Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

[jesk]

To summarize: Barbarossa was successful in the first three months. Soviet strenght was reducing both army and economical strenght. But operation Typhoon already had seeds of German defeat within it. They should go on after war industry and oil.

Very funny. The main defeat of the armed forces of the enemy. Oil and industry is attached.

[Boby]

In November, the generals offered Hitler to go on the defensive.

Remember Halder at Orsha?

When and where the generals offered Hitler to go on the defensive?

[jesk]

In November, the generals offered Hitler to go on the defensive.

Remember Halder at Orsha?

When and where the generals offered Hitler to go on the defensive?

Just do not remember. It is necessary to quote.

[jesk]

Yes, von Bock advocated the continuation of the offensive. But further analysis beyond understanding. Too many letters. What did von Bock talk about?

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/12.html

Поскольку у меня возникло впечатление, что Браухич вчера меня недопонял, и по причине того, что «вышестоящие», как мне кажется, все еще переоценивают мои силы, я направил Верховному командованию сухопутных сил телекс следующего содержания:

«Несмотря на неоднократные запросы и рапорты, направленные Верховному командованию сухопутных сил группой армий с целью привлечения внимания к удручающему состоянию своих войск, было принято решение о продолжении наступления даже ценой риска полной потери боеспособности атакующих соединений. Но наступление, которое сейчас разворачивается, в значительной степени осуществляется посредством [262] фронтальных ударов, каковые лишают нас преимуществ тактического маневра. Как уже не раз отмечалось, мне не хватает сил для осуществления крупномасштабных операций по окружению противника, а в настоящее время еще и возможностей для переброски войск с одного участка фронта на другой. В результате этой атаки наши войска после ожесточенных, кровопролитных сражений, несомненно, добьются определенных успехов и даже разобьют некоторые русские части, но все это вряд ли будет иметь стратегический эффект. Сражения последних 14 дней показали, что «полное уничтожение» противостоящей нам русской армии является не более чем фантазией. Остановиться у ворот Москвы, где сеть шоссейных и железных дорог является наиболее густой во всей восточной России, означает завязать тяжелые позиционные бои против значительно превосходящего нас по численности противника. Между тем войска группы армий совершенно к этому не готовы. Но даже если невозможное станет возможным и нам в ходе наступления удастся поначалу захватить новые территории вокруг Москвы, у меня все равно не хватит войск, чтобы окружить город и плотно запечатать его с юго-востока, востока и северо-востока. Таким образом, проводящееся сейчас наступление является атакой без смысла и цели, особенно учитывая тот факт, что время приближается к роковой черте, когда силы наступающих войск будут исчерпаны полностью. Необходимо уже сейчас принять решение, что делать потом. В настоящее время войска группы армий «Центр» растянуты на более чем 1000-километровом фронте, при этом у меня за линией фронта в качестве резерва находится одна-единственная дивизия. При таких условиях, учитывая потери в офицерском составе и резкое падение боеспособности войск, силы группы армий не смогут противостоять даже весьма посредственно организованному наступлению. Исходя из плачевного состояния находящихся в нашем секторе железных [263] дорог нет никакой возможности подготовить этот чрезмерно растянутый фронт к оборонительным сражениям или организовать его снабжение на время боев.
Я не знаю во всей полноте намерений Верховного командования сухопутных сил, но если группе армий предстоит вести зимой оборонительные бои, это при ее нынешней диспозиции возможно только при том условии, что к фронту будут переброшены крупные резервы. Этих резервов должно быть достаточно для того, чтобы противостоять мощным атакам противника и сменить обескровленные войска на переднем крае для отведения их в тыл на отдых и переформирование. Для этого потребуется 12 дивизий. Однако я не знаю, имеются ли они в распоряжении Верховного командования сухопутных сил и можно ли их задействовать в обозримом будущем. Другим существенным условием выживания является наведение порядка на железных дорогах и установление четкого графика движения составов, каковых должно быть достаточно для регулярного снабжения частей и создания необходимых запасов. Если оба вышеуказанных условия не могут быть соблюдены полностью, в тылу для восточной армии должны быть в самое ближайшее время найдены удобные для обороны спрямленные позиции. На эти рубежи необходимо направить соответствующий персонал для строительства зимних квартир, долговременных складов и оборонительных сооружений, чтобы войска могли их занять как только соответствующий приказ будет издан».

Since I had the impression that yesterday Brauchitsch misunderstood me, and due to the fact that the “superior ones”, it seems to me, still overestimate my strength, I sent a telex to the Supreme Ground Forces Command as follows:

“Despite repeated requests and reports sent to the Supreme Command of the Army by a group of armies to draw attention to the dismal state of their troops, it was decided to continue the attack, even at the risk of completely losing the combat capability of the attacking formations. But the offensive, which is now unfolding, is largely carried out through [262] frontal attacks, which deprive us of the advantages of tactical maneuver. As has been noted more than once, I lack the strength to carry out large-scale operations to encircle the enemy, and nowadays there are also opportunities for the transfer of troops from one sector of the front to another. As a result of this attack, our troops, after fierce, bloody battles, will undoubtedly achieve some success and even smash some Russian units, but all this is unlikely to have a strategic effect. The battles of the last 14 days have shown that the “complete destruction” of the opposing Russian army is nothing more than a fantasy. To stop at the gates of Moscow, where the network of highways and railways is the most dense in all of eastern Russia, means to engage in heavy positional battles against the enemy that is significantly superior to us in numbers. Meanwhile, the army group forces are completely unprepared for this. But even if the impossible becomes possible and during the offensive we will be able to initially seize new territories around Moscow, I still will not have enough troops to surround the city and seal it tightly from the southeast, east and northeast. Thus, the current offensive is an attack without meaning and purpose, especially given the fact that time is approaching the fateful line, when the forces of the advancing troops are completely exhausted. It is necessary to decide now what to do next. Currently, the army of the Army Group Center is stretched out over a more than 1000-kilometer front, while I have only one division as a reserve behind my front line. Under such conditions, taking into account the losses in the officer corps and the sharp drop in the combat capability of the troops, the forces of the army group will not be able to withstand even the very mediocre organized attack. Proceeding from the deplorable state of the railways in our sector [263], there is no way to prepare this overly extended front for defensive battles or organize its supply for the duration of the battles.
I do not know the entire intentions of the Supreme Command of the ground forces, but if a group of armies has to conduct defensive battles in the winter, with its current disposition, it is possible only on the condition that large reserves are transferred to the front. These reserves should be enough to withstand the powerful attacks of the enemy and change the bloodless troops on the front line for taking them to the rear for rest and re-formation. This will require 12 divisions. However, I do not know whether they are at the disposal of the Supreme Command of the land forces and whether they can be used in the foreseeable future. Another essential condition for survival is the establishment of order on the railways and the establishment of a clear timetable for the movement of trains, which should be sufficient for the regular supply of parts and the creation of the necessary stocks. If both of the above conditions cannot be fully complied with, rectified positions convenient for defense should be found in the very near future in the rear for the Eastern Army. Relevant personnel should be sent to these lines for the construction of winter apartments, long-term warehouses and fortifications, so that the troops can occupy them as soon as the relevant order is issued. ”

[jesk]

Reading the diary of von Bock, he underestimated the Russian winter. Did not guess that equipment and weapons in such quantities would be lost due to frost. In any case, the Soviet offensive quickly ended. Marshal Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs, the continuation of attacks after December 15 was in vain and brought only great losses to the Soviet troops.

[SloveneLiberal]

Another interesting lecture of dr. David Stahel about the battle for Moscow.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4XEbJOqTCo

[jesk]

Stahel's conclusions at a short distance. In 1942 Hitler just did not want to take Moscow. It does not keep within theses about exhaustion of Wehrmacht and underestimation of Russians in any way.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jesk,

OK, so why did the Wehrmacht attack across the whole Eastern Front in 1941, but only the southern third (with a lot of input from its allies) in 1942?

Are you saying that in 1942 the northern two-thirds of the Ostheer were just as capable of mounting a strategic offensive as the southern third, but were instead just ordered to sit on their backsides and twiddle their thumbs for the sake of it, while the three senior W-SS divisions were sent to France on holiday?

Cheers,

Sid.

[SloveneLiberal]

Sid G. dr. Stahel was in fact talking about 1941 not 1942. Jesk is writting some strange or even spooky things a lot of time.

Lecture of dr. Stahel is talking how much Germans underestimated Soviets in operation Typhoon this being one of biggest mistakes of OKW, how Soviet soldiers were now more prepared to fight seeing that the war is racial and ideological, what were main German problems. ( long supply lines and enemy attacks on those lines, bad weather because time was not right etc ).

[jesk]

Sid G. dr. Stahel was in fact talking about 1941 not 1942. Jesk is writting some strange or even spooky things a lot of time.

Lecture of dr. Stahel is talking how much Germans underestimated Soviets in operation Typhoon this being one of biggest mistakes of OKW, how Soviet soldiers were now more prepared to fight seeing that the war is racial and ideological, what were main German problems. ( long supply lines and enemy attacks on those lines, bad weather because time was not right etc ).

In October, the Germans captured a million Soviet soldiers. But too late. In October, the temperature dropped and a thaw began.

[jesk]

Hi Jesk,

OK, so why did the Wehrmacht attack across the whole Eastern Front in 1941, but only the southern third (with a lot of input from its allies) in 1942?

Are you saying that in 1942 the northern two-thirds of the Ostheer were just as capable of mounting a strategic offensive as the southern third, but were instead just ordered to sit on their backsides and twiddle their thumbs for the sake of it, while the three senior W-SS divisions were sent to France on holiday?

Cheers,

Sid.

Of course. I am still surprised by the reduction of battalions in infantry divisions. Maybe not enough trained recruits. But it is unlikely. Hitler needed additional motives to justify strange decisions.

http://don1942.ru/oborona-sovetskikh-vo ... balans-sil

Так как для осуществления крупной наступательной операции на юге не хватало сил, и резервов не было, немецкому командованию пришлось провести ряд организационных мероприятий. Для обеспечения операции "Блау" людьми и техникой немецкому командованию пришлось сократить 69 (из 77) пехотных дивизий групп армий "Север" и "Центр". В них осталось по два батальона в полку (всего в дивизии шесть). В танковые дивизии, не участвовавшие в наступлении на юге бронетехника не поставлялась, имеющимися танками дивизии должны были укомплектовать только один батальон и ждать поступлений. Мотопехотные дивизии положенных им танков так же не получили. Все танки и штурмовые орудия новых модификаций отправлялись только на южный участок фронта.

Для того чтобы восполнить недостаток производства танков, в войсках использовались противотанковые пушки на шасси устаревших и французских трофейных танков, имевшие слабую броневую защиту. Эти вынужденные мероприятия должны были повысить противотанковую оборону немецкого фронта.

Группа армий «Юг» усилилась за счет только немецких соединений примерно с 20 до 68 дивизий. И эти дивизии, кроме трех пехотных, были либо полностью укомплектованы, либо ограниченно пополнены.

Since there was not enough strength to carry out a major offensive operation in the south, and there were no reserves, the German command had to take a number of organizational measures. To support Operation Blau with people and equipment, the German command had to reduce 69 (out of 77) infantry divisions of the Army Groups North and Center. They left two battalions in the regiment (there are six divisions in total). Tank divisions that did not take part in the offensive in the south did not supply armor, the division had to equip only one battalion with existing tanks and wait for revenues. The mechanized infantry divisions did not receive their tanks either. All tanks and assault guns of new modifications were sent only to the southern sector of the front.

In order to compensate for the lack of production of tanks, the troops used anti-tank guns on the chassis of outdated and French captured tanks, which had weak armor protection. These forced measures were supposed to increase the anti-tank defenses of the German front.

Army Group South has increased due to only German units from about 20 to 68 divisions. And these divisions, except for three infantry, were either fully staffed or partially replenished.

[Max Payload]

In November, the generals offered Hitler to go on the defensive.

...

When and where the generals offered Hitler to go on the defensive?

Just do not remember. It is necessary to quote.

In your subsequent post (No. 184) you quote Bock at length but you failed to include the date of the quote. Could it be that this was part of Bock's formal request of 15 December for AGC to go on the defensive and nothing whatsoever to do with any 'offer' in November?

Reading the diary of von Bock, he underestimated the Russian winter. Did not guess that equipment and weapons in such quantities would be lost due to frost. In any case, the Soviet offensive quickly ended. Marshal Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs, the continuation of attacks after December 15 was in vain and brought only great losses to the Soviet troops.

If this is an accurate quote from Rokossovsky, and I suspect it isn't, then I have to disagree with Konstantin Konstantinovich in one respect because between mid-December and mid-February Rokossovsky's army and its neighbouring armies drove AGC back 200-300 kilometres from Istra and Klin to Vyazma, Rzhev, Toropets and almost to Velikie Luki. At Stalin's insistence, and at no real further gain, the offensive continued through the rest of February, through March and into April.
So your casual assertion that the Soviet offensive quickly ended is simply untrue. (Unless, that is, you are employing a highly unconventional definition of 'quickly ended'.)

Perhaps the only relevance of all this to the original theme of the thread is that as a result of this Soviet offensive the Wehrmacht was unable in the summer of 1942 (or at any time thereafter) to seriously threaten the Soviet capital.

[jesk]

In your subsequent post (No. 184) you quote Bock at length but you failed to include the date of the quote. Could it be that this was part of Bock's formal request of 15 December for AGC to go on the defensive and nothing whatsoever to do with any 'offer' in November?

On November 30, under pressure from Hitler, von Bock was imposed on a plan of operations for which, according to von Bock, there was not enough strength. Aggravated the situation of the Germans before the Soviet counteroffensive. Quote December 1.

If this is an accurate quote from Rokossovsky, and I suspect it isn't, then I have to disagree with Konstantin Konstantinovich in one respect because between mid-December and mid-February Rokossovsky's army and its neighbouring armies drove AGC back 200-300 kilometres from Istra and Klin to Vyazma, Rzhev, Toropets and almost to Velikie Luki. At Stalin's insistence, and at no real further gain, the offensive continued through the rest of February, through March and into April.
So your casual assertion that the Soviet offensive quickly ended is simply untrue. (Unless, that is, you are employing a highly unconventional definition of 'quickly ended'.)

Perhaps the only relevance of all this to the original theme of the thread is that as a result of this Soviet offensive the Wehrmacht was unable in the summer of 1942 (or at any time thereafter) to seriously threaten the Soviet capital.

The Soviet troops got to an encirclement and Germans reserved the Rzhev ledge in 80 km from Moscow. Maybe the North-Western Front won the territory, other fronts turned out worse.



http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov2/08.html

Рокоссовский в 1962 году в беседе с преподавателями и слушателями академии имени Фрунзе критически оценил ход советского контрнаступления под Москвой: «20 декабря после освобождения Волоколамска стало ясно, что противник оправился, организовал оборону и что наличными силами продолжать наступление нельзя. Надо было серьезно готовиться к летней кампании. Но, к великому сожалению, Ставкой было приказано продолжать наступление и изматывать противника. Это была грубейшая ошибка. Мы изматывали себя. Неоднократные доклады о потерях Жуков не принимал во внимание. При наличных силах добиться решительных результатов было нельзя. Мы просто выталкивали противника (не только выталкивали, но и сами попадали в окружение! — Б: С.). Не хватало орудий, танков, особенно боеприпасов. Пехота наступала по снегу под сильным огнем при слабой артиллерийской поддержке. Наступало пять фронтов, и, естественно, сил не хватало. Противник перешел к стратегической обороне, и нам надо было сделать то же самое. А мы наступали. В этом была грубейшая ошибка Сталина. Жуков и Конев не смогли его переубедить». Впрочем, нет никаких надежных свидетельств, что Георгий Константинович и Иван Степанович пытались это сделать.

Rokossovsky in 1962, in an interview with teachers and students of the Frunze Academy, critically assessed the course of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow: “On December 20 after the liberation of Volokolamsk, it became clear that the enemy had recovered, organized a defense and that it was impossible to continue the offensive. We had to seriously prepare for the summer campaign. But, unfortunately, the Stavka was ordered to continue the offensive and exhaust the enemy. It was a grave mistake. We were exhausting ourselves. Repeated reports of losses Zhukov did not take into account. With the available forces it was impossible to achieve decisive results. We simply pushed the enemy (not only pushed, but also got surrounded by ourselves! - B: S.). There were not enough guns, tanks, especially ammunition. Infantry attacked the snow under heavy fire with weak artillery support. There were five fronts, and, naturally, there was not enough strength. The enemy turned to strategic defense, and we had to do the same. And we were advancing. This was Stalin’s worst mistake. Zhukov and Konev could not convince him. ” However, there is no reliable evidence that Georgy Konstantinovich and Ivan Stepanovich tried to do this.

[Max Payload]

Rokossovsky in 1962, in an interview with teachers and students of the Frunze Academy, critically assessed the course of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow: “On December 20 after the liberation of Volokolamsk, it became clear that the enemy had recovered, organized a defense and that it was impossible to continue the offensive. We had to seriously prepare for the summer campaign. But, unfortunately, the Stavka was ordered to continue the offensive and exhaust the enemy. It was a grave mistake. We were exhausting ourselves. Repeated reports of losses Zhukov did not take into account. With the available forces it was impossible to achieve decisive results. We simply pushed the enemy (not only pushed, but also got surrounded by ourselves! - B: S.). There were not enough guns, tanks, especially ammunition. Infantry attacked the snow under heavy fire with weak artillery support. There were five fronts, and, naturally, there was not enough strength. The enemy turned to strategic defense, and we had to do the same. And we were advancing. ...

It is true that Rokossovsky’s army made only limited progress west of Volokoamsk after 20 December, but your quotation of him was, ‘the continuation of attacks after December 15 was in vain’, and your reference in that post was clearly to the offensive as whole. By 15 December the Soviet offensive had not made much progress, Klin was not taken until that evening and Zhukov’s forces had not moved much beyond Istra in the centre and Stalinogorsk in the south. But as the map you posted above clearly shows, the continuation of the attacks, while costly in terms of Soviet losses, were hardly ‘in vain’. Moscow-Vyazma - 200km; Moscow-Rzhev - 200km; Oshtakov-Demidov >200km.
And, to repeat, this offensive can hardly be described as ‘quickly ended’.

[offizier1916]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VP_QaNU5Uys

interesting lecture.

summary: german army was in a devasted situation already before Fall Blau. During Fall Blau the Situation was even more catastrophic. No reserve, to weak forces, fronts overstretched, axis allies not prepared for a mechanical warfare. General Paulus lived from hand to mouth because of lack of troops and ammunition and fuel. After DIeppe 42 Hitler was alarmed and scared and started to Transport troops from the east to the west/from the Ersatzheer to the west