Statistics on German PoW hauls in latter October 1941?

[Yuri]

Not so sure about that. The Taifun encirclements were, unlike Minsk and Smolensk, fairly compact.

In addition, as I mentioned up-thread, 34th Panzer Corps captured 2,400 PoW over 5 days in late October. This formation was at the head of Guderian's drive, not cleaning up the rear. Its PoW's came mostly from 6th Guards Rifle Division. So a major lead element of the German drive was taking abnormally high numbers of tactical prisoners - and from an elite Soviet unit.

And although this is not significant, you have a typo here. Not the 34th Panzer corps, but the 24th Panzer corps (3rd and 4th Panzer divisions).

Now to the point, that is, about the morale of the Red Army. To determine the morale of troops only by the number of prisoners of war is an incorrect method. More precisely, this is determined by the ratio of the number of killed per prisoner. If three prisoners and one killed is one situation, and if three prisoners and ten killed is another, although the number of prisoners will be the same.

However, if you take only this parameter, then in this case you will most likely make an incorrect conclusion. If Your goal is to determine the morale of the Red Army in different periods of the Soviet-European war, you should distinguish two periods and consider them separately.
First period from June 22 to July 31, 1941.
Second period from August 1, 1941 to May 9, 1945
The period from June 22 to July 31, 1941 is very, very different from other periods of the Soviet-European war ,as well as from other wars: the German-Polish war, the German-French-British war.
In the period from June 22 to July 31, 1941, the strategic situation as a whole for country and for the entire red Army and the operational situation in various sectors were very, very different from all other periods. This period of the Soviet-European war can be compared to the German-Yugoslav war in April 1941

I have been studying the topic "The Fighting spirit of the Red Army during the Soviet-European war of 1941-45" for more than two years and have not yet completed the collection, study and analysis of all documents. However, some preliminary conclusions are already available.
The morale of the Red Army in different periods is very clearly seen in the documents of the Red Army.
The lowest state was in two periods: 1) from 15 to 31 October 1941; 2) from 1 to 31 July 1942.

You are right about the decline in morale of the Red Army between October 15 and 31, 1941, but you are wrong about the low morale of the 6th Guards Rifle Division.
For the fighting near Mtsensk in the period from 21 to 25 October, 1941 all the personnel of the 6th Guards Rifle Division, and therefore including those who were captured, received a commendation from the Commander of 26th Army.
For comparison, we can give an example with the 17th Rifle Division. In these very days, the Commander of the Western front, General Zhukov, ordered the commander of the 17th Rifle Division to be shot in front of the personnel of this division.

Why did the personnel receive a commendation, despite the fact that some of the soldiers and officers were captured?
At least because the main mass of prisoners is the rear units of the 6th guards rifle division and the 11th Tank Brigade, including the wounded in the regimental medical center of the 11th Tank Brigade and the medical-sanitary battalion of the 6th Guards Rifle Division in the village of Dolmatovo.
It's better to look at it from the documents.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The lowest state was in two periods: 1) from 15 to 31 October 1941; 2) from 1 to 31 July 1942.

That's my general impression as well, which is why I included Blau as the other rival to post-Taifun for producing tactical surrenders.

Can you point me in the direction of sources for, or summarize your arguments for, November 1, 1941 marking the end of the first low-morale period? From the primary documents we're discussing, AGC's prisoner hauls were about as high in November as in the last two weeks of October.

In the period from June 22 to July 31, 1941, the strategic situation as a whole for country and for the entire red Army and the operational situation in various sectors were very, very different from all other periods. This period of the Soviet-European war can be compared to the German-Yugoslav war in April 1941

Your general thesis is reasonable: few countries have experienced such a massive surprise invasion; even fewer survived one. Soviet heroism in WW2 is beyond dispute.

I'm not sure what you're getting at in the context of this discussion, however. If it's about the relative rates of tactical surrender, wouldn't the special circumstance of the Border Battles predict a high level of tactical - as opposed to operational - surrenders?

You are right about the decline in morale of the Red Army between October 15 and 31, 1941, but you are wrong about the low morale of the 6th Guards Rifle Division.
For the fighting near Mtsensk in the period from 21 to 25 October, 1941 all the personnel of the 6th Guards Rifle Division, and therefore including those who were captured, received a commendation from the Commander of 26th Army.
For comparison, we can give an example with the 17th Rifle Division. In these very days, the Commander of the Western front, General Zhukov, ordered the commander of the 17th Rifle Division to be shot in front of the personnel of this division.

I'm open to being wrong on the particulars of this division. But I'd need more evidence than the Soviet state's accordance of medals. We all know that politics influenced these decisions and it wouldn't look good for a division honored with a "Guards" title not to have been recognized as performing well. Do you have any details on the circumstances that led to such a high PoW haul?

At least because the main mass of prisoners is the rear units of the 6th guards rifle division and the 11th Tank Brigade, including the wounded in the regimental medical center of the 11th Tank Brigade and the medical-sanitary battalion of the 6th Guards Rifle Division in the village of Dolmatovo.

Ok that's a good explanation. Thanks. I'd still wonder what "main mass" means. Even if this explains 70% of 24th (correction noted!) Corps' PoW haul, that still leaves an abnormal level of tactical surrender.

My overall thesis doesn't rely on 6th Guards, which represents only a small percentage of the ~200k PoW's taken by AGC after Taifun's encirclements. Can we agree that it was unusual for so many Red Army soldiers to surrender without being operationally encircled?

-----------------------

We seem to agree that the Red Army's moral was lowest immediately after Taifun. We seem to disagree about (1) whether PoW hauls are a reliable metric for identifying morale problems and (2) for how long the post-Taifun morale decline lasted. I'd be very interested to hear what other evidence you use to reach your conclusions about Soviet morale. AFAIK the documentary record from Soviet soldiers is pretty thin (e.g. diaries and letters).

[Max Payload]

Wouldn’t a more direct and meaningful measure of morale be desertion/defection rates, which, IIRC Geoffrey Jukes cited as being consistently high (particularly among non-Russian personnel) up until the early spring of ‘43, and relatively low thereafter.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Wouldn’t a more direct and meaningful measure of morale be desertion/defection rates, which, IIRC Geoffrey Jukes cited as being consistently high (particularly among non-Russian personnel) up until the early spring of ‘43, and relatively low thereafter.

It is very funny for to read on conclusions for difference tactical and operation surround = evidence morale. Difference for operation surround success or failure = evidence morale.

When Ivan and his company was surround in some village or field near Minsk and was have no bullets or bombs Ivan was have good morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was success.

When Igor and his company was surround in some village or field near Smolensk and was have no bullets or bombs Igor was have good morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was success.

When Dima and his company was surround in some village or field near Kyiv and was have no bullets or bombs Dima was have good morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was success.

When Sasa and his company was surround in some village or field near Gomel and was have no bullets or bombs Sasa was have worstest morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was fail.

[Max Payload]

Wouldn’t a more direct and meaningful measure of morale be desertion/defection rates, which, IIRC Geoffrey Jukes cited as being consistently high (particularly among non-Russian personnel) up until the early spring of ‘43, and relatively low thereafter.

It is very funny for to read on conclusions for difference tactical and operation surround = evidence morale. Difference for operation surround success or failure = evidence morale.

When Ivan and his company was surround in some village or field near Minsk and was have no bullets or bombs Ivan was have good morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was success.

When Igor and his company was surround in some village or field near Smolensk and was have no bullets or bombs Igor was have good morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was success.

When Dima and his company was surround in some village or field near Kyiv and was have no bullets or bombs Dima was have good morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was success.

When Sasa and his company was surround in some village or field near Gomel and was have no bullets or bombs Sasa was have worstest morale because surround was part of big operational surround what was fail.

A unit that could attempt to pull back or fight its way out of a situation but chooses instead to surrender is one thing. A unit that has already tried to do that but subsequently finds itself 100km behind enemy lines and then surrenders is something else entirely.
But what any of that has to do with desertion/defection rates I fail to understand.

[Ружичасти Слон]

A unit that could attempt to pull back or fight its way out of a situation but chooses instead to surrender is one thing. A unit that has already tried to do that but subsequently finds itself 100km behind enemy lines and then surrenders is something else entirely.
But what any of that has to do with desertion/defection rates I fail to understand.

Correct.

For to understand why peoples was surrender in real history is most complex because was be many many different places times and contexts.

How can to conclude pow from surround village near Moscow was bad morale and pow from surround village near Minsk was good morale because big surround operation was fail?

It is same for desertion and defection.

Rates and numbers and increases and decreases not give evidences of motivations and reasons.

In real historys only when have evidences for surrender desertion and defection was because bad morale can to conclude morale was different on one place from one other place.

In imaginary historys can to conclude whatever you want.

[stg 44]

In Zetterling's book on Taifun and its aftermath, he mentions that a single panzer corps in Guderian's group captured ~2,400 PoW over a few days in latter October '41 - so after Taifun's operational encirclements. Most of these were from 6th Guards Rifle Division, so not green militias whose tactical surrender would be less surprising. Was this a representative sample of Soviet morale, post-Taifun?

Does anyone have access to AGC's PoW hauls in latter October and November 1941?

Wasn't AG-Center still picking up stragglers from the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets for weeks after the pockets were supposedly dealt with?

You got to admire the logical disconnects. For example, the 12th Army Group G-1 mentions that a single division in First U.S. Army captured 3,813 German PoW over a single day in latter August '44 - so after Cobra's breakthrough. They were from many different German SS and Heer divisions, so not green militias whose tactical surrender would be less surprising. Was this a representative sample of German morale, post-Cobra? Or another division that captured 4,853 in early September.

Not sure what this has to do with my question or even the point Marcksplan was talking about; seems like Whataboutism.
Your comparison is incorrect thought in terms of the 'green militia' point, because by Op. Cobra most German divisions in Normandy were mostly made up of green conscripts that were inadequately trained draped around the collapsing skeleton of veteran cadres.

[Richard Anderson]

In Zetterling's book on Taifun and its aftermath, he mentions that a single panzer corps in Guderian's group captured ~2,400 PoW over a few days in latter October '41 - so after Taifun's operational encirclements. Most of these were from 6th Guards Rifle Division, so not green militias whose tactical surrender would be less surprising. Was this a representative sample of Soviet morale, post-Taifun?

Does anyone have access to AGC's PoW hauls in latter October and November 1941?

Wasn't AG-Center still picking up stragglers from the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets for weeks after the pockets were supposedly dealt with?

You got to admire the logical disconnects. For example, the 12th Army Group G-1 mentions that a single division in First U.S. Army captured 3,813 German PoW over a single day in latter August '44 - so after Cobra's breakthrough. They were from many different German SS and Heer divisions, so not green militias whose tactical surrender would be less surprising. Was this a representative sample of German morale, post-Cobra? Or another division that captured 4,853 in early September.

Not sure what this has to do with my question or even the point Marcksplan was talking about; seems like Whataboutism.
Your comparison is incorrect thought in terms of the 'green militia' point, because by Op. Cobra most German divisions in Normandy were mostly made up of green conscripts that were inadequately trained draped around the collapsing skeleton of veteran cadres.

Nope. It's about the logical leap from "many prisoners captured" to "many prisoners captured means poor morale" or "poor training" or that they were "green militia" or that they were "green conscripts". It is a surreal simplification that essentially ignores any other factors contributing to a decision to surrender.

Meanwhile, given that many of the units in France were stable organizations with regular training, the argument that they were either "inadequately trained" or "green conscripts" is difficult to sustain. It is evident that much of the personnel turnover in Ob.West was either by entire divisions - units that were in France for Auffrischung - or by Marsch-Batallionen - primarily through the Reserve-Divisionen, which periodically turned over fullytraned personnel as replacements.

I am not sure how you can argue that a unit such as 12. SS-Panzer was comprised of "green conscripts that were inadequately trained draped around the collapsing skeleton of veteran cadres"? Ditto Lehr, 21. Panzer, and the various others, but the same for 352. and 353. ID, 716. ID, and many others.

You could argue that from late February to 6 June 1944, Rommel placed too much emphasis on fortification construction to the detriment of training, but that was variable as well.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Wouldn’t a more direct and meaningful measure of morale be desertion/defection rates, which, IIRC Geoffrey Jukes cited as being consistently high (particularly among non-Russian personnel) up until the early spring of ‘43, and relatively low thereafter.

Yes that is true. But more revealing would be the trend of desertion within the range of "consistently high."

Soviet tactical surrender rate was fairly high even against AGN in the baseline period for our discussion so far. 35,000 PoW in 6 weeks is 3x what Ostheer yielded in all of '41. Yet we see spikes in the post-Taifun and Blau periods, indicating morale problems even against the backdrop of relatively high tactical surrender rates.

Does anyone have monthly data on Soviet desertion rates?

There also may be confounding relationships between high tactical surrender and desertion. I.e. during periods of intense combat, it's conceivably the case that most soldiers who would have deserted during a lull surrendered instead.

[stg 44]

Nope. It's about the logical leap from "many prisoners captured" to "many prisoners captured means poor morale" or "poor training" or that they were "green militia" or that they were "green conscripts". It is a surreal simplification that essentially ignores any other factors contributing to a decision to surrender.

Meanwhile, given that many of the units in France were stable organizations with regular training, the argument that they were either "inadequately trained" or "green conscripts" is difficult to sustain. It is evident that much of the personnel turnover in Ob.West was either by entire divisions - units that were in France for Auffrischung - or by Marsch-Batallionen - primarily through the Reserve-Divisionen, which periodically turned over fullytraned personnel as replacements.

I am not sure how you can argue that a unit such as 12. SS-Panzer was comprised of "green conscripts that were inadequately trained draped around the collapsing skeleton of veteran cadres"? Ditto Lehr, 21. Panzer, and the various others, but the same for 352. and 353. ID, 716. ID, and many others.

You could argue that from late February to 6 June 1944, Rommel placed too much emphasis on fortification construction to the detriment of training, but that was variable as well.

Though it's been a while since I browsed it, I'm pretty sure Zetterling's Normandy book demonstrated that outside a few elite divisions the majority of German troops in Normandy in June were quite inexperienced and by July were badly worn down or virtual militia replacements.
Generally speaking though large numbers surrendering is an indication of poor morale and/or training as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of PoWs that both the Soviets and Wallies captured were in the last couple of months of the war. German largely troops kept fighting until the bitter end. The Soviets were sort of the reverse in that the majority of prisoners were taken in 1941 and 1942 and quite few after that, which matched their war fortunes changing and belief in victory going up.

I'm not saying poor morale or training are the only reasons to surrender, but they are a prime motivator.

In Normandy by July casualties had been so heavy for German forces that they were starting to break down, because replacements weren't keeping up and training standards were falling.

I'm not sure how you can argue the 12th SS and Panzer Lehr were representative of more than a fraction of the forces in Normandy or that the 352nd was somehow on par with either of the Panzer divisions.

Or that training was adequate for the average division beyond Rommel's construction projects getting in the way.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Generally speaking though large numbers surrendering is an indication of poor morale and/or training

Just stick with that self-evident, undeniable truth. For some posters here their only motivation is to obfuscate discussions that don't fit their agendas.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Generally speaking though large numbers surrendering is an indication of poor morale and/or training as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of PoWs that both the Soviets and Wallies captured were in the last couple of months of the war. German largely troops kept fighting until the bitter end. The Soviets were sort of the reverse in that the majority of prisoners were taken in 1941 and 1942 and quite few after that, which matched their war fortunes changing and belief in victory going up.

You was confuse self opinion with concept on evidence.

Many Soviet troops was surrender in 1941. Nobody was give evidence on 1 example of reason for to surrender in topic. Not one. Not for reason bad morale. Not for any reason.

[stg 44]

Generally speaking though large numbers surrendering is an indication of poor morale and/or training as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of PoWs that both the Soviets and Wallies captured were in the last couple of months of the war. German largely troops kept fighting until the bitter end. The Soviets were sort of the reverse in that the majority of prisoners were taken in 1941 and 1942 and quite few after that, which matched their war fortunes changing and belief in victory going up.

You was confuse self opinion with concept on evidence.

Many Soviet troops was surrender in 1941. Nobody was give evidence on 1 example of reason for to surrender in topic. Not one. Not for reason bad morale. Not for any reason.

Some German intelligence reports about Soviet PoWs in 1941 were posted to this forum a while back and based on the interviews of the PoWs the majority gave reasons that largely boiled down to low morale. Many hadn't had training, weren't fed regularly, didn't have their equipment, didn't want to fight for Stalin, thought they couldn't win, etc.
If I can find the thread I will report here.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Generally speaking though large numbers surrendering is an indication of poor morale and/or training as evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of PoWs that both the Soviets and Wallies captured were in the last couple of months of the war. German largely troops kept fighting until the bitter end. The Soviets were sort of the reverse in that the majority of prisoners were taken in 1941 and 1942 and quite few after that, which matched their war fortunes changing and belief in victory going up.

You was confuse self opinion with concept on evidence.

Many Soviet troops was surrender in 1941. Nobody was give evidence on 1 example of reason for to surrender in topic. Not one. Not for reason bad morale. Not for any reason.

Some German intelligence reports about Soviet PoWs in 1941 were posted to this forum a while back and based on the interviews of the PoWs the majority gave reasons that largely boiled down to low morale. Many hadn't had training, weren't fed regularly, didn't have their equipment, didn't want to fight for Stalin, thought they couldn't win, etc.
If I can find the thread I will report here.

Claim on thread is Soviet morale on end november was be worstest for 1941.

Base on claim was write number from tactical surrender was be biggest on end november than on other dates in 1941.

Nobody was give datas for tactical surrender at any time.

Nobody was explain what mean tactical surrender. Everybody must to guess or for to make self opinion what mean tactical surrender.

Numbers on pow is not evidence for low morale. Peoples was surrender for many different motivations and reasons.

Nobody was give datas on motivations and reasons for surrender.

Peoples on low morale can to fight and fight and fight and not surrender.

Peoples on high morale can decide for to surrender when have nothing for to fight. No bullets no bombs and no pkace for to run and escape surround.

Even when peoples have low morale when was surrender it not always mean peoples was surrender because low morale.

Maybe peoples have low morale bad training no food be anticommunist and many other problems but reason for to surrender is no more bullets or bombs after big fight.

It is not correct for to conclude big number pow must = low morale. Maybe yes. Maybe no.

When have much datas and informations about peoples what have guns and many bullets and bombs and what was decide not to fight and decide for to surrender then can to think for conclusion low morale.

[TheMarcksPlan]

From Walter Dunn's Stalin's Keys to Victory: The Rebirth of the Red Army:

Soviet morale improved in 1943 and 1944, as detailed in a German report on the average daily number of men deserting from the Red Army. In July 1943 the average number of desertions was 209; in December 1943 only 28; in July 1944 only 12.

p. 17

Anybody have data on desertion rates in 41 & 42, ideally with monthly trends?

Note that even the relatively high desertion rates of '43 are 1/20th the tactical surrender rates seen in October/November '41. So the tactical surrenders capture a much broader swath of the Red Army.