Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk

[Duncan_M]

I was reading Robert Forczyk's Osprey book Kursk 1943: The Northern Front, in it he states the first line of Soviet defense included penal battalions.

Is there any information as to which battalions were used, where, and how they fought?

[Dann Falk]

Greetings,

In my first book, "The 64th Army at Stalingrad 1942-43", I talk about the use of penal units at Stalingrad. Currently I'm writing the follow up book which finishes the story, “The 7th Guards Army from Kursk to Prague 1943-45”.

I have not researched the use of penal units on the north side of the Kursk attack, but let me quote from my second unfinished book covering part of the south attack: (this information is subject to change)

"Interestingly the 7th Guards Army still retained penal companies (PC - criminals) and blocking detachments (BD - to backup less reliable troops). During the first six days of combat, the Penal Companies #5, 62, 63, 65, and 66 lost the following troops:
• 170 killed
• 508 wounded
• 260 missing in action
• 2 in hospital with illness
For a total of 940 men.

These penal companies were actually over strength because normally each would contain between 150-200 men. During this time the 5 PC only lost 5 men wounded, so the other four PCs suffered the remaining 935 casualties. In other words, they were wiped out.
The three Blocking Detachments (sometimes known as Barrier units), #82, 85 and 86 only lost 3 killed, 6 wounded and 3 missing during the same time period. (see Appendix 4)"

Here is Appendix 4:

"Appendix 4
Several Historical OOB charts for 15 April, 29 April, and 19 August 1943 (TsAMO Archive) show the 7th Guards Army controlling the, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66 Penal Companies and the 82, 83 84, 85, and 86 Blocking Detachments. The losses for all these units during the battle for Kursk appear to be unavailable, but we can assume they did take part in the fighting.

Of special note, the 66 Penal Company was listed as having 193 men missing in action. This large number of missing, suggests that either most of these men went over to the Germans on the first day of combat or they were surrounded and quickly captured."

I hope this info helps

Dann

[Art]

Battalions or companies? These are different things. Actually both the Central Front and the Voronezh Front had only one penal battalion each (No.8 and No.9) respectively. Based on an absence of recorded losses the 8th battalion wasn't much involved in defensive operation but was only committed during the Soviet counteroffensive (operation Kutuzov)

[Art]

According to the war diary of the 48 Army/Central Front on 1 July 43 the 8 Penal Battalion was attached to the 399 Rifle Division on the front-line near Panskaya. In early July this division was replaced with the 16 Lithuanian Rifle Division, but it looks that the battalion remained where it was. By the order of the 16 LRD the battalion was to be relieved by 2/249 Rifle Regiment during the night 8/9 July
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112725730
By another order after the relief was completed the battalion was to march to the 17 Guards Rifle Corps, the march was expected to be completed on 11 July:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112725732
When this transfer was completed the operation "Citadel" essentially ended, so it looks that the battalion didn't take any part in defensive fighting. Which is again corroborated by an absence of recorded casualties during this period.

[Duncan_M]

Greetings,

In my first book, "The 64th Army at Stalingrad 1942-43", I talk about the use of penal units at Stalingrad. Currently I'm writing the follow up book which finishes the story, “The 7th Guards Army from Kursk to Prague 1943-45”.

I have not researched the use of penal units on the north side of the Kursk attack, but let me quote from my second unfinished book covering part of the south attack: (this information is subject to change)

"Interestingly the 7th Guards Army still retained penal companies (PC - criminals) and blocking detachments (BD - to backup less reliable troops). During the first six days of combat, the Penal Companies #5, 62, 63, 65, and 66 lost the following troops:
• 170 killed
• 508 wounded
• 260 missing in action
• 2 in hospital with illness
For a total of 940 men.

These penal companies were actually over strength because normally each would contain between 150-200 men. During this time the 5 PC only lost 5 men wounded, so the other four PCs suffered the remaining 935 casualties. In other words, they were wiped out.
The three Blocking Detachments (sometimes known as Barrier units), #82, 85 and 86 only lost 3 killed, 6 wounded and 3 missing during the same time period. (see Appendix 4)"

Here is Appendix 4:

"Appendix 4
Several Historical OOB charts for 15 April, 29 April, and 19 August 1943 (TsAMO Archive) show the 7th Guards Army controlling the, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66 Penal Companies and the 82, 83 84, 85, and 86 Blocking Detachments. The losses for all these units during the battle for Kursk appear to be unavailable, but we can assume they did take part in the fighting.

Of special note, the 66 Penal Company was listed as having 193 men missing in action. This large number of missing, suggests that either most of these men went over to the Germans on the first day of combat or they were surrounded and quickly captured."

I hope this info helps

Dann

Awesome info, that was great.

Do you know how penal units were used on the defense, tactically? On outposts in front of the MLR? Manning the very first line of defenses? Detailed for immediate counterattack? Just augmented to the existing battalion sized positions?

One thing that kind of confused me with Forczyk's book was that he states Rokossovsky placed his best infantry in the second and third lines, and his lesser units in the front lines, which suggests the first was sacrificial, to attrit the Germans while they broke through it before catching hell against the better and sturdier second and third line of defenses. But after the first line was breached, Rokossovsky counter attacked ferociously with his reserve instead of letting the Germans break themselves on the second line. Was this purely the result of Stalin and Stavka micromanaging while in an unnecessary panic? Or was the first line of defenses never intended/allowed to be lost?

[Stephan]

One thing that kind of confused me with Forczyk's book was that he states Rokossovsky placed his best infantry in the second and third lines, and his lesser units in the front lines, which suggests the first was sacrificial, to attrit the Germans while they broke through it before catching hell against the better and sturdier second and third line of defenses. But after the first line was breached, Rokossovsky counter attacked ferociously with his reserve instead of letting the Germans break themselves on the second line. Was this purely the result of Stalin and Stavka micromanaging while in an unnecessary panic? Or was the first line of defenses never intended/allowed to be lost?

I dont know nothing about this particular tactics, but I know some about Rokossowski.

He had a solid reputation as one of the very best soviet generals, excellent tactician and good strategist. Unlike Zjukov, he is wellknown for planning all his operation with a view to spare his soldiers. In the cases where losses were heavy, they at least did managed with their tasks and destroyed the opposing german forces too.

But overall, it was less risky to be a soldier under Rokossowskij, than under Zjukow or Konjev. No massive waves of assaults, one after another, when most were supposed to fall.
And also, he wasnt blindly obedient to Stavka... There is a nice story of him thrice disobeying Stalin himself, when he refused to leave the planning room and cool down, thinking on retracting his proposals... He insisted, although generals could be shot for less... And Stalin accepted his solution, muttering he appreciated generals whom knew their profession, and had courage to stand for it....


Thus, with ferocious counterattacks its surely no meaningsless storming because so is ordered by Stavka, but well prepared tactical strikes. Done and made with full energhy and no stupid hesitation. As directly from the best of manuals written by practictioners.
.

[Stephan]

Of special note, the 66 Penal Company was listed as having 193 men missing in action. This large number of missing, suggests that either most of these men went over to the Germans on the first day of combat or they were surrounded and quickly captured."

I hope this info helps

Dann

Which is essentially the same, even if there IS some nuance, actively deserting contra actively accepting the inevitable defeat and the whole company capitulating together.

Why? Russians seldom capitulated en masse... Unlike in most other countries. Usually they capitulated in small groups or individually.
This is important to know, when we read statistics, esp from the early days of the war, with many thousands captured russians.
They seldom capitulated in whole divisions just so, but tried to fight, or if not possible, to disperse... And capitulated in small groups when no fight was possible any longer...
Of course, them being forbidden to retreat made it much more difficult to retreat. Even if this happened.

[Dann Falk]

Great comments by all.

For the 7th Guards Army, on the southern Kursk Bulge area, it appears the penal companies were paired up with rifle divisions and used directly in the front lines. So, they would be holding an advance section of the front and would be subject to direct assault and or major artillery fire on the first day. That is why, they suffered very heavy casualties as I stated.

[Art]

But after the first line was breached, Rokossovsky counter attacked ferociously with his reserve instead of letting the Germans break themselves on the second line.

The plan of counterstrikes was developed in advance by the staff of the Central Front and approved by general Rokossovsky:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100770668
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=132345256
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=132345255
So no improvisations here.

[Art]

But overall, it was less risky to be a soldier under Rokossowskij, than under Zjukow or Konjev.

I guess, despite being some kind of off-topic it would be still useful to repost this table here.

Combat casualties of Soviet fronts in January-May 1945 as a percentage of their average personnel strength:
Leningrad Front (Marshal Govorov) - 2.5%
2nd Baltic Front (general Yeryomenko/Marshal Govorov) - 27.5%
1st Baltic Front (general Bagramyan) - 23.6%
3rd Belorussian Front (general Chernyakhovsky/Marshal Vasilevsky) - 51.6%
2nd Belorussian Front (Marshal Rokossovsky) - 48.7%
1st Belorussian Front (Marshal Zhukov) - 40.9%
1st Ukrainian Front (Marshal Konev) - 49.6%
4th Ukrainian Front (general Petrov/general Yeryomenko) - 49.1%
2nd Ukrainian Front (Marshal Malinovsky) - 32.1%
3rd Ukrainian Front (Marshal Tolbukhin) - 42.6%

Calculated from "Soviet casualties and combat losses..." by G.Krivosheev.
Of course, causalities were a function of many different factors, not just the personality of military commander alone.

[Stephan]

Great comments by all.

For the 7th Guards Army, on the southern Kursk Bulge area, it appears the penal companies were paired up with rifle divisions and used directly in the front lines. So, they would be holding an advance section of the front and would be subject to direct assault and or major artillery fire on the first day. That is why, they suffered very heavy casualties as I stated.

As raw and rough as it sounds, this is really a wise solution. Somebody must take the first line and take on the first crushing strike... That is an old problem in the military... There were different solutions in modern time: just pick up a formation and order it. Or make it more or less explicit they whom survive will be automatically decorated and promoted. Or use voluntaries, with the same idea. Or let the batalion commanders draw straw... The loser takes the first line (or act as the last guarding troop - another high risk mission in an army on quick retreat being pursuited).

To have these penalty companies to do a big part of this first line defence is really an elegant solutions. BUT Here with two problems: Im not sure the survivors got automatic pardon and the right to be normal soldiers again... The sacrifice would be all right if they did, but I suspect they didnt...
Second, they couldnt retreat even in a military necessisity and even if tactically fully possible: they had the NKWD barraging troops behind...

[Art]

BUT Here with two problems: Im not sure the survivors got automatic pardon and the right to be normal soldiers again...

The term spent in a penal unit couldn't be larger than 3 months. This term ended automatically in case of wounds received in battle. It could also be shortened in view of performance demonstrated by individuals or whole units.

Second, they couldnt retreat even in a military necessisity and even if tactically fully possible: they had the NKWD barraging troops behind

I'me feeling a little silly repeating the same thing over and over, but so-called blocking or barrage detachments (mentioned in the post No.2 in this topic) had nothing to do with NKVD. They were Red Army's units formed by Red Army's TO&Es, having Red Army's personnel, and commanded by the Red Army. Who were actually notorious NKVD "blocking detachments" and what functions they performed is described in a parallel topic:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=243738
As far as the 7 Guards Army is concerned, in July 1943 it had the 92 NKVD Border Regiment with about 1000 men deployed as security force in its rear zone.

To have these penalty companies to do a big part of this first line defence

Five companies with about 1000+ personnel were not such a big part, considering that the 7 Guards Army had 7 divisions with about 60,000 men plus well above 20,000 in other separate units. One point which should be added that theoretically penal companies were field army-level units, hence the official designation "separate army penal company". In practice commanding such small units in combat from an Army HQ would be both impossible and inefficient. So a company was habitually attached to a division which attached it to one of its regiments.

As far as I remember some details on operations of the 7 GA's penal companies as well as a general description of the operation "Citadel" in this sector can be found in Valery Zamulin's very detailed book:
https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Battle ... 1911512579

[Stephan]

Tx for these extra explanations, Art!

[Yuri]

Penal battalion, penalties company and the Barrage detachments of RKKA.
Penal company - one company unto division. In this company were sent privates, sergeants and junior officers (platoon commanders or their respective) of the division. In addition, in the army, a the separate penal company in this penal company were sent those who had served in rear military units this army.
Penal battalion one to the front. The penal battalion sent officers from the company commander and above.
Barrage detachments of the NKVD is explained ART. They had nothing to do with the fighting.
Barrage detachments of the Red Army created one detachment unto rifle regiment from soldiers and officers the same regiment. The commander was one of the commanders of a company or a separate platoon (for example, an anti-tank platoon). The barrage detachments not stood behind the penal companies. These units have a different function. Barrage detachment is essentially a reserve of the commander of the regiment in the amount of the rifle company. The main difference between an ordinary company from the barrage detachment - ordinary soldiers of the barrage detachment have the right to use weapons against alarmists and those who do not follow orders during the battle and only during the battle. Since the barrage detachment operated in the most threatened areas, they usually had higher losses than ordinary companies.
About the actions of penal companies and Barrage detachment of the 333-rd rifle division I was told a little in the thread "Battle for state farm 79"
and "Importance of Artillery" viewtopic.php?f=55&t=226912&start=105

[Yuri]

Penal companies and battalions, as well as the barrage detachments were created in the development of the order №227 from 28.07.1942.
29 Oct 1944 in connection with the liberation of the Soviet territory Stavka issued an order according to which "in connection with changes in the General situation on the fronts of the need for further content the barrage detachments disappeared". By 15 November 1944 these units were disbanded