Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

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EL KAISER
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Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by EL KAISER » 18 Dec 2018 09:06

Hi everyone! For the sources of what I say, I leave the links at the end of the post. But please, read ALL the text before answering. Thank you!

I personally believe that the WORST year in the war for the USSR was not 1941 but 1942, and therefore this year was for Germany ideal to deal a fatal damage to the USSR. Obviously the ideal thing was to have defeated it in 1941. But that didn’t happen. And of course, in the topic i’m referring to summer of 1942, not to the winter in the end of the year! Yet it seems that the VAST majority of people and historians regard the situation of Germany in 1942, even before Operation Case Blue began, as “hopeless” in the east alone, and sometimes even in the war as a whole, mainly because of the entry of the USA in the war, and because of the “failure” against the USSR. And I say “failure” because in this “failure” the USSR lost more than half of its steel, iron and coal resources. Three quarters of their economy was occupied or destroyed. Its army was completely decimated (they had a new one, but of equal skill).

In the economic field, Germany, even before Barbarossa, possessed a larger economy than that of the USSR (because of its conquests, no doubt) and by 1942 it surpassed the USSR by a factor of four in the production of coal, iron, steel, etc. Only in the production of oil the soviets produced twice as much as Germany. I’m very aware about the USSR producing much more tanks and AFVs, as well as artillery, but, again, the VAST majority of people ignores the fact that in the field of war production, not seen JUST in these basic weapons but including ALL types of military equipment, even the non-fighting equipment, Germany produced MUCH MORE war material than the USSR did, which is not surprising since its economy was much bigger. To give one simple example of this, Germany produced (during the whole war) 345.000 armored vehicles (I mean military cars, military motorcycles, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, demolition tanks, etc.), while the soviets almost none. Literally.

About the military field, the quality of its army remained much more professional than the soviet one. The Kharkov offensive in May 1942 is a good proof of this.

So, HOW TRUE is this view that Germany, in the east, could not defeat the soviets in a new major offensive? I'm not talking about a conquest victory, I know that’s out of question, I’m talking about the possibility of dealing the USSR a massive blow to force it, in the next year, to negotiate a peace, without a doubt favorable to Germany, or in any case prevent the USSR, and thus the allies, from ever achieving victory in the east.

If case blue had succeeded, for example, and cut off the oil fields of the Caucasus from the rest of USSR, I cannot imagine the USSR fighting for much longer. At the time the UK and USA relief convoys covered only 10% of soviet production and expenditure. As a side note, the great difference in manpower was highly compensated by the superiority of the average Germans soldier. Even in 1945 the Russian lost more soldiers and tanks than the Germans, even though by then their superiority in EVERY aspect was decisive and massive. Case Blue, a massive strategic failure for Germany, dealt more damage to the soviets than to the Germans (not strategically, of course) despite the russians having much more soldiers and tanks. And I think the main reason why it failed was not the soviet prowess in warfare, but the strategic blunders committed by Hitler in July 1942: Dividing the army, adding Stalingrad as a new, simultaneous and divergent strategic objective, sending Manstein to Leningrad instead of the Caucasus, weaken Army Group A to fortify Army Group B, whose objective was infinitely less important, etc. In short, I believe Case Blue, as ORIGINALLY perceived, COULD succeed.

So again, was Germany’s situation in the east in the summer of 1942 THAT bad as to consider the war in the east was lost for good?
Of course, i would like to hear diverse opinions, not only the predictable "germany was lost in the east in 1942". Those opinions are OBVIOUSLY welcomed, but i would like to read different points of view and its reasons.

German War Production (also of war-resources): https://ww2-weapons.com/german-arms-production/
Russian War Production (also of war-resources): https://ww2-weapons.com/russian-arms-production/
German AND Russian War Production (also of war-resources): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ ... ons_groups
German AND Russian resources Production (See Table 81): http://www.lago-colony.com/CRUDE_OIL_PR ... g_worl.htm

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 18 Dec 2018 11:28

Hi EK,

If you are really under the impression that ".....Germany produced (during the whole war) 345.000 armored vehicles (I mean military cars, military motorcycles, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, demolition tanks, etc.), while the soviets almost none. Literally." I would suggest that you may need to do a bit more reading, or to explain yourself better.

It is all very well asking for diverse other opinions, but it probably best to get your own ducks in order first!

Also, there was no war only between the USSR and Germany. The USSR was increasingly boosted by Lend-Lease from other Allies. Thus the USSR's situation (and Germany's relative to it) was never a simple equation between the two economies.

In 1942 Germany was already weakening. It had used up all its trained manpower reserves within two months of invading the USSR in 1941 and the Ostheer's numbers were in decline thereafter. In 1941 it had been able to launch a strategic offensive across the whole Eastern Front, but in 1942 it could only free resources to assault on the southern third of the front, and even then with the help of its allies. Germany might still have scraped a victory over the USSR in 1942, but its offensive capacity was weakening relative to its opponents. Really, Germany had to defeat the USSR in 1941 to save its war.

Sid

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by EL KAISER » 19 Dec 2018 07:22

Sid Guttridge wrote:
18 Dec 2018 11:28
Hi EK, If you are really under the impression that ".....Germany produced (during the whole war) 345.000 armored vehicles (I mean military cars, military motorcycles, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, demolition tanks, etc.), while the soviets almost none. Literally." I would suggest that you may need to do a bit more reading, or to explain yourself better.
What i meant to say is that Germany's war production was much bigger than the Soviet one. That's a reality. ANY statistic shows that. But if you ONLY focus on the following three weapons: airplanes, tanks and artillery, the soviet surpassed the german production by far. But i was not talking ONLY about those weapons, but about ANY KIND of military equipment (a military truck is a military equipment, even if it is not armed) For example, in 1942 Germany manufactured 49.707 military trucks and lorries, while the USSR 30.400.
Sid Guttridge wrote:
18 Dec 2018 11:28
, there was no war only between the USSR and Germany. The USSR was increasingly boosted by Lend-Lease from other Allies. Thus the USSR's situation (and Germany's relative to it) was never a simple equation between the two economies.
I already know there was no separate "german-soviet war", i meant the THEATER of war in the East. Besides, like i said, the USSR never needed the Lend-Lease help, which in 1942 covered only between 5 and 10% of their own production. The soviets won the war with THEIR production, not because of the help of the USA.
Sid Guttridge wrote:
18 Dec 2018 11:28
In 1942 Germany was already weakening. It had used up all its trained manpower reserves within two months of invading the USSR in 1941 and the Ostheer's numbers were in decline thereafter. In 1941 it had been able to launch a strategic offensive across the whole Eastern Front, but in 1942 it could only free resources to assault on the southern third of the front, and even then with the help of its allies. Germany might still have scraped a victory over the USSR in 1942, but its offensive capacity was weakening relative to its opponents. Really, Germany had to defeat the USSR in 1941 to save its war.
I could very well say the same about the USSR: Its army was ANNIHILATED in 1941. They built a new one, but its offensive capacity was not big. The Red army couldn't launch an offensive in the whole front (you said the same about Germany), as the offensives in January-February 1942 show, and it couldn't even break german lines in a single region, like the May offensive against Kharkov demonstrates. The German army, on the other hand, COULD do this.

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Max Payload » 21 Dec 2018 00:50

EL KAISER wrote:
19 Dec 2018 07:22
... the USSR never needed the Lend-Lease help, which in 1942 covered only between 5 and 10% of their own production. The soviets won the war with THEIR production, not because of the help of the USA.
The Soviets didn’t win the war, the United Nations won the war. And the Soviets didn’t achieve what they did solely with THEIR production. The lend-lease contribution, even as early as mid 1942 was not inconsequential, and by the following years its contribution was considerable, not only in weaponry but in alloys, chemicals, electronics, machinery, food and transport.
Germany had a multiplicity of problems in 1942, but two of the most serious in relation to the Soviet war were a shortage of manpower in the east and the need to divert much of its industrial resource to meeting demands in other theatres - the air war in the west and the Mediterranean, the battle of the Atlantic, garrison maintenance in Norway, France and the Adriatic, industrial support to Italy and ground force commitments in North Africa. By mid-1943 the air war in the east was almost a side show for the Luftwaffe, given its commitments elsewhere.

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Max Payload » 21 Dec 2018 01:17

EL KAISER wrote:
18 Dec 2018 09:06
I believe Case Blue, as ORIGINALLY perceived, COULD succeed.
As originally conceived Case Blue was supposed to encircle and destroy Southwestern Front. It failed to do so, a failure that occurred before Hitler began to expand the operation’s scope. As originally conceived Case Blue was to have ‘AG South’ seize the Maikop oil fields and to secure the Don and the Caucasus as flank protection. Such objectives, achievable as they were given von Bock’s resources, would not have led to the defeat of the Soviet Union.

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 21 Dec 2018 07:59

Hi El Kaiser,

You are still not really addressing the point that the German and Soviet war economies were not in exclusive combat with each other. Germany had the resources of much of the rest of Europe, while the USSR had Leand-Lease to make up any deficit in key areas.

For example, you say that Germany manufactured 49,7007 military trucks in 1942 and the USSR 30,400. In 1941 Germany used at least 10,000 French trucks for the invasion of the USSR and its own production was boosted throughout the war by the output of Czech companies such as Praga. On the other side the USA delivered 500,000 military vehicles to the USSR over 1942-45, which dwarfs both.

The USSR very probably did need Lend-Lease help. Soviet infantry from 1942 onwards were largely carried on American trucks. It is also often overlooked that the mass delivery of US locomotives allowed the USSR to switch significant resources to the production of tanks. Take the US radios out of all Soviet land and air equipment in the second half of the war and the airwaves on the Red Army's side of the front would have been almost silent.

I would suggest that the USSR survived, barely, on its own resources, but was heavily dependent on US Lend-Lease to win its war, certainly by as early as 1945.

Indeed, I might say the same about the USSR, but I was addressing Germany because that was the subject of your thread. No, the Red Army was not "annihilated" in 1941. If it had been, the Germans could have pushed through to anywhere in the USSR they chose. They couldn't do so because ther was always a significant Red Army before them. The USSR's low point came just before the Moscow counter offensive in December 1941, when, for the only time in the war, it had less manpower at the front than the Axis powers had against it. Thereafter, unlike Germany, it was relatively strengthening.

I would suggest that the May Kharkov Offensive of 1942 very much shows that the USSR could break the German lines. Their problem there was not in breaking the German lines, but in exploiting the breakthrough.

Cheers,

Sid

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Steve » 21 Dec 2018 10:39

Hitler gambled on winning a quick war in the east and it was not a bad bet. Neither the intelligence services of Germany the USA or the UK expected the USSR to survive in 1941. According to General Jodl after the American landings in North Africa “it was clear not only to the responsible soldiers but to Hitler himself that the God of war had now turned from Germany and gone over to the other camp.” Hitler seems to have understood, certainly from the end of 1942 that another failure in the east meant that he could not win the war.

In 1940 the British and the French had looked at bombing the USSR oilfields in the Caucasus region (Operation Pike) and come to the conclusion that destroying them could cripple the Soviet war effort. The German strategy of capturing the oil fields was probably the best option available to them in 1942 and in theory should have had a major impact on the Soviet war machine.

Because of fighting a two front war it was unlikely that Germany even with a much larger GDP in 1943 than the USSR could have achieved a stalemate in the east. I agree with Syd that lend lease was a huge help to the Red Army and enabled the drive west to go ahead much quicker. The quantity and quality of the material pouring in from 1943 onwards probably meant that they were better off with lent lease than if they had retained the industrial capacity of the territory lost in 1941.

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by ljadw » 21 Dec 2018 12:22

EL KAISER wrote:
18 Dec 2018 09:06
Hi everyone! For the sources of what I say, I leave the links at the end of the post. But please, read ALL the text before answering. Thank you!

I personally believe that the WORST year in the war for the USSR was not 1941 but 1942, and therefore this year was for Germany ideal to deal a fatal damage to the USSR. Obviously the ideal thing was to have defeated it in 1941. But that didn’t happen. And of course, in the topic i’m referring to summer of 1942, not to the winter in the end of the year! Yet it seems that the VAST majority of people and historians regard the situation of Germany in 1942, even before Operation Case Blue began, as “hopeless” in the east alone, and sometimes even in the war as a whole, mainly because of the entry of the USA in the war, and because of the “failure” against the USSR. And I say “failure” because in this “failure” the USSR lost more than half of its steel, iron and coal resources. Three quarters of their economy was occupied or destroyed. Its army was completely decimated (they had a new one, but of equal skill).

In the economic field, Germany, even before Barbarossa, possessed a larger economy than that of the USSR (because of its conquests, no doubt) and by 1942 it surpassed the USSR by a factor of four in the production of coal, iron, steel, etc. Only in the production of oil the soviets produced twice as much as Germany. I’m very aware about the USSR producing much more tanks and AFVs, as well as artillery, but, again, the VAST majority of people ignores the fact that in the field of war production, not seen JUST in these basic weapons but including ALL types of military equipment, even the non-fighting equipment, Germany produced MUCH MORE war material than the USSR did, which is not surprising since its economy was much bigger. To give one simple example of this, Germany produced (during the whole war) 345.000 armored vehicles (I mean military cars, military motorcycles, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, demolition tanks, etc.), while the soviets almost none. Literally.

About the military field, the quality of its army remained much more professional than the soviet one. The Kharkov offensive in May 1942 is a good proof of this.

So, HOW TRUE is this view that Germany, in the east, could not defeat the soviets in a new major offensive? I'm not talking about a conquest victory, I know that’s out of question, I’m talking about the possibility of dealing the USSR a massive blow to force it, in the next year, to negotiate a peace, without a doubt favorable to Germany, or in any case prevent the USSR, and thus the allies, from ever achieving victory in the east.

If case blue had succeeded, for example, and cut off the oil fields of the Caucasus from the rest of USSR, I cannot imagine the USSR fighting for much longer. At the time the UK and USA relief convoys covered only 10% of soviet production and expenditure. As a side note, the great difference in manpower was highly compensated by the superiority of the average Germans soldier. Even in 1945 the Russian lost more soldiers and tanks than the Germans, even though by then their superiority in EVERY aspect was decisive and massive. Case Blue, a massive strategic failure for Germany, dealt more damage to the soviets than to the Germans (not strategically, of course) despite the russians having much more soldiers and tanks. And I think the main reason why it failed was not the soviet prowess in warfare, but the strategic blunders committed by Hitler in July 1942: Dividing the army, adding Stalingrad as a new, simultaneous and divergent strategic objective, sending Manstein to Leningrad instead of the Caucasus, weaken Army Group A to fortify Army Group B, whose objective was infinitely less important, etc. In short, I believe Case Blue, as ORIGINALLY perceived, COULD succeed.

So again, was Germany’s situation in the east in the summer of 1942 THAT bad as to consider the war in the east was lost for good?
Of course, i would like to hear diverse opinions, not only the predictable "germany was lost in the east in 1942". Those opinions are OBVIOUSLY welcomed, but i would like to read different points of view and its reasons.

German War Production (also of war-resources): https://ww2-weapons.com/german-arms-production/
Russian War Production (also of war-resources): https://ww2-weapons.com/russian-arms-production/
German AND Russian War Production (also of war-resources): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ ... ons_groups
German AND Russian resources Production (See Table 81): http://www.lago-colony.com/CRUDE_OIL_PR ... g_worl.htm
About the oil factor : your assumptions are not correct : The German oil experts warned for the illusion that the SU would collaps without the Caucasian oil ( Source : Germany and WWII 0 : it would hurt the SU ,but there was no proof that the SU would collaps, for several reasons ,as :
the SU could replace some of the oil by oil from other oil fields
the SU could replace some of the oil by using less oil : the Soviet energy mix in 1940 was 18,7 % oil,20 % wood and 61% coal and gaz
In 1945 it was oil 15 %,wood 50 % and coal and gaz 35 %
no one knew and knows how much oil the SU needed during the war ,and how much of it was consumed by the military and how much by other consumers .
There are 2 opposing facts aboit the oil;
1 the SU finished the oil with 60 % of the prewar production
2 the more oil Germany had,the worse was its military situation ;
1940 : 6,7 million ton
1941 :8,3 million ton
1942 : 8,6 million ton
1943 : 10,3 million ton
1944 : 6,4 million ton .
Thus there is no causal relation between the amount of available oil and the military situation .
About Fall Blau : it was 1000 km from Rostov to Baku, and the Germans could go to Baku only if
1 they defeated the opposing Soviet forces
2 if the SU could not replace these forces .
The truth is that Fall Blau failed after a few weeks .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 21 Dec 2018 12:38

Hi ljadw,

That doesn't take into account available reserves.

Germany never had more than six months of oil reserves at any one time. This impinged heavily on its possibilities and planning choices. Thus, I would suggest, there very definitely was a ".....causal relation between the amount of available oil and the military situation." I would further suggest that the choice of Fall Blau as Germany's main strategic offensive in 1942 was the prime example of this.

I think you are right that "Fall Blau failed after a few weeks". The Red Army evaded encirclement and it managed to so effectively sabotage the oil fields during its retreat that the Germans got barely a drop from them during their six months of occupation.

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by ljadw » 21 Dec 2018 17:16

Sid Guttridge wrote:
21 Dec 2018 12:38
Hi ljadw,

That doesn't take into account available reserves.

Germany never had more than six months of oil reserves at any one time. This impinged heavily on its possibilities and planning choices. Thus, I would suggest, there very definitely was a ".....causal relation between the amount of available oil and the military situation." I would further suggest that the choice of Fall Blau as Germany's main strategic offensive in 1942 was the prime example of this.

I think you are right that "Fall Blau failed after a few weeks". The Red Army evaded encirclement and it managed to so effectively sabotage the oil fields during its retreat that the Germans got barely a drop from them during their six months of occupation.

Cheers,

Sid.
I don't see why it would be needed to have an oil reserve of more than 6 months .An oil reserve is oil that is not used .
In 1940 the monthly consumption of aviation oil was 71000 ton,stocks at the end of the year were 613000 ton: 8/9 months .
In 1941 the monthly consumption was 100000, stocks were good for 2.5 months
1942 :consumption 120000 ton, stocks 324000 ton : 2 1/2 months .
1943 : consumption : 150000 ,stocks 440000 ,almost 3 months
1944 : consumption : almost 120000,stocks146000, 1,4 months .
The point is that it was impossible to predict the future consumption,thus it was also impossible to determine what should be the minimum stocks .One can ask the question if the aviation stocks at the end of 1940 were not to big .
And I do not see that bigger stocks would make the military situation better :
in 1941 ,the total oil production (including imports ) was 8,5 million ton, the consumption was 7,3 million ton .The reserves 1,5 million ton ,or 20 % of the consumption,thus 2 1/2 months,or 17 % of the production .
in 1942 production was 10,5 million,consumption 7 million.Reserves :3,5 million .Reserves were 50 % of the consumptiom and 33 % of the production .
But the better stock situation resulted in a worse military situation . Thus ...
About the oil of the Caucasus : before the start of Fall Blau,Hitler said : I need the oil of the Caucasus,otherwise I must stop this war .
After Fall Blau, he continued the war,although he did not have the oil of the Caucasus . Besides,even if he conquered the oil fields ,the maximum of oil he could have was 1 million ton a year ,and even this would take several years .'The reason for Fall Blau was simple it was the only thing the Germans could do ,an attack on Moscow,even if if it was successful, would have no results .Thus at Rastenburg everyone was telling to the marines that it would be successful and would result in the fall of the SU and that the fall of the SU would force the Allies to give up .
The Germans were falling in an abyss,they searched for a straw,they found one and they told each other that if they clutched at the straw, the fall would stop and they would go up again .
The traveller in the desert who is searching for water also believes the fata morgana is real.

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by EL KAISER » 22 Dec 2018 08:42

Thanks for the answers! I found a book called “Deathride: Hitler Vs. Stalin – The Eastern front 1941-1945” by John Mosier. I have read MANY books on the eastern front, but this one is VERY different. This book debunks (or attempts to do so) what i personally consider to be one of the biggest myths of WWII: That Germany, after the battle of Moscow, was DOOMED in the east. The author shows that, up until July 1943 (Kursk) victory in the east for the Germans was “tantalizingly close”, using the author’s words. Needless to say, this was also the case in the fall of 1941 because of Barbarossa and the fall of 1942 because of Fall Blau. For example, he explains that the Battle of Stalingrad (particularly its second phase, Operation Uranus) was just one overrated victory in a huge OCEAN of Russian defeats, both before and AFTER Stalingrad. The Russians were actually planning a massive campaign to drive Germany out of the war (or almost) with three operations in just three months (Mars, Uranus, and Little Saturn). When other academics see the disaster at Stalingrad, this academic sees (and shows) the disaster of the Russian campaign as a whole: Mars was a disaster, and Uranus only a partial success, and because of which Little Saturn failed completely. In fact, despite Stalingrad, Russian losses were staggering while the German ones were not. He explains that Germany never actually ran out of manpower or equipment or economic resources. He asserts that because Russian casualties in both soldiers and equipment was vastly superior to the German ones, the ones in REAL danger of running out of manpower were the soviets, not the Germans. He also mentions what I said when I opened this thread: That Germany was MUCH more productive than the USSR. By January 1942, as an example, Germany had manufactured 6.370 assault guns, 760 self-propelled guns, and 2.042 tank destroyers, while the Russians only 117 in all those branches. And that it literally did not possess military trucks of their own: ALL military trucks they used came from the USA or UK, while Germany manufactured (in the whole war) 82.000. (Althugh according to other sources, the soviets did manufactured those 30.000 trucks i mentioned) So the Russians manufactured more tanks: Big deal, the German production outpaced them. In fact, the book explains why Germany was only getting stronger and stronger both economically and in firepower capacity as the war progressed, and not weaker. Again needless to say, Stalingrad was not at all a turning point in the war to this author, but Kursk, and MAINLY because of Hitler’s own decision to abandon that offensive. To the author, the Germans lost MANILY (but obviously not ONLY) because A) The Lend-Lease project, and B) Stalin was, like Hitler, prepared to fight a war to the very bitter and painful end, sacrificing millions of Russian soldiers and citizens. Anyway, a good reading if someone is tired of reading (or does not believe) the persistent “Germany was doomed in the east after 1941” narrative.

I personally never comprehended this whole idea that “Germany was doomed after 1941”, which is why I opened the thread. I mean, you are telling me the USSR lost three quarters of their economy, lost almost ALL major cities, lost a whole and complete set of armed forces (the army in the Battle of Moscow was a new one), but after one defeat (and minimal, if one is to see the victories of the Germans) was DOOMED in the east? Come on… Even in 1942 the Germans had a much larger economy, a much larger production of Coal and Iron. In the “failure” of Fall Blau they advanced 800 kilometers, inflicted a huge number of casualties, and was extremely close to shut off the Red Army from both food and oil, and yet again this could have “never succeed in achieving victory over the USSR”. When the front temporarily stabilized in March 1943, the Germans were in similar positions they had before Fall Blau, which means the soviets were in the same situation as in the summer of 1942. Even worse, because, like pretty much ALWAYS, the Russians had lost millions of soldiers and equipment, while the Germans did not and were just getting stronger. In short, having read many books, I always believed the Germans COULD knock the USSR out of the war up until Stalingrad but never did because of Hitler’s huge strategic mistakes, and the author explains why, to him at least, Hitler could do so up until July 1943, which he thinks was a golden opportunity to knock it out.

Thanks Again!

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by ljadw » 22 Dec 2018 08:52

Mosier ??? :roll:
He is a revisionists and is not taken serious, what is not surprising for a man who said that Germany was winning WWI and that the intervention of the US saved France and Britain .

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Ironmachine » 22 Dec 2018 10:29

EL KAISER wrote:And that it literally did not possess military trucks of their own: ALL military trucks they used came from the USA or UK
Just this statement should have shown you that Mosier's book is totally worthless, as this is completely false. Take a look here, for example:
viewtopic.php?f=79&t=145035&p=1258671&h ... k#p1258671

Or take a look at this statement:
EL KAISER wrote: By January 1942, as an example, Germany had manufactured 6.370 assault guns, 760 self-propelled guns, and 2.042 tank destroyers, while the Russians only 117 in all those branches
There is no significant conclusion that can be obtained of such a comparison. Limiting yourself to a small category, you are not going to reach a global view of the relative power of German and Soviet economies. Did it ever occur to you that if the Soviets were not producing assault guns, self-propelled guns or tank destroyers, perhaps they were building more of something else, like tanks for example? Maybe you should take a look at the production numbers of heavy tanks by Germany and the Soviet Union by January 1942, and see what conclusion you would reach...

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 22 Dec 2018 12:51

Hi ljadw,

You post, "The point is that it was impossible to predict the future consumption".

This is not really true, as consumption levels depended to a great degree on what Germany chose to do.

You post, ".....thus it was also impossible to determine what should be the minimum stocks". The more the better, as this increases the options available. Working on minimum stocks necessarily limits the options.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

Post by Max Payload » 22 Dec 2018 15:04

EL KAISER wrote:
22 Dec 2018 08:42
The author shows that, up until July 1943 (Kursk) victory in the east for the Germans was “tantalizingly close”
Stavka made some serious mistakes in the war but it would have taken some colossal miscalculations on their part for the above to be true. The best Germany could have hoped for after 1941 was a negotiated settlement.

EL KAISER wrote:
22 Dec 2018 08:42
Operation Uranus) was just one overrated victory in a huge OCEAN of Russian defeats, both before and AFTER Stalingrad.
Yet despite their ocean of defeats they managed to keep moving inexorably westwards, sometimes at a spectacular pace. There were plenty of failed Soviet offensives after Stalingrad, particularly on the central axis, but significant territorial losses only occurred when advances over-reached and were subject to German counter-attack - the most notable example being the Manstein counter-strike in February ‘42. Yet even on these occasions frontlines stabilised west of where the campaign had begun.

EL KAISER wrote:
22 Dec 2018 08:42
Mars was a disaster, and Uranus only a partial success, and because of which Little Saturn failed completely.
Little Saturn failed to isolate and destroy the southern wing of the Ostheer and end the war at a stroke (which had been the ambition of the original Saturn planning), but the less ambitious Little Saturn did contribute massively to driving the Ostheer back from the Terek and the Don to the Mius and the Donets.

EL KAISER wrote:
22 Dec 2018 08:42
I personally never comprehended this whole idea that “Germany was doomed after 1941”, .... the Russians had lost millions of soldiers and equipment, while the Germans did not and were just getting stronger. In short, having read many books, I always believed the Germans COULD knock the USSR out of the war up until Stalingrad but never did because of Hitler’s huge strategic mistakes, and the author explains why, to him at least, Hitler could do so up until July 1943, which he thinks was a golden opportunity to knock it out.
Given what we now know, some argue that 'Germany was doomed' after 22 June 1941. What should be take into account is that
- the Soviet Union was on a total war footing within weeks of the launch of Barbarossa, shifting industrial capacity to safety in the east while at the same time Germany was scaling back on ground force weapon development programs on the assumption of a short campaign
- by 1942 the Soviet Union could commit its industrial capacity almost exclusively to the war against Germany while Germany had to commit much of its effort to other theatres
- while Germany’s military/industrial capacity was growing stronger, that of its enemies was growing stronger faster.
It's true that Soviet manpower was not inexhaustible, but by the beginning of '45 the personnel strength of the armed forces of the SU was only half a million less than the 11.9 million it had been at the beginning of July '43.

Ironmachine wrote:
22 Dec 2018 10:29
EL KAISER wrote:And that it literally did not possess military trucks of their own: ALL military trucks they used came from the USA or UK
Just this statement should have shown you that Mosier's book is totally worthless,
Or at the very least that it contains serious factual errors that render his conclusions highly questionable.

Ironmachine wrote:
22 Dec 2018 10:29
Maybe you should take a look at the production numbers of heavy tanks by Germany and the Soviet Union by January 1942, and see what conclusion you would reach.
Good advice

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