USSR night bombers activity before the Operation Citadel

[otto1]

Armor and Blood : The Battle of Kursk, Dennis E. Showalter:


"Since January, partisan operations against the railroads in the rear of German Army
Group Center had been disrupting troop and supply movements. On June 14, Stavka
initiated a comprehensive “rail war” focused on the lines into the Kursk sector. Raids
destroyed bridges, disabled rolling stock, and diminished train crews’ morale and
eϱectiveness. They created traϫc jams oϱering proϧtable targets to Red Air Force night
bombers, who in turn were for practical purposes unopposed because night ϧghters, guns,
and their supporting electronic systems were increasingly needed for the defense of the
Reich itself"

Do you know anything about the USSR night bombers operations before the Operation Citadel?
Fragment indicates the high effectiveness of night bomber raids on trains (in my opinion it is debatable).I have never heard about high effectiveness of USSR night bombers against trains.

[Art]

How to say it - correct in general, yet details might be dubious. From the Teske's account in "Kursk. The German view:

April, like March, was marked by heavy troop transport requirements
within the army group. Accordingly, Soviet air assets attempted to interfere
primarily at points of approach and intervehicular communications
near the front-line area, as well as at unloading stations. The increasingly
frequent partisan raids, by contrast, aimed at our communications lines
in the rear, upon which we depended for supply and individual troop
transports. Nevertheless, Field Railroad Headquarters 2 achieved maximum
efficiency along the Smolensk-Bryansk-Orel line, which was critical
to the strategic buildup.
During May the number of troop and supply transports decreased, as
the strategic concentration for Operation Citadel had been, in general,
completed. On the other hand, the number of troop transports moving
through our area to Army Group South, and intended for the southern
attack wing out of the Kharkov-Belgorod area, increased. Accordingly,
the Soviets aimed their air and partisan attacks at the points of main effort,
which in this case meant the important railroad stations at Gomel,
Orsha, and Minsk, as well as the critical short stretch of track between
Zhlobin-Gomel. In May alone that section of railroad came under attack
sixty-nine times, resulting in 156 hours of blockage on the single-track
line and 222 hours along the double-track line. We also lost thirty-five locomotives
and 106 cars.
In June, the last month of the strategic concentration, we saw another
increase in troop movements for attack units. Simultaneously, the number
of interruptions in traffic and partisan raids increased to an average
of twenty-four per day, culminating in a loss of 298 locomotives, 1,222
cars, and forty-four bridges throughout Army Group Center's area. Soviet
air raids were limited to the immediate area of the strategic buildup
and struck the railroad stations at Bryansk, Orel, and Karachev. A counteraction
against the partisans in the badly infested woods south of
Bryansk—Operation Gypsy Baron—involved eleven front-line divisions
and brought only temporary relief.

From the same article 92 air raids on railroad transportation were registered in April 43, 159 in May and 123 in June.
From the Soviet sources the ADD flew 9400 sorties in April-June 43, of them 2852 against the rail hub of Bryansk and 2325 - against Orel.
So night attacks did happen and inflicted in combination with partisan activity certain delays to transportation and losses to rolling stock.

[Dann Falk]

Good information as always.