Yes, assuming we are comparing the full MTO force, but a small sized task force can be supplied in the Ukraine without issue.
I did also say that it would have been challenging, but it was definitely not impossible.
Why is it assumed that an Allied task force sent to the USSR would need American or British equipment and supplies? These were trained professionals who could easily be cross-trained on any new weapon platforms, and they would become fully competent in their use. Are Soviets weapons incompatible with Western hands?
The point about logistics is that by 1943 the Soviets could have met most of the supply requirements for a task force up to at least a Corps (rations, weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles, tanks, fuel, winter uniforms, Soviet and American aircraft, etc). The Allies could bring along whatever else they felt they needed.
The example of the French Normandie-Niemen fighter group is that they exclusively used Soviet aircraft. They arrived in Moscow on 28 NOV 1942 and were trained on the Yak-7 from 2 DEC 1942 - 14 MAR 1943 (3 months and 12 days), afterwards they were engaged in battle using the Yak-1 and Yak-9 on the Eastern Front from 22 MAR 1943 until 8 MAY 1945.
This line of thought is only relevant to a massive task force (100,000+), and as I said above most of the supply requirements can be met by the Soviets if it is a smaller group.EwenS wrote: ↑24 Jul 2020 12:37Shipping was always at a premium and that was particularly so until US shipyards began to crank out merchantmen in huge numbers. It is only from about 1943 that new shipping joining the merchant fleets exceed losses to enemy action. Until well after D-Day there were never enough LSTs. British efforts in the Far East were constrained by lack of shipping until 1945 along with efforts to support the BPF.
He was not lukewarm to the idea in 1942 when he requested 25-30 Divisions, if the Allies had sent him a small task force by 1943 his attitude towards the Allies would have changed. I mentioned previously that he held a grudge against the West precisely because in his view they did nothing for 3 years; he did not consider the invasion of Italy qualified as a 2nd front.EwenS wrote: ↑24 Jul 2020 12:37What Stalin wanted was a Second Front in France to force the Germans to divide their forces. He certainly had little interest in having British & US forces on Soviet soil. Evidence of that is the lukewarm support given in the summer of 1944 to the shuttle bombing operations from the U.K. and Italy to the Poltava area of the Ukraine, Operation Frantic. And also the less than warm (and not just the weather) reception for RN personnel in northern Russia.
Operation Frantic was a failure from the outset because it was not aimed at helping the Soviets where they needed it, and it began 1 year later then it should have. The Soviet's attitude towards the West soured as their own losses kept mounting from 1942-1944 without seeing the Allies accomplish what they wanted. If OF had been initiated in 1942 or 1943 and it was focused on helping the Soviets with tactical combat instead of strategic bombing far from the front, it would have made a difference. The Soviets are not guiltless, they were not as receptive as they should have been earlier, but if the French could get a force to fight there so could the US.