'Annexe to Abt Ia Nr I 21/44 geh. of 13.01.1944
Experiences in the nature and the command of armored battlegroups as they are possible in the material and personell situation of 13.pz div at this time.
1)Composition and commanders of the armored battlegroups
The composition of the armored battlegroup in the recent fighting was in the prevailing cerconstances in most cases as follows:
1 Pz Gren Batallion on APC and parts of the Aufklärungsabteilung together around 15-25 APC of all sorts
1 tank kompany in the best case one Abteilung with 10-15 pz III and IV
1 company Panzerjäger on sfl(7,5 or 88 mm) 4-10 guns
1 20 3m Flek batt on sfl 3-5 guns
1 artillery Abteilung on sfl, Hummel and Wespe, together up to 10 guns
This composition has proven itself to be practical and originated in the effort to pull together all available armored vehicles that can be found for the planned counterattack.
For the choice of the commander of an armored battlegroup only competence, agility ,decisiveness and energy are decisive not rank and seniority.
2. Difficulties and deficiencies
Such armored battlegroups have the following defects:
a) its parts do not organically belong to a fixed unit. The cohesion is therefore loose and has to be created.
Besides allocation of Army troops,(Sturmgeschütze and heavy Panzerjäger)which partially are only subordinated with the operation, it has happened that in the Panzer Abteilung of 15-20 vehicles parts of 3 divisions were combined.
The seconded individual units of the division and the troops foreign to the division all have the natural tendency to return to their unit as soon as possible after the operation. The consequence of this is that the combat strength of the battlegroup drops fast when this tendency is not opposed energetically and sharp.'
to be continued
Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
continued
''b) The communications within the battlegroup are difficult because of the different outfitting with radio equipment and the lack of communications hardware .For example, the battle group commander cannot drive with the panzer attack with a radio station on a normal kfz 17.Command panzer are often not available. Sturmgeschütze and panzer have different radio equipment, so that they can be poorly commanded together.The Panzerjäger company on sfl often has no radio equipment at all.
c)the supply of such a battlegroup is also difficult because each unit has placed its maintenance troup, combat supplytrain etc... in a different place and tries to lo rganise its own supply, which mostly fails as the commanders of the small units have insufficient overview. Supply difficulties which often hinder the missions, are the consequence.
It has to be ensured that the units that are sent to the battlegroup are fully supplied with ammo and fuel and carry along full ammo and fuel vehicles.
3)Resolving these difficulties and deficiences
When possible such battlegroups have to be constituted at an early stage and have to be lodged together for a longer time , so that the battle group commaner is given the opportunity to impact on the individual parts of the battlegroup, to make up for difficulties and deficiencies , gain personal contact with the different leaders and this way take the battle group in hand.
The inner command of the battle group cannot be tight enough.All separation desires must be counteracted from the loutset.Commanders that do not fully exert themselves have to be removed and replaced by others.Only positive,bold commanders are useful in such an armored battlegroups.
To ensure the communication technical abilities within the battlegroup , the commander of the Panzer Nachrichten Abteilung has to organise the communication within the battlegroup himself.This is made easier when for the command of the battlegroup a regimental staff from a pz gen rgt or pz regt can be made available.The communications have to be exercised before the mission so that it is not discovered during combat that a unit has no radio documentation and code names.
The supply of the armored battle group must be unified in the hands of the battle group commander. To this purpose at the moment of the issuing of the mission, all fully fillled up supply vehicles have to assembled with the battlegroup and must be guided by an officer specifically designated for this. The supplying must be centrally steered by the division.Supply packets specifically assembled for this must be as quickly as possible brought forward to the battlegroup according to the tactical situation. Often the supply will only be possible in a convoy system.'
to be continued
''b) The communications within the battlegroup are difficult because of the different outfitting with radio equipment and the lack of communications hardware .For example, the battle group commander cannot drive with the panzer attack with a radio station on a normal kfz 17.Command panzer are often not available. Sturmgeschütze and panzer have different radio equipment, so that they can be poorly commanded together.The Panzerjäger company on sfl often has no radio equipment at all.
c)the supply of such a battlegroup is also difficult because each unit has placed its maintenance troup, combat supplytrain etc... in a different place and tries to lo rganise its own supply, which mostly fails as the commanders of the small units have insufficient overview. Supply difficulties which often hinder the missions, are the consequence.
It has to be ensured that the units that are sent to the battlegroup are fully supplied with ammo and fuel and carry along full ammo and fuel vehicles.
3)Resolving these difficulties and deficiences
When possible such battlegroups have to be constituted at an early stage and have to be lodged together for a longer time , so that the battle group commaner is given the opportunity to impact on the individual parts of the battlegroup, to make up for difficulties and deficiencies , gain personal contact with the different leaders and this way take the battle group in hand.
The inner command of the battle group cannot be tight enough.All separation desires must be counteracted from the loutset.Commanders that do not fully exert themselves have to be removed and replaced by others.Only positive,bold commanders are useful in such an armored battlegroups.
To ensure the communication technical abilities within the battlegroup , the commander of the Panzer Nachrichten Abteilung has to organise the communication within the battlegroup himself.This is made easier when for the command of the battlegroup a regimental staff from a pz gen rgt or pz regt can be made available.The communications have to be exercised before the mission so that it is not discovered during combat that a unit has no radio documentation and code names.
The supply of the armored battle group must be unified in the hands of the battle group commander. To this purpose at the moment of the issuing of the mission, all fully fillled up supply vehicles have to assembled with the battlegroup and must be guided by an officer specifically designated for this. The supplying must be centrally steered by the division.Supply packets specifically assembled for this must be as quickly as possible brought forward to the battlegroup according to the tactical situation. Often the supply will only be possible in a convoy system.'
to be continued
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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
Im surprised to learn the vehicle radios were incompatible at this low level. Did the situation persist through the war?''b) The communications within the battlegroup are difficult because of the different outfitting with radio equipment and the lack of communications hardware .For example, the battle group commander cannot drive with the panzer attack with a radio station on a normal kfz 17.Command panzer are often not available. Sturmgeschütze and panzer have different radio equipment, so that they can be poorly commanded together.The Panzerjäger company on sfl often has no radio equipment at all.
About everything else looks familiar. A couple decades in the Marines made task organization and ad hoc units second nature to me.
Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
continued
'4.missions of the armored battlegroup
The armored battle group is mostly used as intervention group to restore the main defense line, to link up with cut off units, to seal off, to counterattack etc... For this it is often deployed close to the threatened spot, however often comes into operation after a long march up. It always has to be aimed for that the battlegroup is already near to the probable place of operation because in long marches under time pressure the technical losses particularly of the tracked vehicles will numerically so grow through the susceptibility of the material and bad road conditions, that the battle group will already have lost a large part of its battle strength before it even enters into combat.
The batllegroup is not a panzerdivision despite its inherent combat strength.The battlegroup can therefore not be used in farreaching operations, but can only be lead reined in for a limited objective. It has to be ensured that the success it obtains can be held. For this it is necessary that infantry is deployed, which also holds the terrain gained by the battlegroup. When this infantry is not available then the mission of the battlegroup has to be reconciled witth the local conditions and the mission has to be limited. Otherwise it is to be expected that the battlegroup will be heavily attritted in counterattacks.
It should not be overlooked that the battle group cannot 'fly'. The march speed depends on road conditions and the supply situation.
A carefull time calculation protects against illusions. A timely issuing of the mission is important.
5) Command within the battlegroup
As a rule the battle group commander goes with the attack in an armored vehicle . The tanks will be deployed forward which are followed by the APC and sfl which cover their flanks. The self propelled artillery closely follows the attack, suppresses resistance by concentrated fire and shoots the panzer attack forward.Through frequent changing of position the self propelled artillery has to maintain contact with the battlegroup and should not stay behind., because otherwise it cannot be protected. With its lower speed the self propelled artillery cannot keep up with the tanks. The battle group commander has to take care that the tank attack does not run away and on the other hand the self proprlled artillery keeps up.
The fight of the battle group is conducted fast and mobile.A standing around of armored vehicles has to be avoided in all circonstances.'
to be continued
'4.missions of the armored battlegroup
The armored battle group is mostly used as intervention group to restore the main defense line, to link up with cut off units, to seal off, to counterattack etc... For this it is often deployed close to the threatened spot, however often comes into operation after a long march up. It always has to be aimed for that the battlegroup is already near to the probable place of operation because in long marches under time pressure the technical losses particularly of the tracked vehicles will numerically so grow through the susceptibility of the material and bad road conditions, that the battle group will already have lost a large part of its battle strength before it even enters into combat.
The batllegroup is not a panzerdivision despite its inherent combat strength.The battlegroup can therefore not be used in farreaching operations, but can only be lead reined in for a limited objective. It has to be ensured that the success it obtains can be held. For this it is necessary that infantry is deployed, which also holds the terrain gained by the battlegroup. When this infantry is not available then the mission of the battlegroup has to be reconciled witth the local conditions and the mission has to be limited. Otherwise it is to be expected that the battlegroup will be heavily attritted in counterattacks.
It should not be overlooked that the battle group cannot 'fly'. The march speed depends on road conditions and the supply situation.
A carefull time calculation protects against illusions. A timely issuing of the mission is important.
5) Command within the battlegroup
As a rule the battle group commander goes with the attack in an armored vehicle . The tanks will be deployed forward which are followed by the APC and sfl which cover their flanks. The self propelled artillery closely follows the attack, suppresses resistance by concentrated fire and shoots the panzer attack forward.Through frequent changing of position the self propelled artillery has to maintain contact with the battlegroup and should not stay behind., because otherwise it cannot be protected. With its lower speed the self propelled artillery cannot keep up with the tanks. The battle group commander has to take care that the tank attack does not run away and on the other hand the self proprlled artillery keeps up.
The fight of the battle group is conducted fast and mobile.A standing around of armored vehicles has to be avoided in all circonstances.'
to be continued
Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
I believe, it is widely known that American tanks couldn't communicate with infantry radios and, moreover, tank destroyers had radios different from tanks.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑21 Feb 2021, 21:20Im surprised to learn the vehicle radios were incompatible at this low level. Did the situation persist through the war?
Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
Here is the table of radio equipment which various units were supposed to have at this stage of the war
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6
in essence the standard tank radios were limited to communicating with the "radio telephone type f". Which, as I understand, was a portable radio specially developed for communication between small armored and infantry units. However, it had quite a limited range. At higher echelons communications depended on availability of command tanks with more powerful radios of smaller frequencies. As this report implies they could be absent for some reasons.
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6
in essence the standard tank radios were limited to communicating with the "radio telephone type f". Which, as I understand, was a portable radio specially developed for communication between small armored and infantry units. However, it had quite a limited range. At higher echelons communications depended on availability of command tanks with more powerful radios of smaller frequencies. As this report implies they could be absent for some reasons.
Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
continued
' Local movements in the battle area can diminish the effect of artillery. Quick action at the weak points guarantees success. If it is for example determined that an AT gun front has been established on a certain spot, then it must be circumvented and the attack must be started at another spot.
In the heavy operations of the division in december,above all the panzer group had good experiences and obtained big sucesses with night attacks.
The execution of night attacks depends to a large extent from the weather A certain sighting and observation capability must be guaranteed( the actual snow is favourable).
It has however become apparent in all night attacks that the russian, who was weary after the day fighting,could be surprised. Often panick happened with the enemy. Own losses were mostly very low.
The following experiences were made:
The antitankguns are uncertain, often fire high and the possibility exists to attack dashingly and overrun and disable them.
The enemy artillery and mortars often have not registered their fire and are therefore very fragmented in their fire.
The disadvantages are Obvious
Bad observation and effeciency above all for tanks , no full esploitation of the success because of strong enemy elements getting away , which gather themselves the day after.
Disabling of vehicles often because of small damage, the fixing of which is difficult, slipping and getting stuck of vehicles through restricted sight, for example on slopes and other terrain obstacles.
The advantages and successes were always more important in the december operations.
6)Collaboration with the troops in the frontline
Close contact with the frontline units, especially with their artillery has to be guaranteed and is the mission of the artillery commander of the panzer division. It is its mission to take out flanking threats,blind observation points, the sealing off of the break in spot etc... Use of smoke is very effective .
The frontline infantry has to be encouraged to possibly bring strong forces to go along with the operation, to exploit the success of the armored battle group.
7) the experiences of the recent combat have proven that vigourous and boldly commanded armored battlegroups always have success despite their deficient and improvised equipment even with local superiority of the Russians and with proportionally low losses heavily damage the enemy.'
' Local movements in the battle area can diminish the effect of artillery. Quick action at the weak points guarantees success. If it is for example determined that an AT gun front has been established on a certain spot, then it must be circumvented and the attack must be started at another spot.
In the heavy operations of the division in december,above all the panzer group had good experiences and obtained big sucesses with night attacks.
The execution of night attacks depends to a large extent from the weather A certain sighting and observation capability must be guaranteed( the actual snow is favourable).
It has however become apparent in all night attacks that the russian, who was weary after the day fighting,could be surprised. Often panick happened with the enemy. Own losses were mostly very low.
The following experiences were made:
The antitankguns are uncertain, often fire high and the possibility exists to attack dashingly and overrun and disable them.
The enemy artillery and mortars often have not registered their fire and are therefore very fragmented in their fire.
The disadvantages are Obvious
Bad observation and effeciency above all for tanks , no full esploitation of the success because of strong enemy elements getting away , which gather themselves the day after.
Disabling of vehicles often because of small damage, the fixing of which is difficult, slipping and getting stuck of vehicles through restricted sight, for example on slopes and other terrain obstacles.
The advantages and successes were always more important in the december operations.
6)Collaboration with the troops in the frontline
Close contact with the frontline units, especially with their artillery has to be guaranteed and is the mission of the artillery commander of the panzer division. It is its mission to take out flanking threats,blind observation points, the sealing off of the break in spot etc... Use of smoke is very effective .
The frontline infantry has to be encouraged to possibly bring strong forces to go along with the operation, to exploit the success of the armored battle group.
7) the experiences of the recent combat have proven that vigourous and boldly commanded armored battlegroups always have success despite their deficient and improvised equipment even with local superiority of the Russians and with proportionally low losses heavily damage the enemy.'
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Sean Oliver
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Re: Experiences in the command of armored battle groups
Regarding wireless/radio communications: A recurring problem as I understand it was the difficulty involved in tuning radios to the proper frequency of the other station, and then both maintaining that frequency under conditions which could easily disrupt the signals such as vehicle movement, hilly/wooded terrain, and the AFVs own engine which interfered with the signals. Radios also used fragile vacuum tubes which were easily damaged and in short supply.