Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

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Art
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Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#1

Post by Art » 04 May 2020, 16:08

This topic is an account of little-known local combat episode that happened on 25-28 December 1942 north of Stalingrad. It is based on my study of Soviet documents, war diary of the German 6 Army and some secondary sources.

General situation. On 23 November 1942 the German 6 Army was encircled in the Stalingrad pocket and occupied an all-around defense perimeter. In order to shorten the perimeter in the northern part of the pocket the LI Army Corps (general of artillery W. von Seydlitz-Kurzbach) retreated to new positions which ran along a line of hills north of Stalingrad. Soviet attempts to attack these positions in late November – early December were unsuccessful. The Soviet command of the Don Front (lieutenant general K. Rokossovsky) decided to take a break and prepare for a renewed general offensive. Meanwhile local attacks were to be launched in order to harass the defenders and improve positions before the final reduction of the pocket. In particular, the Soviet 66 Army (major general A. Zhidov(Zhadov)) was to capture two hills, known as the Hill 137.8 and Hill 139.7, at the northern perimeter of the pocket. This local operation was to be launched on 25 December.

Situation in the Stalingrad pocket as of 25.12.42, an orange arrow shows the area of interest:
pocket.png
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Terrain and weather. The area was an open rolling plain almost completely devoid of forests and single trees. The two hills (137.8 and 139.7) were dominant heights which offered good observation of the surrounding area. Since the frontline formed as kind of obtuse angle with an apex at these hills, their reverse slopes were kept under partial observation from the Soviet side. From the hills the ground gradually descends to the south-east to a large draw called Balka Konnaya or Balka Satu, which formed a natural defilade for the Germans. Already in late December there was deep snow, which hindered movement of men, animals and vehicles. Until 24 December there was a light cold with low overcast, which strongly limited operations of air forces. With onset of a cold wave on 25 December the temperature dropped to -20-25, and the sky became clearer.

Fragment of the Soviet topo map of the area, hills 137.8 and 139.7 are designated with red triangles:
map.jpg

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#2

Post by Art » 04 May 2020, 16:13

German forces and situation. The hills 137.8 and 139.7 lay on the juncture between 60. Infanterie-Division (mot) (major general H.-A. von Arensdorf) and 16. Panzerdivision (lieutenant general G. Angern) respectively. Both divisions were under command of the XI Army Corps which in its turn was tactically controlled by the LI Army Corps. On 23 December the 6 Army ordered to prepare a relief of the 60 ID (mot) which was to be employed for breakout from the pocket. This relief never actually started.

Both division were exhausted and suffered from a serious shortfall of personnel, which was only partly compensated by incorporation of remains of the disbanded 94 Infanterie-Division. As of 21 December the 60 ID (mot) had 7 weak infantry battalion and a weak pioneer battalion, 22 light and 10 heavy field guns, 15 light and 6 heavy anti-aircraft guns, 13 medium and 8 heavy anti-tank guns. The division was considered fully fit for defense. On the same day the 16 PzD with 4 weak infantry battalions, one weak pioneer battalion, 12 light and 10 heavy field guns, 15 light and 3 heavy anti-aircraft guns, 12 medium and 8 heavy anti-tank guns was considered conditionally fit for defense. Organic armor (Panzer-Regiment 2) was detached from the division to the western part of the Stalingrad pocket (sector of the XIV Panzer Corps). The armor reserve in the sector of the LI Army Corps belonged to the 24 Panzerdivison and included 21 operational tanks (2 II, 2 IIIkz, 9 IIIlg, 2 III-7.5, 2 IVkz, 2 IVlg, 2 Bf.Pz.) on 24 December. Situation with all kind of supplies, including food and ammunition, was poor.

According to the Soviet intelligence the Hill 137.8 was defended by 1st battalion/92. Infanterie-Regiment (mot)/60 Infanterie-Division (mot). The battalion defense area was about 1 km x 1 km and included about 60 personnel shelters, each for 4-8 men, with overhead cover of steel rails, steel plates and earth. Combat position (combat trenches) were built near shelters and connected by several lines of communications trenches and snow walls. The first line comprised machine gun emplacements, the second and third lines – also mortars and anti-tank guns positions. Behind the third line there was a firing position of 3 150-m guns (probably heavy infantry guns) with an ammunition dump.
Soviet scheme of the trench system on the Hill 137.8
trenches.jpg
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The Hill 139.7 was defended by the battle group Dörnemann/16 PzD comprising divisional reconnaissance battalion, Schützen-Regiment 64 and 3rd company of the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 16 (divisional anti-tank battalion). The defense was organized similarly to the Hill 137.8. Both hills were protected by minefields and in some sectors by wire obstacles. Positions were mutually supported by oblique and flanking fire. Anti-tank weapons in the sector of the two hills included 2 light, 7 medium and 2 heavy towed anti-tank guns, 4 self-propelled heavy AT guns and 2 88-mm Flaks. Of them 8 guns (2 light, 5 medium and 1 heavy were deployed on the first line)

Positions of the 16 Panzerdivision in December 1942 (scheme from the divisional history):
16 Pz.D.png
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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#3

Post by dgfred » 04 May 2020, 17:44

Excellent. Thanks for posting.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#4

Post by Art » 05 May 2020, 20:58

Soviet Forces. 66 Army was on the left wing of the Don Front, having its left border anchored on the Volga River. The army consisted of 6 rifle divisions, one fortified region and several separate units – total 36 543 men in combat units by 25.12.42. The local operation in the right-wing sector of the army was coordinated by deputy army commander major general Kozlov and included two divisions - 226 (colonel Nikitchenko) and 343 Rifle Division (colonel Usenko). Both division suffered heavy losses in the operation “Uranus” and further attacks on the Stalingrad pocket and incorporated only limited replacements from service and rear units. 226 and 343 Divisions had 4749 and 5463 men respectively on 22.12.42. Each division consisted of three rifle regiments each of two rifle battalions, an artillery regiment and divisional units. In addition, the 360 Separate Machine Gun battalion (573 men on 25.12.42) was attached to the 343 Division for occupation of defense positions. Artillery assigned to the operation in addition to organic assets of 226 and 343 Divisions included 843 Artillery Regiment (299 Division), 143 Mortar Regiment, and 56 and 72 Guards Mortar Regiments (each with 9 operational M-13 rocket launchers). That was equal to about 290 mortars of all calibers, 120 field guns, 60 anti-tank guns and 18 rocket launchers. The only tank unit available was the 7 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment. That was a newly formed and inexperienced unit with deficient training, which lost most of its KV tanks in already in first days of combat in late November 1942. After 22 December the regiment took over remaining tanks of the 58 Tank Brigade. After that it had 7 KV-1s, 2 T-34 and 7 T-70 tanks operational (evening of 24 December). Supply situation was tense, in particular ammunition was available in limited numbers.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#5

Post by Art » 07 May 2020, 11:24

Soviet plans and preparation.
Scheme: attack on Hills 137.8 and 139.7 on 25.12.42
00000108.jpg
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Infantry: Attack was launched by main forces of two rifle divisions. 343 Rifle Division was to attack the Hill 137.8 from the north and north-east with 1153 and 1151 Rifle Regiment deployed abreast on a frontage of 1-1.5 km. 1155 Rifle Regiment and 360 Machine Gun battalion continued to defend their former positions on the right wing. 226 Rifle Division was to attack the Hill 139.7 from the north and east with 987 and 989 Rifle Regiment deployed abreast on frontage of 1-1.5 km. On its left wing the 989 Rifle Regiment was to defend its former positions. Following success of the other two regiment its right wings elements were to advance and secure southern slopes of the Hill 139.7. Jump-off positions were prepared at a distance of 100-200 meters from a German line under protection of a snow wall and were to be occupied in the night before an attack. The attack was to start at the morning of 25.12 after a short (15 minutes) artillery preparation. After securing both hills the infantry was to take positions on their western and south-western slopes and prepare to repulse possible counterattacks.

Artillery.
Distribution of artillery:
343 RD – organic artillery, two battalions of 843 Artillery Regiment, 72 Guards Mortar Regiment
226 RD – organic artillery, one battery of the 843 Artillery Regiment, 143 Mortar Regiment, 56 Guards Mortar Regiment.
Artillery preparation on both hills started at H-15 and consisted of a 3-minute fire strike, 7 minutes of methodical fire and a final 5-minute fire strike. Fire was directed against reconnoitered targets such as machine guns, trenches, observation posts etc. Anti-tank guns, infantry guns and several batteries of divisional artillery regiments (e.g. two cannon batteries in the sector of the 226 RD) were employed for direct fire against known target, including anti-tank guns. Here envelopment of the Hill 139.7 by Soviet lines from north and east was used with great effect (see the scheme). Planned ammunition expenditure in the artillery preparation of the 226 Division:
560 rounds - 76-mm divisional guns
384 rounds - 122-mm howitzers
300 rounds - 76-mm regimental guns
220 rounds - 120-mm mortars
520 rounds - 82-mm mortars
Planned expenditure by the 343 Division:
388 rounds - 76-mm divisional guns
720 rounds – 122-mm howitzers
257 rounds - 76-mm regimental guns
420 rounds – 50-mm mortars
820 rounds – 82-mm mortars
384 rounds – 120-mm mortars
120 rounds – 45-mm AT guns
Salvos of rocket launchers signaled the end of preparation at H hour. Attack of infantry (and tanks in the sector of 226 RD) was supported by a creeping barrage (four phase lines 200 meters apart in the sector of 343 RD, three phase lines some 300-400 meters apart in the sector of 226 RD, see the scheme). Two cannon batteries were assigned to support tanks and knock out hostile anti-tank guns revealed in the process of combat. Artillery forward observers, anti-tank, infantry guns and a part of divisional artillery moved to the hills after they were secured by infantry and prepared to repulse counterattacks. Defense barrages were prepared in advance.
Schemes:
Targets in the sector of 343 RD:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113835219
Deployment of artillery of the 226 RD:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113441813
Planned actions of the direct fire guns of 226 RD
00000105.jpg
Planned creeping barrage in the sector of 226 RD
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from:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113441806


Tanks. 7 Guards Heavy Tank regiment was deployed at assembly positions in hollow 1 km east of the Hill 139.7 in the sector of the 226 Division started movement at H-15 (with the start of the artillery preparation), T-34 tanks towed armored sleds with a group of infantry (60 men, SMG company of the 987 Rifle Regiment). Battle formations: KV tanks on the left, T-34s with armored sleds on the right, T-70 behind T-34 with towed anti-tank guns. At H-hour tanks crossed the frontline and headed at full speed to a road fork south-east of the Hill 139.7 where infantry dismounted from sleds and in cooperation with tanks neutralized and mopped up German positions until foot infantry joined them. After positions on the hill were secured, tanks moved back to assembly area on the eastern slopes of the Hill 139.7, where they were kept as a mobile reserve ready to repulse hostile counterattacks. Light tanks towed anti-tank guns to new positions on the hill.

Engineers cleared passes in minefields before the attack. After both hills were taken by infantry they were to lay anti-tank mines and wire obstacles before new positions using special light sleds for transporting mines and engineer materials.

Preparations
:
- regrouping to the attack sector
- reconnaissance by observation and scouting
- personal reconnoitering by commanders down to company level, issue of detailed plans and orders
- a snow wall was built to protect jump-off positions from observation and hostile fire, infantry jump-off positions and positions for heavy weapons were prepared and marked
- training of infantry, tank-transported groups of the 987 Rifle Regiment exercised with tanks. Camouflage smokes and rations were issued to infantry
- accumulation and issue of ammunition
- registration by artillery
- sleds for ammunition, weapons and engineer material, and armored sleds for tank-transported infantry were procured
- engineers cleared passes in mines and prepared mines and wire obstacles for consolidation

Conclusion: the plan emphasized speed and surprise of attack and the maximal use of effect of a short fire preparation. Much attention was given to consolidation after successful attack. Sufficient time was given to planning and preparation.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#6

Post by Art » 09 May 2020, 11:32

Attack. In early hours of 25 December Germans noticed some activity on the Soviet side (probably engineers removing mines or infantry moving to jump-off positions) and stayed alerted until morning. However, the attack started at 8.00 as planned. The visibility was poor due to morning fog and sharp wind accompanied by blizzard. The wind also concealed noise of tank engines. Germans weapons on the frontline were rendered ineffective by cold and snow and partly knocked out by well-directed Soviet fire. 88-mm Flaks deployed behind positions couldn’t be used due to limited visibility. Engines of their prime-movers as well as engines of two self-propelled anti-tank guns didn’t start due to strong cold. As a result the Soviet attack quickly reached German positions. German defensive fire was poorly directed and ineffective and failed to stop the attack. 7 Guards Tank Regiment attacked the Hill 139.7 with 12 tanks (7 KV, 2 T-34, 3 T-70). According to a German account 5-cm AT guns achieved several direct hits on KV tanks, which failed to penetrate the armor. Tanks advanced to the hill and transported armored sleds with infantry according to the plan. Fighting in trenches and mop-up of positions continued for two or three hours until 10-11 a.m. Infantry of the 343 Division used previously rehearsed technique of trench fighting: small groups advanced along trenches and cleared them with hand grenades. German positions were mostly captured. The exception was the sector of the 1151 Rifle Regiment. Here the 2nd battalion captured forward positions but was stopped on the summit of the Hill 137.8. As a result the 1st battalion/1151 RR stayed isolated. The battalion advanced to the south-east slopes of the hill and captured positions of the 10. (Flak) company of the Schützen-Regiment 64. As the visibility improved and defenders recovered from the initial shock continuation of attack became impossible and the gap between the two battalions wasn’t closed.
The attacked cost two or three disabled tanks (either KV and T-34 or KV and 2 T-70 according to different sources). The 7 Guards Tank Regiment still had 6 KV, 2 T-34 and 1 T-70 operational on the evening of 25.12 which supports relatively small losses suffered. Personnel casualties suffered in the attack phase cannot be accurately established but were moderate according to Soviet accounts. Considerable trophies (weapons, equipment and material) and several POWs were captured.

Consolidation started immediately after attack. Captured trenches and positions were converted for defense facing west and south. Anti-tank and infantry guns were moved to captured positions despite difficulties of hauling guns in deep snow (assistance from infantry was needed). Already by the evening there were 10 regimental guns, 19 anti-tank guns and several guns of divisional artillery installed on the Hill 139.7 in the sector of the 226 Division. 343 Division deployed 11 45-mm AT guns, 4 regimental and 2 divisional 76-mm guns on the Hill 137.8. Observers of divisional artillery were also moved to captured positions, for instance observers of two cannon batteries of the 903 Artillery Regiment in the sector of 343 Division, observers of the 1st Battalion/806 Artillery Regiment in the sector of 225 Division. Tanks of the 7 Guards Tank Regiment moved back to assembly area behind the Hill 139.7 in readiness to repulse counterattacks. Engineers started laying mines and wire obstacles in front of positions. Mines and obstacles were covered by fire of machine guns and anti-tank guns. Later combat outposts were advanced to a distance of 300-500 meters from the main positions. Outposts were supported by heavy weapons, supplied with flares and connected with telephone lines with main positions.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#7

Post by Art » 11 May 2020, 21:35

German counterattacks.

Fragment of the Soviet situation maps showing German counterattacks on 25.12.42
Image

Soviet penetration on the morning of 25.12 prompted reaction from the German side. Soviet ground observes and aerial reconnaissance noticed movement of vehicle columns from northern suburbs of Stalingrad to the penetration area. Apparently these were tanks of the 24 Panzerdivision and reserve elements of the 16 Panzerdivision. According to a 16 PzD’s divisional history a Christmas mass to be hold at the divisional command post was cancelled and soldiers were directed to the sector of the KG Dörnemann. Additional anti-tank weapons were transferred to the penetration site to block expansion of the penetration. Taking advantage of good weather Soviet airplanes attacked German vehicles and personnel concentrating behind the penetration site. Total 27 sorties of IL-2 ground-attack planes and 36 sorties of Yak-1 escort fighters were made. They claimed 17 tanks, 20 trucks, 100 men and various weapons destroyed with a loss of 2 IL-2s due to anti-aircraft fire.

According to Soviet documents the first German counterattack came at 11.00-11.30 and was made by a group of infantry with 5 armored vehicles. Probably that was a local reserve. Stronger counterattacks were launched from south and south-east in the second part of the day (at 14.00 and later) and included about 40 armored vehicles – by all probability tanks of the 24 PzD an armored personnel carriers of the 16 PzD. The largest success was achieved against 1151 Rifle Regiment (343 Rifle Division), which as described above failed to occupy a coherent defense line. According to Soviet sources one company of the 1st battalion/1151 RR with 42 men, which occupied the third line of trenches on south-east slopes of the Hill 137.8 was overran by German armor. German sources say that 60-70 Red Army soldiers were captured in an armor counterattack and a contact with remaining German elements near the Hill 137.8 was reestablished. As a result positions on the Hill 137.8 were partly recovered, although the Soviet infantry still controlled north and west slopes. The new frontline apparently ran close to the summit of the hill. However, attempts to return positions on the Hill 139.7 failed. The counterattacking force came under strong Soviet fire, especially indirect fire of 122-mm howitzers. The German command stopped the counterattack and decided to launch a new attack on the hill the following night using forces transferred from the 60 ID (mot) sector. The counterattacking force retreated to Balka Konnaya (Satu).

According to causalities register on 25 December 1942 the 226 Rifle Division lost 33 men killed, missing or dead of wounds (mostly in 985 and 987 Rifle Regiments). Causalities of the 343 Rifle Divisions were far heavier – 149 men killed and missing, the bulk were in the 1151 Rifle Regiment, which was strongly hit by armor counterattack. Exact German personnel losses on this day are difficult to establish, but they were clearly large. According to the situation report of the 6 Army from 25.12 2 German tanks and 4 armored carriers became total write-offs, 15 tanks were damaged, 8 anti-tank guns and several light infantry guns were lost. The number of operational tanks in the 24 PzD dropped to 6 by 26.12, which evidences serious losses suffered.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#8

Post by Art » 12 May 2020, 17:03

German counterattacks (continuation)
226 Rifle Division used the nighttime to reinforce defenses, replenish ammunition and lay additional mines and obstacles. Divisional machine gun battalion (257 Machine Gun Battalion) took positions on the forward line between 985 and 987 Rifle Regimens. Defenders were alerted by continuous sound of vehicle engines heard from Balka Konnaya (Satu). A second counterattack of infantry and armor on the Hill 139.7 came in early morning of 26 December (about 5-6 am) under cover of darkness from south and south-west. German tanks managed to dislodge the 3rd Battalion/987 Rifle Regiment from its positions and inflict considerable losses. However, German infantry was separated from armor by strong defensive fire and tanks without support had to turn back. According to a German report 4 tanks were knocked out in a counterattack, of them one - beyond repair. Following withdrawal of German armor the 987 Regiment recovered its former positions. Several prisoners were taken and told that the attack was made by tanks of the 24 PzD. In the sector of 343 Division only weak German activity was registered during the night which was probably a part of the general attack on the Hill 139.7. Divisional artillery took part in repulsing German night attacks delivering fire on infantry and tanks.

Following a failure of the second counterattack a new German operation to recover positions was planned on the morning of 28 December using additional forces transferred from elsewhere. The days of 26 and 27 December were uneventful, combat activity was limited to light harassing fire. In the night 26/26 December combat outposts of the 987 Rifle Regiment south-west of the Hill 139.7 repulsed attack of several tens German infantrymen. That was probably active scouting before a general attack on the following night. For a renewed attack Panzer-Regiment 2 (aka Panzer-Regiment Sieckenius) was returned to the 16 PzD from the XIV Panzerkorps (south-west sector of the Stalingrad pocket). The regiment had 17 operational tanks (1 Bf.Pz., 11 III lg, 1 IV kz, 4 IV lg), 4 more were transferred from the 24 PzD (1 Bf.Pz., 1 III lg, 1 III-7,5, 1 IV kz). Also III battalion of the 544 Grenadier-Regiment was transferred from the sector of the 389 Infanterie-Division and attached to the 16 PzD.

Following a previous pattern the third counterattack started in early hours of 28.12 (about 4.00 according to Soviet reports). It was made by about a battalion of infantry and some 20 tanks and supported by artillery and mortar fire. This time the attack was even less successful than on 26.12 and didn’t reach Soviet positions. German tanks and infantry tried to attack the same combat outpost of the 987 Rifle Regiment that they probed on the previous night, but were beaten back by Soviet artillery and mortar fire. Attempts to bypass the outpost also failed. After 2 or 3 hour combat the counterattacking force returned to starting positions in Balka Konnaya. According to a German report the counterattack “was stopped by powerful hostile defense with anti-tank guns and mortars “. 3 tanks (2 III lg, 1 IV lg) were lost as total write-offs. As observed by engineers of the 226 Divisions during the night attack 3 German tanks while maneuvering drove to a Soviet minefield in the sector of the 989 Rifle Regiment and were immobilized. Other tanks were damaged as evidenced by decrease of the number of operational tanks of the 16 PzD to 8 by 29.12. Soviet losses in combat of 28.12 were small – total 10 men killed in the 226 Division on that day, including casualties to harassing fire. 343 Division supported repulse of the counterattack by artillery, mortar and anti-tank gun fire but otherwise wasn’t actively involved.
After the failure of the third counterattack the German command refused from further attempts to recover lost positions at the Hill 139.7. A temporary lull came to this sector, which continued until the start of operation “Ring” on 10.1.43.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#9

Post by Art » 13 May 2020, 19:27

Results and aftermath

The Soviet 66 Army captured a hill with good observation of the surrounding area which was tactically important for future reduction of the Stalingrad pocket. Germans plans to relieve 60 ID (mot) and employ it for breakout from the pocket were completely ruined. Admittedly, a retreat of the external relief force (4 Panzer Army) which started those days made this breakout unfeasible irrespective of the situation in the pocket. German forces in the pocket were kept pinned down during this critical phase. Two German divisions suffered considerable losses in personnel and equipment. The effect on morale was apparently also noteworthy. As the history of the 16 Panzerdivision said “For the first time the division failed to hold its line”.

Although the battle was fought on a limited stretch of land about 2 kilometers wide it entailed large casualties. According to the war diary of the 64 Army personnel losses in four days (25-28 December) were equal to 204 killed, 397 wounded and 9 missing in action. Those data look understated somewhat. According to my count based on register of casualties the 343 Rifle Divisions lost it least 198 men killed, missing or dead of wounds and accidents on 24-28.12. The bulk of them belonged to the 1151 Rifle Regiment and were apparently caused by German counterattack on 25.12. 1153 Rifle Regiment lost 30 men; losses of other units were light. Also the 360 Machine Gun battalion attached to the division lost 7 men. According to a losses report submitted by the 343 Division it lost 211 men killed and dead of wounds on 20-31 December and the 360 Machine Gun Battalion lost 10. That is in good accord with calculation presented above. Casualties of the 226 Rifle Division were smaller – total 100 killed and dead of wounds on 25-28.12, of them 30 in the 985 Rifle Regiment and 55 in 987 Rifle Regiment. Casualties of nondivisional units (tanks, artillery, engineers) seem to be light. Altogether about 300 men were killed, died of wounds or went missing. Several tens of them were taken prisoners during the German counterattack on 25.12. Losses of tanks are difficult to establish for a lack of sources, but it seems that the 7 Guards Tank Regiment didn’t suffer any write-offs, although the number of operational tanks dropped from 16 on the evening of 24.12 to 10 on the evening of 28.12. Weapon losses were light – 3 45-mm guns, 1 50-mm and 2 82-mm mortars, 1 light machine guns and 10 rifles according to the war diary of the 66 Army.

On the German side 16 Panzerdivision lost 365 men (54 killed, 92 missing and 219 wounded) on 25-28.12 according to daily casualty record and amendments. It is not clear if losses of the attached III/544 Grenadier Regiment are included here. Casualties of the 60 Infanterie-Division (mot) are more problematic, since numbers in the original reports are skewed at one point. The minimal figures are total 156 men (41 killed, 3 missing, 112 wounded) but actual casualties could be even higher. There were additional non-battle losses to sickness, frost and exhaustion. According to fragmentary records in situation reports 5 or 6 German tanks became total write-offs during counterattacks. Losses of other weapons – armored carriers anti-tank guns, mortars, machine guns etc must be also appreciable.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#10

Post by Art » 17 May 2020, 12:16

Conclusion and observations.

A. The attack was mostly successful for the following reasons:
1) Sufficient time assigned to preparations, detailed and realistic plan, practical troops training before attack
2) Sufficiently large forces assigned to the operations (the bulk of two divisions with artillery and tank support)
3) Tactical surprise was achieved at least in part (deployment for attack at night, concealed by blizzard)
4) The site of attack was well chosen on a juncture between two divisions (not clear if it happened by accident or by design). A salient point in German line, hence no flanking fire or observation. On the contrary German positions were kept under Soviet observation from two sides (north and east).
5) Weather conditions with limited visibility (morning fog, blizzard) materially aided the attack by limiting hostile fire and observation. In particular, tank losses happened to be light despite presence of many German anti-tank guns. Limited visibility didn’t upset the attack because jump-off positions were marked in advance and were at close distance from attack objectives. That raises the question if the same effect could be attained with night attack of with use of artificial smoke.
6) Effective artillery preparation directed against well-defined targets rather than on areas. Enveloping configuration of Soviet lines was used with good effect.
7) Infantry was deployed on jump-off positions close to German lines and could quickly reach them by one bound immediately after artillery preparation.
8) Tank support. The 226 Divisions supported by tanks fully captured its objectives. The 343 Division without tank support failed to do that and suffered heavier losses.

B. Experience confirmed importance of consolidation in attacks with limited objectives. It was once again demonstrated that it is easier to capture some locality than to defend it against subsequent counterattacks. The heaviest losses in the operation were inflicted by a successful German counterattacks (1151 Rifle Regiment). The counterattack met success where Soviet infantry failed to fully reach and consolidate their objectives. It was confirmed that early counterattack promises the best chances of success. Three German counterattacks (25 December, early 26 December, early 28 December) attained progressively smaller results.

Counterattacks were mostly repulsed for the following reasons:
1) Consolidation planned and prepared in advance before the attack. After attack consolidation of captured positions was quickly organized.
2) Organized defensive fire of artillery and heavy weapons (quoted by German reports as a principal reason). Characteristically, two of three counterattacks were launched at night in order to evade effect of Soviet fire, which was only partly successful. Terrain in front of the Hill 139.7 was well observed from the Soviet side and lacked defiladed avenues of approaches, which reinforced effect of defensive fire.
3) Engineer obstacles: wire traps, mines. Mines apparently inflicted tank losses on 28.12.
4) Combat outposts were positioned in front of the main line of defense to prevent surprise attacks especially at night. This measure paid off on 28.12.
5) Absence of aerial support of German counterattacks (no ground-attack planes in the pocket). Artillery support was apparently lacking due to shortage of ammunition. Characteristically counterattacks inflicted heavy losses when German tanks managed to penetrate Soviet lines. Losses attributable to artillery and heavy weapons fire were apparently slight. In this connection the report of the LI Army Corps of 31.12.42 said “Due to lack of ammunition for fire support unnecessary large losses were suffered in the last 15 days…Many hostile weapons and left unengaged and their fire inflicts above-mentioned losses. Counterattacks fail due to absence of fire support”.
6) Counterattacks followed the same predictable direction (from a defiladed assembly area in the hollow to the Hill 139.7). The attack on 28 December was basically a repetition of the previous attack on 26 December but with fresh forces. Curiously, that was the same thing German usually criticized in Soviet conduct of combat.

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Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#11

Post by Art » 17 May 2020, 17:32

Tactical conclusions and observations from Soviet documents:

A. 806 Artillery Regiment/226 Rifle Division.
Principal flaws:
1. Infantry is not trained for fighting tanks using Molotov cocktails and anti-tank grenades.
2. Scarce use of rifle and machine guns fire.
3. When hostile trenches are captured they are not adapted and our infantry cannot deliver fire from them.
4. Absence of radios in artillery influences continuity of artillery support.
5. Troops don’t use favorable moment when hostile counterattack is stopped to attack themselves inflict even larger losses to the enemy.

Conclusions:
1. Capture of the Hill 139.7 was aided by through reconnaissance of enemy.
2. Correct tactical tasks were assigned to rifle units.
3. Correct planning of artillery and mortar fire both on the forward line and in depth.
4. Cooperation between all arms
5. High density of artillery fire in a small sector (sector of the main effort).
B. Conclusions from examination of 985 Rifle Regiment by staff officers of the 66 Army:
1. Owing to a lack of camouflage discipline units suffer unnecessary losses to artillery and mortar fires and snipers both before combat and in the process of combat.
2. Commanders’ control of their subordinates is lacking. Strong bunching-up and straggling in combat especially at occupation of hostile trenches and shelters. Men search for various effect abandoned by the enemy and get distracted from their tasks.
3. There are still cases of employment of single anti-tank rifles and bunched-up positioning of anti-tank guns (7-8 guns in 100 meters) with small sectors of fire.
4. State of readiness of units should be checked before any operation.
5. The regiment fulfilled its tasks with small losses and repulsed two strong counterattacks of 50 tanks and two infantry companies. Commander of the 985 Rifle Regiment major Nakoidze fully implemented plan developed before the operation. The commander made energetic decision and was calm in combat.
6. Organization of anti-tank defense made in advance enabled repulse of strong counterattack of hostile tanks from Balka Satu.
C. From a report of war experience of the 343 Rifle Division:
Things necessary for liquidation of a hostile strong point:
1. Detailed study of a system of combat trenches, weapons and communication trenches.
2. Surprise and speed of attack in order to deprive the enemy of time for preparation.
3. Time of attack – at morning (8 am) when the bulk of enemy soldiers have rest after night watch.
4. Attack on the first line alerts the enemy on further lines, so an artillery support of attack and commitment of tanks are needed for elimination of hostile resistance in depth.
5. To consolidate gains and repulse counterattacks it is needed to have anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, and regimental guns in battle formations of attacking infantry. They advance by bounds from one open position to another in readiness to repulse tanks. Simultaneously the forward line of captured position should be mined, especially flanks and junctures. For this purpose the stock of anti-tank mines is moved close to staring line at several points. With the start of attack sappers with mines on sleds follow behind infantry skirmish lines and lay mines immediately after the area is cleared of enemy.
These measures allowed repulsing several hostile counterattacks, holding our gains and inflicting large losses to the enemy.

headwest
Member
Posts: 328
Joined: 29 Aug 2014, 23:18

Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#12

Post by headwest » 09 Jun 2020, 17:24

this is very cool, thanks for all the work, Can you show a google earth picture of these hills today? I was trying to find them based off your maps but am not sure I have the right places

thanks!

Art
Forum Staff
Posts: 7028
Joined: 04 Jun 2004, 20:49
Location: Moscow, Russia

Re: Christmas in the Stalingrad Pocket

#13

Post by Art » 10 Jun 2020, 11:00

That's an approximate area on Google Maps:
https://www.google.ru/maps/place/48%C2% ... 44.4394425

Photo taken somewhere nearby:
https://avatars.mds.yandex.net/get-ugc/ ... 7df133/X5L

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