent in the morning of 24.6 on motor vehicles and only in the evening is at the disposal of the 6th Army Corps.

This assessment of the situation is reported at 5.00 by the deputy chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army in the name of the deputy chief of staff of the Army Group Center.

At 6.00 the commander of the 9th Army Corps receives a report that from the 24th Infantry Division there arrived: a fusilier battalion, an engineering battalion and the 909th brigade of assault guns (to Obol). The 279th Infantry Regiment has not yet arrived. A few hours later, the 31st and 102nd Infantry Regiments are due to arrive. A little later, the 32nd Infantry Regiment will arrive.

In the strip of the 6th Army Corps, despite the increasing pressure of the enemy, it is possible to create a new front line on the second line of defense of the 299th Infantry Division. From 4.00 to 4.45 and again from 5.10 the enemy conducts a hurricane fire throughout the entire body strip.

In the band 53 of the army corps the night passes calmly, with the exception of two-way reconnaissance and local animated harassing enemy fire.

The pressure of the enemy increased in the zone of the 9th Army Corps, especially south of the Obol River. In the area of ​​Sirotino, parts of the 252nd Infantry Division lead heavy fighting and are pushed back by the enemy to the Osinovka-Yuryevo line. From 4.00, after strong artillery preparation, the enemy fiercely attacks on this site. Rainy weather hampered all movement of motorized transport.

Due to bad weather, during the night, very limited aviation activities were observed.

At 8.30, the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 6th Army Corps informs that there are no more German troops in the Lepeshino district (299th Infantry Division) and that the Russians penetrated the trenches of the neighboring building on the lake defile.

In connection with the critical situation at the center of the sector, the corps is allowed to leave the novices. At the disposal of the corps the 280th Infantry Regiment is transferred. At the same time, an order is given to abolish the previous order, which did not allow the use of building battalions to participate in battles.

The corps asks whether the 206th Infantry Division can take one of the sections of the 197th Infantry Division. This question should be clarified in the future. The Russians began shelling Bogushevsky.

Chief of Staff of the 9th Army Corps reported at 9.00. that the main forces of the 24th Infantry Division will be concentrated on the southern bank of the Obol River. The command of the 3rd Tank Army believes that the main direction of the strike is to the east of the forest. Wherever there are only frontiers, they must be withheld. The division should be possibly used by one link.

At 10.00 there are negotiations between the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and his chief of staff, in which exclusively critical situation at the front is discussed. The Commander agrees with the withdrawal of the left flank of the 256th Infantry Division, provided that the troops are fully combat-ready are brought to the "Bearing Line". The headquarters of the 95th Infantry Division should be used as a command staff. In the name of the command of the 9th Army Corps, it is necessary to prepare an order to occupy a new line along the railway, including Shumilino. The front line must be retained by all means. On the left flank of the 252nd Infantry Division, the 461st Infantry Regiment continues to hold its old positions. One should think about the possibility of withdrawing the regiment, which has close ties with its neighbor, to the eastern edge of the swamp. The Army Tank Assault Battalion should be pushed to Ulla.

At 10.20, talks were held between the deputy chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army with the operational separation of the headquarters of the 95th Infantry Division. The division command immediately takes over the sector on both sides of the junction of the 299th and 197th Infantry Divisions, with the simultaneous subordination of the 298th and 280th Infantry Regiments to it.

Some time later, the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army informs the chief of staff of the 6th Army Corps about the possibility of using the headquarters of the 95th Infantry Division. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army demands that, in the retirement of the left flank of the 256th Infantry Division, the combat footing of the troops that have retired to the new frontier should be maintained at the Bearing Line.

The chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army is negotiating with the operational department of the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps on the critical situation created in the strip of the 9th Army Corps. General Geidkemper asks whether it is possible to take the right flank, including the 461st Infantry Regiment, to the rear line leading to the south.

At 11.00, the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army informs the operational department of the headquarters of Army Group Center that the 9th Army Corps will take a new line along the railway, but the left flank of the hull will hang in the air. In this regard, the First Army Corps must immediately withdraw its right flank, since the Russians will otherwise move northward.

During negotiations with the field marshal, the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army reports on the situation and proposes to withdraw to the second frontier. General Field Marshal Bush orders that the 461st Infantry Regiment keep its line and an offensive should be carried out in order to establish contact. The 24th Infantry Division must, by forces of one regiment and with assault guns, close the gap that has been formed. All the current frontiers must be withheld with all cruelty.

The chief of staff of the 9th Army Corps reports that north of the Obol River is the 31st Infantry Regiment in conjunction with sappers and fusiliers. The other two regiments of the division are concentrated in Obol and will operate south of the Obol River.

General Geidkemper passes the order of the Field Marshal, which states that the 24th Infantry Division must enter into contact with the 461st Infantry Regiment. In the rest, the main direction continues to remain still to the south of the Obol River.

Colonel Prefke further reports that the Russians crossed the railway and advanced to Khotilovo. At present, under the personal command of the division commander, a counterattack of the corps division "D" is carried out.

In the strip of the 6th Corps fierce battles continue with the attacking enemy, supported by heavy weapons and tanks. The battles are fought throughout the first half of the day from the left flank of the 256th Infantry Division to the bridgehead Perevoz inclusive. The enemy seized the settlements of Ordish and Osinovo, penetrated into Yushkovo and attacked the Selenki and the Strigans.

At 2 pm, information is received from the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army Corps and from the corps commander on the issue of an unclear position on the section of the 299th Infantry Division, whose front is broken by enemy tanks. In the Zamostochye area, the Russians are directly at the railroad. The 280th Infantry Regiment was put into operation, with the task of re-seizing the railway line. The 280th Infantry Regiment was put into operation, with the task of re-seizing the railway line. The corps command plans to release two battalions by cutting the front edge of the 256th Infantry Division. Another battalion can be released if Noviky bridgehead is left.

At 15.45, as a result of subsequent negotiations between the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and the commander of the 6th Army Corps, the latter is allowed to move to the right to the Luchesa River section, in order to be able to obtain reserves and create a new defensive line. However, the corps commander believes that he will not be able to create the defensive line on the Luchesa River by the available forces.

The commander of the army stresses that in connection with the heavy losses of the 299th Infantry Division, which has suffered considerably from the bilateral coverage, it is absolutely necessary to create a military guard at the "Brown Line". A battalion (2nd Battalion of the 50th Airborne Regiment) will be transferred from the composition of the 53rd Army Corps. The 3rd battery of the 519th heavy anti-tank division will be immediately attached to the 197th Infantry Division and used as an infantry unit.

In the strip of the 53rd Army Corps, the enemy behaved calmly throughout the day. On the right flank of the hull the artillery of the enemy conducts a strong firing between the Luchesa River and the motorway. At 15.45 the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army is negotiating with the chief of staff of the 53rd Army Corps and orders to take the left flank to the line in the Khvostov area. The 246th Field Reserve Battalion must be transferred to the bank of the Dvina River, in the Komli area. On this site, it is extremely important to create a strong military guard. To support the right neighbor, it is necessary to transfer the 2nd Battalion of the 50th Airborne Regiment to the order of the 297th Infantry Division.

In connection with massive enemy attacks, carried out on a broad front, our troops were forced to retreat beyond the railway line in the 9th Army Corps. The enemy broke into the railway station Lovsha and attacked his tanks and tank assaults Spassky and Kritsky. At 16.00, the Chief of Staff of the 9th Corps reports that the 24th Infantry Division will start the planned offensive at 17.00. The task for the division, in case of its successful advancement, is to master the second frontier.

General Geidkemper gets the impression that the Russians will strike in the direction of Vitebsk. In this regard, it is extremely important to keep the "Tiger" line in the zone of the corps division "D".

Army Tank Assault Battalion will be transferred to the location of the hull.

At 5.00 pm, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army reports to the Field Marshal General the latest information on the situation at the front and requests an immediate decision on the issue of withdrawal in the Vitebsk region to the second line (fortified area). General Field Marshal shares this point of view, but stresses that this requires Hitler's decision, which can be followed no earlier than at 24.00. General Field Marshal orders to keep the current line and do everything that is possible. After the commander of the 3rd Tank Army repeats: "Therefore, to do everything possible, no matter what", the Field Marshal terminates him with the words "Depending on what allows you to make a position, and the boundary must be withheld under any conditions." The general of the field marshal reserves the right to decide on the destruction of the Vitebsk-Orsha railway.

At 18.30 the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army has a conversation with the commander of the 53rd Army Corps. General Holvitzer ordered the evacuation of all inactive installations and equipment. This evacuation is scheduled for the second night. In order to create reserves, it is absolutely necessary to move to the rear lines, as the hull rear does not have any parts. At the same time, consolidated alert units are being created in Vitebsk. The enemy is west of the location of the 246th Infantry Division and is advancing towards the Dvina River. The units of the corps found a regimental group of the 482nd regiment, numbering up to 200 people, in disbanded condition. After the necessary instruction, this regimental group, with a very small amount of ammunition, was ordered to take a lake defile in the Androsovici area and keep it under any circumstances.

The hull is supposed to capture on its left flank Terebeshevo so that the gap in the direction of the adjacent hull is not so large.

On the southern bank of the Dvina River, the 246th Field Reserve Battalion creates a defensive line in the Komli area. The command of the corps doubts the possibility of creating an obstacle line by the forces of the aforementioned regimental group and units of the corps division "D".

In the conversation that followed in 18.50 between the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and the corps commander, the latter makes an offer to depart to the second line during the night and take the rear guard there in a day. Heavy artillery should be taken away to the depths tonight. The command of army sappers is tasked to begin sending heavy equipment from the city of Vitebsk.

By the end of the day, the enemy's attempt to capture Vitebsk was clearly indicated. Judging by the number of enemy tanks operating in the south, one can draw a conclusion about the actions of four tank brigades. To the north, before the 9th Army Corps, the actions of the 6th Guards Army were confirmed. All prisoners persistently speak about the battles for Vitebsk, and not for Polotsk.

In the strip of the 6th Army Corps, the enemy, after hurricane artillery preparation, launched an offensive in front of the right flank of the 197th Infantry Division. He managed to cross the Luchesa River and the railway line and move further to the west. By the end of the day, we left Shchelka and Ushche. Thus, the 197th Infantry Division was cut off from the 6th Army Corps. In this regard, the command of the 53rd Army Corps subdued the 197th Infantry Division

At 17.45, the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army is discussing the situation with the army commander. The question arises whether to give the 197th Infantry Division assault guns of the 53rd Army Corps, along with the second reserve battalion of the 50th Airborne Regiment on the march. The army commander decides that the assault guns along with the next battalion should be sent to the battle site.

From the separate negotiations between the deputy chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army and the chief of staff of the 6th Army Corps, the exacerbated situation on the section of the 197th Infantry Division is being clarified. Tanks of the enemy continue to move to the area of ​​the Church. An order was given for the withdrawal of the 256th Infantry Division at 22.30 hours. There are attempts to block the Russian offensive in the direction of Oresha.

At 18.50, a message comes from the deputy chief of staff of the Army Group Center to the commander of the 3rd Tank Army that Hitler has expressed his consent to withdraw the 53rd Army Corps to the second line.

At 19.45 the commander of the 3rd Tank Army ordered the commander of the 53rd Army Corps to concentrate one division (4th airfield division) in Sosnovka and strike in the direction of the location of the 6th Army Corps. The withdrawal of the hull to the second boundary can be carried out in accordance with the proposal of the corps command. It is necessary to block the advance of enemy tank forces in the western and north-western directions. This is imperative, since a group of troops stationed in the Perevoz region must be diverted to the marsh area. Together with the 2nd Battalion of the 50th Airborne Regiment, a Field Reserve Battalion of the 53rd Army Corps will be transferred. The waste must be made within the limits actually required.

During the talks, held at 18.35 and at 20.20, the commander of the 9th Army Corps reported to the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army about the creation of the barrier line on the lake defile up to Moslinsky Lake. This line was occupied for the reason that only subdivisions remained from the corps division "D", which can not defend areas of considerable length. In artillery, the corps division "D" is still strong enough and has 20 light field howitzers and 8 heavy field howitzers, but lacks ammunition.

The situation is further unclear to the north, up to Latkova. The 24th Infantry Division again left Rovenets. The enemy continues to advance in the south-west direction. Thus, the connection with the northern regiment is lost. The enemy occupies the forest north-west of Khodorovka. From this place to the river Obol is our barrage. The order of the 24th Infantry Division was issued to establish contact with the 252nd Infantry Division. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army draws attention to the fact that the main direction of the enemy's strike in the lane is the lake defile on the right flank, since it was there that an attempt was made to cover Vitebsk. The commander of the corps doubts that the corps division "D", with the current state of its troops, could offer serious resistance. The commander of the Third Tank Army demands once again to oblige the officers to be responsible for the combat readiness of the troops, who must fight as they are required. "It is absolutely scandalous that after two days of fighting we must again speak about the fighting efficiency of the troops. The "Tiger" border must be definitely restrained. "

At 19.50 an order is given for the transfer of an army tank assault battalion to the location of the 9th Army Corps for operations on the right flank of the corps division "D".

At 21.50 the commander of the 16th Army asks him to inform him of the situation and promises to help with the forces of one division.

At 22.00 the commander of the 53rd Army Corps reports that a small enemy force in the area of ​​Komli crossed the Dvina River. These forces will be destroyed by the 246th Field Reserve Battalion. The corps does not have any forces to block the advance of the enemy to the west. The corps commander assumes that the "Tiger" line in the zone of the corps division "D" is not occupied by anyone, and that the enemy has complete freedom of movement on the western bank of the Dvina river. The Vitebsk highway is under fire from anti-tank guns. On the right flank of the corps, a fence line was created, with the remnants of the 197th Infantry Division and the newly arrived 2nd Battalion of the 50th Airborne Regiment. This fence line runs along the marshes. The 4th airfield division is necessary for the defense of the southern sector of the front and therefore can not be liberated for the assigned offensive task. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army expresses his consent on the matter of the measures taken. Received information from the commander of the 53rd Army Corps, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, in a few minutes, informs the commander of the 9th Army Corps. General Wootman reports that the corps division "D" was ordered to block the lake chain in the southeast direction. No indication was given that the corps should make contact with its right neighbor in the region of Komli. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army orders to keep the connection and take the line "Tiger", leading from there to the south. The assault battalion subordinated to the corps must be transferred in this direction.

At 22.45, negotiations are again held with the commander of the 16th Army and the latter reports that by June 24 the 290th Infantry Division will be transferred to the Ulla-Obol area without one reinforced regiment. The last regiment arrives a day later.

At 23.05 the commander of the 3rd Tank Army reports the situation to the Field Marshal and especially draws attention to the gap that formed at the junctions of the 53rd and 9th Army Corps. Field Marshal insists on eliminating the gaps. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army indicates a new danger that is created if the Russians continue their offensive on June 24, and if the 5th Guards Rifle Corps commences operations from the Sirotino area.

General Geidkemper informs the chief of staff of the 53rd Army Corps that the commander of the 3rd Tank Army ordered the 9th Army Corps to block the lake chain up to the Dvina River. The 53rd Army Corps must carry out communications on the banks of the Dvina River in the Yvon area (south of Komli).

Reports on this issue, as well as information about the occupation of the "Tiger" line, have been requested from the 9th Army Corps.

Based on the telegraph order of Army Group Center, the 14th Infantry Division (without one reinforced regiment) should be concentrated in the Reserve Army Group Center in the area and on both sides of Bogushevsky. The division must conduct reconnaissance in the northern direction. The connection with the command of the 6th Army Corps must be established and must be prepared for the occupation of the "Tiger" line on both sides of Bogushevsky.

At 24.6, the following intentions are established:

For the 6th Army Corps - the defense at the Babinovichi line to the north of Moshkany (along the Luchesa and Oboljanka rivers).

For the 53rd Army Corps, a retreat to the second frontier, with the 4th Air Field Division to be liberated. Preparation for the defense on both sides of Vitebsk and the implementation of the offensive, in order to close the gap with the 6th Army Corps.

For the 9th Army Corps - the destruction of existing gaps on the new defensive line.

Throughout the day, Russian aviation carries out raids at a shaky altitude, mainly in the location of the 9th Army Corps. In total, 23 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the army's location.

The 6th Army Corps destroyed 18 enemy tanks. The 9th Army Corps destroyed 2 tanks and 8 assault guns of the enemy.

Strongly cloudy weather was noted. In the afternoon - a heavy thunderstorm rain.

590 the rear commandant's office reports on the conduct of battles with small partisan detachments. The operation "Cormorant" is being carried out systematically. In the area surrounding the guerrilla forces were dispersed into small detachments.

[jesk]

Sources what they tiresome and boring

June 24, 1944

For today, very heavy fights are observed on both major breakout sites. In the south, the enemy managed to make a breakthrough through the railway, passing through Bogoshevskoe and successfully expand the breakout in the south. In the area of ​​the gap between the 6th and 53rd Army Corps, the enemy continued its offensive in the western and north-western directions by significant tank and mechanized mechanized formations. Parts of the 3rd Guards Corps reached the Ostrovno area and cut off the last possibility of linking the 53rd Army Corps to the west. The enemy managed to pull additional forces from the north and reach the line of the Dvina River.

Thus, the environment of Vitebsk is over. The 53rd Army Corps was ordered to strike in the south-west direction, establish contact with the Tiger border and hold this contact.

Early in the morning, information is received from the operational department of the headquarters of the 9th Army Corps, which reports that the enemy broke through with its tank and amphibious forces on both sides of Lake Leskovichi and penetrated into the direction of Uboloka-Pisarevo. On the basis of this new breakthrough, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army orders the 9th Army Corps to withdraw all its units to the Dvina River and hold the Dvina line.

At 2.00, the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army, respectively, informs the deputy chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the Army Group Center that the enemy broke through on a section of 6-7 kilometers wide and can not be countered by anything.

In conclusion, the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army once again has a conversation with the operational department of the corps headquarters. Major Shumm makes an offer to move to the shortest boundary in the area of ​​turning the Dvina River north of Beshenkovichi. Preliminary verbal order is prepared to prepare for the occupation of the line along the Dvina River between Komli and Ulla and everywhere, and not only in those places where it is possible to carry out the crossing. At 2.45 a telegraph order is given.

Since the "Tiger" line is broken on a broad front, the 9th Army Corps must make its way to the Dvina River and prevent the crossing of the river between Budilovo and Ulla. The shortest line to the north of Beshenkovichi should be withheld. It is necessary to block the advance of the enemy in the west direction between Ulla and the right flank of the 24th Infantry Division.

In accordance with this, the information is transmitted to the Chief of Staff of the 53rd Army Corps, who is informed that the 9th Army Corps was ordered to retreat to the Dvina River. In connection with the weakness of the 9th Army Corps, it is necessary to extend the left flank of the 53rd Army Corps to the Budilov district. The border is a stream.

Throughout the night, fighting continues in both main directions to the south and north-west. Vitebsk. In the zone of the 6th Army Corps, the enemy managed to break through into the wooded area south of the Luchesa River, in the Rudaki and Kovali area.

North of the gap with the 53rd Army Corps, the enemy managed to advance further north to Zarudnitsa. Departure to the second boundary is systematic. Local breakthroughs on the section of the 6th Air Field Division were liquidated. The left flank of the 246th Infantry Division stubbornly retreats to a new defensive line, north-west of the Dvina River. As a result of our counterattack, Terebeshevo was again captured. Three anti-tank guns were captured. Minor enemy forces, crossing the Dvina River, were thrown back.

The opponents of the corps division "D" are trying to liquidate the enemy's breakthrough in the strip of the 9th Army Corps. On the site of the 252nd Infantry Division, the enemy manages to break through our line of defense, occupy Latkvo and superior infantry and tank forces to continue the offensive. The 24th Infantry Division repelled numerous enemy attacks supported by tanks.

At 8.00, negotiations were held between the commander of the northern army group and the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. It turned out from the talks that the 290th Infantry Division, with the forces of one reinforced regiment, is on its way to Obol and has an order to liquidate the gap that has been created.

The 9th Army Corps informs by telegraph about the difficulties that have arisen in the communication and supply of the 24th and 290th Infantry Divisions. The corps command proposes that both divisions be subordinated to the 1st Army Corps, which will be better able to provide and carry out command of these formations.

At 10.30 the commander of the 3rd Tank Army reports to the Field Marshal concerning the breakthrough of the enemy north of Bogushevsky. The left flank is located approximately in the Moshkany area. The command of the 53rd Army Corps is moving parts of the 4th Air Field Division, with the aim of using them on threatening directions. Further, the army commander reports to the field marshal that on the Dvina River there are our minor forces, in part only the combined units. With regard to the suggestion of the command of the tank army to free the main forces of the Vitebsk formations, as well as completely leave Vitebsk, today a decision will be taken in the afternoon.

The headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army, together with a small operational group, moved to Bocheykovo, the rest of the headquarters department moved to Borovka.

At 10.40 the commander of the 3rd Tank Army gives a verbal order to the commander of the 53rd Army Corps, to concentrate the 4th airfield division in Ostrovna and strike from there in the southeast direction. In the event that an order is given for a further retreat, during this night it is necessary to inflict a strong push on the enemy. The Commander of the 3rd Tank Army agrees with the proposed line of the departure of Luchas-Dvina. Only a retreat to the Luchesa river line is now no longer possible because of the intensified pressure of the enemy.

At 10.45, the Chief of Staff of the Army Group Center reports to the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Tank Army by telephone that the 45th Security Regiment is being transferred and will be subordinated to the 3rd Panzer Army. General Geidkemper reports that for the occupation of the front line of defense all the forces that could have been scraped off anywhere were collected. However, at present it does not seem clear where the advanced units of the 9th Army Corps are located. At the junction of the 53rd and 9th army corps appeared up to 40 enemy tanks. The command of the 3rd Tank Army liberated from the anti-guerrilla zones the 601st Security Regiment. It is necessary to immediately deploy parts of the 14th Infantry Division to prevent further breakthroughs in the zone of the 6th Army Corps.

At 11.05, General Krebs again summons the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army and informs him that the 14th Infantry Division (without one regiment) can be immediately used by the command of the 3rd Tank Army for operations in the zone of the 6th Army Corps.

From there come threatening information from the breakout sites. The actions of 2 regiments and 40 tanks are marked, which move south along the Bogushevskoye-Senno road.

The corps commander asks whether it is possible to withdraw the elongated right flank with the aim of releasing forces, given the critical deployment of the position on its open left flank. A decision on this issue will be given additionally.

General Reus reports on the intensified actions of enemy aviation at the turn of the Dvina River.

On the line of the Oberkwartmasters service comes the message: "The tea rose has blossomed off." In this regard, the Oberkvartarmeister orders to evacuate all property from Vitebsk.

According to the local commandant of the city of Borisov, it is confirmed that two battalions of the 45th security regiment are likely to arrive in Lepel today.

At 11.00 the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Tank Army reports to the Chief of Staff of Army Group Center on the situation in the rear of the 256th Infantry Division.

General Krebs answers that the division should not be assigned to the "Bearing Line". Further, General Geidkemper reports that the motorized regimental group, sent by the command of Army Group Center, was sent not to Obol, but to Cordon. The advance of the enemy to Ulla was designated from the south-east and north-east directions. Until noon there was no contact with the enemy on the Dvina River and on the shortest Dvina border. North of the River Obol, the enemy behaves calmly, although it makes a slow progress. The 1st Army Corps, according to the dispatch of his command, regroups its right flank.

The chief of staff of the 6th Army Corps informs of the concentration of the enemy on both sides of Bogushevsk from the area south of Vitebsk. In this regard, both regiments of the 14th Infantry Division must act not in the northern, but in the eastern direction. According to the command of the corps, the 256th Infantry Division can not resist if the enemy presses.

At 12.45 the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Tank Army again reports to the Chief of Staff of the Army Group Center on the situation in the Bogushevskoye and Ulla districts. Command of the army group "Center" orders to withdraw the 6th Army Corps to the line "Tiger". The considerations of the command of the 3rd Tank Army for the transfer of the 24th and 290th Infantry Divisions, upon their arrival, under the jurisdiction of the Northern Group of Armies - were rejected for security reasons. Thus, both divisions remain in the 9th Army Corps. In this connection, a telegraph order is sent to the command of the 6th Army Corps to withdraw the units of the 256th Infantry Division that lie ahead of the "Tiger" line. These units, keeping in touch with the right-wing neighbor, must be withdrawn to the Tiger line, since the latter must be retained at the section between the army border and Bogushevskoye. This withdrawal must be made with the complete evacuation of all weapons and ammunition. At the same time, the 14th Infantry Division will be part of the 6th Army Corps, with the exception of units active in the Fourth Army. Somewhat later, a telegraph order was issued to divert the left flank of the corps to the Tigris line. The left border is Lake Lipno. All this band should be completely kept. The 256th Infantry Division, after its withdrawal to the "Tiger" line, is completely at the disposal of the 6th Army Corps. The question of the junction with the right flank must be checked, based on the order of the Field Marshal, by the staff officer.

The name of the 9th Army Corps is reported by telegraph that the 290th Infantry Division and the Motorized Artillery Division of the RGC will be subordinated to the corps, which have the task of closing the gap between the right flank of the 24th Infantry Division and the section on the Dvina River in the Cordon region.

At 13.30, direct telegraph communication with the 6th and 53rd Army Corps ceases. Thus, negotiations with the 53rd Army Corps become impossible. Despite the existing difficulties, a connection is established with the 6th Army Corps through the headquarters of Army Group Center and the headquarters of the 4th Army.

From noon the enemy is carrying out strong attacks with the support of tanks (120 tanks are noted) in the direction of the 14th Infantry Division occupying the "Tiger" line on both sides of Bogushevsky. The retreat of the 256th Infantry Division takes place in close cooperation with the neighbor.

In the area of ​​the breach with the 53rd Army Corps, the enemy advanced north-west and reached the leading detachments of the Ostrovno and Likhovshchina districts. The defending battalions of the 4th Air Field Division were ordered to detain the enemy.

In the strip of the 9th Army Corps, all the available units (divisions of the division, construction and security units that have penetrated) occupy the Dnipro line from Budinov to the area north-west of Ulla. The enemy pursues and attacks with tank and infantry forces. After the departure of all our units, under the influence of the enemy, Ulla's bridgehead is being cleared. The bridge across the Dvina River explodes. South-west of Obol, the enemy penetrated Leonovo. The 24th Infantry Division, partially in heavy counterattacks, beats off continuous attacks of massive tank forces, the main direction along the roads and the Lovsh-Obol railroad, and also to the north of the Obol River. The enemy suffered heavy losses.

At 15.25 the chief of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces, Colonel-General Zeitzler, calls the commander of the 3rd Tank Army to the apparatus and informs him that Hitler is sharply opposed to leaving Vitebsk, since he maintains that leaving Vitebsk will lead to a general withdrawal. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army reports to Colonel-General Zeitzler that a huge hole shines in the center between the 6th and 53rd Army Corps, and that he does not have any forces for liquidation. Only today the units of the 4th Airborne Division will arrive there. The decision to leave Vitebsk today is indispensable in order to free up the forces necessary to keep other places. In addition, it is absolutely necessary that troops be withdrawn in a combat-ready condition. The commander of the Third Tank Army is afraid of a well-known situation, when everything is done too late. To the question of the chief of staff of the ground forces, that from materials, foodstuffs and so on. will be abandoned, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army responds that the warehouses have a three-week supply. If the decision is made immediately, a huge amount of materials will be exported. Colonel-General Zeitzler said that the pace of such a retreat would be unacceptable for Hitler, given that the enemy achieved such success in the first few days. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army responds to this, that on the first day everything will be diverted to the Luches-Dvina line and only the central part of the city will be left, since defense on the city outskirts will not bring anything. Colonel-General Zeitzler asks whether the 24th and 290th Infantry Divisions will be able to change the situation in the northern direction and whether it can not be limited to a partial withdrawal. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army responds that the aid of both divisions from the northern direction is impossible because of the gap between the 9th Army Corps and the 24th Infantry Division. Therefore, in no case can he agree with a half-hearted decision. With the situation created, only a complete solution is possible. (Stressed in the original .- Ed.).

After a short break in the negotiations (during this pause, Colonel-General Zeitsler reported to Hitler), at 15.35, Colonel-General Zeitzler informed the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army that Hitler had decided to keep Vitebsk as a fortified area. In this regard, it is necessary to do everything possible.

Immediately after these negotiations, a radio report from the 53rd Army Corps comes in which it is reported that the Russians have seized Shigaly. In addition, unconfirmed enemy forces are advancing from Gorki and Tovstiuki to the north. In this regard, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army calls the Chief of Staff of the Army Group Center to the apparatus and informs him of the content of the talks with Colonel-General Zeitzler and the incoming radio report of the 53rd Army Corps. In this connection, it is not possible to directly connect the troops stationed in Vitebsk, as the bypass road is in the hands of the Russians, and the Vitebsk-Lepel highway is under enemy fire. The commander of the Third Tank Army considers it necessary that Colonel-General Zeitzler be informed of what happened, since, in the situation that has arisen, the decision ordered by him is unfulfilled. Something must immediately happen, something happens. There can be no other solution than suggested by the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army.

The point is that if possible, withdraw all forces from Vitebsk, in order to close the gap between the 6th and 9th army corps and take up defenses on the prepared and equipped lines. There are no other troops to occupy this new front line. If the order to leave Vitebsk is not given, the gap will become even greater. Since the encirclement of the divisions in Vitebsk has become very clear, it is necessary to show the greatest haste.

To the east of Vitebsk are still only small enemy forces, so there can be no question of tying up our significant forces in this region. The Russians' tactic is to completely isolate the city of Vitebsk and to use all forces to strike right and left, in order to complete the fastest encirclement.

The commander of the 3rd Tank Army is discussing the matter with his chief of staff, who takes over the command of the troops of the eastern sector of the front, south of the Dvina River. General Pemberg, the commander of the corps division "D", is appointed commander of the troops of the eastern sector, who must detain Beshenkovichi. The next issue of discussion is the increased importance of the transfer of security regiments, because by decision made by Hitler, the connections of the 58th Corps can not be used to occupy a new frontier.

Meanwhile, General Krebs negotiated with Colonel-General Zeitzler and at 16.15 called the commander of the 3rd Tank Army to the apparatus. General Krebs informs that according to Hitler, one division is enough for Vitebsk. In this connection, one division must be left in Vitebsk. Other connections should be used to establish connection with the rear. Hitler believes that one connection can keep Vitebsk, and the others will be able to carry out the task assigned to the 53rd Army Corps. General Krebs informs about the possibility of transferring from Orsha the 5th Panzer Division, which will be sent in a hurry. This division will go to the disposal of the 3rd Panzer Army. In addition, General Krebs announced the cessation of the anti-guerrilla operation "Cormoran", in connection with which, all the troops participating in it will go to the command of the army.

In telegraph negotiations with the commander of the 4th Air Division, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army complains of the Russian superiority in the air. General Reus reports that the fighter aircraft remained without his aerodrome Podokok Ulla, and dive bombers support the operations of the 4th Army.

By the end of the day, fighter aircraft will operate in the Vitebsk region. The corps command must indicate the objectives.

At 18.10, a report comes from the commander of the 601st guard regiment, Colonel Genn. One of the battalions departs from the district of Chashniki.

At 18.20 the Field Marshal calls the commander of the 3rd Tank Army to the apparatus and informs him that he is once again going to raise the question of Vitebsk in high instances. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army informs the Field Marshal that the enemy has reached the southern outskirts of Ostrovno. In addition, it occupied the Likhovshchina and appeared in the rear of our batteries, which operate along the road with a front turned in the north. At present, according to Hitler's order, the 53rd Army Corps has been ordered that Vitebsk is still the "Tea Rose". The front line should, as far as possible, be allocated to the third boundary to the Vaskovičy area, and from there along the second boundary to the turn of the Dvina River in the Novka area. The 6th airfield division must be withdrawn from combat. The 4th and 6th airfield divisions should be used to liberate and defend the road leading from Vitebsk to the west. This order is unquestionably half-hearted. The corps is currently retiring with battles. The systematic evacuation of property is no longer feasible. The correct order would be: "All the way back to the" Tiger "border. When asked where the 4th airfield division is now, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army responds that she was to go to Ostrovno, in order to defend the road and, apparently, her units are east of Ostrovno. The enemy continues the offensive in the direction of Ostrovno, and other parts in the western direction to the Dvina border and the lakes. In this area, as well as in the western and southern directions, our troops do not exist. Only where the "Tiger" line passes into the open area, in front of Lipno, are parts of the 6th Army Corps. In the strip of the 9th Army Corps, the enemy made attacks in the direction of our lake positions, north of Beshenkovichi. Attacks were repulsed. Countermeasures were taken to eliminate the enemy units that had broken through to the Dvina River. The enemy attacked four times in the direction of Ulla and strongly attacked with the support of the tanks towards the location of the 24th Infantry Division. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army hopes that the 290th Infantry Division, which, unfortunately, too slowly concentrates, will be able to achieve something. The Field Marshal reports that the arrival of the 212th Infantry Division is expected. He believes that the most unpleasant phenomenon is the breach from Lipno to Beshenkovichi.

The commander of the 3rd Tank Army responds that this frontier is in the first stage of construction, and that the labor force is again thrown there. The 6th Army Corps has sufficient forces for its new lane in accordance with today's situation. In conclusion, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army once again indicates that, given the difficulties of the withdrawal of four formations from Vitebsk, a quick decision should be made. A breakthrough is needed in a narrow area. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army doubts the considerable forces of the enemy and therefore the breakthrough must succeed. The Field Marshal promises to try once again to resolve this issue.

In accordance with the orders issued, the 4th and 6th Air Field Divisions are fighting to exit the encirclement. In order for these battles to be sufficiently strong and successful, it is necessary to introduce two divisions in Vitebsk (the 206th and 246th Infantry Divisions). Dispersal of one's own forces and a disjointed introduction into the battle can be unfavorable and will only lead to significant losses. However, the question just boils down to, if possible, reduce losses and withdraw troops in a combat-ready state to a new front line.

The 18th anti-aircraft division intends to transfer one light anti-aircraft battalion to Senno and, if possible, one combined division.

From negotiations with the chief of staff of the 9th Army Corps, it turns out that telegraph communication with both left divisions (the 24th and 290th Infantry Divisions) has ceased. During this time, another infantry battalion and one light artillery battalion arrived from the 290th Infantry Division. Located on the approach of the 601st security regiment must take the line "Tiger", east of the corps division "D".

At 19.00 a message comes from the Field Marshal, in which he notifies the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Panzer Army that the command of the army to abandon Vitebsk is again rejected. Particularly important reasons are the need to keep Vitebsk. One division should stay in Vitebsk. It was decided to leave the 206th Infantry Division there. General Gitter is appointed by the new commandant. The telegraph request of the commander of the 53rd Army Corps should be answered that the orders issued remain in force and Vitebsk must be withheld. It is necessary to indicate once again the possible consequences. The management of the operations of other Vitebsk divisions, whose task is to break through to the west, is entrusted to the corps commander. Today there is no other solution.

At 19.30 the chief of staff of the army group "Center" once again informs the chief of staff of the 3rd Tank Army of Hitler's new decision. It is necessary to take the road and hold it. The command of the army group "Center" still hopes to withdraw the 206th Infantry Division. The Field Marshal model appointed General Gitter as his commandant for Vitebsk by his telegraph order. The time for the commencement of his command should be indicated by the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army after the 53rd Army Corps withdraws.

During the subsequent information, General Geidkemper reports that the leadership of the troops is extremely difficult due to the lack of telegraph communication. Communication with the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps was also interrupted. Leonov was again captured. Command of the 3rd Tank Army learned from the staff of the 16th Army that the 461st Infantry Regiment entered the jurisdiction of the 1st Army Corps. The command of Army Group Center is unknown about this subordination.

At 20.00 the command post of the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army moves to Borovka.

A radio report from General Golvitzer is received, in which he requests the appointment of the commander of the 206th Infantry Division as the commandant of Vitebsk, as he himself is forced to regroup in the western direction.

Regarding the situation of the 9th Army Corps, a message is sent to the 53rd Army Corps that the planned operation on the Dvina River is being carried out, and that the weak forces defending the Tigris line are gradually increasing.

The final decision is passed over the radio to General Holvitzer: "The Tea Company (Vitebsk) will defend itself only with the strengthened 206th Infantry Division under the leadership of General Gitter, as commandant of the fortified district. It is necessary to convey considerations on the timing of the taking command. The task of the corps is to take the road Vitebsk - the "Tiger" line and keep it. The Field Marshal ordered once again to point out the order of Hitler. "

Chief of Staff of the 53rd Army Corps reported at 21.15 on the transfer of the command post to the western flank of the corps. At 22.00 the corps reports that the enemy of an unidentified strength broke into Pushkari.

According to the instructions of General-Field Marshal Bush, in accordance with Hitler's order No. 11, Lieutenant-General Gitter is appointed commandant of the fortified district of Vitebsk. The performance must be conveyed by radio.

An hour later, a report was received from the corps command that under the strong pressure of the enemy had to withdraw the rear guard. The enemy's attacks in the direction of the road and the U-5 road, as well as in the direction of the left flank of the corps, were reflected. The enemy is continuously trying to cross the highway from the south.

At 21.35 the chief of staff of the 9th Army Corps reports that east of Beshenkovichi, 13 enemy tanks crossed the Dvina River on the ford. At the same time, a message comes from the 6th Army Corps about the appearance of enemy tanks in Bogushevskoye and Khojzi. The left flank of the hull is in the Machine.

At 23.00 the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Tank Army informs the Chief of Staff of Army Group Center that the enemy from the Ostrovno area is advancing northward. At the same time enemy tanks operating from the northern direction advanced in two places to the Dvina River. Thus, the encirclement of the city of Vitebsk ended. Extremely remarkable for today is the complete helplessness of our air forces.

The units of the 45th Security Regiment that are on the march must enter the subordination of the corps division "D".

By evening, the coverage of the left flank of the 6th Army Corps in the western direction was clearly indicated, which is carried out by an enemy of an unknown strength from the gap area between the 6th and 53rd Army Corps. Hastily assembled forces, the corps tries to stop the advancing of the enemy.

Because. That the 53rd Army Corps fell out of the front line of the 3rd Panzer Army, between the 6th and 9th Army Corps formed a gap of 35-40 kilometers wide. The enemy rushed to this gap, in the area south of the Dvina River. Lake defile in the area of ​​Hodzy is in the hands of the enemy.

In the strip of the 9th Army Corps, with the support of all the construction and consolidated units, the creation of a line on the Dvina River is systematically carried out. Numerous attacks of the enemy, carried out during the second half of the day in the direction of the new defensive line, were almost completely, partly in counter-attacks, reflected. In the area north-west of Beshenkovichi fighting continues to eliminate the local breakthrough. In this area, the 505th Sapper Battalion of the RGC under the command of Captain Wolf was especially distinguished. In connection with the forcing of the Dvina River by individual tanks of the enemy, the question arose about the use of the 601st regiment at the "Tiger" line. On the left side of the strip of the hull, the first parts of the 290th Infantry Division managed to seize the road Obol-Sludysh.

Due to the lack of telegraph communication, there were no accurate reports of enemy losses and our own.

The 6th Army Corps reports that in the course of 23 and 24.6, up to 70 enemy tanks were destroyed. The 24th Infantry Division destroyed within 24.6 to 11 tanks. The anti-aircraft platoon of the 9th Army Corps shot down 2 enemy aircraft.

In addition to the enemy's strongest artillery fire, large concentrations of infantry and tank forces in all directions, our command and troops are under the unheard of effect of enemy fighter and assault aircraft, which greatly hampered all movements and almost completely destroyed telegraph communications.

Shortly after midnight, an order was issued to the 6th Army Corps on the need to eliminate breakthroughs in the Bogushevskoye and Novoselki regions and the need to keep the left flank at occupied altitudes. Due to the fact that a gap in the direction of the left-hand boundary can not be closed, it is necessary to conduct continuous monitoring and reconnaissance of the enemy's behavior.

In the name of the command of the 9th Army Corps, the personal order of the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army is given, in which he demands that the enemy infiltrating on various sectors be destroyed by all available forces. At the same time, all attempts to cross the river should be blocked, it is necessary to take the "Tiger" line to the right side of the border. Especially it is necessary to block lake defile. Early in the morning 25.6 a 45th security regiment will be transferred through Beshenkovichi.

As intentions at 25.6 it is planned to block the advance of the enemy from the area west of Vitebsk, due to the introduction of the 601st security regiment. Further, active operations are being planned to extend the front edge of the 290th Infantry Division to the Ulla-Obol line. For the 53rd Army Corps, a retreat to the third line is planned and, in addition, the capture and retention of communication (road) between Vitebsk and the "Tiger" border.

[jesk]

25 Jun 1944

In the course of the day the position of the 3rd tank army was aggravated hours. The enemy managed to widen the gap between the 6th army corps and the river Dvina to 50 kilometers and to enter into this gap from the North in the direction of Beshenkovichi new strength. The elimination of the gaps existing forces is not more possible. 6 army corps, and 290, 24 infantry division from the 3rd Panzer army.

Concentrated forces 53 the army corps prepared to implement the breakout from the encirclement in the South-Western direction.

At the turn of the lake Lukomlsky - palmasera - lake forces officers ' school of the 3rd tank army and security forces created a line of defense of the strongholds.

During the evening and night tank the enemy forces are attacking from Jozy in a southerly direction at Senno.

53 army corps conveys that the concentration of 4 Aviapolis division before Ostrovno is still not given, and the measures for mastering the highway.

With 4.00 commandant of Vitebsk, is a Lieutenant-General, Getter.

During the night received a report from General Bamberg (commander of the corps division "D") in which he reports that the enemy continues to attack West of milestone "Tiger" reached from the South of the highway Vitebsk - Beshenkovichi before the Zadorozhie and carries out a crossing on pontoon equipment across the river Dvina in the area of forest land North of Killorglin. In the evening 24.6 carried out counter-attacks with the aim again to master the turn "the Tiger" in the center of the highway and to the South. In connection with the overload and the resulting road congestion, due to the presence of carts 53 army corps, slowed arrival arrival 601 guard regiment.

In the band 9 army corps on the front along the river Dvina considerable tank and infantry forces of the enemy trying to crack our defenses. Are counterattack in the direction of the individual and the bridgehead fortifications on the river Dvina. A considerable force of the enemy crossed the river Dvina in the area of Cherkovishte. Other attempts of the enemy to cross the river were repulsed with heavy losses. The shortest boundary to the North of Beshenkovichi was again occupied by our troops after the destruction of individual enemy tanks, which operated with amphibious groups. North Ulla our artillery suppressed the initial borders of the enemy. In the morning around the area of hostilities is celebrated lively activity of enemy aircraft.

At 8.00 am the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army to inform the army commander that the enemy tanks are moving from "origin of symmetry" in the South, and from the area Hazy in the North-Western and South-Western directions. The advanced troops of the enemy reached Senno. Should be considered with a concentric attack on the Beshenkovichi. Command of 3 Panzer army clearly that it is helpless in the issue of shut out the enemy in a southerly direction. In spite of this, should attempt to create a line of fence. The commander of the 3rd tank army's orders to collect all available slight forces and transfer them to the line of the river Dvina.

During a report the name of the field-Marshal at 8: 15 3танковой army commander requesting air support. The commander of the army indicates that the 3 tank army is completely powerless against tanks and enemy infantry in area of Senno. He asked at the time of withdrawal 53 the army corps to provide him the right to dispose of the 206 infantry division, as this division will not be able to hold Vitebsk and cannot constrain in this region a considerable force of the enemy. Located on the March 45 guard regiment will be used at the front of the river Dvina. The use intended for the transfer of the Northern group армий212 infantry division planned for the area South of the river Dvina.

53 the commanders of the army corps requires urgently to send an ambulance plane. The operations section of the corps headquarters moved during the night to a location 246 infantry division. 53 the commander of the army corps requests the repeal of the defense of Vitebsk as a fortified area, as there are not enough forces to accomplish both tasks (retention of Vitebsk and mastering expensive),

At 8.25 received a report from 53 army corps that part 4 Aviapolis division is surrounded in the area of Ostrovno and ask about the airlift of ammunition for assault weapons and food.

Heavy blows of the Russian, past the Vitebsk has led to the situation whereby every break out of Vitebsk battle group, re-enters the environment. Due to the increasing pressure of the enemy in a westerly direction, are created more difficult conditions for these groups to break through to the West. A message is sent to the command of the corps (no 206 infantry division), which consists mainly of parts 6 and Aviapolis division 246 infantry division, that the enemy continues to move from Hazy and West of the lake chain in the Northern direction. This should be considered when the intent to break in a westerly direction.

The right flank of the 9 army corps continues to hold the Beshenkovichi.

At 9.00 chief of staff of the 6 army corps informs the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army that on a plot of 256 infantry division all right, but the enemy tanks were around 14 infantry division. Similarly, on a plot of 95 infantry divisions, the enemy managed to break through to the turn of the "Tiger" in the area of zaozer'ye. The issue of waste 95 infantry division rejected the command of army group "Center". According to the command of the case, the best solution is to retreat to the East Bank of the river Obolyanka. The chief of staff of the 3rd tank army passes the order to the commander of the army in the name of Colonel Monteil about the need to retain the existing boundary.

A short time later, after the situation was discussed by the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army commander of the army, gave the order to the commander of the 6 army corps that 95 infantry division retreated from the fighting across the river Obolyanka in a southerly direction with the aim to establish a link on the left flank in the area Tsipky and stay on that line.

At 10.00 am the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army informs the chief of staff of army group "Center". Discussed below 6 the army corps became a subordinate 4 army, because the leadership of the 3 tank army is almost impossible, given that under the waste movement the body would go to the location of the 4 army. On the question of subordination of the left flank of the 3rd tank army to the command of the 1 army corps General Heitkemper agrees with this transfer. Command of 3 Panzer army asks to provide him with a headquarters 201 security division, which should create a boundary along the river Ulyanka. At the same time General Heitkemper asks about the deployment of mobile anti-tank weapons. 95 infantry division hung in the air and got the order to retreat.

Comes a Telegraph order of the command of army group "Center" of 406 infantry regiment would be immediately released from operations on liquidation of the partisan movement "Cormoran" and transferred to the 3rd Panzer army.

At 9.25 negotiations were held between the commander of the 9th army corps and chief of staff of the 3rd tank army, which again calls unconditionally to keep the Beshenkovichi. The question of the subordination of the parts North of the river Dvina, remains unclear. The command of the corps agrees with the possible subordination of the command of the 1 army corps.

Promotion 601 guard regiment performed with great difficulty, as the Candle on the highway is a burning convoy. General Heitkemper indicates that the task of the corps is to eliminate such obstacles, and that all difficulties on the road should be eliminated.

During the talks, held at 10.00, the decision on creation of the new line fence between the lake and the lake Lukomlsky Palmasera. On this line the boom will act army officer school, 201 security division, 45 guard regiment and the 252nd infantry division. Before this line the boom will be located Cossack detachment Perche. On Lieutenant General Jacoby and Colonel von Monterone assigned personal tasks. Oberwachtmeister is instructed to intercept all empty transport and create new ones in the rear area of Parapanov - Molodechno.

During the visit, Colonel-General Ritter von Grand and the commander of the antiaircraft regiment, the latter was promised broad support. The same was promised by General Reus.

At 11.10 again, talks were held between the chief штаба3 tank army and the chief of staff of army group "Center". As expected, the 6 army corps comes in immediate obedience 4 army, and the area of Senno goes to the same place. 290 and 24 infantry divisions promptly obey 1 army corps. 212 infantry division immediately thrown in the area of Parapanov. 5 Panzer division loaded in Borisov and will be used in the area of Senno or Lepel.

Command of group of armies "the Center" is full of ambiguity on the question of the power of the offensive operations of the enemy. In this regard, the unacceptable waste in front of a minor enemy forces. Garrisons should be used for all attacks. Command of group of armies "Center" disclaims all telegraphic queries 53 the army corps. With regard to the transfer of movable anti-tank weapons, because of the large offensives of the enemy they should be distributed between three different armies.

At this time it arrives telegraphic instruction of the group of armies "Center" about subordinate to 6 army corps with all attached parts to the command of the 4 army. At the same time set a new border 4 army: North side of the lake Lukomlsky - North side of the lake Senno.

Command of group of armies "the Center" is full of ambiguity on the question of the power of the offensive operations of the enemy. In this regard, the unacceptable waste in front of a minor enemy forces. Garrisons should be used for all attacks. Command of group of armies "Center" disclaims all telegraphic queries 53 the army corps. With regard to the transfer of movable anti-tank weapons, because of the large offensives of the enemy they should be distributed between three different armies.

At this time it arrives telegraphic instruction of the group of armies "Center" about subordinate to 6 army corps with all attached parts to the command of the 4 army. At the same time set a new border 4 army: North side of the lake Lukomlsky - North side of the lake Senno.

In the last message, 6 army corps indicated that the enemy broke through the East of the highway 78 infantry division and by agreement with the command of 4 army corps departs from the fighting.

Given the extremely difficult position with anti-tank weapons, German 3 Panzer army reports by Telegraph at the command of the army group "Center". In this telegram stated that with the transfer of 6 army corps at the disposal of the army and 4 in the transfer current North of the river Dvina division at the disposal of the 16 army lost almost all antitank weapons. In a 3 tank army at the present time there is only one brigade of assault guns (one battery). The rest of the anti-tank part is distributed as follows: 519 heavy anti-tank battalion acts as the main force of 6 army corps and one company in the area of Obol; 281, 909 245 brigade assault guns operate in the strip 6 army corps, or to the North of the Ulla river; the 3rd division assault guns is part of the 53 army corps. As all enemy attacks are massive strike tanks, the command of the 3rd tank army asks about the transfer of unicorns and battalions of assault guns, and the return of his 909 division assault guns, remaining North of the river Ulla. In addition, highly requested transfer of artillery RGC.

At 11.20 the chief of staff of 9 army corps also reports that the commander of 262 divisional group continues to defend the Beshenkovichi, and that the enemy along the way Ulla - Beshenkovichi reached Pyatigorsk. Unit 601 guard regiment operate on both sides of the Candle.

The same information comes at 11.45 from the commander of the 9th army corps in the name of the commander of the 3rd tank army. New messages from Beshenkovichi were reported. General Bamberg given the right to produce explosions. Currently, the General Bamberg moves to a new command post. The commander of the 3rd tank army points to the absolute inadmissibility of retreat across the river Dvina. If there is any danger, the forces should be drawn on the lake chain. 201 security division, which should be enacted in Northern new defensive line, will be included in the submission of the case. 252 infantry division defending along the edge of the forest North of the narrow portion of Dvina - Sauchanka.

Around 13.00 happen in negotiations between the generals Heitkemper and Krebs. The chief of staff of the 3rd tank army asks about the transfer of unicorns and assault guns. General Krebs promises to throw a new brigade of assault guns, which currently goes through Vilna. General Heitkemper suggested discharge in the area of Parapanov, as the team is scheduled to step in Lepel district. The question of the return of the fallen part 16 army (in connection with the transfer of the left flank in the 16th army) and one company of unicorns, a battery of assault guns and one motorized artillery battalion - not possible according to the General Herrmann (16 commander of the army).

At 13.15 the chief of staff of army group "Center" reported to the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army, which could not be given consent to the withdrawal of the front line, and the output 206 infantry division from Vitebsk.

13.15 command 53 the army corps brings the radio about a radical change in the situation. The continuously increasing part of the enemy has completed a full circle. 4 aviaprima division no longer exists. 246 infantry division and 6 aviaprima division are engaged in heavy fighting. In numerous sectors of the front are waging a fierce battle. The enemy in some places broke into the city of Vitebsk. Command the body urges the support of the forces fighters.

The commander of the 3rd tank army sends General Gollwitzer radio my best wishes of good luck out of the environment. At the same time it is reported for information to the General Gollwitzer, in the case of the shot in the Western direction, he will encounter the strongest resistance of the enemy. In this regard, the most successful strike using Hazy.

The name of Lieutenant-General, Hitter sent a telegram, which reported that the command of army group "Center" awaiting confirmation on acceptance of the responsibilities of the commandant of the fortified area of Vitebsk.

At 16.00 the command of the 53 army corps is back in Vitebsk. General Gollwitzer reported to 19.00, the General situation forces him to apply concentrated forces blow in a South-westerly direction. The offensive is scheduled for 5.00 26.6.44. The request to provide air support in the area South-West of Vitebsk. The commander of the 3rd tank army responds that he quite agree with the intentions, but on the basis of repeated orders of Hitler, 206 infantry division must hold the Vitebsk under the direction of Lieutenant-General, Getter.

At 13.40 received a report of the chief of staff of 9 army corps that the Russians have reached river Svechanka West Beshenkovichi. Command the body proposes to take the front line on the lake parade in accordance with the earlier agreement.

In this regard, the commander of the 3rd tank army talks with field Marshal and inform him of the great danger, which represents a breakthrough milestone on the river Dvina, and that, in his opinion, the Russians will find yourself on the chain of lakes earlier than the German troops. To this the Marshal replied that the waste is completely unacceptable. Milestone on the river Dvina to be deducted. The commander of the 3rd tank army indicates that in this case there is a danger of deployment of the enemy with the purpose of circumventing Lepel. This should be considered because of the mass of the enemy moving from the North in the direction of Beshenkovichi. Promised for 3 tank army additional forces can not now be taken into account, as the 212 infantry division will arrive no earlier than 26.6 in the evening, and from the brigade assault guns haven't arrived.

14.25 the negotiations were held between the chief of staff of army group "Center" and the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army, which reported that will not pass long time until the moment when the Russian reached the lake Palmasera, and then 9 army corps will not have the opportunity to strengthen his right flank. Beshenkovichi is already surrounded. Of the army tank assault battalion only a small force had crossed the river Dvina. Enemy tanks continue to move from Senno in a South-westerly direction.

The commander of the 3rd tank army also talks with General Krebs and points to clear existing tendencies of the enemy to advance on Lepel. If the troops must occupy a convenient area on the lake shows, it should be promptly decided on the abandonment of the turn on the river Dvina. And this time again is indicated by the famous phrase "too late."

The commander of the 9th army corps considers that the order the field Marshal to strengthen the group the right to create a layered defense and at the same time to keep the line on the river Dvina is unrealistic, since the turn on the river Dvina, it is not possible that any release.

During the two subsequent 15.15 15.40 and negotiations between the chief of staff of army group "Center" and the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army transmitted the order the field Marshal of deduction of turn on the river Dvina until out of the environment 53 the army corps. The subsequent onset of right flank 1 army corps brought no relief. Again increased action of enemy aircraft.

This is the final decision of the field Marshal, was 15.45 transferred to the chief of staff of 9 army corps.

The Colonel Praefke reports that the adjutant of the corps division "D" will organize a defensive line in Bocheykovo. The enemy is currently under the Candle.

With other parts of the body division "D" currently, there is no connection, as it is interrupted with the district Beshenkovichi.

According to the testimony of prisoners can be judged that with the approach of enemy forces to the river Dvina (6th guards army), we should expect a 26.6 a major offensive in the direction of 9 army corps. 6 guards army, interacting with a strong motorized enemy units in the area of Senno, will make all efforts to win space in the Western direction, to widen the existing breach, to prevent the possibility of creating troops of the German defensive line and, if possible, early to seize the key point Lepel.

Of moving the headquarters of the 1 Baltic front to the area of town it can be concluded that the enemy throws considerable force, stationed in front of the 16th army, to support the 6 guards army.

At 18.00 the commander of the 9th army corps informs that the enemy seized the Candle, and that 45 guard regiment creates a new defensive line on both sides Bocheykovo. Part 252 infantry division crossed the river Ulla on the second line.

The commander of the 3rd tank army requires that in all circumstances was barred by the Russian breakthrough between the forest and the highway. Field Marshal categorically ordered to move the main direction of the impact to the South. In this regard, will be a weakening of the boundary on the river Dvina.

At 18.25 received a report from the commander of the 9th army corps, in the Beshenkovichi continue fighting. General Voetmann is informed that 26.6 expected enhanced effects of aviation on the main lines to the West of Beshenkovichi.

At 18.35 held new talks between the field Marshal and the commander of the 3rd tank army. The field Marshal had a conversation with the General-the Colonel of Zeitzler, who was of the view that the position of the 3rd tank army can be stable without podbroste new forces. According to the command of the Northern army group, holding the turn on the river Dvina is particularly important.

With regard to the question of the fortified area of Vitebsk, Hitler once again strictly ordered to leave in only one division. In field Marshal the impression that General Gollwitzer must receive the order to retreat, providing details of out of the environment. At 18.45, the field Marshal ordered to send a staff officer from the headquarters of the 3rd tank army, which on the plane (landing or parachute jump) to carry out this order. The issue is that 4 aviaprima division at the disposal of General Gollwitzer, did not get into the environment and thus would have suffered smaller losses.

The commander of the 3rd tank army shall report to the field Marshal the contents of radio communications with the General Gollwitzer, in which the latter announced his intentions to break through to the southwest with a change of the thrusts.

At 19.30 the chief of staff of 9 army corps reports to the commander of the 3rd tank army that the Russians are Candle and on the East Bank of the river Svechanka. Part of the enemy advancing through Cherkovishte, turned in the direction of the wing 252 infantry division. Colonel Baze concentrated in Bocheykovo two batteries and a battalion of assault guns with the task to defend the area. Part 1 of the army corps are now on highway Oball - Slugish. In the woods North of this district are Russian.

20.00 Marshall is once again negotiating with the commanders of the 3rd tank army and requires sending a staff officer to Vitebsk. Thus, General Gollwitzer will be informed about the General situation and will be able to take the appropriate decision.

The commander of the 3rd tank army does not consider it appropriate, given the personal characteristics of General Gollwitzer, who is not an optimist. Then the commander of the 3rd tank army indicates that adopted by the General Gollwitzer decision to return to Vitebsk is correct, because the overall situation makes him the United effort to break through in a South-westerly direction.

Negotiations continue with a private conversation between the head of the 3rd Panzer army and the chief of staff of army group "Center". General Krabs wants to talk to the General Heusinger on the issue of the 206 infantry division, but does not believe in the success of these negotiations. The important reasons, Hitler wants to stay for another 6 -7 days in the same turn.

In General, 20.06 Gitter reported on what the enemy broke into the North-Eastern part of the city. Minor a breakthrough occurred in the North-Western part. The situation is extremely serious.

General Gitter confirms radiogram 53 army corps No. 7908/44 from 24.6.

Obviously, we are talking about the adoption by the General Getter of the duties of the commandant of the fortified area according to the order of field Marshal.

Later received reports about the fierce street fighting in the town of Vitebsk and a profound breakthroughs along the highway. 4 aviaprima division no longer exists. The division headquarters are surrounded in Ostrovno. Attempt 6 Aviapolis division to attack towards Ostrovno failed. The bridge is no longer used. Happen continuous heavy air raids. Overall the situation is serious, but not hopeless.

Colonel count von Kielmansegg (operational Department staff of the army) asked about the information that is given to him by the Deputy chief of operations. Major Sochi indicates that the front of the 3rd tank army are from 5 to 6 armies and numerous armored units, and our tank defense is extremely weak.

Colonel count von Kielmansegg says that nobody expected a quick exit. The enemy forces has caused an unexpected surprise. So far, however, no marked reserve operational units of the enemy, released on the southern front. In the command of land forces is dominated by the impression that the situation was not the best, if promptly ordered the abandonment of Vitebsk. Major General staff of the Sochi clearly speaks against this wrong view.

Negotiations with the chief of staff of the 6th air fleet on the issue of ensuring through the air surrounded in Ostrovno 4 Aviapolis division.

The chief of staff of the 3rd tank army Colonel obliges Prefce to find out the reasons of the proceeds from 9 the army corps the various false reports. Moved larger military unit than was reported by the command of the corps. Army assault tank battalion was nearly at full strength; corps division "D" also moved significant forces. Arriving parts must be used so that the breakthrough of the enemy would be impossible.

At 21.00 the field Marshal once again negotiating with the commander of the 3rd tank army and demands to unconditionally specify the position at which the General Gollwitzer, making its breakthrough from Vitebsk, will not be forced to participate in it 206 infantry division.

The commander of the 3rd tank army reports that General Gitter transferred to the appropriate instructions based on the orders of Hitler on the question of defence of the fortified area of Vitebsk.

The commander of the 3rd tank army further reports that he expressed earlier General point about holding the line of the river Dvina was based on misleading reports of 9 army corps.

The negotiations were continued by the chief of staff of the 3rd tank army, and was made again a request for anti-armor weapons. At the same time it was reported that according to the latest reports of air reconnaissance convoy moving in the area of Senno, given the right promotion, can be German.

By the end of the day, due to heavy interference by the enemy, became impossible the radio with 53 army corps.

At 22.15 the commander of the 9th army corps reported that repelled the attack on the fords and due to the small number of reports received from the corps division "D", throughout the day was hampered by the leadership of military operations.

Garrison Beshenkovichi received orders for the coming night to break in the direction of our front line of defense.

By the end of the day, the Russians again attacked the village of Beshenkovichi. During the day enemy aircraft continuously bombed and shelled the main communications enclosure.

Our light anti-aircraft artillery shot down 4 enemy aircraft.

North of Beshenkovichi our three unicorn knocked out 15 enemy tanks.

6 the army corps reported that over the last three days they destroyed 101 enemy tanks.

The 9 army corps ordered: within 26.6 to take his right flank over the river Ulla on nalesny Dvina abroad and to defend the area South of Dubysche. Home land defense is along the Ulla river, South Bocheykovo. 201 security division is entered in the submission of the case to use on the right site. Provides for the transfer of security parts involved in the operation "Cormoran". On both sides of the Candle must be longer than the left rears with the aim of safeguarding the construction of a new defensive line. Carrying on the southern section of the guard Cossack division (battalion) First entered in obedience 201 security division. Emphasizes the importance of the implementation of deep intelligence.

The telegram received from headquarters of the army group "Center" confirms that from the location of the Northern group of armies to the area of Parapanov sent urgent order 212 infantry division. The transfer of the Lepel district will be accelerated by the provision of road transport.

[jesk]

https://profilib.net/chtenie/87520/alek ... sii-49.php

Former chief of staff of the 3rd Panzer army Heitkemper in his book "Vitebsk" in paints describes the dispute between Reinhardt and Bush that occurred at the end of the first day of the Soviet offensive. He writes:
"In the early evening [between] the field Marshal Bush, who spent the whole day in front of the IX army corps, and Lieutenant-Colonel [Reinhardt] there was a major dispute, in which latter talked about the fact that using the tank army was provided "too late". Field Marshal Bush categorically refuses to satisfy the petition of Colonel-General about the immediate evacuation of Vitebsk. At first he did not agree on the withdrawal of at least the LIII army corps, separate sections of the front which up to the present time the enemy attacked in small groups to companies each. Colonel-General proposed with the aim of saving the strength to take the body on a circular boundary around Vitebsk. Later, the field Marshal agreed to submit the proposal for consideration of army staff. Notice of resolution of the objection was received on the same evening."
It is interesting to note that on 23 June, Bush held on the site of the IX army corps. Business here the Germans have really evolved in the worst case scenario. Permitted waste on the perimeter defense of Vitebsk allowed the German command to take the minimum necessary steps to prevent the incipient encirclement of the LIII corps. During produced during the waste was released 4th aviaprima division, which was derived from the first line and spanned March to the area southwest of Vitebsk, in order to counteract the enemy from the West, and in the case that this will require the setting – from the South.
The data move was spotted by the Soviet aerial reconnaissance. So, on June 24 from air reconnaissance 523-th fighter aviation regiment received the following radiogram:
"14.10 the altitude of 1500 MT. From Vitebsk Beshenkovichi across the road to traffic up to 1,000 vehicles and 3,000 wagons with the troops of the enemy. On the outskirts of Vitebsk and in the city to 700 cars coming on the highway Vitebsk, Beshenkovichi"[259].
They were perceived as a departure from the district of Vitebsk. Indeed, in the realities of the previous experience of the Soviet-German front, the situation looked fairly obvious: under the threat of encirclement had to move away. At the moment the situation for the LIII corps was not so hopeless. In the bend of the West. Dvina river near Ostrovno remained levoflangovtsy units of the 246-th infantry division, prevented at least temporarily the crossing into the bend of the river, parts of the 43rd army. The approach from the West 4th Aviapolis division is allowed to form a defense, through which it would be possible to move main forces from Vitebsk. However, in light of Hitler's ideas regarding "fortress" it was not so obvious.

From postknowledge height the most logical option for the German command looks like the output from the district court of the main forces of LIII corps at the first threat environment with the abandonment and retreat into a "fortress" maximum those who will not have time to break organized.
The actual result of all these discussions in the higher spheres of the time that German troops could spend on waste, it was hopelessly lost. Part of the 39th army on the evening of 24 June consistently caught all the road running from Vitebsk. 28th tank brigade from 15.00 reassigned 17th guards. infantry division. By 17.00, the division and brigade come to its original position to attack almost due North. At 19.40 they go from the catwalk in swampy forests and in the end of the day intercept highway Vitebsk – Beshenkovichi on the outskirts of Vitebsk and overlook on the shore of the Western Dvina. It is interesting to note that on the other Bank of the Western Dvina, at that time there were no parts of the 43rd army. There were the Germans of the 246-th infantry division. Surrounded by a garrison of Vitebsk were doing the interception of roads and the blocking of the group, flanked at Ostrovno.
One barrier in a highway environment was, of course, is not enough. So was formed the external front of encirclement with the release of the 19-th guards. infantry division in the district of Gnezdilova and West of the city. Near the 19-th guards. infantry division took up defensive positions in the lake defile in the area of the farm Chotsy 251 infantry division. These two divisions haven't got armored machinery, and in the case of attempts to release them would have to be tight. However, movable units for the release of the 3rd Panzer army at that time was not. 91st guards. infantry division in collaboration with the 735th SAP by the end of the day came to the road junction Ostrovno.

[jesk]

The result of Hitler's orders on June 23-25 was the defeat by small Russian forces of the 53 Corps in parts. The offensive of the Russians, I stress, was not strong. Departure to the reduced front line, pulling up several reserve divisions allowed successfully repelling the offensive. Hitler arranged a rout on an equal place, out of nothing. As the later encirclement of the 7th Army in Normandy.

[Boby]

Carpathians, Lvov, Lublin, the Balkans. This is a superficial analysis of events. I wanted to pay attention to this. For 15-20 minutes of search in google Boby "delves into the topic" and even criticizes Frieser. This is not serious. To fully understand the picture of the operation "Bagration" need a scrupulous, without laziness analysis of sources.
.

I agree. And many thanks for the translation of 3. Panzer-Army KTB entries. This is very interesting.

But, please, don't blame me for not having primary sources about Bagration: these are not easily available on the net.

[ljadw]

1) This is not correct : the Soviets were that strong that they could attack on several frionts . Before 22 June, AG NU was under heavy pressure and the few mobile reserves (9 + 10 SS ) were sent to this sectoe, because otherwise AGNU would collaps .

2) "replenish reserves" = nonsense :there were no reserves . And, if AGC was withdrawing, the other AGs also would have to withdraw .

3 ) Elastic defense is an euphemism for retreat . The only thing Manstein did after Citadel was to retreat . If you don't have sufficient mobile reserves, elastic defense is impossible .

4) Mellenthin is talking nonsense

5) There were no reinforcements available /

The situation in the East had arrived at the point that the Germans did not send their reserves where the Soviets could attack, but where they were attacking ; the Soviets were leading the dance, the Germans followed . Even if the Germans knew about Bagration, there was nothing they could do, unless taking away the mobile divisions who were preventing the collaps of AGNU .

I do not see the difference between mobile and static units.

The average German ID was to weak to stop the Soviets : only mobile divisions could do this .

Besides:why are you blaming Hitler for the collaps of AGC and not the Soviets ?

[ljadw]

It's easy to make Hitler responsible for the success of Bagration (one should almost think that he drafted the Soviet plans, if one may believe some persons ) .

The unpleasant truths are

1 ) that the Soviets had an overwhelmong superiority (source : Germany and WWII Tome VIII, German edition )


For the first phase of Begration

1,254,000 men

24383 pieces of artillery

2715 tanks

1355 assault guns

5327 aircraft (strategic aircraft not included)

Germans :

Ist-Stärke 849000

Tagesstärke :486000

Artillery : 3236

62 !! tanks ,reinforced (haha) by the 56 tanks of 20 Pz

Assault guns : 452

Aircraft : 602

2 ) The proposal (by AGC and post war by the apologists of the Wehrmacht ) to withdraw AGC (til the German border ? )was senseless , as

a) before June there was no need for a withdrawal, as there were no indications for Bagration

b) after June 1 it was too late for a withdrawal

c) if the aim of the withdrawal was to shorten the front, a withdrawal would also shorten the front for the Soviets and would not change the Soviet superiority :withdrawal would not result in more German and less Soviet tanks and divisions : there were 34 German divisions, if AGC retreated, there would be still 34 German divisions .

3) At least Hitler had a possible solution to delay a Soviet advance : Die Festen Plätze = fortified towns and cities , these, was hoping Hitler, would suck in Soviet reserves, as they did in the winter of 1941/1942 .We know that they didn't suck in, and that they were a failure . But the proposals of the generals were not better .

AGC was no longer mobile and had no reserves to stop a Soviet advance .

There was no solution,unless hoping for a miracle and accepting that there would be a disaster.

[jesk]

The average German ID was to weak to stop the Soviets : only mobile divisions could do this .

The average German mobile unit in the east was also weak. 40-50 of the same tanks. The best forces were in Normandy. In addition, why do you think the Russian infantry divisions are stronger than the German ones? This is nonsense.

Besides:why are you blaming Hitler for the collaps of AGC and not the Soviets ?

From the autumn of 1943 to the spring of 1944 the Germans successfully fought in Byelorussia. The way out of the positional deadlock was found by Hitler. Invented an exotic for the 20th century fortress system along the perimeter of the army group. He solved 2 tasks.

1. The ratio of forces in the areas of Russian attacks was higher than could be. Commander of the armies in Belarus are deprived of freedom of maneuver, even on the perimeter of the front.

2. When the Germans were surrounded, they sat in "fortresses", wasting time. They were required to cut the front, wait for some reserves and defend further.

It's easy to make Hitler responsible for the success of Bagration (one should almost think that he drafted the Soviet plans, if one may believe some persons ) .

The unpleasant truths are

1 ) that the Soviets had an overwhelmong superiority (source : Germany and WWII Tome VIII, German edition )


For the first phase of Begration

1,254,000 men

24383 pieces of artillery

2715 tanks

1355 assault guns

5327 aircraft (strategic aircraft not included)

Germans :

Ist-Stärke 849000

Tagesstärke :486000

Artillery : 3236

62 !! tanks ,reinforced (haha) by the 56 tanks of 20 Pz

Assault guns : 452

Aircraft : 602

Normal ratio. I'm not sure that the artillery numbers are correct. Already too high a disproportion.

2 ) The proposal (by AGC and post war by the apologists of the Wehrmacht ) to withdraw AGC (til the German border ? )was senseless , as

a) before June there was no need for a withdrawal, as there were no indications for Bagration

b) after June 1 it was too late for a withdrawal

c) if the aim of the withdrawal was to shorten the front, a withdrawal would also shorten the front for the Soviets and would not change the Soviet superiority :withdrawal would not result in more German and less Soviet tanks and divisions : there were 34 German divisions, if AGC retreated, there would be still 34 German divisions .

Reducing the front is always useful. For example, in the autumn of 1918 the Germans boasted that they managed to cut the front from 900 to 700 km. The Russians possessed the initiative, their forces were already gathered into a fist. There are fewer forces in the secondary areas. Approximately 20 on 4, on the remaining 8/8. The reduction of the front is advantageous only to the Germans, the correlation in strength in favor of the Russians is diminishing.

3) At least Hitler had a possible solution to delay a Soviet advance : Die Festen Plätze = fortified towns and cities , these, was hoping Hitler, would suck in Soviet reserves, as they did in the winter of 1941/1942 .We know that they didn't suck in, and that they were a failure . But the proposals of the generals were not better .

There were no fortified towns in the winter of 1941/1942. This invention of Hitler in the spring of 1944. Fortified cities were effective in the Middle Ages, when the armies were 50 thousand people. 10 thousand in the fortress shackles. With multimillion armies there were always reserves to block. It was sabotage. Russian 9 months could not break through the defense in Belarus, Hitler helped them.

AGC was no longer mobile and had no reserves to stop a Soviet advance .

The overall ratio in the forces was not large. Hitler stretched the front, exacerbating the situation by tying the divisions to fortresses. On the directions of Russian attacks, the ratio was significant due to Hitler's actions.

There was no solution, unless hoping for a miracle and accepting that there would be a disaster.

The Soviet offensive was weak. Attack on the whole front, little force for the development of success. Small reduction of the front stopped the Soviet advance. The source already quoted.

http://pawet.net/library/history/bel_hi ... он%27.html

By that time, the Soviet command had abandoned the method of "deep operation" (after a failed strategic offensive "from sea to sea" in the first half of 1942) in favor of another, which can be christened "wide hacking". One of the first to use it was the commander of the Western Front, Ivan Konev during Operation Mars. Subsequently, it began to be used everywhere - the welfare of the Wehrmacht contributed to it.

The use of the "wide hacking" method was a logical decision, applied to the realities of the Eastern Front. The Germans, who were far behind their enemy in strength, could not ensure the reliability of defense throughout the front. As early as the Soviet troops of the Luban offensive operation (January-April 1942), German observers in the Volkhov Front band noted that only one platoon with one machine gun provided 1 km of German defense - this is the density.

That is, the breakthrough of the first line of the German defense was a relatively simple matter, the difficulties started later.

The main problem of the "wide hacking" method was precisely this: spraying the troops along the entire front, it is difficult to create sufficient reserves of the day for the development of success in depth.

In addition, the tactical preparation of the troops for the purpose of "building up" units and fighting interaction was insufficient, and such training was extremely necessary for the parts crowded with new recruits.

The operation "Bagration" was planned exclusively on the map. And if the command of the German group "Center" had adequate reserves, it would have ended at best in Berezina, and at worst 50-100 km from the turn of the offensive.

[jesk]

Why 5 German divisions defeated in the Vitebsk ledge, If the Germans knew where the Soviet attacks would take place?



The command of the army group probably always hoped for the possibility of timely withdrawal. To keep in fortress, but if the enemy begins to surround, Hitler allow the withdrawal.

Time passed, Hitler hesitated, made half-hearted decisions.

http://pawet.net/library/history/bel_hi ... сть_1.html

June 23, 1944

At 17.00 the commander of the 3rd Tank Army reports to the Field Marshal General the latest information on the situation at the front and requests an immediate decision on the issue of withdrawal in the Vitebsk region to the second line (fortified area). General Field Marshal shares this point of view, but stresses that this requires Hitler's decision, which can be followed no earlier than at 24.00. General Field Marshal orders to keep the current line and do everything that is possible. After the commander of the 3rd Tank Army repeats: "Therefore, to do everything possible, no matter what", the Field Marshal terminates him with the words "Depending on what allows you to make a position, and the boundary must be withheld under any conditions." The general of the field marshal reserves the right to decide on the destruction of the Vitebsk-Orsha railway.

June 24, 1944

At 18.20 the Field Marshal calls the commander of the 3rd Tank Army to the apparatus and informs him that he is once again going to raise the question of Vitebsk in high instances. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army informs the Field Marshal that the enemy has reached the southern outskirts of Ostrovno. In addition, it occupied the Likhovshchina and appeared in the rear of our batteries, which operate along the road with a front turned in the north. At present, according to Hitler's order, the 53rd Army Corps has been ordered that Vitebsk is still the "Tea Rose". The front line should, as far as possible, be allocated to the third boundary to the Vaskovičy area, and from there along the second boundary to the turn of the Dvina River in the Novka area. The 6th airfield division must be withdrawn from combat. The 4th and 6th airfield divisions should be used to liberate and defend the road leading from Vitebsk to the west. This order is unquestionably half-hearted. The corps is currently retiring with battles. The systematic evacuation of property is no longer feasible. The correct order would be: "All the way back to the" Tiger "border. When asked where the 4th airfield division is now, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army responds that she was to go to Ostrovno, in order to defend the road and, apparently, her units are east of Ostrovno. The enemy continues the offensive in the direction of Ostrovno, and other parts in the western direction to the Dvina border and the lakes. In this area, as well as in the western and southern directions, our troops do not exist. Only where the "Tiger" line passes into the open area, in front of Lipno, are parts of the 6th Army Corps. In the strip of the 9th Army Corps, the enemy made attacks in the direction of our lake positions, north of Beshenkovichi. Attacks were repulsed. Countermeasures were taken to eliminate the enemy units that had broken through to the Dvina River. The enemy attacked four times in the direction of Ulla and strongly attacked with the support of the tanks towards the location of the 24th Infantry Division. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army hopes that the 290th Infantry Division, which, unfortunately, too slowly concentrates, will be able to achieve something. The Field Marshal reports that the arrival of the 212th Infantry Division is expected. He believes that the most unpleasant phenomenon is the breach from Lipno to Beshenkovichi.

[ljadw]

The Source for the Soviet artillery is :Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges Band 4, P 226 (mentioned by Frieser).

On P 531 of the German edition of Germany and WWII , Frieser writes :"the biggest problem for AGC was the shortage on tanks ".118 German tanks against 2715 Sovjet tanks . This is NOT a normal ratio !

And on P 535 , Frieser writes : "Die immobil gewordene Heeresgruppe Mitte war im Sommer 1944 nicht mehr operationsfähig " .In English : AGC was in the summer of 1944 no longer mobile and could no longer operate .

And a retreat was a non sequitur :

at the beginning of May, FHO expected an attack against AGNU with as direction East Prussia or Hungary .

a week before Bagration the prognose was : a secundary attack against AGC and the principal attack against aGNU with direction East Prussia .

Besides, given the immobility of AGC it was too late in June for a withdrawal .

And, if you are shortening the front for the Germans, you are shortening him also for the Soviets .