Maybe I'm the first who noticed that the "stiffness" of Zhukov and the "softness" of Rokossovsky is a postwar myth. It so happened that 333 rifle division (2nd formation) was in early October 1942, the 66th army of the Don front (General Rokosovsky). After examining the documents (including that published Rokosovsky, and then they canceled Stalin or Zhukov) I had doubts about the views which have emerged in the literature. In fact, everything is exactly the opposite. Later, Alexey Isaev came to the same opinion.Art wrote: ↑29 Sep 2019, 09:53I guess, despite being some kind of off-topic it would be still useful to repost this table here.
Combat casualties of Soviet fronts in January-May 1945 as a percentage of their average personnel strength:
Leningrad Front (Marshal Govorov) - 2.5%
2nd Baltic Front (general Yeryomenko/Marshal Govorov) - 27.5%
1st Baltic Front (general Bagramyan) - 23.6%
3rd Belorussian Front (general Chernyakhovsky/Marshal Vasilevsky) - 51.6%
2nd Belorussian Front (Marshal Rokossovsky) - 48.7%
1st Belorussian Front (Marshal Zhukov) - 40.9%
1st Ukrainian Front (Marshal Konev) - 49.6%
4th Ukrainian Front (general Petrov/general Yeryomenko) - 49.1%
2nd Ukrainian Front (Marshal Malinovsky) - 32.1%
3rd Ukrainian Front (Marshal Tolbukhin) - 42.6%
Calculated from "Soviet casualties and combat losses..." by G.Krivosheev.
Of course, causalities were a function of many different factors, not just the personality of military commander alone.
Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk
Re: Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk
Re: Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk
I can't read Russian. The original plan was to use the front tank army reseves to immediately counterattack to retake the first line if breached, not wait for further German attrition caused by attacks against the second or third line?Art wrote: ↑29 Sep 2019, 09:07The plan of counterstrikes was developed in advance by the staff of the Central Front and approved by general Rokossovsky:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100770668
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=132345256
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=132345255
So no improvisations here.
Re: Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk
Not immediately but on the 2nd or 3rd day, and not only with tank reserves but also with 17 and 18 Guards Rifle Corps. But in other details you understand it right.
Re: Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk
If the first line of defenses had to be held at all.cost and were trigger for immediate and huge counterattack, why would Rokossovsky put his least capable divisions in it?
Re: Red Army Penal Battalions at Kursk
I wouldn't say so. Rokossovsky had his best divisions (17 and 18 Guards Rifle Corps) in reserve (formally they belonged to the 13 Army, but he defined where and how they were committed) which was not an unusual practice. Other divisions were divided between the frontline and army reserves. This division was, I believe, mostly random and in fact they were regularly rotated. So, for example, as already mentioned 399 Rifle Division was replaced in the first line with 16 Rifle Division just before the "Citadel" started.