80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Discussions on WW2 in Eastern Europe.
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Appleknocker27
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Appleknocker27 » 19 Nov 2020 14:38

In terms of the number of Soviet troops tied down, I'd say the Finn and Romanian contributions would weigh heavily in any comparison to the value of LL in the German vs Soviet balance. How about Romanian oil? To me, LL vs the contributions of allied Axis nations in a non-starter, the Germans had the better end of it.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Michael Kenny » 19 Nov 2020 18:52

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
19 Nov 2020 07:37


If you know the barrel life, number of rounds to wear one out, then you can do some arithmetic with quantity of ammunition expended.
Given it is a high-velocity tube and that barrel-wear was a problem with the Flak in Germany then firing 10X the ammo must mean 10x replacements.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 19 Nov 2020 21:17

Michael Kenny wrote:
19 Nov 2020 18:52
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
19 Nov 2020 07:37


If you know the barrel life, number of rounds to wear one out, then you can do some arithmetic with quantity of ammunition expended.
Given it is a high-velocity tube and that barrel-wear was a problem with the Flak in Germany then firing 10X the ammo must mean 10x replacements.
For June 1942 in I./501 on 88 mm flak statistics such. There are 12 guns in total:
- one gun was destroyed by enemy fire,
- one gun was completely lost due to wear and
- 7 barrels were replaced due to wear.
In Falk.Reg18. the gun that fired 6000 rounds did not have a replacement barrel.

Problems with increased wear and tear (not only FLAK but also of all the artillery of the Wehrmacht) began after Stalingrad/Tunisgrad, which increased after Kursk, became a very serious problem in the spring of 1944 . Main reason: reduced skills of factory workers (foreign workers), lack/absence/shortage of non-ferrous metals (chrome) while output increased.
Last edited by Yuri on 19 Nov 2020 21:41, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Michael Kenny » 19 Nov 2020 21:39

It was more of a problem with high-velocity guns. Using the 8.8cm as an area bombardment weapon means barrel wear will be much greater than with a normal field piece. Routinely using a Flak Regiment (with all its attendant sighting and ranging equipment) as normal artillery is 'breaking windows with golden guineas'
I know the Allies used their heavy AA guns as bombardment weapons in NWE but that was because they lacked air targets.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 19 Nov 2020 22:17

That's right.
You can also add that the loss of qualified personnel increased (many times).
One of the reasons for the use of 88 mm FLAK as conventional artillery is that the main gun (76 mm ZIS-3) of the Red Army division had a significantly longer range than the 105 mm light Field Howitzer of the Wehrmacht division. Soviet gunners placed their guns in an open position and fired at observed targets (direct fire).
This is a report from the 336th artillery regiment of the 336th Infantry division that mentions this issue.
IV_ArtReg336 42-07-31.jpg
"...They shoot from open positions, defend themselves exclusively using the advantage of the Russian artillery over the German in the firing range..."
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 19 Nov 2020 22:39

By the way, November 19 in the Soviet Union/Russia's holiday "Day of Artillery" (the day of the beginning of operation Uranus) - established in 1944. After a series of reorganizations in 1941-42, the red Army artillery in "Uranus" appeared as it is usually perceived.
Since one of my military professions is an artilleryman, I'm supposed to drink 100 grams of vodka today, ... to start with, of course.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Nov 2020 22:56

Michael Kenny wrote:
19 Nov 2020 21:39
It was more of a problem with high-velocity guns. Using the 8.8cm as an area bombardment weapon means barrel wear will be much greater than with a normal field piece. Routinely using a Flak Regiment (with all its attendant sighting and ranging equipment) as normal artillery is 'breaking windows with golden guineas'
I know the Allies used their heavy AA guns as bombardment weapons in NWE but that was because they lacked air targets.
The Flak typically used lower charges for ground-directed HE rounds. Barrel wear rises exponentially with muzzle velocity and with RoF, both of which were lower in ground use than as AA. Naval rounds fired with reduced charges, for example, had only 3% the wear of a full-velocity fire.
When first introduced into service during World War II, the barrel life was 290 ESR, the lower of the two values given above. HC rounds at 2,690 fps (820 mps) were 0.43 ESR and at 1,900 fps (579 mps) were 0.03 ESR.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16 ... Ammunition
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Nov 2020 23:03

Yuri wrote:
19 Nov 2020 21:17
Michael Kenny wrote:
19 Nov 2020 18:52
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
19 Nov 2020 07:37


If you know the barrel life, number of rounds to wear one out, then you can do some arithmetic with quantity of ammunition expended.
Given it is a high-velocity tube and that barrel-wear was a problem with the Flak in Germany then firing 10X the ammo must mean 10x replacements.
For June 1942 in I./501 on 88 mm flak statistics such. There are 12 guns in total:
- one gun was destroyed by enemy fire,
- one gun was completely lost due to wear and
- 7 barrels were replaced due to wear.
In Falk.Reg18. the gun that fired 6000 rounds did not have a replacement barrel.

Problems with increased wear and tear (not only FLAK but also of all the artillery of the Wehrmacht) began after Stalingrad/Tunisgrad, which increased after Kursk, became a very serious problem in the spring of 1944 . Main reason: reduced skills of factory workers (foreign workers), lack/absence/shortage of non-ferrous metals (chrome) while output increased.
I'd be interested in how - and how frequently - complete guns were lost due to wear. Improper maintenance of the recoil pistons leading to structural failure? The US 16in/50 (BB Iowas) had a fatigue life that was discovered during their recommissioning, when modern barrel wear techniques made this fatigue life operative rather than liner life. Probably that's true of smaller guns as well.

Westerman's Flak notes the losses of AA to fatigue but doesn't specify whether these were losses of complete guns or whether they simply needed liner replacement. Given that losses were in the hundreds per month during 1944, it was probably of liners.

Anyone know the cost of liner replacement, btw?
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Nov 2020 23:13

Yuri wrote:Starting from Kursk "in the East", for every shell that the German Wehrmacht artillery fired towards the enemy, there was one lost shell (lost for all reasons - either blown up by the enemy or captured by the enemy or blown up by the Germans themselves, so that it was not captured by the enemy).
I had no idea of this stat. What were the lost/fired stats in '41-'42? Is this for 88mm specifically or for all German artillery? Source?
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Nov 2020 12:03

Yuri wrote:
19 Nov 2020 21:17
Michael Kenny wrote:
19 Nov 2020 18:52
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
19 Nov 2020 07:37


If you know the barrel life, number of rounds to wear one out, then you can do some arithmetic with quantity of ammunition expended.
Given it is a high-velocity tube and that barrel-wear was a problem with the Flak in Germany then firing 10X the ammo must mean 10x replacements.
For June 1942 in I./501 on 88 mm flak statistics such. There are 12 guns in total:
- one gun was destroyed by enemy fire,
- one gun was completely lost due to wear and
- 7 barrels were replaced due to wear.
In Falk.Reg18. the gun that fired 6000 rounds did not have a replacement barrel.

Problems with increased wear and tear (not only FLAK but also of all the artillery of the Wehrmacht) began after Stalingrad/Tunisgrad, which increased after Kursk, became a very serious problem in the spring of 1944 . Main reason: reduced skills of factory workers (foreign workers), lack/absence/shortage of non-ferrous metals (chrome) while output increased.
I've run across multiple reference to restriction of full charge use with the German howitzers. Specifically the 75mm light infantry gun in the regiment and the 105mm howitzer. Full propellant charge could only be used according to certain criteria, & authorization from the a senior artillery commander. I no longer have the reference for accurately estimating the extension of the barrel life. Not using the full charge does reduce the effective range 15-20%.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 24 Nov 2020 14:29

In tables 8 and 9, Zamansky provides figures on the distribution of mobile batteries and battery losses by theater of operations.
Dan Zamansky - The Study-21-22Tabl8-9.jpg
The data in these tables can only be used (and only) for further research and calculations. However, under no circumstances should this data be used as a basis for final conclusions - a gross mistake will be made.
For a better understanding, let's start with table 9 - distribution of lost batteries.
Obviously, by the term "lost battery" Zamansky means a battery that lost equipment and/ or personnel, after which the number (or name) of this battery was not used in the future.
This was the case with the batteries of the 19th and 20th anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe, which operated in Libya and Tunisia, hence in table 9:
- for "Mediterranean 1941-43" the loss of 92 batteries (88-94 mm caliber) is indicated, which is equivalent to the loss of 92 x 4 = 368 guns;
- while for "Eastern front 1941-43" 24 batteries are indicated, which is equivalent to 24 x 4 = 96 guns.
However, the full history of the 88 mm Flak at the end (December) of 1943 will look something like this:
Flak 88 History by Dan ZamanskyAndWiki.jpg
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 24 Nov 2020 14:46

Above, We found that for the period of offensive actions of the Europeans in the East, the loss of 88 mm guns of the German Luftwaffe per year is approximately 200% of the regular strength.
According to Zamansky's data, the average number of 88 guns in the East is about 1000 guns, so in two years the losses should be about 4,000.
As you can see, the data from Zamansky's work confirm our conclusions, but not Vice versa.

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 25 Nov 2020 07:50

Here is an example of how the data in table 9 can mislead the unsophisticated reader of Zamansky's work. Above we have given information about the composition of the 10 anti-Aircraft division and the losses of one of the abteilungs of this division (II./241) in August 1943. (I didn't find any documents about the losses of the entire division). For September 1943, the 10th anti-Aircraft division reported losses of 87 88 mm Flak. For October 1943, no information about losses was found.
This is information about the losses of the 77th anti-Aircraft regiment of the 10th anti-Aircraft division for four days (from 6 to 9) in November 1943.
43-11-06_09 FlakAbt I_33 96 125 620 Ausfalle Waffen_Gerate_Personal.jpg
Now let's make a small calculation about the losses of 88 mm guns in the 10th anti-Aircraft division from August to November 1943 ( that is, for four months) from the discovered documents.
We have the following figures for the loss of 88 mm Flak in the 10th anti-Aircraft division in four months (August-November 1943):
5+87+11+22 = 125 guns 88 mm, which is equivalent to 30 batteries.
At the same time, we understand that this is far from complete information about the losses in four months of one of the nine motorized anti-aircraft divisions and one non-motorized anti-aircraft brigade (the latter operated on the Finnish and Norwegian sections of the Soviet-European front) of German Luftwaffe. In this case, the unsophisticated reader of Zamansky's work can conclude that for 30 months and 10 days (from June 22, 1941 to December 31, 1943), the losses of 88 mm Flak of the German Luftwaffe on the Soviet-European front amounted to only 96 guns.
And note that the loss of personnel of the 77th anti-Aircraft regiment was not significant, which forced the commander of the 1st anti-Aircraft corps to issue this document.
43-11-11 I_FlakKorps Ausfalle WaffenUndGerate.jpg
My (as always bad) translation:
=========================
Secret
11.11.43
To 9., 10., 15., 17. Flakdivision

Due to retreats and heavy fighting, there have recently been significant losses in weapons, equipment, and vehicles. Not always every opportunity was used to collect and deliver the most valuable material for repairs.
Partially excessive supplies of logistics and repair squadrons also led to the loss of materials and spare parts.
I once again make it a duty for commanders to constantly take care, by any means, of the timely evacuation of all damaged or unusable guns, equipment parts, accessories, and not necessarily necessary spare parts.
Der Kommandierende General des I. Flakkorps
Br.B. Nr. 17 389/43 g (Qu)

========================

Next, we will show the Zamansky error when determining the number of mobile batteries.
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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Art » 26 Nov 2020 17:22

Somewhat different stats on availability and losses of 88-mm guns here:
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... up&seq=317

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Re: 80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

Post by Yuri » 27 Nov 2020 22:00

According to Zamansky's methodology, this mixed (gem.) FlakAbteilung.147 (v) is not mobile, and in table 8 the heavy and light batteries of this Abteilung are not included in the number of mobile batteries on "the Eastern front".
42-11_43-08 147FlakAbt(v)_Amwrossijewka_Route.jpg
Meanwhile, all FlakAbteilungs in motorized anti-aircraft divisions "in the East" are of type (mot. /mot S or mot. Z/) or type (v).
Note: Until 1943, the type "Reserve" was indicated instead of type (v).
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