80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

[TheMarcksPlan]

Of note to the general contention endorsed by Putin - that the West didn't want a big land war, was happy to have the Russians do it instead - is the virtual halt of increases in spending on Army Ground Forces in 1Q/2Q 1943:



By that time it was clear the SU would survive and could do most of the bleeding/killing. 1943 would be the deadliest battlefield year for the SU.

[MarkF617]

I don't know why people are getting all wound up over the percentages of which country did what and who was more responsible for the defeat of Germany. The way I see it the only percentage that matters is that it was a 100 percent victory to the combined Allies no matter where they are from.

Thanks
Mark.

[Yuri]

In section 3 of Zamansky's work, there is no information about several important elements of anti-aircraft artillery in the German armed forces.
One element missing from Zamansky's work was pointed out above in post 34 (Art's post). This is anti-aircraft artillery of the Heer and Waffen-SS.
The Heer and Waffen-SS had:
- separate battalions and abteilungs own anti-aircraft artillery (Fla-Battalions and Heer.Flak.Abteilung);
- in the artillery regiment of the tank and motorized division, the IV.Abteilung was anti-aircraft.
From 1944, infantry divisions also received anti-aircraft Abteilung. In addition, in the anti-tank Abteilung, one company was anti-aircraft.
During major operations, the anti-aircraft artillery units of the Heer and the Waffen-SS were subordinate to the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery command.
Anti-aircraft artillery of the German armed forces at the 1st stage of operation Blau.

395_FlakKorp1_Abteilung_Gliederung_mit_Heer_26-06-42(_).jpg

[Yuri]

Zamansky's work is not clear about the accounting of anti-aircraft units that were subordinate to the luftgau that controlled the zones in the occupied territory of the USSR, in particular: LuftGau Dnepropetrovsk (then LuftGau Rostov); LuftGau Kiev; LuftGau Kharkow. It is also not clear whether, and if so, how fully, such units as Flak-Abwehr-Groups are taken into account.

FlakSchutz_Flufplatze Charkow-I and Charkow-Alexejewka (07-06-42).jpg

In this case, the light FlakAbteilung 774 and 3./9 battery are subordinate to the LuftGau Kharkow, and the two Flak-Abwehr-Groups are part of the flight units. Flak-Abwehr-Groups move along with their flight unit. Flak-Abteilung will remain in place (a stable part of the air defense object LuftGau). In am very skeptical that the number of Flak-Abwehr-groups is taken into account in Zamansky's work. For example, I was able to establish (from the German documents) that at least six Flak-Abwehr-groups were surrounded in Stalingrad. However, the final report on the number of Flak-Abteilungs and Batteries lost in Stalingrad does not mention any of the Flak-Abwehr-Groups.

[Yuri]

In the work of Zamansky, there is no clarity regarding the accounting of the Eis-Transport-Schutz-Flak-Abteilungs operating "in the Eastfront". The actions of these anti-aircraft units were controlled by the Reichsbahn.
Below are the first and fourth pages, as well as Appendix 2 from the description of the actions of the anti-aircraft battery (3./Eis-Transport-Schutz-Flak-Abteilung 864) for February 20-21, 1943 at the Sinelnikovo and Slavgorod stations.

Eis_TransportSchutz_FlakAbteilung-864(1_4).jpg

Eis_TransportSchutz_FlakAbteilung-864(Skizze2).jpg

Result: lost two locomotives, all cars (including 5 cars with ammunition = 70 tons), 11 2 cm Orlikon.
Personnel losses: of the two battery officers, one is wounded and one is missing; from 15 unter-officers, 10 are missing, and several more are dead and wounded; from 60 mens 33 are missing, and there are still dead and wounded. Thus, one Luftwaffe anti-aircraft battery, in two days of operations "in the East", lost more personnel than in November-December 1943, the 1st (Berlin) Anti-Aircraft Division of the Luftwaffe.
At the same time, the method of accounting for the distribution of Luftwaffe forces used in Zamansky's work does not allow us to say exactly in which theater of operations the losses of 3./Eis-Transport-Schutz-Flak-Abteilung 864 are taken into account (if these losses are taken into account at all).

[Richard Anderson]

In section 3 of Zamansky's work, there is no information about several important elements of anti-aircraft artillery in the German armed forces.
One element missing from Zamansky's work was pointed out above in post 34 (Art's post). This is anti-aircraft artillery of the Heer and Waffen-SS.
The Heer and Waffen-SS had:
- separate battalions and abteilungs own anti-aircraft artillery (Fla-Battalions and Heer.Flak.Abteilung);
- in the artillery regiment of the tank and motorized division, the IV.Abteilung was anti-aircraft.

While it is true that Zamansky did not count those personnel, why should he? They were Heer and Waffen-SS personnel, not Luftwaffe.

From 1944, infantry divisions also received anti-aircraft Abteilung. In addition, in the anti-tank Abteilung, one company was anti-aircraft.

Um, sorry, no, but they did not. The only Flak in the late-war Infanterie and Volksgrenadier divisions was the Heeres-Flak Batterie that was an element of the Panzerjäger Abteilung, which again, were Heer and not Luftwaffe personnel.

In any case, I'm not sure why it would be relevant to Zamansky's analysis, since he was looking at flying units?

[Richard Anderson]

In the work of Zamansky, there is no clarity regarding the accounting of the Eis-Transport-Schutz-Flak-Abteilungs operating "in the Eastfront". The actions of these anti-aircraft units were controlled by the Reichsbahn.

Again, why should he be concerned about Reichsbahn Flak in what was a study of the disposition and losses of Luftwaffe flying and Flak units? Should he have concerned himself with the Kriegsmarine Flak in France and the Reich too? The Marine-Bordflak Abteilungen?

[Yuri]

In the work of Zamansky, there is no clarity regarding the accounting of the Eis-Transport-Schutz-Flak-Abteilungs operating "in the Eastfront". The actions of these anti-aircraft units were controlled by the Reichsbahn.

Again, why should he be concerned about Reichsbahn Flak in what was a study of the disposition and losses of Luftwaffe flying and Flak units? Should he have concerned himself with the Kriegsmarine Flak in France and the Reich too? The Marine-Bordflak Abteilungen?

Yes, it is necessary to take into account and must be taken into account in all aspects.
Otherwise you will not get a complete picture of the air defense forces of the German armed forces. Similarly, it is necessary to take into account the land part of the Luftwaffe, otherwise there will not be a complete picture of the size of the land part of the German armed forces.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, it is necessary to take into account and must be taken into account in all aspects.

Why? Zamansky was looking at Luftwaffe force commitments and losses.

Otherwise you will not get a complete picture of the air defense forces of the German armed forces.

Zamansky was not looking at "air defense forces of the German armed forces". He was looking at Luftwaffe force commitments and losses. If you want a complete picture of the air defenses of the German Reich and armed forces, then I suggest you look at Westermann.

Similarly, it is necessary to take into account the land part of the Luftwaffe, otherwise there will not be a complete picture of the size of the land part of the German armed forces.

That may be true, but it was not what Zamansky was looking at. He was not looking for a "complete picture of the size of the land part of the German armed forces". Criticizing Zamansky for something he was not doing is a bit odd?

[Yuri]

Similarly, it is necessary to take into account the land part of the Luftwaffe, otherwise there will not be a complete picture of the size of the land part of the German armed forces.

That may be true, but it was not what Zamansky was looking at. He was not looking for a "complete picture of the size of the land part of the German armed forces". Criticizing Zamansky for something he was not doing is a bit odd?

Perhaps you don't understand me. In this case, I have no criticism of Zamansky for "He was not looking for a "complete picture of the size of the land part of the German armed forces". This is just an analogy: it is impossible to determine the size of the ground forces of the German armed forces without taking into account the land part of the Luftwaffe. Similarly, it is not possible to determine the size of the anti-aircraft forces of the German armed forces without taking into account the anti-aircraft units of the ground forces. Anyone who does this is misleading their readers (whether consciously or not doesn't matter).
The nature of the action anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe on the one hand on "the Eastern front", and on the other hand "on the expanded territory of Reich" are so different that to compare them is almost impossible, and without taking into consideration air defense of the land forces of the "Eastern front", absolutely impossible.
The assumption that if the allies did not conduct strategic bombing of the "expanded territory of the Reich", then the Luftwaffe anti - aircraft forces could be moved from this territory to "the Eastern front" and would have a significant impact on the course of hostilities there is a misconception. In this case, the size of the anti-aircraft units of the German armed forces could be increased by no more than four anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe. And at the same time, in two, or at most four weeks, the situation would have returned to the same state as it was before the arrival of these four divisions.
In General, on "the East front" this would increase the anti-aircraft capabilities of the German armed forces by no more than 20% and no more than four weeks.

[Yuri]

In Zamansky's work, it is not clear whether these are anti - aircraft units of the Luftwaffe or anti-aircraft units of the German ground forces?

5LwFD_Gliederung(b).jpg

7_LwFeldDiv_Kriegsgliederung_.jpg

[Richard Anderson]

In Zamansky's work, it is not clear whether these are anti - aircraft units of the Luftwaffe or anti-aircraft units of the German ground forces?

Until 1 November 1943 they were Luftwaffe. After that date they were Heer. In both cases they were units of the "German ground forces".

[Richard Anderson]

Perhaps you don't understand me.

Indeed, I don't understand you, but that explanation did not help. Cheers!

[Yuri]

Richard Anderson
Indeed, I don't understand you, but that explanation did not help. Cheers!

This is not surprising, since Your point of view on the anti-aircraft forces of the German Luftwaffe differs from the one from which I "look". From my point of view, you can "see" what you can't "see" from Yours, but not the other way around.

If Zamansky did not take into account anti-aircraft Abteilungs in the LwFDs, this is an error. The staff of these Abteilungs was recruited from FlakDivs located in Germany, Poland and France. Moreover, personnel for the LwFDs artillery and anti-tank Abteilungs were sent from the same source. Thus, the creation of the LwFDs led to the withdrawal of personnel for 60 anti-aircraft, artillery , and anti-tank Abteilungs From FlakDivs (I repeat, from FlakDivs located in Germany, France, and Poland) in September 1942.
To replace those who went to LwFDs, in FlakDivision sent:
A) Prisoners of War,

SowjetKfg in Flak.jpg

B) foreigners (in 1943, 220,000 foreign volunteers were recruited to the anti-aircraft units of the German Luftwaffe. Mainly from Slovakia and the Balkans. Since 1944, the anti-aircraft units of the German Luftwaffe called up citizens of the USSR, who until August 23, 1939 lived in the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus).

Auslander_in_LwFlakAbt_.jpg

[Yuri]

C) civilians (including young men and women aged 15 to 17).

Geschichtsblätter für LüdenschLüdenscheider(1-2)_.jpg

Geschichtsblätter für LüdenschLüdenscheider(3-4).jpg