Courland

[wwilson]

I have a very basic familiarity with the history of the Courland "pocket".

But something about the situation is not clear to me.

So, late 1944, Army Group North gets pushed back hundreds of kilometers and ends up holding Courland with the 16th and 18th Armies.

From late 1944 until March 1945 or so, the Soviets attempt to defeat AG North (later called AG Kurland) no less than six times. Every offensive is a failure and the front lines hardly move at all.

What is not clear is, why was the Courland defense so successful?

The Soviet and German forces were, AFAIK, largely the same ones that had fought near Leningrad in the summer of 1944. Yet, in Courland, the Soviets could barely dent the German defense -- for a German force that was dependent on sea lanes for supply from the Reich.

One aspect I have noted is the terrain in Courland -- a lot of forests, marshland, and areas cut by waterways. This implies that mechanized and motorized forces would not only have their attacks channelized, but their avenues of advance could also be predicted by a defending force.

Yet -- this condition had to hold for other areas of the Eastern Front in 1945, and the Soviets defeated the German forces in front of them all along the front ... except, again, in Courland.

Comments or thoughts?

Thanks and Cheers

[I have questions]

Well, the simple answer of why Kurland held as long as it did was that it was a secondary theater. It was also a peninsula with only one access point from the mainland, and, as you said, that area was marshland and heavily forested. The result was that the Germans could concentrate their defensive power on a (relatively) short stretch of front, with plenty of assistance from the geography. There wasn't an opportunity on the Soviet side to conduct an encirclement or deep-battle because in order to do that you had to breakthrough somewhere, and they never did.

1.) The Germans held a terrain/geographic advantage
2.) Not a super high priority for either side, as by October 1944 the Germans and Soviets were more concerned about East Prussia to the south

The units present isn't really all that important. The Germans around Leningrad faced a different set of issues, Kurland was essentially a defending general's dream as it offered a practically invulnerable position that funneled the enemy into one lane of advance, there wasn't a feasible option for the Soviets except hoping to pierce the line. The fact that just two divisions (11th Infantry and 14th Panzer) acted as the army group's sole reserve speaks volumes about how good the Germans felt about their position there.

In the end it didn't come down to generalship or superior tactics for either side, the Germans just got very lucky that they found themselves in a marshy, forested peninsula that made it easy to keep the enemy at arm's length.

[wwilson]

Thanks for the comments, they make sense given the situation and events that transpired.

Cheers

[donwhite]

David Grier's "Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich's Last Hope, 1944-1945" provides some interesting points about Army Group North's relative defensive successes. The most salient from memory being the average divisional frontage Army Group North's units held in Courland being by far the most advantageous defensively (in terms of comparable width) on the whole Eastern front while at the same time possessing the highest ratio of Heer-level artillery abteilungs support (even with ammunition/shell shortages). Grier also discusses the strategic thinking behind Hitler's insistence of maintaining the Courland Bridgehead in the face of strident calls to evacuate the army group, particularly by Guderian.

Cheers

[Art]

Every offensive is a failure and the front lines hardly move at all.
...
Yet, in Courland, the Soviets could barely dent the German defense -- for a German force that was dependent on sea lanes for supply from the Reich.

Not exactly (the frontline changes from October to May) :


Yeremenko even claimed that he was one inch and five minutes from a complete breakthrough, which, of course, might be a little of overstatement.

[Pips]

Why didn't the Soviets attempt an amphibious landing? They had after all seen several successfully done by the Western Allies.
Did they not have the wherewithall to do so? Or could not guarantee sea and air control?

[I have questions]

Why didn't the Soviets attempt an amphibious landing? They had after all seen several successfully done by the Western Allies.
Did they not have the wherewithall to do so? Or could not guarantee sea and air control?

From what I've read, JG 54 had the skies pretty well controlled for a while. An amphibious operation takes a lot of time and resources, given that Kurland wasn't a priority for them, they likely didn't care enough to divert men and material for an amphibious operation.

[wwilson]

Hi Art,

Thank you for the map, it is visually appealing.

I think, though, what is important is what the map does not show. Here is a map showing the front line as of March 1945, which is the period of the final Soviet offensive in Courland.

kurland front line march 1945.jpg (36.9 KiB) Viewed 6452 times

I am finding it difficult to determine the dates particular towns were captured, but I don't think Saldus or Tukkums came under Soviet control until the last days of the war in May 1945, and, if the account below is accurate, it was more a result of German withdrawals that were not prompted by Soviet attacks:

The (111th Rifle) corps planned for an operation to break through the German line between Rasas and the Abava river, defended by the (German) 81st Infantry Division, from 25 April. On the night of 6–7 May, the German troops began withdrawing from the defensive line towards the north and northwest, covered by small rearguard detachments. On the morning of 7 May, the 196th was directly subordinated to the army command. As a result of the German withdrawal, the corps began advancing on 10:00 on 7 May in the second echelon of the army, behind the 377th Rifle Division.[22] By the end of the day, the 382nd had reached the line of Pampji and the south bank of the ravine 700 meters north of Tyuti to the west of the 189th, which reached the area of Kūlaini and Jahthaus; the corps' positions were roughly 2 kilometers south of the German rearguard at Bluiskas. At 24:00, the 377th, which had advanced to a line between Irlava Manor and Rēpiņi, was operationally subordinated to the corps.[19][23]

During the night of 7–8 May, the corps' assault battalions pursued the German rearguard from Bluiskas to the line of Kalninkas and Jaunmokas Manor to the west of Tukums, where they encountered the most organized resistance. Dislodging the German rearguard, the corps continued to advance and by the end of the day on 8 May the 377th had reached Vilksalu manor to the northwest of Tukums after three German battalions surrendered to it. To the west, the 189th's forward units were between two kilometers southwest of Vilksalu manor and Bāliņi, and on the corps' left flank the 382nd was at Sērmuļi and Skrimbas. The German forces opposing the corps refused to accept battle and began a general surrender at 24:00.[24]

That quote is taken from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/111th_Rifle_Corps. The sources mentioned in the Wiki article are:

19: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=130019976 pp. 5 and 6
22: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135635625 p. 15
23: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135635625 p. 17
24: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=130019976 pp. 6 and 7

These sources are combat journals of the 111th Rifle Corps and the 67th Army. I am unable to read Russian, perhaps, if you have time, you can read the documents and see if they confirm what the Wikipedia article claims.

All in all, this "minor theater" has quite a few interesting aspects.

Cheers

[wwilson]

Found German situation maps for the Courland front at various points in time.

December 1944. http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /I1244.jpg

January 1945. http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /I0145.jpg

February 1945. http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /I0245.jpg

March 1945. http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /I0345.jpg

April 1945. http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /I0445.jpg

Cheers

[Virginian]

Hi, I translated parts of the 111th Rifle Corps' and 67th Army combat journals a few years ago to source the Wikipedia article on the corps. In the entry in 67th Army's combat journal for 6 May (https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135635625), a detailed plan is laid out for an attack by the 67th Army in cooperation with the 1st Shock and 42nd Armies:

The armies of the right wing of the front (67th, 1st Shock, 42nd) are to break through the Tukums-Saldus defensive zone, inflicting the main blow towards Kuldiga, to take the centers of the defense: Tukums, Kandava, Sabile, Kabile, and Saldus, with a subsequent advance to the Venta river.

On the night of 5–6 May, the Soviet forces regrouped for the planned offensive. The 67th Army was left with only the 111th Rifle Corps for its rifle forces, being stripped of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps (51st GRD, 67th GRD, 332nd RD) and artillery: the 28th AD, 17th AT Gun Brigade, 39th and 26th Guards Mortar Regiments (Katyushas), 723rd Sep Artillery Recon Bn, and 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 12th Guards Mortar Brigade.

Thus the army was left with the 111th RC, consisting of the 189th, 196th, and 382nd RDs, the 377th RD, and the 155th Fortified Region (FR).

But the Soviets were pre-empted, as seen from the 67th Army Intelligence Department's summary of the German actions on 7 May:

On the night of [6]–7 May the enemy began to withdraw significant units of his forces holding the first defensive position, tactical reserves and artillery, to the second defensive position along the line of Radzimtsiems, Yaunamuyzha, mz. Irlava.

To cover the withdrawal of the main forces, the enemy left groups of submachine gunners and light machine guns in the forward line, who with increased firing tried to give the impression of a normal fire density.

By the morning of 7 May 1945 the covering detachments abandoned the trenches in the sector of Priednieki/1740/, river Abava. During the retreat the enemy blew up all bridges and crossings. Minefields and felled trees were placed on the roads to hinder the offensive of our units and buy time for the withdrawal to the next defensive line.

Artillery and mortars, supporting the retreat of the covering detachments, methodically shelled our advancing units from the regions of Paukas/1329/, Kadazhas/1226/, mz. Degole and directly from the combat formations of the infantry.

The operations of two 150 mm artillery batteries, 4 105 mm artillery batteries, and 4 81 mm mortar batteries were noted.

In all for the day the enemy launched up to 500 shells and mines. Along the Sakarni, Dzhukste road, in the zone of the 81st Infantry Division, 12 SP guns operated, supporting the enemy covering detachments.

At 8:15 on 7 May two Fw 190 aircraft conducted reconnaissance of the forward area.

In the sector from the Riga Gulf to Priednieki the enemy continued to hold his previous lines, holding back the attempts of the 155th Fortified Region to go on the offensive with infantry and artillery fire.

[Virginian]

Continuing from the 67th Army operations on 7 May:

Using combined arms and artillery reconnaissance, the 155th FR and 377th RD by the morning of 7 May found the weakened enemy defenses in the sector of Priednieki, river Abava. The troops of the army went on the offensive, overcoming the engineering obstacles and dislodging covering detachments, advancing from 2 to 7 km on the front of Priednieki to the Abava river...
During 7 May 1945 our advancing units took up to 50 enemy soldiers prisoner. According to the testimony of the prisoners it follows that the Courland Group command aimed to pull back its troops to the ports of Libava, Vindava, and others and evacuate them by sea to Gogland and Denmark.

In short, on 8 May, the Germans kept retreating to the northwest and west, abandoning Tukums at 7:30 that morning. 67th Army's intelligence report mentioned small scale counterattacks and rearguard actions, but also the surrender of up to two infantry battalions. By the second half of the day German resistance is already described as insignificant. At 1900 the 21st Luftwaffe Field Division (Group Barth) ceased to resist, and its commander went to the commander of the 196th RD to surrender his division. At 22:00 the Army Group Courland command agreed to unconditional surrender. As the 67th Army's combat journal describes it,

Military operations on the Kurland peninsula ended.

But the fighting was not without loss for the Soviets, with the 336th SP Arty Regt of the 67th Army losing two out of 17 ISU-122s in fighting for Irlava on 7 May. The Leningrad Front's combat journal goes into detail on losses for 7 May, in addition to mentioning ten aircraft from its 15th Air Army failing to return:

Losses of the troops of the front:
1st Shock Army: 39 KIA, 223 WIA
42nd Army: 30 KIA, 135 WIA
10th Guards Army: 9 KIA, 66 WIA
6th Guards Army: 7 KIA, 13 WIA
51st Army: 7 KIA, 12 WIA
4th Shock Army; 2 KIA, 14 WIA

The final report on the losses of the Leningrad Front between 1 and 10 May:

The combat journal describes the follow-on Soviet operations, with some interesting points:

In accordance with the surrender terms, the Kurland Army Group command pledged to concentrate its forces in designated regions in full order, informing the command of our forces about their number and composition, carrying out the preservation of its weapons, equipment and other property, not spoiling or damaging them.

Despite the acceptance of the surrender terms, the Kurland Army Group command did not fulfill all conditions. All documents of units and formations of the 16th Army were found to be purposefully destroyed. A significant part of the heavy weapons - machine guns, mortars and cannons, small arms and equipment were found to be abandoned in fields and forests. Part of the equipment was purposefully damaged.

The surrender of 208 German officers and 7,083 NCOs and soldiers to the 67th Army is reported, as well as 68 ex-Red Army officers and 11,459 ex-Red Army NCOs and soldiers [Latvians?].

The 67th Army combat journal describes the usage of 710 German POW sappers to demine their frontline between 11 and 19 May.

[Art]

One post with statements on modern politics and calls for violence was removed.

[Art]

The surrender of 208 German officers and 7,083 NCOs and soldiers to the 67th Army is reported, as well as 68 ex-Red Army officers and 11,459 ex-Red Army NCOs and soldiers [Latvians?].

The war diary mentions the 19 SS Divisions and Latvian police battalions at this point. I doubt that the bulk of them were actually former Red Army personnel.

[Virginian]

The surrender of 208 German officers and 7,083 NCOs and soldiers to the 67th Army is reported, as well as 68 ex-Red Army officers and 11,459 ex-Red Army NCOs and soldiers [Latvians?].

The war diary mentions the 19 SS Divisions and Latvian police battalions at this point. I doubt that the bulk of them were actually former Red Army personnel.

Yes, the personnel of those units were also mentioned in the 111th RC's war diary. Absolutely, it's unlikely that most of them had actually served in the Latvian Territorial Rifle Corps in 1940 and 1941.