Question About Western Contribution to the War

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MarkN
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#91

Post by MarkN » 06 Jan 2018, 13:28

Richard Anderson wrote:Gaps? I don't need no stinking gaps. :lol:
Have you noticed how Britischers are obsessed with their gaps? Especially the Little Englander ones. You visit London as a tourist and you take the city transport. Non stop you have this electronic voice warning the locals to "mind your gap, mind your gap, ...". :lol:
Richard Anderson wrote:I did not include them because they were too "second rang". And Indian tanks are definitely "second rang".
I included them because, I believe, they are included in ljadw's confirmation bias google data hunt. At least that's what the source document would suggest. For example, the data offered by ljadw also includes the mild steel prototypes of the Light Tank Mk.II/III/IV/V !!!! I'm looking forward to his/her knowledge-based answer as to what fighting effectives value these tanks possessed. Was it "first rate", "second rang" or ????

Where has he/she got to now? I was hoping he/she would come back with some of his/her expert knowledge to help fill the obvious gaps in my knowledge.
Richard Anderson wrote:Thanks for the Indian data. I thought they were there, but never found numbers. So of the first "second rang" then.
The 126 noted for India are ones ordered by the Colonial Office for the Indian Army. There may well have been others sent to India from WO orders.

Reconciling the tank state during the summer of 1940 is a hopeless task. Why? Because the data kept by the WO - especiacially SD.7/AFV - is fragmentory to non-existant and each document contradicts every other. Some of the data contained in the RAC half yearly reports I can demonstrate as being manifestly wrong.

Nevertheless, a series of 'tank states' in various formats existed to help planners plan the defence of GB and leaders (mainly the PM) to understand the problem. Some of the data included is pure fantasy and is a rather embarrasing indictment of the quality of the (average) British staff officer. Some of the errors were picked up and queried, but most were just accepted.

Post war, when the official historians started to do their research, the contradictions and errors were pointed out and clarification sought. This lead to another round of staff officer fudges and fantasy calculations to try and come up with an official set of 'accurate' numbers. For example, the numbers posted by ljadw come from Basil Collier's The Defence of the UK, HMSO, 1957 with the commentary "According to a statement furnished by the War Office in May, 1947, the numbers of armoured fighting vehicles held by units in the United Kingdom (including depots and training units) on 1st June, 1940, were as follows:". The information he references as coming from: File H.S. 47, Annex VII, enclosure dated 9 February 1955 and table attached to it (Cabinet Office, Brig. Latham). I have a copy of the original note and attached data table from the Assistant Quarter-Master-General to Latham dated 28 May 1947. So I know what the basic data posted by ljadw includes and excludes. I bet my gap is smaller than ljadw's void in knowledge.

The Assistant Quarter-Master-General's note contains the words: "[the numbers] were extracted from the War Office Monthly Distribution Statement as at 1st June 1940". He later states that this data has been checked and "confirmed". All well and good so far?

However, 5 months later, October 1947, in response to another author's request for information, Latham responds with a different set of information. The file also includes his notes where he takes the numbers given 5 months earlier by the Assistant Quarter-Master-General, crosses them out, and replaces them with others!

Then, in January 1948, another author - the Australian Chester Wilmot - writes to say that all the numbers provided don't add up and can it all be rechecked and reconfirmed for his book(s).

The circle comes round AGAIN in late 1949 when Ellis queries the figures once more...

Back to (Vickers) Light Tanks for a moment. Have you noticed that there is no single definitive answer as to how many were produced of each type? Several coffee-table glossy books claim definitive answers, but well researched and written books by credible historians duck the answer.

****
Edited to correct and add.
The number of India Pattern Light Tank VI.b ordered by the Colonial Office for the Indian Army was 136 not 126. My bad. Please adjust calculations accordingly. In addition, 10 Light Tank VI.a were ordered by the War Office on behalf of Australia. These are rightly included in the production totals too but ought to be reduced from the 'remaining in UK' number.

ljadw
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#92

Post by ljadw » 06 Jan 2018, 18:11

The Light Tank MK II,III, IV, V prototypes had as much value as the Pz I and II and the Pz Bef.


Richard Anderson
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#93

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jan 2018, 19:30

MarkN wrote:Have you noticed how Britischers are obsessed with their gaps? Especially the Little Englander ones. You visit London as a tourist and you take the city transport. Non stop you have this electronic voice warning the locals to "mind your gap, mind your gap, ...". :lol:
Britisher? Not me, I'm 'Murican and I believe ljadw is some form of Continental creature. Meanwhile, London Underground must have changed their message, since I remember it as "mind the gap..." :lol:
Richard Anderson wrote:I included them because, I believe, they are included in ljadw's confirmation bias google data hunt. At least that's what the source document would suggest. For example, the data offered by ljadw also includes the mild steel prototypes of the Light Tank Mk.II/III/IV/V !!!! I'm looking forward to his/her knowledge-based answer as to what fighting effectives value these tanks possessed. Was it "first rate", "second rang" or ????

Where has he/she got to now? I was hoping he/she would come back with some of his/her expert knowledge to help fill the obvious gaps in my knowledge.
He did weigh in on the combat effectiveness of the "second rang" British light tanks, just a few minutes ago. According to him they are of the same "rang" as the German Pz I, II, and Befehl. Although how you equate a fighting tanks effectiveness with a command tanks effectiveness is beyond me. :roll:
The 126 noted for India are ones ordered by the Colonial Office for the Indian Army. There may well have been others sent to India from WO orders. (snip excellent detail)
Thanks for the information. I miss getting to Kew, its been over ten years now. I've suspected there were problems with the accepted data for some time, ever since I went through some of the CAB production figures, which are quite a muddle. They can't seem to agree on even a simple pro forma, instead changing categories and nomenclature at will. However, to be fair, it is not really much different from the muddled state of affairs with regards to American tank inventory data.
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MarkN
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#94

Post by MarkN » 06 Jan 2018, 20:39

Richard Anderson wrote: since I remember it as "mind the gap..." :lol:
You weren't listening properly. :lol:
Richard Anderson wrote: He did weigh in on the combat effectiveness of the "second rang" British light tanks, just a few minutes ago. According to him they are of the same "rang" as the German Pz I, II, and Befehl. Although how you equate a fighting tanks effectiveness with a command tanks effectiveness is beyond me. :roll:
Very true.

However, I have found original documentation noting a similar form of evaluation. From Greiner OKW WFSt KTB. Notice divisions referred to as "1. Klasse". Perhaps ljadw is onto something after all. :roll:

Image
Richard Anderson wrote: Thanks for the information. I miss getting to Kew, its been over ten years now. I've suspected there were problems with the accepted data for some time, ever since I went through some of the CAB production figures, which are quite a muddle. They can't seem to agree on even a simple pro forma, instead changing categories and nomenclature at will. However, to be fair, it is not really much different from the muddled state of affairs with regards to American tank inventory data.
The British 'tank' story - its failings etc - is well documented and written about. The idea that nobody seems to have been able to keep decent records of what they were doing is hardly a surprise. The British military, in particular the War Office, were geared towards peacetime colonial policing with the odd sharp skirmish. Production data, delivery timetables etc etc are just not the done thing when one has to be preparing for the tiger shoot after croquet!

Chester Crocker's request for help flowed from being provided the same topical information from three different sources: War Office, Ministry of Supply and post-war Cabinet Office Historical Section. How many tanks? Each set of data was different!!!!

I have some MoS (Ministry of Supply) data for the time period (1939-40). Interested?

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#95

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jan 2018, 21:06

jesk wrote:At me all is logical, it is co-ordinated with German sources. Hitler barred the use of a huge 11 army in the offensive in the Caucasus. And this decision saved the Russians from the loss of the Caucasus.
I know anything is logical for you if it feeds your fantasies. That "huge" army was not "barred" by Hitler from doing anything. It was tasked by Hitler to secure the Crimean peninsula and seizing Sevastapol, in order to secure the southern flank of BLAU. Thus, it was an integral part of BLAU.

Meanwhile, "huge"? As of 6 June 1942 it was 203,800 strong, which includes major elements of 3d Rumanian Army that made up about one-quarter of the total.
July 11, 1942, Hitler gave the order to transfer the "Leibstandard SS Adolf Hitler" to France.
Yet again, how does Hitler "order" something that had been underway for ten days? LSSAH was in route to France on 1 July.
By July 15, the "Leibstandard SS" was finally formed regiments (before that there were only battalions). In the 1st Infantry Regiment of the "Leibstandart Adolf Hitler" Obersturmbannführer Fritz De Witt entered the 1st and 3rd battalions, and in the 2nd regiment of the SS Obersturmbannführer Theodor Vish - 2nd and 5th Battalions, Part 4 battalion were distributed between the two regiments. The tank battalion was deployed in a tank regiment under the command of SS Sturmbannführer Georg Schoenberger.
Uh, no, sorry, but that is wrong too. 1. Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was organized with I., III., and elements of IV. Bataillon and 2. Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was organized with II., V., and elements of IV. Bataillon of LSSAH on 5 July 1942. In Normandy. You know, the Normandy in France?

The orders for the formation of the 1. SS-Panzer Abteilung were on 28 January and it began organizing at Wildflecken on 1 February 1942 from elements of the Stu.G.-Batterien and Pz.Jg. Kompanien. It joined the rest of the nascent division, now titled SS-Division (mot.) 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler', in France around 15 July. Panzer-Regiment Leibstandarte SSAH was then organized in July from the three-company 1. SS-Panzer Abteilung and the Stu.G.-Batterien and Pz.Jg. Kompanien. It was 22 October before it was reorganized as SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 LSSAH and completed equipping.

On 29 July, the existing elements of the new division paraded in Paris before going to its new training ground at Evreux - Melun - Fontainebleau. It completed training, organizing, and equipping there 24 November 1942, when it was renamed SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler".
In the west, the headquarters of the SS Corps of the SS Paulus Hausser was organized, and three motorized SS divisions were transferred there from the Eastern Front: the Leibstandard SS Adolphe Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf [41].
The SS-Korps was organized in the Netherlands in July, with SS-Reich going to France in the same month. Totenkopf did not go to France until October.
To a collapse in 1942, 9 army was far.
Not according to the Germans it wasn't. Zhukov's 4 August offensive opened a 30km-wide hole in the army front and penetrated 12 to 20 kilometers.
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 06 Jan 2018, 22:04, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#96

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jan 2018, 21:10

MarkN wrote:I have some MoS (Ministry of Supply) data for the time period (1939-40). Interested?
Sure! I'll trade you my CAB production spreadsheet if you like. It covers the CAB reports from November 1940 to May 1945 and is almost incomprehensible. :lol:
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#97

Post by MarkN » 06 Jan 2018, 22:02

Richard Anderson wrote:
MarkN wrote:I have some MoS (Ministry of Supply) data for the time period (1939-40). Interested?
Sure! I'll trade you my CAB production spreadsheet if you like. It covers the CAB reports from November 1940 to May 1945 and is almost incomprehensible. :lol:
Thanks for the offer, but I suspect I already have all the data that interests me on your spreadsheet. If you insist on trading, I'm sure you have something on your HD I'd like. :wink:

The file is AVIA 22/469. http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.u ... r/C2184631

Just under 100 pages. about 150Mb total size. So give me a wee while to sort it out and upload it to my website. Data starts regarding Nov39 deliveries and goes up to Aug41. I'll PM you when it's ready.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#98

Post by jesk » 06 Jan 2018, 22:03

Richard Anderson wrote:
I know anything is logical for you if it feeds your fantasies. That "huge" army was not "barred" by Hitler from doing anything. It was tasked by Hitler to secure the Crimean peninsula and seizing Sevastapol, in order to secure the southern flank of BLAU. Thus, it was an integral part of BLAU.

Meanwhile, "huge"? As of 6 June 1942 it was 203,800 strong, which includes major elements of 3d Rumanian Army that made up about one-quarter of the total.
You did not understand. On July 11, the 11th Army's offensive on the Caucasus should have started. Hitler postponed the beginning of the offensive, on July 23, abolished. When I wrote a huge army, I meant the number of divisions. 13 German, 6 Romanian with many separate parts.
Yet again, how does Hitler "order" something that had been underway for ten days? LSSAH was in route to France on 1 July.
In my sources on July 11th. Who needs to believe?
Uh, no, sorry, but that is wrong too. 1. Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was organized with I., III., and elements of IV. Bataillon and 2. Infanterie-Regiment Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was organized with II., V., and elements of IV. Bataillon of LSSAH on 5 July 1942. In Normandy. You know, the Normandy in France?

The orders for the formation of the 1. SS-Panzer Abteilung were on 28 January and it began organizing at Wildflecken on 1 February 1942 from elements of the Stu.G.-Batterien and Pz.Jg. Kompanien. It joined the rest of the nascent division in France around 15 July. Panzer-Regiment Leibstandarte SSAH was then organized in July from the three-company 1. SS-Panzer Abteilung and the Stu.G.-Batterien and Pz.Jg. Kompanien. It was 22 October before it was reorganized as SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 LSSAH and completed equipping.

On 29 July, the existing elements of the new division paraded in Paris before going to its new training ground at Evreux - Melun - Fontainebleau. It completed training, organizing, and equipping there 24 November 1942, when it was renamed SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler".
This trifle will leave you. I only paid attention to Halder's regret, voiced on July 6, 1942, about the prohibition against the Leibstandarte from participating in attacks on the Russians.
Not according to the Germans it wasn't. Zhukov's 4 August offensive opened a 30km-wide hole in the army front and penetrated 12 to 20 kilometers.
The Germans loved counterblows. Elimination of incursions is one of the few opportunities to experience the feeling of a real war. Although not always it was justified. Alfred Jodl, speaking of the rout in Bagration, accused the commander of the army group "Center" Bush that he too far placed reserves from the front line. In those conditions it was impossible to count on a counterblow, only on counterattacks. The density of defense in 1942 near Moscow was much higher.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#99

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jan 2018, 22:22

MarkN wrote:Thanks for the offer, but I suspect I already have all the data that interests me on your spreadsheet. If you insist on trading, I'm sure you have something on your HD I'd like. :wink:
I'm sure you do, since I just realized I have been calling them CAB documents when in fact they are from AVIA... :o :lol: :roll:
The file is AVIA 22/469. http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.u ... r/C2184631

Just under 100 pages. about 150Mb total size. So give me a wee while to sort it out and upload it to my website. Data starts regarding Nov39 deliveries and goes up to Aug41. I'll PM you when it's ready.
That would be interesting, since I only have five pages (the summary charts) from it. I also have:

17 pages from AVIA 22/511 - the monthly summaries for May-December 1942
25 pages from AVIA 22/512 - the monthly summaries for January-December 1943
25 pages from AVIA 22/513 - the monthly summaries for January-December 1944
11 pages from AVIA 22/514 - the monthly summaries for January-May 1945

I remain curious regarding where the summaries for September 1941-April 1942 went. I suppose they have to be winkled out from the weekly reports in AVIA 22/504-507?
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#100

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jan 2018, 22:43

jesk wrote:You did not understand.
No, I understand quite well you have no idea what you are yammering on about.
On July 11, the 11th Army's offensive on the Caucasus should have started. Hitler postponed the beginning of the offensive, on July 23, abolished. When I wrote a huge army, I meant the number of divisions. 13 German, 6 Romanian with many separate parts.
On 11 July 1942, 11. A.O.K. was just finishing up its twin offensives to eliminate the Kerch bridgehead and the fortress of Sevastapol. Trappenjagd, completed 19 May, incurred 7,588 German and Rumanian casualties in forces that were already weak (each German division had a fehl of 1,750 to 2,300 men at the start of Störfang on 6 June). Störfang resulted in 27,412 more German and 8,454 more Romanian casualties. Illness also remained a problem, with 4,830 falling out sick in 11. A.O.K. in June alone. By 1 July, five of the divisions later transferred with 11. A.O.K. to Leningrad had a combined fehl of 23,820 (about 1/3 their strength) and by 12 August had received replacements of just 16,650.

Meanwhile, it wasn't infantry formations from 11. A.O.K. that was lacking for a successful BLAU...it was mobile formations and sufficient logistics support.
In my sources on July 11th. Who needs to believe?
The numerous contradictory data points I pointed out? Or your single faulty source?
This trifle will leave you. I only paid attention to Halder's regret, voiced on July 6, 1942, about the prohibition against the Leibstandarte from participating in attacks on the Russians.
Yes, reality is a trifle always regretted by those immersed in fantasy.
The Germans loved counterblows.
Which required mobile forces. As in Inf.Div. GD and 19. and 20. Panzer, which were committed in those counterblows.
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#101

Post by ljadw » 06 Jan 2018, 23:02

For obvious reasons MarkN is inflating the German stength and underestimating the British strength . An old trick not unusual amongst british historians .

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#102

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jan 2018, 23:30

ljadw wrote:For obvious reasons MarkN is inflating the German stength and underestimating the British strength . An old trick not unusual amongst british historians .
Where? When? Which post? Is he inflating it the way that you inflated British strength by including obsolete tanks and tanks trapped in France? :roll:
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#103

Post by jesk » 07 Jan 2018, 09:24

Richard Anderson wrote:
No, I understand quite well you have no idea what you are yammering on about.
You are trying to replace decisions with statements about the inability of divisions. The same was with the divisions in France, they all turned out to be terribly manned and the Germans simply did not have the opportunity to enter them immediately into battle. Only when ready ...
On 11 July 1942, 11. A.O.K. was just finishing up its twin offensives to eliminate the Kerch bridgehead and the fortress of Sevastapol.
May 19 battles ended, with the exception of the remnants of Soviet troops in the quarries.

http://www.volk59.narod.ru/kerch1942.htm
In the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Supreme Command ordered:

"Kerch does not surrender, organize defense according to the type of Sevastopol."

However, already on May 16, 1942 the German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. On May 19, 1942, military operations on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, except for the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkay quarries.

Of the 250,000 fighters and commanders of the Crimean front, 162,282 people - 65% - were lost irrevocably during 12 days of fighting. German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in the "History of the Great Patriotic War":

It was not possible to conduct an evacuation in an organized manner: the enemy seized almost all our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol. "

Trappenjagd, completed 19 May, incurred 7,588 German and Rumanian casualties in forces that were already weak (each German division had a fehl of 1,750 to 2,300 men at the start of Störfang on 6 June). Störfang resulted in 27,412 more German and 8,454 more Romanian casualties. Illness also remained a problem, with 4,830 falling out sick in 11. A.O.K. in June alone. By 1 July, five of the divisions later transferred with 11. A.O.K. to Leningrad had a combined fehl of 23,820 (about 1/3 their strength) and by 12 August had received replacements of just 16,650.

Meanwhile, it wasn't infantry formations from 11. A.O.K. that was lacking for a successful BLAU...it was mobile formations and sufficient logistics support.
Logic is, but it is an attempt to falsify history. By July are not ready, went to Leningrad, there on August 12 received replenishment. And then have already restored fighting efficiency. Itself is not funny? :lol:
Which required mobile forces. As in Inf.Div. GD and 19. and 20. Panzer, which were committed in those counterblows.
In February 1943, the Germans themselves collapsed, cutting the front line, thereby freeing 21 divisions. The Russians actually attacked, trying to get the Germans to withdraw and strengthen the Stalingrad direction. Defeat near Moscow in the summer of 1942 is desirable for Germans.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#104

Post by jesk » 07 Jan 2018, 09:31

Richard Anderson, is forced to notice, already in a lot of posts you are engaged in a frank falsification of history. At you it as it correlates with the perverted craving for military statistics. At the exit falsification turns out. You would like these figures to explain everything, but they make up maybe only 10% of the picture of history.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#105

Post by ljadw » 07 Jan 2018, 14:11

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:For obvious reasons MarkN is inflating the German stength and underestimating the British strength . An old trick not unusual amongst british historians .
Where? When? Which post? Is he inflating it the way that you inflated British strength by including obsolete tanks and tanks trapped in France? :roll:

Where ? When ,

He used as argument that Hitler boasted to Petain about 186 German divisions first class in the spring of 1941.

His claim that in the summer of 1940 the German divisions were fully equipped and manned .

His claim that in the summer of 1940 the British Home Forces had only equipment for 4 divisions .

Note that German historians , including Frieser, are using the same tactic by claiming that the WM was in 1940 qualitatively /quantitatively weaker than the allies, but still won because of the genius of the Prussian von Manstein .

The truth (for Sealion ) is that ,even without the help of the RA/RN, the RAF was strong enough to prevent a German invasion, that the RN was strong enough to do this,without the help of the of the RAF/RA,and that the RA was strong enough to do it without the help of the RN/RAF .

Of course, people in Britain dislike to hear this, because it would destroy the myth that since 1940 is dominating the UK : the small group of pilots that saved Britain .

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