Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

You post, "The point is that it was impossible to predict the future consumption".

This is not really true, as consumption levels depended to a great degree on what Germany chose to do.

You post, ".....thus it was also impossible to determine what should be the minimum stocks". The more the better, as this increases the options available. Working on minimum stocks necessarily limits the options.

Cheers,

Sid.

Germany had not the choice what to do : the choice remained with the allies.Germany reacted .
There is no way to known how much oil will be consumed in a military operation : the consumption of motor oil in 1941 was 2,5 million ton, more than in 1940 when it was 1,8 million ton : the increase was mainly caused NOT by Barbarossa, but by the fact that Barbarossa failed: if Barbarossa was successful before August, less oil would have been consumed.But ,notwithstanding that Barbarossa continued, the motor oil consumption in 1942 and 1943 was less than in 1941 :2,089 million and 2,101 million .
And what were the stocks ? At the end of 1940 599000 tons,at the end of 1941 379000,at the end of 1942 313000, at the end of 1943 436000 .
What was a minimum ? When were the stocks troo low, when were they sufficient ?
Did the Germans need stocks of 599000 tons in 1941, or 379000 at the end of 1942 ?

[EL KAISER]

The author shows that, up until July 1943 (Kursk) victory in the east for the Germans was “tantalizingly close”

Stavka made some serious mistakes in the war but it would have taken some colossal miscalculations on their part for the above to be true. The best Germany could have hoped for after 1941 was a negotiated settlement.

Operation Uranus) was just one overrated victory in a huge OCEAN of Russian defeats, both before and AFTER Stalingrad.

Yet despite their ocean of defeats they managed to keep moving inexorably westwards, sometimes at a spectacular pace. There were plenty of failed Soviet offensives after Stalingrad, particularly on the central axis, but significant territorial losses only occurred when advances over-reached and were subject to German counter-attack - the most notable example being the Manstein counter-strike in February ‘42. Yet even on these occasions frontlines stabilised west of where the campaign had begun.

Mars was a disaster, and Uranus only a partial success, and because of which Little Saturn failed completely.

Little Saturn failed to isolate and destroy the southern wing of the Ostheer and end the war at a stroke (which had been the ambition of the original Saturn planning), but the less ambitious Little Saturn did contribute massively to driving the Ostheer back from the Terek and the Don to the Mius and the Donets.

I personally never comprehended this whole idea that “Germany was doomed after 1941”, .... the Russians had lost millions of soldiers and equipment, while the Germans did not and were just getting stronger. In short, having read many books, I always believed the Germans COULD knock the USSR out of the war up until Stalingrad but never did because of Hitler’s huge strategic mistakes, and the author explains why, to him at least, Hitler could do so up until July 1943, which he thinks was a golden opportunity to knock it out.

Given what we now know, some argue that 'Germany was doomed' after 22 June 1941. What should be take into account is that
- the Soviet Union was on a total war footing within weeks of the launch of Barbarossa, shifting industrial capacity to safety in the east while at the same time Germany was scaling back on ground force weapon development programs on the assumption of a short campaign
- by 1942 the Soviet Union could commit its industrial capacity almost exclusively to the war against Germany while Germany had to commit much of its effort to other theatres
- while Germany’s military/industrial capacity was growing stronger, that of its enemies was growing stronger faster.
It's true that Soviet manpower was not inexhaustible, but by the beginning of '45 the personnel strength of the armed forces of the SU was only half a million less than the 11.9 million it had been at the beginning of July '43.

And that it literally did not possess military trucks of their own: ALL military trucks they used came from the USA or UK

Just this statement should have shown you that Mosier's book is totally worthless,

Or at the very least that it contains serious factual errors that render his conclusions highly questionable.

Maybe you should take a look at the production numbers of heavy tanks by Germany and the Soviet Union by January 1942, and see what conclusion you would reach.

Good advice

All of your views and opinions are treated and refuted in the book. im not going to transcrypt them here. If you want to know why you are wrong, just read the book. If you want to believe what you belive, be my guest. I'll stick to MY views.

[Ironmachine]

All of your views and opinions are treated and refuted in the book. im not going to transcrypt them here. If you want to know why you are wrong, just read the book.

I did not write views and opinions, I wrote facts. It is a fact that the Soviet Union did have military trucks of their own, and it is a fact that the Soviet production of heavy tanks until January 1942 was much higher that the German production of such vehicles.
Simply put, there is no way that the book could refute the fact that the Soviet Union did possess military trucks of their own. Come on, the Spanish Army was still using by the end of the 1950's Soviet trucks that had been sent to Spain during the SCW!
And there is no way that the book could refute the fact that the German production of heavy tanks (5 Neubaufahrzeug, IIRC) compares very poorly with Soviet production ( there are some divergences between different sources, but let's say 1,200 KV-1 and 300 KV-2), and those numbers can indeed be used as a counterexample for your assault guns-propelled guns-tank destroyers example that Germany was more productive than the USSR. And in fact both examples are worth nothing in that regard, because they just show differences in allocation of resources, not differences in productivity.
In both statements made by me, it is clearly the book that is wrong.

If you want to believe what you belive, be my guest. I'll stick to MY views.

You can do what you want, but if that is your option you could have saved the time and effort of asking. You wrote in your first post:

Of course, i would like to hear diverse opinions, not only the predictable "germany was lost in the east in 1942". Those opinions are OBVIOUSLY welcomed, but i would like to read different points of view and its reasons.

Then perhaps you are in the wrong place. The well-informed opinion around here (and I'm not talking about myself) seems to be just that last one, that Germany had already lost the war by 1942.
Regards.

[DavidFrankenberg]

Thanks for the answers! I found a book called “Deathride: Hitler Vs. Stalin – The Eastern front 1941-1945” by John Mosier. I have read MANY books on the eastern front, but this one is VERY different. This book debunks (or attempts to do so) what i personally consider to be one of the biggest myths of WWII: That Germany, after the battle of Moscow, was DOOMED in the east. The author shows that, up until July 1943 (Kursk) victory in the east for the Germans was “tantalizingly close”, using the author’s words. Needless to say, this was also the case in the fall of 1941 because of Barbarossa and the fall of 1942 because of Fall Blau. For example, he explains that the Battle of Stalingrad (particularly its second phase, Operation Uranus) was just one overrated victory in a huge OCEAN of Russian defeats, both before and AFTER Stalingrad. The Russians were actually planning a massive campaign to drive Germany out of the war (or almost) with three operations in just three months (Mars, Uranus, and Little Saturn). When other academics see the disaster at Stalingrad, this academic sees (and shows) the disaster of the Russian campaign as a whole: Mars was a disaster, and Uranus only a partial success, and because of which Little Saturn failed completely. In fact, despite Stalingrad, Russian losses were staggering while the German ones were not. He explains that Germany never actually ran out of manpower or equipment or economic resources. He asserts that because Russian casualties in both soldiers and equipment was vastly superior to the German ones, the ones in REAL danger of running out of manpower were the soviets, not the Germans. He also mentions what I said when I opened this thread: That Germany was MUCH more productive than the USSR. By January 1942, as an example, Germany had manufactured 6.370 assault guns, 760 self-propelled guns, and 2.042 tank destroyers, while the Russians only 117 in all those branches. And that it literally did not possess military trucks of their own: ALL military trucks they used came from the USA or UK, while Germany manufactured (in the whole war) 82.000. (Althugh according to other sources, the soviets did manufactured those 30.000 trucks i mentioned) So the Russians manufactured more tanks: Big deal, the German production outpaced them. In fact, the book explains why Germany was only getting stronger and stronger both economically and in firepower capacity as the war progressed, and not weaker. Again needless to say, Stalingrad was not at all a turning point in the war to this author, but Kursk, and MAINLY because of Hitler’s own decision to abandon that offensive. To the author, the Germans lost MANILY (but obviously not ONLY) because A) The Lend-Lease project, and B) Stalin was, like Hitler, prepared to fight a war to the very bitter and painful end, sacrificing millions of Russian soldiers and citizens. Anyway, a good reading if someone is tired of reading (or does not believe) the persistent “Germany was doomed in the east after 1941” narrative.

I personally never comprehended this whole idea that “Germany was doomed after 1941”, which is why I opened the thread. I mean, you are telling me the USSR lost three quarters of their economy, lost almost ALL major cities, lost a whole and complete set of armed forces (the army in the Battle of Moscow was a new one), but after one defeat (and minimal, if one is to see the victories of the Germans) was DOOMED in the east? Come on… Even in 1942 the Germans had a much larger economy, a much larger production of Coal and Iron. In the “failure” of Fall Blau they advanced 800 kilometers, inflicted a huge number of casualties, and was extremely close to shut off the Red Army from both food and oil, and yet again this could have “never succeed in achieving victory over the USSR”. When the front temporarily stabilized in March 1943, the Germans were in similar positions they had before Fall Blau, which means the soviets were in the same situation as in the summer of 1942. Even worse, because, like pretty much ALWAYS, the Russians had lost millions of soldiers and equipment, while the Germans did not and were just getting stronger. In short, having read many books, I always believed the Germans COULD knock the USSR out of the war up until Stalingrad but never did because of Hitler’s huge strategic mistakes, and the author explains why, to him at least, Hitler could do so up until July 1943, which he thinks was a golden opportunity to knock it out.

Thanks Again!

Mosier's book seems very interesting !

It reminds me some souvenirs of WWII survivors.

Some of them told me that indeed the real turn was not Stalingrad but rather Kursk : until Kursk German army was still very dangerous and victory in the east not totally sure, but after Kursk It was totally doomed. It didnt prevent the same people to say that many people started to change their mind after Stalingrad : many collarborators began to slow down their collabrroation and even started to deal with communists and "resistance".

[BDV]

Some of them told me that indeed the real turn was not Stalingrad but rather Kursk : until Kursk German army was still very dangerous and victory in the east not totally sure, but after Kursk It was totally doomed. It didnt prevent the same people to say that many people started to change their mind after Stalingrad : many collarborators began to slow down their collabrroation and even started to deal with communists and "resistance".

Zitadelle + Kutuzov + Rumyantsev not only proved that Germans could no longer defeat RKKA operationally when on the offensive. They could NOT DO IT ON DEFENSIVE (like they did in MARS and prior in the AGC sector).


However the time this became apparent is likely after it became a reality.

[DavidFrankenberg]

Some of them told me that indeed the real turn was not Stalingrad but rather Kursk : until Kursk German army was still very dangerous and victory in the east not totally sure, but after Kursk It was totally doomed. It didnt prevent the same people to say that many people started to change their mind after Stalingrad : many collarborators began to slow down their collabrroation and even started to deal with communists and "resistance".

Zitadelle + Kutuzov + Rumyantsev not only proved that Germans could no longer defeat RKKA operationally when on the offensive. They could NOT DO IT ON DEFENSIVE (like they did in MARS and prior in the AGC sector).


However the time this became apparent is likely after it became a reality.

You are right

[Cult Icon]

Earlier- Soviet winter counter-offensive 42-43 with STAVKA reserves. These reserve forces were more highly developed than those fought in the summer and were capable of sustaining long range offensives. The performance of the Soviets against Operation Winter-storm was unprecedented in my view. Glantz specializes a lot in this area and has published several tomes.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

As Germany held the strategic initiative from 1939 to 1942, I would suggest that it was Germany that was making most of the choices during this period, not the Allies.

You are right, "There is no way of knowing how much oil will be consumed in a military operation." However, we can be sure that it wouldn't be launched without oil and that the decicion to launch it necessarily involved increased consumption.

Barbarossa was a campaign chosen by Germany. It did so thinking it had about 5 months of trained manpower reserves (actually it had only two) and about 6 months of oil reserves.

In 1941 Germany had assembled most of the available trucks in Europe for its invasion and advanced vast distances across the entire front. Oil consumption was therefore very high. However, by 1942 it could only launch an offensive on one third of the front and it is no coincidence that this was aimed at the Caucasus oil fields.

Germany ran its oil war hand to mouth. If you are right and Germany was using around 2-2.5 million tons of oil a year in 1941-43, and the stocks were about 25% of this at the end of 1940, 15% at the end of 1941 and 15% at the end of 1942 you are left with about 3 months reserves in 1940 and two months reserves in 1941 and 1942. Such low levels either severely restrict one's strategic options or oblige one to take high risk options. Hitler preferred the high risk options.

Clearly, even by your own statements, if Barbarossa's failure overstretched Germany's oil resources, then reserves were insufficient. So, yes, not only did the Germans need stocks of 599,000t in 1941 and 379,000t at the end of 1942, they needed rather more if all strategic options were to remain open. That is why they massively expanded their synthetic oil output.

Cheers,

Sid.

[AriX]

In 1942 chances for Germant to win war on East Front were hogh more than 50/50. If Baku would be lost, only US oil product aid should prevent SU from total collapse.

[Max Payload]

In 1942 chances for Germant to win war on East Front were hogh more than 50/50.

How was that supposed to happen?
Virtually all of the Soviet Union’s remaining strategic locations were beyond German reach.

If Baku would be lost, only US oil product aid should prevent SU from total collapse.

The Wehrmacht didn’t have the resources to reach Baku, it couldn’t even reach Grozny or Astrakhan or any part of the Caspian Sea. The supply route through ‘Persia’ was secure, the destination ports for the Arctic convoys were secure, the Trans-Siberian railway was secure. Militarily the SU had the resources to block any German advance that could threaten its ability to continue the war. A German ‘win’ in 1942 or thereafter would have required a degree of gross incompetence on the part of the GKO and Stavka that by 1942 was entirely absent.

[stg 44]

In 1942 chances for Germant to win war on East Front were hogh more than 50/50.

How was that supposed to happen?
Virtually all of the Soviet Union’s remaining strategic locations were beyond German reach.

If Baku would be lost, only US oil product aid should prevent SU from total collapse.

The Wehrmacht didn’t have the resources to reach Baku, it couldn’t even reach Grozny or Astrakhan or any part of the Caspian Sea. The supply route through ‘Persia’ was secure, the destination ports for the Arctic convoys were secure, the Trans-Siberian railway was secure. Militarily the SU had the resources to block any German advance that could threaten its ability to continue the war. A German ‘win’ in 1942 or thereafter would have required a degree of gross incompetence on the part of the GKO and Stavka that by 1942 was entirely absent.

According to Mark Harrison the Soviet economy was driven to the point of collapse by late 1942. Germany had hit the vital point of the USSR economically speaking and it was the offensive to push them back into Ukraine that prevented collapse. Arguably they just had to hold on to their gains in Summer 1942 into Summer 1943 to initiate an economic collapse, which could be hastened by bombing Baku oil like they did to Grozny in October according to Joel Hayward's paper "Too Little Too Late" about potential for the Germans to bomb Soviet oil resources in the Caucasus. Even with L-L Kuban and Ukraine were vital to the Soviet ability to continue the war, both due to the food production they enabled and the population which could be recruited to sustain offensive operations.

[Hanny]

What i meant to say is that Germany's war production was much bigger than the Soviet one. That's a reality. ANY statistic shows that. But if you ONLY focus on the following three weapons: airplanes, tanks and artillery, the soviet surpassed the german production by far.

No it was not. No its not reality. Your own statistics dont show that ( not least because they dont compare like to like and are all unsourced) let alone anyone else.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/do ... 1&type=pdf
Table 1-6 (continued).
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Germany
No. of months 4 12 12 12 12 12 4 68
Thousands
Rifles, carbines 451 1352 1359 1370 2275 2856 665 10328
Machine pistols 40 119 325 232 234 229 78 1257
Machine guns 20 59 96 117 263 509 111 1176
Guns 2 6 22 41 74 148 27 320
Mortars 1.4 4.4 4.2 9.8 23.0 33.2 2.8 78.8
Tanks and SPG 0.7 2.2b 3.8 6.2 10.7 18.3 4.4 46.3
Combat aircraft 2.3 6.6 8.4 11.6 19.3 34.1 7.2 89.5
Units
Submarines 15 40 196 244 270 189 0 954


USSR
No. of months .. .. 6 12 12 12 8 50
Thousands
Rifles, carbines .. .. 1567 4049 3436 2450 637 12139
Machine pistols .. .. 90 1506 2024 1971 583 6174
Machine guns .. .. 106 356 459 439 156 1516
Guns .. .. 30 127 130 122 72 482
Mortars .. .. 42.3 230.
0
69.4 7.1 3.0 351.8
Tanks and SPG .. .. 4.8 24.4 24.1 29.0 20.5 102.8
Combat aircraft .. .. 8.2 21.7 29.9 33.2 19.1 112.1
Units
Major naval vessels .. 33 62 19 13 23 11 161


And again here.https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics ... tprint.pdf
Table 1. Volume of combat munitions production of the major belligerents, 1935-44
(annual expenditure in $ billion, U.S. 1944 munitions prices)
1935-9 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
U.S.A. 0.3 1.5 4.5 20 38 42
Canada 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 1.5
U.K. 0.5 3.5 6.5 9 11 11
U.S.S.R. 1.6 5 8.5 11.5 14 16
Germany 2.4 6 6 8.5 13.5 17
Japan 0.4 1 2 3 4.5 6

(B) Volume of combat munitions production compared to numbers of military
personnel (U.S. 1944 dollars per man), 1940-44b
U.S.A. U.K. U.S.S.R. Germany
1940 2,800 1,500 1,200 1,100
1941 2,800 1,900 ... 800
1942 5,400 2,200 1,100 900
1943 4,200 2,300 1,300 1,200
1944 3,700 2,200 1,400 1,400

And that it literally did not possess military trucks of their own: ALL military trucks they used came from the USA or UK, while Germany manufactured (in the whole war) 82.000.

Dont read revisionst material unless you also a revisionist.
Red Army Motor Vehicle Park
Vehicle - Date

22/6/41 - 1/1/42 - 1/1/43 - 1/1/44 - 1/1/45 - 1/5/45

Domestic - 272.6 317.1 378.8, 387.0, 395.2, 385.7
% of Total Park - 100.0%, 99.6%, 99.7%, 77.9%, 63.6%, 58.1%

Imported - -, -, 22.0, 94.1, 191.3, 218.1
% of Total Park - 0.0%, 0.0%, 5.4%, 19.0%, 30.4%, 32.8%

Captured - -, 1.4, 3.7, 14.9, 34.7, 60.6
% of Total Park - 0.0%, 0.4%, 0.9%, 3.9%, 6.0%, 9.1%

Total - 272.6, 318.5, 404.5, 496, 621.2, 664.4

IF you take the time to decipher the numbers posted above, you will see that although there is no doubt the LL trucks helped a lot, they were in no way decisive in the outcome of the war (by decisive I mean their absence would have meant a German victory). The Soviets tailored their production to complement LL materiel deliveries, reduced Soviet truck output from '42 onwards was not a result of their Plant being maxed out, it was a conscious decision once it was clear LL trucks would become available in quantity.

On a side note, another little known fact about LL trucks is that about a third of them (119,000 mv) were actually assembled in Soviet factories.


All info from "Journal of Slavic Military Studies" Vol. 10, June 1997, "Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through Lend-Lease" by V.F. Vorsin.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Hanny,

30% looks like a significant proportion to me.

When you add in the greater modernity, higher carrying capacity and better performance of the US vehicles, not to mention their better all terrain capacity, then their importance would have been far higher than the simple figures of chassis you quote.

The Red Army advance only really started motoring in the years from 1943, which coincides with the arrival in numbers of US motor transport.

On another side note, a further little known fact is that most of the trucks counted as Soviet-built were either licensed versions of US Ford trucks, or derivatives of them built by GAZ. The same goes for Soviet tractors. Furthermore, most of the tanks possessed by the USSR in 1941 were also derivatives of US or British designs.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Hanny]

Hi Sid

Its how the SU used the LL trucks, for logistical support that made their advances mid war so much more effective, they could power project further from a rail head by giving priority to LL trucks in a support role to move munitions etc. 30% is 45 a lot, but in the important years, not so much.

Some ford engineers went missing in SU when setting up the plants irc, i used to have link to that story but its now dead. http://www.nvrg.org/Tours%20and%20Event ... Fords.html

[Max Payload]

According to Mark Harrison the Soviet economy was driven to the point of collapse by late 1942. Germany had hit the vital point of the USSR economically speaking and it was the offensive to push them back into Ukraine that prevented collapse. Arguably they just had to hold on to their gains in Summer 1942 into Summer 1943 to initiate an economic collapse, which could be hastened by bombing Baku ...

I haven’t seen the the data that would justify such a conclusion but it seems to me that an economy ‘driven to the point of collapse by late 1942’ would have been unable to support Operation Uranus, Operation Mars, Operation Little Saturn, the Ostragozhsk-Rossosh Operation, Operation Spark, the Krasnodar/Novorossiysk Offensive, the Taman Peninsula Offensive, the Alekseyevka Offensive, the Voronezh-Kastornoe Operation, Operation Leap, and Operation Star all in the space of a few months from November ‘42 to February ‘43, and in so doing push the Wehrmacht back from the Volga and the Terek almost to the Dnepr.
Any economic advantage the SU gained from the recovered territory would have taken months to fully realise and I fail to see how that recovered territory was instrumental in the avoidance of an ‘economic collapse’ during the summer of ‘43.
Bombing Baku from Nalchik would have required a 1,200km sortie. Seriously interrupting Baku’s oil production from such a range would have been a tall order for a Luftwaffe that was losing control of the airspace over the southern axis by January ‘43.