photo from Salla (June 1941)

[WGoose]

yes. The North has always been a secondary front. There were Finnish divisions UP TO the Arctic Circle since 1942, and German divisions north of the Arctic Circle were.
https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/1829323
The Soviet leadership planned an offensive in the spring and summer (May-June 1944) along the entire line from Leningrad to Murmansk. But the Finns resisted and the attack on the Kandalaksha direction was canceled. In the 1st quarter of 1944, before the offensive, 30-31-32 ski brigades arrived to the aid of 122 and 104 rifle divisions and stood north of the Voyanvaara Hill, formed an 88 tank regiment, strengthened the 77 naval brigade and it became the 341 division, and added the 38 Guards tank brigade.
When the Germans began to withdraw at the end of August 1944, from September 03, 1944, Soviet troops began to go parallel to the Alakurtti-Salla road (Kuoloyarvi) and attacked the Miokolakhti area from the north, and from the south Moutinkainen and the Finnish village of Oncamo.
In the center of the front, the attack of 2 battalions choked on the first day and the troops went to Alakurtti from the north along the Liposyuntyum-Oula line.

[WGoose]

122 and 104 rifle divisions were withdrawn from the Kandalaksha direction only in December 1944 and sent to Romania.

[WGoose]

dear colleagues!
by the link https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/2527198 in German and Russian languages.
36AK telephone reports for July 1941 (analogous to Operational Reports) on the direction of Rovaniemi-Kandalaksha.
if I have time before the end of my vacation, I will publish August and September 1941

[WGoose]

dear colleagues!
I exhibit "Telephone conversations" and "War Diary" 36AK for August-September 1941 in a single text.
In German and Russian
https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/2543155

[WGoose]

dear colleagues!

I exhibit the "War Diary" 36AK for October-December 1941
in German and Russian

https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/2546755

[WGoose]

dear colleagues!
I'm putting up an AUGMENTED version of the ZHBD 36AK for 1942
https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/2549737
in Russian and German
it added January and February and partly the rest of March 1942.
he added almost nothing else.
any materials for April, May and June 1942 (War Diary, Morning and Evening Reports, etc.) have not been found.

[WGoose]

dear colleagues!
I am putting up an article on "The losses of the Germans and Finns until 09/15/1941" (the first stage of the offensive of the Germans and Finns towards Kandalaksha).
https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/2551166
according to other sources, these data are almost the same, so I think these figures may be the main guideline.

[WGoose]

dear colleagues!
I am putting up a CORRECTED version of the report SS-Div.Nord in June-July 1941.
her further actions (since August) in the Kandalaksha direction are already included in the Reports 36AK, which I have already published in previous links.
https://cont.ws/@wildgoose/2551649
Fixed the ugly order of building the Report, put everything exactly for ease of reading, added a few links
in Russian and German

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a point of view on Salla (169. ID)................

The Battle of Salla, July 1 to 8, 1941.

The German army, which in the spring of 1941 marched to attack the Soviet Union between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea and, far away, in northern Finland, certainly did not look at the future events that were gradually emerging with a half-fearful or half-curious expectation, as is typical of newcomers to war. Even when these were new formations, each of the units that gathered here was so populated by veterans of the four previous campaigns of this war that they could be considered experienced and accustomed to it.

The victorious outcome of all previous battles justified strong self-confidence as soldiers. However, this time the feeling of uncertainty and melancholy was even more pronounced than usual on the eve of important events. The disdain for the eastern enemy that was prevalent at the upper level caused many people to shake their heads in skepticism at the lower level. Many of the older officers remembered the remarkable combat performance of the Russians in the First World War; Some people knew the reports of officers who had commanded in the USSR about the rigor of discipline and the harshness of training in the Red Army.

The enormous industrial development experienced by the Soviet Union in recent years was also known. Many serious questions arose for the thinking soldier, as long as the immediate tasks of the day and the need to prepare for the immediate situation gave time for them. To a large extent it was a feeling of resignation in the face of an inevitable fate, which was combined with the will to do the best and especially here.

In addition to the general uncertainty about their future enemy, the German forces, which since the beginning of June were advancing towards Lapland between the Arctic Circle and the Arctic Ocean under the orders of the Army High Command Norwegen, experienced another moment of uncertainty:

The unusual features of the theater of war. The study of the limited literature and maps had only been able to provide a very imperfect image of the landscape. The Finnish economic map, compiled from aerial photographs, not territorial surveys, showed an almost uninterrupted forest area, accessible only by a few roads and trails, and sparsely populated; Where forest signs were missing, moors and swamps were marked, often stretching for kilometers. But what was the landscape like in the vertical direction? Elevation figures were missing and only the Finnish names for "mountain" or "ridge" showed that the terrain must be very mountainous and certainly difficult in sudden transitions between heights and swampy lowlands.

In these circumstances, scans during deployment and consultations with Finnish officers were of particular importance. The latter's skepticism was not encouraging: when asked about the prospects of a campaign in this region, he sometimes responded: "No one has ever waged war here in the summer." It soon became apparent that the landscape had changed too much for the map to be anything more than a guide. Moorland footprints, for example, could indicate either an area of grassland or an impassable swamp.

The forest was sometimes a sparse heather forest, which sometimes would have posed no obstacle even to vehicles, sometimes a tangle of bushes and rocks, often overlapping for miles. It was clear that in such terrain it was necessary to thoroughly review all the usual rules for marching movements and the use of weapons. It was also obvious that the few roads in this country were of crucial importance, and that any reindeer trail leading in a suitable direction could be of the greatest tactical importance.

Source: Die Schlacht um Salla, 1. - 8. July 1941. Generalleutnant a. D. Kurt Dittmar, Kommandeur der 169. Inf.Div. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift: ASMZ, Vol.120 (1954).

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more................

The Battle of Salla, July 1 to 8, 1941.

The question was quite open as to what this relationship would be like beyond the Finnish-Soviet border, which had become an iron curtain since the war. There was talk that in the year since then the Soviets had rebuilt numerous roads and railways, no doubt as part of their strategy, as had the fortifications they were supposed to have built, especially around Salla.

The sector of the German 169th Infantry Division, which was part of the XXXVI. Army Corps, together with the SS Division Nord (as of June 17, 1941, formerly Kampfgruppe SS-Nord), which was deployed east of Kelloselkä, was to take Salla from the northwest, from Saija, numerous binoculars were pointed towards the area around the Soviet border fortress, but the landscape, immersed in the suffocating subarctic summer heat, revealed none of its secrets. Only the numerous columns of smoke from the locomotives indicated that there was a lot of traffic.

From the beginning there was no doubt that the Soviets would not hand over Salla without a fight. What forces would be expected remained uncertain until the end. It was considered certain that at least the Soviet 122nd Rifle Division, deployed around Salla, would counter the attack. Indications suggesting the presence of Soviet armored forces remained uncertain.

The combat order given to the 169th Infantry Division by the Corps to take Salla from the northwest gave the division complete freedom to extend the attack in a general eastward direction. From the beginning the idea was to conquer the fortress more from the north than from the northwest. Furthermore, following the procedures tested in previous campaigns, a broader encirclement of the presumed second objective, the position east of the Kairala chain of lakes, was foreseen.

Similarly, the Finnish 6th Division, which was subordinate to the XXXVI. Army Corps as the third major unit, was deployed from the area east of Hautajärvi to further encompass the chain of lakes from the south. The fact that the missing road connections had to be largely replaced by water transport in traditional ferries and boats significantly limited the division's supply possibilities and thus its combat effectiveness (See sketch).

Source: Die Schlacht um Salla, 1. - 8. July 1941. Generalleutnant a. D. Kurt Dittmar, Kommandeur der 169. Inf.Div. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift: ASMZ, Vol.120 (1954).

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more................

The Battle of Salla, July 1 to 8, 1941.

The order and terrain resulted in the deployment of the 169th Inf. Div. into three combat groups:

Kampfgruppe Rubel (Inf.Rgt. 378 Reinforced), with the bulk of the artillery behind it, was to attack on both sides of the Saija - Salla route; The attack was completely "channelled" by the terrain - a lido-like chain of forested dunes in the swampland that ran in the direction of the road.

Kampfgruppe Schack (Inf.Rgt. 392 Reinforced) was to attack east of the Saija - Salla route from the Kuukkumavaara staging area in the direction of Keinuvaara and later turn the attack south across the Kuolajoki River. A column path was built up to the Kuukkumavaara, largely as a log dam, which was usable for all vehicles. Behind the Schack combat group, which was intended to be the focal point, two light groups of the Div. Artillery were brought into firing position.

Kampfgruppe Bleyer (III./379, Bat I Ludowig, the latter formed from levies from divisions stationed in Norway) was the one that, separated from the actual attack, was supposed to encompass the Kairala defense position from the north. Both battalions relied on light equipment without horses and vehicles.

The supplies for them were to some extent ensured by the fact that supplies of ammunition and food and carrying capacity were brought as a precaution along the Tenniöjoki waterway right up to the border. Two battalions of the Inf Rgt 379, the Panzerabt Wolf and the engineer battalion, were provided as divisional reserves, unless they were in the combat groups, so that their deployment to Kampfgruppe Rubel or Schack was possible via the shortest possible route.

In the early afternoon of July 1, 1941, the combat groups launched the attack. With Kampfgruppe Rubel it failed in the heavy grenade launcher and machine gun fire from obviously well-developed positions. Attacks repeated several times after renewed artillery fire preparation had no better fate. In the evening the attack had to be considered completely repelled.

With Kampfgruppe Schack, after breaking light resistance immediately across the border, it quickly moved east towards the Keinuvaara ground. A natural dam running through the swamp with good waterway gave rise to premature thoughts of persecution. But all attempts to take the overlooking Keinuvaara from this dam failed. Under the pressure of strong Soviet counterattacks from the south and east, which lasted the entire second and third day of fighting and were partly carried out with tank support, there were even backward movements of advanced units here, so seemed necessary to deploy a battalion from the Div Reserve here. Nevertheless, the combat group fought purely on defense throughout the third day.

In order to master the situation now, it took a whole decision. The fact that this meant the end of an illusion was painful, but it could not be changed: the northern battle group Bleyer, which had been assigned to a wider encirclement, was instructed by radio message to go, contrary to its original order, along the road leading from Korja to Salla, which they had taken against weak resistance forces on the second day of the battle had to advance against the northern flank of the Keinuvaara. This happened on the morning of the 4th day, the Keinuvaara fell under the pressure of attacks from the north and west coordinated by the division. The north bank of the Kuolajoki was cleared of the enemy and an initial success was achieved.

Source: Die Schlacht um Salla, 1. - 8. July 1941. Generalleutnant a. D. Kurt Dittmar, Kommandeur der 169. Inf.Div. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift: ASMZ, Vol.120 (1954).

Cheers. Raúl M .