Question About Western Contribution to the War

[Richard Anderson]

There is no sense in statements. All these divisions scattered throughout Europe must form the components of combat operations. And there are some mistakes and meaninglessness. You described plasticine, but not products from them.

Plasticine? You are truly confused and think you are playing in Legoland perhaps?

[ljadw]

I. A 100 divisions of "first rate" quality - fully equipped, fully, manned, fully trained.


At the same time, Britain had about 30 divisions who were, at best, "fourth rang" given that there was only enough equipment to properly equip about 3-4 divisions.

1) Wrong,or , to use your favourite expression ; garbage .

The Blitzkrieg Legend P 33 :

From a total of 157 divisions on 10 may 1940,77 were fit for attack and defense,29 were only partially operational,28 were only good for defense, 9 only partially ready for defense,9 security divisions and 5 were still forming .

2 ) Also garbage : the Home Forces were strong enough to eliminate the few German units (less than a division ) that would be able to land the first day .

The British Army, the RAF and the RN were stronger than the forces from Das Heer, Die LW and Die KM that would be available for Sealion .

3 ) Not only your knowledge of the WM, but also that of the British forces consists mainly of gaps .

4 ) It is obvious that you don't know the difference between offensive and defensive strength . The same British forces that in 1940 would easily eliminate the Germans that would try to invade, would be unable to launch a successful landing, even if the German forces in the West would be only a fraction of what they were in may/june 1940 . There were no 100 German divisions needed in june 1940 to prevent a British landing,20 would suffice, but there were 100 + German divisions needed in june 1944 to defeat an Allied landing, because meanwhile the Allies had become much more stronger .

[jesk]

But you can not really object. Your meaningless figures, unfortunately, have nothing to do with history. History is what you missed as inessential.

Didn't your Momma ever teach you not to interrupt the conversations of adults?

With age you didn't become cleverer.

Germans couldn't not take the Caucasus, and... figures, documents aren't necessary. Just Hitler has stolen the whole army.

Utter nonsense. In the summer of 1942, Inf.Div. (mot) Grossdeustschland (it did not become a Panzergrenadier division until 19 May 1943) was in reserve at the disposal of HG-Sued in June, before it was attached to XXXXVIII A.K. of 2. A.O.K. in July. It was then assigned to 1 Pz.A.O.K. of HG-A in August in preparation for the exploitation into the Caucasus. However, it was then diverted to 9. A.O.K. on 26 August because of the threat presented by the First Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive Operation. The division remained with 9. Armee, aiding in defeating the two Rzhev-Sychevka offensives, until 16 January 1943 when it went into OKH-Reserve before it was committed to shore up 8. Italian Army.

The bit regarding SS-LSAH is also nonsense. On 1 July 1942 it was on its way to France in order to be rebuilt as a division. On 6 July 1942 the first elements were just arriving in France. It wasn't a division until November 1942 when it completed rebuilding.

I see you are not even interested in another story, except how to calculate the division's inability and many other accompanying figures. The division has 10 tanks, 100 guns, 56 mortars, 2,190 soldiers, 300 drivers and you enjoy in such a very limited ocean of history. It is wrong. You have 10% of a picture of history, the rest is just invented.

Here is an error

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /LSSAH.htm
Anfang Dezember 1941 bezog sie Stellungen nördlich von Tanganrog bei Ssambek, wo sie bis zum 24. Mai 1942 verblieb. Anschließend wurde sie zum Küstenschutz in den Raum Mariupol ans Asowsche Meer verlegt. Ab dem 1. Juli 1942 begann die Verlegung nach Frankreich. Hier wurde die Brigade zur SS-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler umgewandelt.

July 11, Hitler ordered the transfer of the division to France. Other listed divisions are torn from the offensive in the south and transferred for defense to the "Center" group. And this was Hitler's mistake.

[jesk]

It's funny to look at this. The parade of the division in Paris, the Russians can sleep peacefully. Shot - and killed a Russian soldier.

Parade der Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler; Avenue des Champs Elysées (Paris) 29 Juli 1942. Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, SS Obergruppenführer Sepp .

[Richard Anderson]

With age you didn't become cleverer.

Nor with repetitive nonsense do you.

Germans couldn't not take the Caucasus, and... figures, documents aren't necessary. Just Hitler has stolen the whole army.

I see you are not even interested in another story, except how to calculate the division's inability and many other accompanying figures. The division has 10 tanks, 100 guns, 56 mortars, 2,190 soldiers, 300 drivers and you enjoy in such a very limited ocean of history. It is wrong. You have 10% of a picture of history, the rest is just invented.

I see you decided to avoid addressing the nonsense regarding Inf.Div. GD and choose instead to focus on the nonsense regarding SS-LSAH. You also seem to have a problem understanding a simple concept:

IT WAS NOT A DIVISION.

Here is an error

Yep.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /LSSAH.htm

Note the term "SS-Brigaden"? Do you comprehend "brigade"?

Anfang Dezember 1941 bezog sie Stellungen nördlich von Tanganrog bei Ssambek, wo sie bis zum 24. Mai 1942 verblieb. Anschließend wurde sie zum Küstenschutz in den Raum Mariupol ans Asowsche Meer verlegt. Ab dem 1. Juli 1942 begann die Verlegung nach Frankreich. Hier wurde die Brigade zur SS-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler umgewandelt.

July 11, Hitler ordered the transfer of the division to France. Other listed divisions are torn from the offensive in the south and transferred for defense to the "Center" group. And this was Hitler's mistake.

Oh good Christ...so Hitler ordered the transfer of the "division" (actually BRIGADE) to France on 11 July? After the BRIGADE was already in route for ten days and most of it had already arrived in France? Not only is your fantasy Hitler working for STAVKA, he's also a Time Lord.

Meanwhile, "other listed divisions"? To repeat, SS-LSAH was not a division. So it cannot be one of the plural "divisions". The only other division "listed" was Inf.Div. GD, sent to prevent the collapse of 9. A.O.K.

[xsli]

Somehow I do agree with ljadw on LL is the least important in the three. Without it, Soviet probably will survive as long as the other two remain. This is not to complicated even one does not rely on Mark Harrison or his supporters. Just look at the LL "flow-rate" and the eastern front battlefield in 1942-1943.7. The red army strength is ~9 million throughout in the period despite heavy losses. For the bigger part of the year and the battlefronts except for the South, Soviet was more aggressive due to its numerical advantage and improved logistics and munition supplies. In 1942 the German operation blue is the most ambitious, I have read quite a bit about it - seems there is little chance that the Germans could achieve either goal of Stalingrad or Caucasus - even the Soviets do not have the LL supplies/weapons. It is hard to convert the impact of 10% or so extra weaponry into something tangible. Poor commanding would do far more damage than the ~10% munition difference.

After Battle of Stalingrad, there is absolutely no hope for the Germans to conquer the Soviets even if the LL is cut off as the diversion of resources to the west and to the NA/Italy is looming large. Without LL, Soviets could have taken a more defensive position to hold off limited German Attack. It is hard to see big German gains within a 6-8 months time frame.

On the other hand, without the bombing war / the landing, the Soviet will be more threatened as the Soviet economy + LL "flow-rate" is no match to the German resources from the most of the continent. The high casualty rate of the red army is not sustainable in a long war.

[MarkN]

1) Wrong,or , to use your favourite expression ; garbage .

The Blitzkrieg Legend P 33 :

From a total of 157 divisions on 10 may 1940,77 were fit for attack and defense,29 were only partially operational,28 were only good for defense, 9 only partially ready for defense,9 security divisions and 5 were still forming .

Think before you post!

10 May 1940 is NOT June 1940 when the Germans had completed Fall Gelb and stood at Calais.

Nor is 10 May 1940 the summer of 1940 when the Germans - after completing Fall Rot - were planning and organising Seelowe.

Why don't you offer a set of numbers for some other random date that you can find with a quick google?

Also, the numbers are irrelevant without your expert analysis of whether they were "first rate" or "second rang" or other random quality you attach.

2 ) Also garbage : the Home Forces were strong enough to eliminate the few German units (less than a division ) that would be able to land the first day .

Is that your opinion?

The British Army, the RAF and the RN were stronger than the forces from Das Heer, Die LW and Die KM that would be available for Sealion .

What is that based upon?

Have you done a thorough analysis of which divisions were "first rate", "second rang" and so on?

Or is it your random nonsense along the same lines that the 5 Italian divisions (mostly incomplete) remaining in Tripolitania after Op Compass were stronger than the 15 or so divisions that existed in Libya before Op Compass began?

4 ) It is obvious that you don't know the difference between offensive and defensive strength . The same British forces that in 1940 would easily eliminate the Germans that would try to invade, would be unable to launch a successful landing, even if the German forces in the West would be only a fraction of what they were in may/june 1940 . There were no 100 German divisions needed in june 1940 to prevent a British landing,20 would suffice, but there were 100 + German divisions needed in june 1940 to defeat an Allied landing, because meanwhile the Allies had become much more stronger .

Garbage. In the same sentence you start with 100 divisions not needed and by the middle of the same sentence you say 100+ divisions are needed.

I can only suppose that your analysis and conclusions are based upon a quick glance of wargamers manual to all things military to find your 'force factor' and then a throw of the dice. Thus 'Second rang' British division has force factor of 3, throw of dice is 5, so total score 15 = Op Seelowe failure.

[ljadw]

On 25 june 1940 the German army and the LW were less strong than on 10 may,due to the heavy losses they had suffered in men and weapons, supplies....:more than 150000 men, more than 1200 aircraft, more than 700 tanks, airborne units decimated and out of action ...

And on 1 june Britain had 831 tanks (without the obsolescent types) : source : Hyper War : the Defense of the UK P 124 ....

[ljadw]

Somehow I do agree with ljadw on LL is the least important in the three. Without it, Soviet probably will survive as long as the other two remain. This is not to complicated even one does not rely on Mark Harrison or his supporters. Just look at the LL "flow-rate" and the eastern front battlefield in 1942-1943.7. The red army strength is ~9 million throughout in the period despite heavy losses. For the bigger part of the year and the battlefronts except for the South, Soviet was more aggressive due to its numerical advantage and improved logistics and munition supplies. In 1942 the German operation blue is the most ambitious, I have read quite a bit about it - seems there is little chance that the Germans could achieve either goal of Stalingrad or Caucasus - even the Soviets do not have the LL supplies/weapons. It is hard to convert the impact of 10% or so extra weaponry into something tangible. Poor commanding would do far more damage than the ~10% munition difference.

After Battle of Stalingrad, there is absolutely no hope for the Germans to conquer the Soviets even if the LL is cut off as the diversion of resources to the west and to the NA/Italy is looming large. Without LL, Soviets could have taken a more defensive position to hold off limited German Attack. It is hard to see big German gains within a 6-8 months time frame.

On the other hand, without the bombing war / the landing, the Soviet will be more threatened as the Soviet economy + LL "flow-rate" is no match to the German resources from the most of the continent. The high casualty rate of the red army is not sustainable in a long war.

Hm : there was a long war, with a high casualty rate of the red army .

OTOH ground and air war were more important .

But ,what nobody is thinking about, or most people are refusing to admit is that without air/ground war, LL the Soviets also would have won :the presence of Britain/France and the potential danger that they would intervene would help the Soviets as much as their real intervention in the HTL .

[MarkN]

On 25 june 1940 the German army and the LW were less strong than on 10 may,due to the heavy losses they had suffered in men and weapons, supplies....:more than 150000 men, more than 1200 aircraft, more than 700 tanks, airborne units decimated and out of action ...

What was the state of the German forces on 1 June when they could have decided to (try to) remove Britain from the orbat rather than the French?
How many "first rate" divisions, how many "second rang" etc etc.?

What was the state of the German forces at the end of June after they had removed the French from the orbat through Fall Rot?
How many "first rate" divisions, how many "second rang" etc etc.?

What was the state of the German forces in September when Seelowe was due to kick off?
How many "first rate" divisions, how many "second rang" etc etc.?

The 10 May data is irrelevant.

And on 1 june Britain had 831 tanks (without the obsolescent types) : source : Hyper War : the Defense of the UK P 124 ....

You previously wrote...

3 ) Not only your knowledge of the WM, but also that of the British forces consists mainly of gaps .

Now I accept I have gaps in my knowledge. Perhaps you can fill one of them since you seem to believe your knowledge is far greater than mine.

Page 124, The Defence of the UK by Basil Collier, HMSO, 1957 states:

The departure of the 1st Armoured Division had left Home Forces with some 160 light tanks, armed solely with machine-guns and therefore of little value for the purpose; and although there were in the country hundreds of other tanks of various classes (and in various states of repair), they would be of no use until they had been taken up by effective fighting units.

The tanks of 1st Armoured Division left the UK 22-25 May 1940. The 1st Armoured Division was still in France on 1 June 1940. Can you please explain how the tanks that Basil Collier describes as of no use until they had been taken up by effective fighting units and in various states of repair would be of use. What types were they? What operational capabilities and effectiveness? Were they "first rate" tanks or "second rang"?

The problem with your posts is all you do is quote numbers that you have googled. You see a big number and think: wow!!!!

Since my knowledge is full of gaps, can you please explain what these 831 tanks looked like, what they could do, how effective they were, who had them? You see, the text on p.124 from the source that you quoted suggested only 160 light tanks were held by Home Forces - tanks which were "of little value". Yet, 8 days later the number 831 pops up. If the 160 tanks with units were "of little value", what value were the 670 tanks that were not thought to be allocated to fighting units 8 days earlier?

[Richard Anderson]

And on 1 june Britain had 831 tanks (without the obsolescent types) : source : Hyper War : the Defense of the UK P 124 ....

Sigh. As of 1 July 1940, the British had completed 401 Cruiser, 297 Infantry, and 1,322 Light tanks. There were 137 Cruiser and 275 Light tanks in Egypt. There were 134 Cruiser, 120 Infantry, and 321 Light tanks lost in France. That left 130 Cruiser, 177 Infantry, and 726 Light tanks in Britain. Of those, all the Light tanks were considered obsolescent or near obsolescent. Thus, Britain had 307 tanks (without the obsolescent types) as of 1 July 1940.

By 1 October they were in better shape, which is what is relevant regarding a possible German invasion.

[MarkN]

And on 1 june Britain had 831 tanks (without the obsolescent types) : source : Hyper War : the Defense of the UK P 124 ....

Sigh. As of 1 July 1940, the British had completed 401 Cruiser, 297 Infantry, and 1,322 Light tanks. There were 137 Cruiser and 275 Light tanks in Egypt. There were 134 Cruiser, 120 Infantry, and 321 Light tanks lost in France. That left 130 Cruiser, 177 Infantry, and 726 Light tanks in Britain. Of those, all the Light tanks were considered obsolescent or near obsolescent. Thus, Britain had 307 tanks (without the obsolescent types) as of 1 July 1940.

By 1 October they were in better shape, which is what is relevant regarding a possible German invasion.

Sorry Richard Anderson but, despite the obvious gaps in my knowledge regarding this matter, gaps that are so large even ljadw can spot them, I have to quibble your numbers a bit.

By the end of June 1940, I have the following:-

Light tanks Mk. II-V (incl. prototypes):
162 produced, about 56 in ME, about 40 in India, none lost in France = total remaining UK 66 (completely obsolete)

Light tanks Mk. VI series:
1322 produced, 172 in ME, 126 in India, 407 lost in France = total remaining UK 617 (operationally obsolete)

Cruiser tanks Mk.I-IV:
401 produced, 68 in ME, 158 lost in France = total remaining UK 175

Infantry tanks Mk.I-III:
297 produced, none in ME, 126 lost in France = total remaining UK 171 (40 of which are the operationally impressive Mk.I !!)

The above figures do not allow for any tanks being lost at any time other than those in France May-June 1940. I have also not included the completely obsolete Medium tanks.

The numbers also include 18 Light, 59 Cruiser and 57 Infantry tanks (136 total) delivered from factory during the month of June.

I think you moved the WS.4 convoy early to the ME and your French losses seem a bit off.

[jesk]

With age you didn't become cleverer.

Nor with repetitive nonsense do you.

Germans couldn't not take the Caucasus, and... figures, documents aren't necessary. Just Hitler has stolen the whole army.

At me all is logical, it is co-ordinated with German sources. Hitler barred the use of a huge 11 army in the offensive in the Caucasus. And this decision saved the Russians from the loss of the Caucasus.

Order of battle (24 June 1942)

At the disposal of the 11. Armee
- Befehlshaber d. Landengen
LIV. Armeekorps
- 1/3 46. Infanterie-Division (in transit)
- 1/3 132. Infanterie-Division + 1/3 46. Infanterie-Division
- 24. Infanterie-Division
- 22. Infanterie-Division + 1/3 73. Infanterie-Division
- 50. Infanterie-Division + 1/3 46. Infanterie-Division
- Romanian 4th Mountain Division
Romainian Mountain Corps
- Romanian 18th Infantry Division
- Romanian 1st Mountain Division
XXX. Armeekorps
- 72. Infanterie-Division
- 170. Infanterie-Division
- 28. leichte Infanterie-Division + 1 Regiment 213. Sicherungs-Division + 1 Regiment 444. Sicherungs-Division
- 1/3 125. Infanterie-Division
- Stab Schröder with 1 Regiment 444. Sicherungs-Division
Gruppe Mattenklott (XXXXII. Armeekorps)
- Gruppe Ritter (Küstenschutz)
- Romanian 8th Cavalry Division
- Romanian 10th Infantry Division
- Romanian 19th Infantry Division
- Romanian Motorized Regiment
- 22. Panzer-Division (part)
- 1/3 132. Infanterie-Division

I see you are not even interested in another story, except how to calculate the division's inability and many other accompanying figures. The division has 10 tanks, 100 guns, 56 mortars, 2,190 soldiers, 300 drivers and you enjoy in such a very limited ocean of history. It is wrong. You have 10% of a picture of history, the rest is just invented.

I see you decided to avoid addressing the nonsense regarding Inf.Div. GD and choose instead to focus on the nonsense regarding SS-LSAH. You also seem to have a problem understanding a simple concept:

IT WAS NOT A DIVISION.

Here is an error

Yep.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /LSSAH.htm

Note the term "SS-Brigaden"? Do you comprehend "brigade"?

Anfang Dezember 1941 bezog sie Stellungen nördlich von Tanganrog bei Ssambek, wo sie bis zum 24. Mai 1942 verblieb. Anschließend wurde sie zum Küstenschutz in den Raum Mariupol ans Asowsche Meer verlegt. Ab dem 1. Juli 1942 begann die Verlegung nach Frankreich. Hier wurde die Brigade zur SS-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler umgewandelt.

Oh good Christ...so Hitler ordered the transfer of the "division" (actually BRIGADE) to France on 11 July? After the BRIGADE was already in route for ten days and most of it had already arrived in France? Not only is your fantasy Hitler working for STAVKA, he's also a Time Lord.

But in January the decision on reorganization of a division has been made. By July if it wasn't called a division yet, there were all signs that. The Russian sources speak about July 11, date of the order of transfer to the west.

https://wiki2.org/ru/Лейб-штандарт_СС_Адольфа_Гитлера
In May and June, the highest political and military leadership of the Allies actively worked out a plan to open a "second front" in northern France in the summer and fall of 1942 (later, it was decided to abandon it in favor of the operation "Torch" in North Africa) [40]. German intelligence informed Hitler about the military preparations of the allies, and they decided to strengthen the Army Group "D", which carries out occupation functions in France, Belgium and Holland.

July 11, 1942, Hitler gave the order to transfer the "Leibstandard SS Adolf Hitler" to France.

By July 15, the "Leibstandard SS" was finally formed regiments (before that there were only battalions). In the 1st Infantry Regiment of the "Leibstandart Adolf Hitler" Obersturmbannführer Fritz De Witt entered the 1st and 3rd battalions, and in the 2nd regiment of the SS Obersturmbannführer Theodor Vish - 2nd and 5th Battalions, Part 4 battalion were distributed between the two regiments. The tank battalion was deployed in a tank regiment under the command of SS Sturmbannführer Georg Schoenberger.

In the west, the headquarters of the SS Corps of the SS Paulus Hausser was organized, and three motorized SS divisions were transferred there from the Eastern Front: the Leibstandard SS Adolphe Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf [41].

Meanwhile, "other listed divisions"? To repeat, SS-LSAH was not a division. So it cannot be one of the plural "divisions". The only other division "listed" was Inf.Div. GD, sent to prevent the collapse of 9. A.O.K.

To a collapse in 1942, 9 army was far. Hitler strongly weakened the Caucasian direction. He still has directed the Italian mountain rifle corps under Stalingrad. From mountains to the steppe.

2nd Tridentina Alpine Division
3rd Julia Alpine Division
4th Cuneense Alpine Division

[jesk]

Britain in 1940 on the eve of a probable invasion.

http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1297078341.php

What could England oppose to the Hitlerites of those days? Could she withstand the decisive onslaught of the armed forces of the German Wehrmacht? Of course, no. Moreover, the British armies that threw first-class weapons-tanks, artillery, ammunition, rifles-on the seaboard at Dunkirk were, as Churchill acknowledged, almost completely unarmed.

"Actually throughout the country," Churchill recalled bitterly, "there were hardly 500 field guns of all types and 200 medium and heavy tanks." In the air force in combat readiness was 446 fighters and 491 bombers.
One can not but conclude that in July-August 1940, a small number of British aircraft with insufficiently experienced flight personnel, in which there was a great shortage, could not adequately counter the massive raids of the German air force. It would take months before the British factories could make up for what was lost. Strictly speaking, in June-July 1940, there was no land army in England in its modern sense. Demoralized, disarmed divisions, to Dunkirk, which formed the backbone of the British army, demanded complete reorganization and armament.

True, in the summer of 1940, small garrisons were scattered on the British Isles, but their armament and equipment were very weak. By the end of June, there were only a few well-trained divisions and brigades. However, weapons and equipment were not enough even for one tank division.
Although local defense forces were established in the country, they at best had rifles of outdated design and machine guns. Hundreds of thousands of Englishmen, ready to defend their homes, had only hunting rifles, old muskets, cold steel, ranging from forks to knives. The English people were more armed with enthusiasm than with weapons.

According to the intelligence of the German General Staff, in early August 1940 the British army had 13-14 divisions on the coast for the defense of the south of the country. The total number of the active army was estimated at 320,000 men, the reserve army - 100,000 instructors and 900,000 possible recruits. In fact, according to Churchill's data of August 1940, eight divisions were concentrated on the entire southern coast of England. In the second half of September, following extraordinary measures to form new formations, the British command had 16 divisions on a broad front of the southern coast, of which three were armored.

[Richard Anderson]

And on 1 june Britain had 831 tanks (without the obsolescent types) : source : Hyper War : the Defense of the UK P 124 ....

Sigh. As of 1 July 1940, the British had completed 401 Cruiser, 297 Infantry, and 1,322 Light tanks. There were 137 Cruiser and 275 Light tanks in Egypt. There were 134 Cruiser, 120 Infantry, and 321 Light tanks lost in France. That left 130 Cruiser, 177 Infantry, and 726 Light tanks in Britain. Of those, all the Light tanks were considered obsolescent or near obsolescent. Thus, Britain had 307 tanks (without the obsolescent types) as of 1 July 1940.

By 1 October they were in better shape, which is what is relevant regarding a possible German invasion.

Sorry Richard Anderson but, despite the obvious gaps in my knowledge regarding this matter, gaps that are so large even ljadw can spot them, I have to quibble your numbers a bit.

Gaps? I don't need no stinking gaps.

By the end of June 1940, I have the following:-

Light tanks Mk. II-V (incl. prototypes):
162 produced, about 56 in ME, about 40 in India, none lost in France = total remaining UK 66 (completely obsolete)

I did not include them because they were too "second rang". And Indian tanks are definitely "second rang".

Light tanks Mk. VI series:
1322 produced, 172 in ME, 126 in India, 407 lost in France = total remaining UK 617 (operationally obsolete)

Thanks for the Indian data. I thought they were there, but never found numbers. So of the first "second rang" then.

Cruiser tanks Mk.I-IV:
401 produced, 68 in ME, 158 lost in France = total remaining UK 175

Infantry tanks Mk.I-III:
297 produced, none in ME, 126 lost in France = total remaining UK 171 (40 of which are the operationally impressive Mk.I !!)

The above figures do not allow for any tanks being lost at any time other than those in France May-June 1940. I have also not included the completely obsolete Medium tanks.

The numbers also include 18 Light, 59 Cruiser and 57 Infantry tanks (136 total) delivered from factory during the month of June.

I think you moved the WS.4 convoy early to the ME and your French losses seem a bit off.

I did indeed forget to subtract the Winston Special. I see I also typed "120" instead of "126" for the loss of I tanks in France...I plead bleary eyes early in the morning. The other losses are odd though. I took them from the R.A.C. Half-yearly reports. Although I forgot the Norwegian loss. Viz.:

3/1941 - 9/1941: Appendix 'M'

Losses of A.F.Vs in France [1940]

Light tanks: Mk VIB 345, Mk VIC 62
Cruiser tanks: Mk I 6, Mk I CS 18, Mk II 31, Mk III 38. Mk IV 57, Mk IVA 8
Infantry tanks: [Matilda] Mk I 97. [Matilda] Mk II 29

Guy armoured car Mk I 6, scout cars 124

Losses in Norway [1940] Light tank Mk VI 1