Soviet and German ammunition production

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Art
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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#31

Post by Art » 18 Aug 2021, 21:03

Similar, albeit somewhat different, figures from Shirokorad:
viewtopic.php?p=2249727#p2249727

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#32

Post by Art » 19 Aug 2021, 14:39

For illustration, purchase prices for weapons and ammunition in 1940:

76-mm regimental gun - 35,000 rubles (gun) + 16,420 rubles (caisson)
76-mm field gun mod. 1939 - 80,000 rubles (gun) + 18,600 (caisson)
vs.
82-mm mortar (without sights) - 6,750 rubles

122-mm field howitzer mod.1938 - 82,5000 (howitzer) + 17,000 (caisson)
vs.
120-mm mortar (without sights) - 15,000 rubles

As could be expected mortars were a way cheaper, especially if additional price of horses or tractors is considered, so economical advantage was obvious. On the other hand, the price of one piece of 76-mm HE ammunition was about 100 rubles, 122-mm HE - about 200 rubles. One artillery tube was expected to expend several thousand shots during its lifetime. That means that the price of ammunition expended by one gun/howitzer was several (up to ten) times bigger than its own price.


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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#33

Post by AriX » 19 Aug 2021, 22:03

Sheldrake wrote:
03 Oct 2020, 11:19
It appears a paradox that the Germans fired more ammunition from fewer artillery pieces than the Soviets, but the weapon of the artillery is the ammunition not the equipment that projects it.
Soviets had x3 times more field guns than Germans on Eastern Front. So, they needed to increase their production in x3 times to overrun Wehrmacht in ammo consumption per gun.
Its interesting that Soviets managed to do such a thing with mortat ammo expenditure.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#34

Post by Sheldrake » 20 Aug 2021, 00:33

AriX wrote:
19 Aug 2021, 22:03
Sheldrake wrote:
03 Oct 2020, 11:19
It appears a paradox that the Germans fired more ammunition from fewer artillery pieces than the Soviets, but the weapon of the artillery is the ammunition not the equipment that projects it.
Soviets had x3 times more field guns than Germans on Eastern Front. So, they needed to increase their production in x3 times to overrun Wehrmacht in ammo consumption per gun.
Its interesting that Soviets managed to do such a thing with mortat ammo expenditure.
Not sure I understand your point.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#35

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Aug 2021, 21:51

Art wrote:the price of one piece of 76-mm HE ammunition was about 100 rubles, 122-mm HE - about 200 rubles.
Interesting that the 122mm cost ~half the 76mm per weight of shell. I'd expect economy of scale but the extent is surprising here. Does anyone have data on, e.g., cost of 105mm vs. 150/155mm shells for Germany and US (or others)?

-------------------------------

One reason the SU produced so many more barrels per shell is that it used a lot more direct fire, and a lot more set-piece bombardment schemes. By comparison, German artillery was more flexible and could accurately fire under many more circumstances. For discussion, see e.g. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 2/id/1551/
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#36

Post by Art » 21 Aug 2021, 09:26

A HE round for 122-mm gun mod.1931 cost 370 rubles.
152-mm howitzer mod.1938 - about 300
152-mm gun-howitzer mod. 1937 - 350
152-mm gun BR-2 - 575

Howitzer rounds were consistently cheaper.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#37

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Aug 2021, 12:00

Art wrote:
21 Aug 2021, 09:26
A HE round for 122-mm gun mod.1931 cost 370 rubles.
152-mm howitzer mod.1938 - about 300
152-mm gun-howitzer mod. 1937 - 350
152-mm gun BR-2 - 575

Howitzer rounds were consistently cheaper.
Does that include propellant/casings or just shells? Howitzer shells had thinner side walls and probably less finely-manufactured ballistics because air resistance is less impactful on range over shorter trajectories(i.e. higher % of vacuum range at short ranges). So I'd expect a gun shell to be more expensive but surprised by a nearly 80% delta. The other likelihood is manufacturing economies of scale for the more-common howitzer shells.
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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#38

Post by Art » 04 Dec 2021, 10:17

Regarding the question "what were so many guns needed for?" From "General tactics based on the World War experience" by F. Kuhlmann from the section dealing with defense of positional warfare:
The strength of the automatic weapons is such that occupation of certain localities [within defense position] with machine guns and automatic rifles makes occupation of the others unnecassary. Thus, the trench lines are continuous but forces occupying them are situated discontinuously.
Of course, that doesn't mean a dispersed mass of single men, each of them having his own isolated mission, - that would negate the principle of command. Actually organic units (platoons, companies, battalions) are concentrated in the most important part of the their sector, while keeping only weak groups in other parts.
...
The resulting distribution of forces in depth and width, which pursues the goal of economy of forces, relies on two basic principles:
1) concentration at skillfully chosen flanking points for defense of the trench lines at the expense of other points
2) location of local reserves in points, most suitable for commitement of reserves either for reinforcement or for a counterattack.
The enemy cannot discover this dispostion either from his ground observation posts or using [aerial] photos; he cannot determine our weak and strong points, since we present to his observation only a confusing and continuous network of trenches, where no point is conspicious and all important points are carefully camouflaged. Consequently he has to shell the entire sector uniformly, expending n times more ammunition than it was strictly necessary, in other words producing the effect n times less than he could expect having exact information on disposition of defenders.
Summarizing that: the strength of automatic weapons meant that positions can be guarded by a relatively sparse force. This force protected itself from hostile artillery bombardment by "hiding a leaf in a forest", in other words by hiding within an extensive system of field fortifications, disproportionally large compared with the garrison strength. If the exact location of strongpoints within the defense position was unknown, then preliminary bombardment was to be made by shelling every meter of the trench, which required a huge number of guns and ammunition. Most importantly, the strength of bombardment and expenditure of ammunition were determined by the length of trenches not by the strength of their garrison. A section of trench occupied by 10 men required the same ammunition expenditure as the same section occupied by 100. Naturally, that was true only when enough time and labour was available for construction of position consisting of at least several continuous trench lines.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#39

Post by Art » 08 Dec 2021, 21:57

The Soviet post-war analysis commented on the number of guns needed for attack of prepared positions:
There are several methods of approximate calculation of artillery means needed for the artillery preparation [of attack]
..
Third method. Beginning from the summer operations of 1943 a third method of calculation started to be used. While this method evolved several times in the course of the war, its essence remained the same...This method was brought about by German transition to the trench system. Its essence was as follows:
The trench requires engagement along its entire length. Here engagement of some areas and engagement of single sections of the trench line does not reach the goal. The entire trench needs to be simultaneously and continuously covered by the artillery fire. We need to either demolish communications trenches or prevent movement along them, separate trenches, dismember them to isolated sections in order to facilitate attack on them and destruction of their garrison.
What density of bursts should be laid on the trench to make it fully suppressed? The most correct decision would be assigning the same number of artillery battalions as in calculation of the creeping barrage, i.e. 150-250 meters of frontage [per battalion], which creates a [continuous] killing area.
Thus 4-6 artillery battalions per 1 km of the front are needed for suppression of the first trench line. To this 2-3 battalions engaging every next trench lien should be added...
All is left to us to finish the question of the artillery density in the offensive operation is to reduce this notion to the common value - the number of guns per 1 km of the front. Suppression of personnel and weapons takes from 72 to 108 guns per 1 km of the front (when two trench lines are engaged simultaneously) or 108-132 guns when the entire closest depth of hostile defense is engaged. Struggle with hostile artillery, his command, supply organs and tactical reserves takes from 18 to 24 guns per 1 km of the front, destruction of targets in the forward line with direct fire - 12-15 guns. In sum the mean density of artillery in offensive operation makes from 100 to 140 guns per 1 km with average density and 140-170 guns - with increased density.
When the defender has fortifications of the permanent type or especially resistant fortifications of the field type, [additional] 12-16 guns per 1 km are needed.
In the final run the normal artillery density by the end of the Patriotic War was considered as 150-200 guns per 1 km of front.
From "Artillery offensive" by F.A. Samsonov (1946).

In other words a huge number of artillery pieces was needed to simultaneously engage two or three trench lines of the main battle position, this number easily made the largest part of artillery employed in the attack on field fortifications.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#40

Post by Art » 09 Dec 2021, 09:19

An example of planning from the report of the artillery commander of the 1st Belorussian Front general Kazakov on employment of artillery in the Warsaw-Lodz-Poznan operation (January 1945).

Number of fortifications and weapons revealed by observation and intelligence in the front's sector of breakthrough:
290 artillery batteries
178 mortar batteries
204 anti-tank and infantry guns
57 anti-aircraft batteries
245 log pillboxes
1191 weapons emplacements
289 heavy machine guns
406 dug-out shelters
154 observation points
310 kilometers of fighting and communication trenches

Required ammunition expenditure (in rounds of 122-mm ammunition)
310 kilometers of trenches (25 rounds per 10 meters) = 775,000
290 artillery batteries (160 rounds per battery) = 46,400
178 mortar batteries (160 rounds per battery) = 28,480
204 single guns (25 rounds per gun) = 3,064
57 anti-aircraft batteries (160 rounds per battery) - 9,120
245 pillboxes (x120 rounds) = 29,400
406 shelters (x120) = 48,720
154 observation points (x120) = 18,480
289 heavy machine guns (x25) = 7,225

Total for preparation - about 965,000 rounds

Preliminary attack - 122,760
Support of attack by creeping barrage - 170,035
Support of combat in depth of defense position - 134,234

Total expenditure on the 1st day of offensive - 1,393,360 122-mm rounds or 2,080,040 76-mm rounds
Actually planned - 1,793,900 rounds of all calibers (actual expenditure happened to be much smaller).
Expenditure of such amount of ammunition during 2 hours 35 minutes of artillery preparation required 5755 122-mm guns or 186 guns per kilometer (47 km frontage). Or 279 guns per kilometer when recalculated for 76-mm guns.

About 80% of all ammunition planned for the preparation was to be used to shell uniformly all trenches in the sector of attack. That required a huge expenditure of ammunition and correspondingly a huge number of guns to expend this ammunition in a relatively short preparation lasting not more than 2-3 hours. Obviously, this method couldn't be realized with a smaller number of artillery pieces. Creeping barrage was also expensive in terms of guns and ammunition required.

Obviously, the trench was an unrewarding target and the ratio of actual casualties inflicted per expended round was rather small.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#41

Post by Judge holden » 26 Mar 2022, 03:29

greetings. The source of the first post says,


''In total, 7.5 million tons of artillery shells, mines, rockets and engineering ammunition and 7.9 million tons were spent. air bombs - 15.4 million tons. against 17.9 million tons spent by the US armed forces in 1941-1945.''
while comparing vietnam war figures to WW2's.

did US armed forces actually consumed 17.9 million tons of munitions ?

https://i451.photobucket.com/albums/qq2 ... nition.png
this charts shows that usa produced 12.2 million tons of munitions between 1941-1945.
so Did the US have more than 5 million tons of ammunition stocks ? or used commonwealth ammunition along with its own ?

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#42

Post by Bottleship » 27 Aug 2022, 13:47

As far as I know, the Soviet figures for the production of ammunition, which are ~ 10 million tons, are compiled using figures for the number of wagons filled with ammunition, including all types of ammunition at once, as well as their packaging, and they are calculated using the maximum carrying capacity of the wagons, and not how busy they are. In addition, in the USSR there were cases when production was doubled due to the juggling of reports.
According to my calculations, in 1944 the USSR produced 600,000 tons of shells for the army and navy, about 500,000 tons of shells for mortars, and up to 300,000 tons of airbombs. Germany at that time fired over 1.5 million tons of shells and at least 615 thousand tons of airbombs. At the same time, one must take into account the fact that the USSR in 1941-1943 had a very low quality of armor-piercing shells, due to the fact that the carbon content and hardening were not maintained, as well as the fact that mortar shells were mainly made from cast iron, which significantly reduced efficiency. And, of course, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars cannot be compared in effectiveness with the German 75-mm and 150-mm infantry guns due to their much lower accuracy.
At the same time, the communists, of course, announced the success of the socialist economy in providing the army with ammunition - because, for the communists, the indicator of success was superiority over the Russian Empire during the First World War in terms of production and technology. At the same time, in fact, the increase in the amount of ammunition production occurred due to an increase in the range of ammunition and accounting for 25-45 mm ammunition. Compared with the beginning of 1917, the growth in the production of shells in the USSR in 1944, if we take into account not the quantity, but their weight, was small, about 1.5 times.
The USSR almost did not produce shells larger than 203 mm, only 9100 shells for 280 mm were fired in 1944, 210-mm shells for Br-17 guns were produced only in 1944 and only 4200 pieces, 305-mm shells for howitzers Br-18s were not produced at all - and the Br-18 howitzers themselves were also not used. Taking into account the production of 203-406 mm naval shells, the total production in the USSR of shells larger than 203 mm is about 20 thousand pieces in 1944, and 203-mm howitzer 176.8 thousand pieces. This is very small compared to the plans of the Russian Empire, and compared to Germany and the United States during the Second World War.
The USSR got the production of the Russian Empire, including new ones, which were supposed to produce 52.4 thousand tons of smokeless powder, 65.5 thousand tons of high explosives and 98.3 thousand tons of ammonium nitrate by the end of the First World War per year. After the war, it was planned to expand the production of gunpowder at the plants available by that time to 163.8 thousand tons, and it was also possible to build new plants. I have no plans for the production of explosives in Russia in the 1920s, but, in general, the production of explosives and gunpowder developed in a ratio of 2 to 1 to 1.5 to 1. According to various sources, the USSR in 1940 had the productivity of gunpowder factories 125 or 160 thousand tons, production of high explosives 135 thousand tons. I don’t know about the productivity of ammonium nitrate, at the beginning of the war with Germany, the USSR lost plants with a total capacity of 16.1 thousand tons per month, this is 193.2 thousand tons per year, that is, apparently, the total productivity was about 300 thousand tons per year .
At the same time, the USSR did not have any large-scale production of hexogen, in 1941-1945 only 7100 tons of hexogen were produced, of which only 1000 tons were produced using Soviet raw materials, the rest was imported, Germany produced 7100 tons of hexogen per month, the USA 15000 tons. The production of explosives in Germany in 1944 reached 51,000 tons per month, which is 612,000 tons per year, and this is at least 1.5 times more than the possible production of high explosives and ammonium nitrate in the USSR.
The production of smokeless powder in Germany in 1944 reached 24 thousand tons per month, which is 288 thousand tons per year, and this is 1.8-2.3 times more than the possible production in the USSR. At the same time, in 1940-41, the USSR discussed the need to expand the production of gunpowder to 300 thousand tons, as well as increase the production of explosives, but these plans could hardly be realized before 1944 or 45, and only if Germany did not attack the USSR.
As far as I know, Hitler refused the plan proposed to him to develop the military-industrial complex in preparation for a long war. Thus, even in a situation where the USSR and Germany do not fight in 1941-1945 and the USSR realizes its wishes by 1945, Germany by that time will also be able to produce much more ammunition than it produced in 1944.
And, I think, it is absolutely useless to compare the USSR with the USA. The maximum output of smokeless powder in the United States is 700 thousand tons per year, the maximum output of high explosives is 1143 thousand tons per year. At the same time, the United States at the end of the First World War had a capacity of up to 245 thousand tons of gunpowder and up to 260 thousand tons of high explosives. If the USSR by the beginning of the war in the production of gunpowder and high explosives had grown in comparison with the First World War by 2.4-3 times and 2 times, having spent 11 years of industrialization on this, then the United States much faster than the USSR increased productivity by 2.85 and 4.4 times.
At the same time, the USSR, due to the loss of production of raw materials for gunpowder in 1943-45, was not able to produce gunpowder on its own, without the supply of raw materials under Lend-Lease. At the same time, the own production of gunpowder in the USSR during the entire war amounted to 70% of deliveries to the army, another 30% of the finished gunpowder came under Lend-Lease, apparently, in 1944, about 40-50% of all gunpowder that was used by the USSR, was delivered under Lend-Lease. In assessing the production of explosives, it is difficult to say something concrete, because an explosion occurred at one of the Soviet factories and because of this, the total production of explosives in 1944 was significantly reduced, because of this, including the total share of deliveries of finished explosives through Land -lease turned out to be much more than it should have been, but the share of explosives produced in the USSR using imported raw materials decreased. In total, during the war, Lend-Lease provided the supply of about half of the explosives used by the USSR, including both ready-made explosives and raw materials.
Also, it is necessary to mention the production of cartridges. By the end of the First World War, Russia was supposed to produce 6 billion cartridges per year at four state-owned factories, in addition, private factories were still supposed to work, after the war, several cartridge factories in Germany and Turkey were to go to Russia, and also, the Russians were going to buy in the USA factories fulfilling Russian orders and transport them to Russia, thus obtaining a capacity of 12 billion rounds per year - given that the Russians wanted to use assault rifles in the army, this is not so much. Because of the revolution and the civil war, only 3 billion cartridges per year remained in Russia. The communists did almost nothing until 1939, in 1939-1941 new machines were installed that doubled productivity to 6 billion rounds per year. If the communists were able to fulfill the imperial program, excluding "bonuses" in the form of trophy factories, then they would have a capacity of about 16-20 billion rounds of ammunition per year. In 1944, the USSR produced 7.4 billion cartridges, of which about 3 billion were rifle cartridges, almost all the rest were pistol cartridges. Germany produced over 5 billion rounds of ammunition in 1944, of which 3.6 billion were rifle rounds. The United States, which at the end of the First World War had a capacity of ~ 3.3 billion rounds per year, produced 19.8 billion rounds in 1943.
Also, the USSR was several times behind Germany and the USA in the production of ammunition for automatic cannons, but I do not have sufficient data on this issue.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#43

Post by historygeek2021 » 27 Aug 2022, 22:24

Bottleship wrote:
27 Aug 2022, 13:47
As far as I know,
Can you please provide sources for your claims.

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Re: Soviet and German ammunition production

#44

Post by Art » 28 Aug 2022, 16:55

Bottleship wrote:
27 Aug 2022, 13:47
Also, it is necessary to mention the production of cartridges. By the end of the First World War, Russia was supposed to produce 6 billion cartridges per year at four state-owned factories, in addition, private factories were still supposed to work, after the war, several cartridge factories in Germany and Turkey were to go to Russia, and also, the Russians were going to buy in the USA factories fulfilling Russian orders and transport them to Russia, thus obtaining a capacity of 12 billion rounds per year
I join the question about the sources. According to Manikovsky the maximal montly output of cartridges in Russia was about 150 million, and the maximal annual output - about 1.5 billion (1916). That was far from 12 or even 6 billion.

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