80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Sep 2020 01:51

Part of the question is exactly what you are trying to analyze. If its the overall 'score' for the entire war then its likely the Red Army Killed, maimed or captured 80% of the Germany armies manpower. If you are looking at the 'defeat' of the remain army & toss out the walking dead period of Jan-April 1945 then maybe not so much. If you are going for total Germans lost s a result of WWII then including PoW held by the USSR and huge mass taken by the west Allies in April/May 1945 give another result.

Heres one estimate which excludes 1945. Excluding the pre 1941 phase of the war suggests the German losses in the east were about 71% of the gross. The "home Front" numbers are assumed to be losses to Allied air attack. Note that Navy and Air force losses are not included. The naval losses in the west may be 160,000. The Air force losses might be half a million tho which fronts those are distributed on I can't say.
Mullwe-Hilldebrand Est German Losses.png


This next estimate Separates the numbers in the east of 1945. Using this estimate from Soviet records - 3,823,800 through 1944 against Muller Hilldibrand give us 83% lost to the Soviet military. Adding in the estimated naval losses of 160,000 lowers this slightly to 79%.
Kirvosheev Estimate German Losses.png


I could toss a bunch of figure of variable reliability for losses to April 1945. However its clear that places the ratio closer to 50% between the USSR & other Allies. The huge mass of Germans that surrendered in the west during 1945 is significant. Over six million. Even tossing out those surrendering in April leaves the west Allied estimates 'large'.
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 10 Sep 2020 15:32

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Sep 2020 00:12

From misc sources. Note the distribution between fronts as well as proportion of losses.

German aircraft losses by Theatre.png

LW Allocation Dec 43.png

OB rate of Growth.png
Source is this the Dan Zamansky's work:
www.ww2.dk/Dan%20Zamansky%20-%20The%20Study.pdf
Dan Zamansky(8).jpg
So, Mr. Dan Zamansky peremptory States/insist that in December 1941, that is, at the height of the battle for Moscow, the German Luftwaffe withdrew from the Soviet-European front to fight in the West to fight the allied aircraft.
Mr. Zamansky justifies his statement by comparing the data from table 1 in the lines "November 8, 1941"and" December 27, 1941". Thus, Mr. Zanamsky was able to find proof of the idiocy of the Fuhrer and the Supreme commander of the Wehrmacht.
Indeed, only an idiot would reduce the strength of their troops at the critical moment of the main battle.
Well, let's assume that Hitler is an idiot. However, now we have another problem: what should I do with this?:
KTB(p1084-1086).jpg
So,
18.12.1942. The Führer and Supreme commander of the Wehrmacht orders the Supreme commander of the Luftwaffe to strengthen VIII.Fliegerkorps and send several additional Kampfgruppen, Zerstörergruppen and Transportgruppen to Moscow.
The Luftwaffe transfers police and SS-regiments from Germany and Poland.
21.12.1941. The Luftwaffe sends a own Fallschirmjager regiment, an SS-regiment is brought From Helsinki (Finland), and a Dutch Legion from Amsterdam to Leningrad (Army Group "North"), and several more battalions of Luftwaffe to Army Group "South".
24.12.1941. Finally, the Führer and Supreme commander of the Wehrmacht orders the Supreme commander of the Luftwaffe:
The Führer ordered: (…)
1.…
2.The Luftwaffe commander-in-Chief withdraws the air force from the fight against England and in a short time prepares their deployment on the Eastern front, depending on the situation in Army Group «Center» or «North».


According to these documents, Hitler is not an idiot, but a very reasonable person.
Since Mr. Zamansky established that in December 194 the Luftwaffe forces were moved from East to West, and not Vice versa, as required by the Führer and Supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, it is possible that Reichsmarschall Goering sabotaged Hitler's orders and he, - Goering, - a secret agent of the Kremlin (read Stalin).
Does anyone have any other suggestions?
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Sep 2020 15:49

Um, the change in percentage of Luftwaffe aircraft in the East between 8 November and 27 December 1941 has little to do with changes in commitments of operational units, but everything to do with the condition of those operational units. Operational aircraft percentages go down after intense operational commitments, especially in harsh operational environments and when enemy resistance remains strong.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Sep 2020 21:01

Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Sep 2020 15:49
Um, the change in percentage of Luftwaffe aircraft in the East between 8 November and 27 December 1941 has little to do with changes in commitments of operational units, but everything to do with the condition of those operational units. Operational aircraft percentages go down after intense operational commitments, especially in harsh operational environments and when enemy resistance remains strong.
Bingo. None of the charts I have, or other data is detailed fine enough to clearly show how variations in frontal strength occur through attrition in one or another area. Nor how changes in supply of new air craft from the factories or depots bring changes in front line strength. That has to be parsed out by comparison of manufacturing output, losses & where it can be found numbers transfered by region or units. I've never created a large description of this.

To carry the point of Rich a bit further, the strength & condition of the air units on those dates also represents the failure to prepare for sustained long term operations that could last into the next year.

However that was not my point, which was the losses in the west steadily ramped up & in 1943 reached a 2-1 ratio of west vs eastern losses. That 80% of aircraft losses did not occur in the east.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 14 Sep 2020 17:22

The maximum size of "The expanded territory of the III Reich" is indicated on this map (Jeschonnek's Order of 15.10.1942, effective 15.11.1942).
Bestimmungen_uber_Flugbertieb_und_Luftverteidigung_42-10-15_Jeschonnek.jpg
UbersichtKarte_DR-OstGebiete_42_.jpg
German Luftwaffe forces on "the Ostfront" are forces located in zone C(Ost), that is, to the East of the line: Aland Islands-Riga-Minsk-Kiev-Poltava-Kerch.
4-5_b.jpg
According to the meaning of the Zamansky's work: all Luftwaffe forces (flying, anti-aircraft, ground units and services) located West of the specified line should be excluded from the forces that operate against VVS of the Red Army and the partisan's force.
The inconsistency of thies the method of distributing the forces of the German Luftwaffe in theaters is obvious. According to this methodology, the forces in the West include parts of the Luftwaffe, which are located in Riga, Minsk, Kiev, Poltava and Kerch.

Similarly, according to Dan Zamansky, the German Luftwaffe forces operating in Norway, Finland and Romania should also be excluded from the forces operating against the Red Army. Documents to refute this point of view will be provided a little later (they are in Russian and must be at least partially translated).
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 15 Sep 2020 12:14

He-115 Yungozero 42-11-26.jpg
According to the methodology in the Zamansky's work:
Heinkel He-115 (factory Nr. 2729 1941) was lost in "The West" on November 26, 1942.
In fact, it was lost on the Finnish section of the Soviet-European front on Yungozero, which is 33 km East of the village Prudozh.
Yungozero:__ 61.731198, 37.171289
Moscow:____ 55.755814, 37.617635
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 15 Sep 2020 12:15

Now the Norwegian section of the Soviet-European front
StukaRadist(1-2).jpg
StukaRadist(3-4_7).jpg
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 15 Sep 2020 12:15

Questionnaire of the prisoner of war Kurt Bachinsky,
Shooter-radio operator of the aircraft "Ju-87"

Bachinsky Kurt, was born in October 1917 in the village Grenwald /a Stetten/. His father, a Polish blacksmith, had recently worked as a watchman, and died in 1940. Her mother is a homemaker and lives in Stetten. The prisoner of war graduated from the 8th grade of the people's school, then worked as a painter's assistant, and in recent years as a painter. Single, non-party.
He was drafted into the army on mobilization in April 1939 in the city Warl /Westphalia/. During the year, he was part of an airfield company in the same city. In May 1940, he was sent to the radio operator school in Halle (up to 500 students). In this school, the prisoner of war did not stay long, and at the end of 1940, to specialize as a radio operator of attack bombers, he entered the corresponding special school in the city of Graz, from which he graduated in June 1940. After finishing school, he was assigned to würzburg and sent to Trondheim, where he was assigned to the 10th detachment of the 4th group of the 1st squadron, stationed in Kirkines.

Route:
The prisoner of war went to Norway by the following route:
Hamburg-Flunsburg by railway, Flunsbourg-Gothenburg /Sweden/ by steamer, Gothenburg-Oslo-Trondheim by railway From Trondheim via Sweden by railway to Narvik, from there by steamer to Alto, from Alto by truck to Kirkines.

The organization of the group:
The 10th detachment of the 4th group of the 1st squadron was renamed the 1st detachment of the 1st group of the 5th squadron in the fall of 1941. Usually a squadron consists of three groups, but currently the 5th squadron has only one 1st group. The 1st group consists of three detachments. In the 1st detachment at 23.3.42 there were 12 aircraft "Ju-87". Usually the number of aircraft in the squad ranges from 9 to 12. The air force does not obey the command of the land army.
Headquarters of the 1st group of the 5th squadron - Kirkines.

Deposits and losses.
The squadron is replenished with aircraft as active vehicles are put out of action. When one of the aircars is eliminated, the squad leader petitions the higher command to replace this aircar with a new one and, if possible, receives it. To deliver a aircar from any airfield /airfields are different, usually in Germany or Denmark/, a team from the squad is sent there. So in November 1941, the task of delivering a new aircar from the airfield to the city Alberg /Denmark/ was given to a prisoner of war and pilot Evich.
From Kirkines they flew on a transport plane "Ju-52", and in Alberga received a aircar "Ju-87 " and returned on the return flight. On the way back, we flew through Germany and had several problems that had to be corrected. The flight was on the route Albert-Lubeck-Koenigsberg-Neumark-Riga-Tallinn-Helsenki-Pori-Rovaniemi. At all these airfields, they landed and stayed there for a long time. We returned to Rovaniemi on March 4.
During the entire war, the 5th squadron lost up to 20 aircars, in recent months the prisoner of war knows about the loss of two aircraft, of which one (the plane of Lieutenant Poik) was shot down, and the other burned at the start.

Combat activity.
On 9 March 1942, several aircraft, including a pow's car, were transferred from Rovaniemi to Kirkines. This move was caused by the onset of flying weather and the ability to take a RAID on Murmansk. The entire 1st detachment of the 1st group and several vehicles of the 2nd group were concentrated in Kirkines.
In November 1941, the pow's plane flew combat missions to bomb the Kirov railway. From the airfield in Kirkines, we made two raids on the positions of our troops in the area of the Western Face river, two raids on the positions of the Rybachy Peninsula and two raids on Murmansk (both raids on March 24).

Problem statement:
....
Raid on Murmansk:
24.3.1942 two raids were made on Murmansk. The first raid involved 11 "Ju-87" and 14 "Me-109" and "Me-110". "Me-110" took off from Kirkines,"Me-109" - from Petsamo. The second raid involved 9 "Ju-87" how many fighters they were accompanied by a prisoner of war does not know.
One 500 kg fragmentation bomb was suspended from the plane. and four 50 kg bombs.
The raid was led by Lieutenant Leingertner. To the goal sewed a wedge of links, and the goal flew in a column of links. They approached the target at an altitude of 6 thousand meters, dived to a height of 1000 meters.
The pow's aircar was one of the last, and was attacked by a "Curtis"-type fighter from above and behind. The first burst broke the window of the cabin and passed near the face of the prisoner of war. He fired back, however, the fighter came closer and gave a series of bursts. a one gas tank must have exploded in the planes. There was an explosion and the aircar lost control. The prisoner of war was thrown out of the cockpit, opened the parachute, landed and was captured.

Airfields:
The prisoner known airfields Kirkenes, Petsamo, Rovaniemi, Alakurtti, Pori, Helsinki, Tromso, Bardufoss.
There is one airfield /8246/ in the Rovaniemi area. In March, there were 2-3 "Ju-88", 3 "Ju-52", 2-3 "Me-110" and 2 "Ju-87".
...
Command staff:
The commander – in-chief of the German air force in Finland is Colonel-General Stumpf.
The commander of the 1st group of the 5th squadron is captain Blazik.
The commander of the 1st detachment of the 1st group is Oberleutnant Lorenz.
The commander of the 2nd detachment of the 1st group is Lieutenant Schmidt.
The commander of the 3rd detachment of the 1st group is senior Lieutenant Pfeiffer.
Colonel-General Stumpf visited the 1st group pilots at Kirkines airfield twice, the last time in November 1941.
The assistant commander of the 1st group is Lieutenant Leintgertner.

Pilots and radio operators of the 1st detachment:
pilots: radiomen:
…. …. /list of pilots and radiomens/

Radio communication:
...
Information about the "Ju-87":
...

Aircraft factories and new types of aircraft:
...
Chemical preparation:
...

Miscellaneous information:
...

Political and moral state:
The political and moral state of the pilots of the first group is good.
Most of them are confident of a German victory, but they admit that at present the German air forces are not only not superior, but, on the contrary, inferior to the Soviet /the Northern front/. The prisoner of war himself stated that the Hitlerite regime had brought him absolutely nothing personally, and that in the Soviet Union he had learned in a few days of his captivity that most of his peers were qualified as engineers, doctors, etc., while in civilian conditions he was an ordinary house painter.
The prisoner of war expressed a desire to join the ranks of the Polish army formed on the territory of the USSR. Until now, he said, I had fought for my mother's country. Now I would be ready to fight for my father's country.
When the prisoner of war was asked whether he agreed to return to the airfield in Kirkines with the obligation to bring back some of his fellow pilots and radio operators, the prisoner replied that this task is difficult. And that it takes time to complete it, however, he could try, because he knows that only this kind of agitation could be believed by his comrades. They do not believe any appeals of captured German pilots, considering that these appeals are forced by the use of violence. The prisoner categorically refused to perform the task of destroying German aircraft in Kirkines, saying that as long as he wears the uniform of the German army and is a German soldier, this kind of betrayal towards his comrades, he can not commit. It would be different, he said, if I became a Polish soldier.
Pilots and radio operators are happy with the food. Emails from home come regularly. The pow's family lives well and has an orchard in Stetten. They get enough bread.

The survey was conducted by:
Head of the 3rd branch of the Intelligence Department of the Karelian front headquarters
Captain /Barantsov/
Translated By: / Pritzker/

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Sep 2020 14:51

Thanks for all this research Yuri.

Regarding Zamansky's inclusion as "Western" of LW units deployed in Zone A on Soviet territory, do you have a rough view of the error caused? Like do you have figures for LW unit strengths in Minsk, Riga, etc.?

How are you certain that Zamansky included only the eastern parts of Zone C as Ostfront? Does he state reliance on Jeschonnek's schema? Given that C includes West and East, Zamansky must have drilled down further than J's top line schema.

I wouldn't anticipate much LW frontline strength having been used against partisans but I could see the Black and Baltic Sea LW units having substantial assets for sea-warfare purposes.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by tramonte » 22 Sep 2020 17:42

According Phillips Payson O'Brien air war took slice of 55-58% of German munition production (including building aircraft ~40-42%, their weaponry and ammo + anti aircraft artillery + its ammo). O'Brien also counted V-1/V-2 production to air war (as it really was, strategic air war and only targeting Western Allied). When he estimated average share of Kriegsmarine and sea warfare been around 12%, the land war - so often claimed as main warfare - took only 30-33% of German munition production.

Now it's pretty clear that around 80% of German land war was there in Eastern Front we must also remember that on average German army in west was relatively more mobilized than in east. When it comes to Luftwaffe aircraft combat losses mostly likely share was: 26% in Eastern Front, 74% against Western Allied. However the share of lost bombers and ground attack aircraft was clearly more than 26% in east. It's also useful to remember that in 1943, the last year when Luftwaffe had large bombing campaign, 85-86% of bombs were dropped in east while that of AA-ammo less than 29% was used in east. In 1942 there is date of dropped 250 - 500 kilos bombs dropped: 79% ( 1,000 kilos or heavier bombs: 74%). Heavy AT-ammo: 84% but heavy AA-ammo: 36% in east.

I have tried to estimate what part of German munitions did go to Eastern Front. Following only lost aircraft, ships, tanks, weaponry would give quite low share, hardly more than 1/3. Building combat armour took slice of just about 6.5% (on average) of German munitions, weapons perhaps 9% but according O'Brien some 45% of weapons didn't go to army. When it comes to ammo some 2/3 was for land war. And ammunition production was second largest segment of German munition production (it differed but on average ~27-28%). Of it great majority went to east with AA-ammunition as the only clear exception.

If i have to bet some % of German munitions going war in Eastern Front i would suggest:

- aircraft: 14% (1/3 of aircraft building costs)
- ammo: 19% (around 2/3 of all ammo, because 1/3 of ammo went to Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe or AA-units)
- weapons 6% (note: about 45% of weapons went to Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe or AA-units)
- combat armour 4.5% (some 70% of lost AFVs in east)
- vehicles 1.5% (not even near all vehicles went to army)
- half trucks 1% (around 70% lost in east)
- navy vessels 1% (biggest losses clearly in war against Allied, and almost all U-boats)

~ 47% (of all German munitions)

Then there are some quite surprising things like huge concrete shelter construction projects. That took just in 1943 according O'Brien around 4 billion Reichmarks. Of this huge effort about 80% was targeting Allied strategic air war. O'Brien also suggested that design costs of especially aircraft and U-boats and of course V-weapons are too often underestimated by scholars. That's why he mentioned that land war likely took just 30% of German war production/munitions.
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by tramonte » 22 Sep 2020 18:03

Here are the figures of German munitions in July 1944. It's necessary to understand that building navy vessels was record lowest level. In first half of the war Navy (vessels, their weaponry and ammo) took even 15% of munitions.

Aircraft: 48.3%
Ammunition: 24.0%
Weapons: 9.3%
AFV (panzers etc): 7.8% (record highest, before 1943 the share was less than 4%!!!)
Navy vessels: 4.5% (in the last quarter of 1944 it rose to 8.1%, in first quarter of 1943 building just U-boats took 11%)
Motor vehicles: 2.4%
Half-tracks: 1.6%
Powder: 2.1%

Source: USSBS, European Report 3, page 145

When it comes to ammunition, the second largest segment of munitions, in 1944 average 67% went to army. But e.g in 1942 that army share was just 48% and in 1943 some 65%.

Of weapons the share of army was 57% in 1944, 53% in 1943 and 50% in 1942. Putting numbers of ammo and weapons it seems to have been that German anti-aircraft weaponry + its ammo took almost 5% of whole munitions. With building aircraft, aircraft weaponry and ammo and adding production of AA + adding cost of huge V1/V2 project air war clearly took at least 55% of German munitions and might have taken near 60% when taking all huge design and concrete shelter construction costs (against Allied strategic air war).
"Military history is nothing but a tissue of fictions and legends, only a form of literary invention; reality counts for very little in such affair."

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 23 Sep 2020 08:53

Perhaps Zamansky didn't see the Jeschonnek's scheme. In Zamansky's work, the term "West" includes everything that is not part of the forces referred to by the Germans as the"Ostfront". If the work of Zamansky is not specified particularly, then the forces in the" West " include: Scandinavia+Mediterranean+"expanded territory of Reich".
At the same time, the concept of the Mediterranean implicitly includes the Balkans. It follows that the Luftwaffe forces in Romania are ultimately "the West".
In Germany concept of "Ostfront" is the part of the Soviet-European front where operate: Luftflotte 1, Luftflotte 2 (afterwards Lw-Kdo-Ost, later Luftflotte 6), Luftflotte 4.
43-04-21 LuftLageOst(1980).jpg
However, as we know, long-range bomber aircraft of the Red Army operated against Ploiesti, Warsaw, Konigsberg and even against Berlin.
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 23 Sep 2020 09:08

Lt. General Gerstenberger /chief of the German Luftwaffe in Romania, captured in August 1944/, tells about the forces of the German Luftwaffe in Romania.
1st and last two pages of the Lt.Gen.Gerstenberg's testimony
44-09 LtGen Gerstenberg1_6-7.jpg
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 23 Sep 2020 09:56

Unfortunately, I can't find on my computer another useful document for us - the testimony of a captured pilot "Ju-52", whose plane was shot down at the end of December 1942 near the pocket of Velikiye Luki. According to the data of the captured pilot: the transport group is located in Germany / Berlin area/, in November-December 1942, it performed flights to North Africa, Stalingrad, Smolensk and Velikiye Luki.
Further, we know from branch "The Battle of state farm 79" (viewtopic.php?f=55&t=116000) that on the transport planes were transferred to the Chir front in November 1942:
- from Poland, the 8th air field division;
- from the Danish island in the North sea, a construction battalion.
Hence the conclusion that the location of the transport group in Germany or Danish or Poland does not mean that the forces of these groups operate only in "the West".
Moreover, it can be expected that most of the time these transport groups act in the interests of "the Ostfront".

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Sid Guttridge » 24 Sep 2020 18:14

Hi Carl,

I am not sure it is reasonable to throw German POWs in March-May 1945 into the mix as a high proportion of those captured by the Western Allies were fleeing the Red Army. The British actually had the highest number of German POWs at the end of the war which, I would suggest, flatters them greatly compared with the Soviets.

Cheer,

Sid..

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