Experience report 24 pz div 1944

[Aida1]

24.Panzerdivision
Abt IA Nr 420/44. Division command post 19.05.1944

Experience report
A) generally

1)the enemy
the finding which was already reported in the last experience report, that the enemy immediately deploys without training and often even without uniform the civilians rounded up in the cleared areas, was confirmed in these months in a growing measure. Often they are equipped with captured German weapons, however only 5-10 rounds per man. The technical and moral battle worth of these troops is low. Often men can be seen also in the first line who prevent retreat with weapons.
Where the attacks of the enemy do not lead to success immediately.,he often does not retreat to his start position but digs in where he was stopped and tries at night and from attack to attack to push closer and closer to our main battle line. He is then difficult to seize with infantry weapons and his stay near the main battle line must be made difficult through artillery, above all by the feared ricochet firing as by infantry guns and mortars. "

To be continued

[Aida1]

"The soul of enemy resistance against own attacks is as before the dense PAK front, which the enemy immediately sets up in any line reached. If one succeeds in preventing the setting up of it by immediate counterattack or overrun it then the resistance of the enemy is broken through this.
In the successful breakthrough in the bridghead of Schirokoje a good organisation of his supply was demonstrated. Tanks towed their own supply trucks. The supply by air was executed in all weather and almost always by landing on the road of advance.
During the mud period the better all terrain capability of the T 34 was shown again compared to our tank types. As these only reached a speed of not more than 2 km per hour with overuse of the motors and had to halt again to clean the tracks and the roler wheels, the T 34 seemed not to be impeded much by the mud. However temporarily, at the height of the mud period in the area of Apostolowa Russian tanks could also not be used. "

To be continued

[Aida1]

"2)Tactical use
a) Contrary to the combat in the bridghead of Nikopol during which the division was exclusively used for counterattacks and therefore frontally against the focal point of enemy defenses, the own attacks for the first time again gave the opportunity to determine the direction of attack oneself and avoid the effect of the strong points of the enemy in mobile combat through sweeping attack. There, the forming of armored battlegroups with tanks, self-propelled guns and APC has proven itself excellently and it has shown itself that the APC when it has free room and it is used correctly in agile conduct of combat, is also without tank support an excellent instrument of combat. Above all the APC saves blood, as is shown by the higher losses of the un armored units.
When one cannot get around enemy PAK fronts, then their overcoming will generally be done through infantry attack., multiple times however PAK fronts are also put out of action by being overrun by tanks and also by APC.
In the mounted tank or APC attack, thorough deployment and sudden coming forward from it are the prerequisite for the successful outcome. The recognized PAK front must at the moment of the start be overwhelmed with fire of all weapons whereby the targets for the individual weapons have to be precisely established beforehand. Through the rolling over the PAK front in high speed, multiple times guns were captured or destroyed without own losses. "

To be continued

[Westphalia1812]

24.Panzerdivision
Abt IA Nr 420/44. Division command post 19.05.1944

Experience report
A) generally

1)the enemy
the finding which was already reported in the last experience report, that the enemy immediately deploys without training and often even without uniform the civilians rounded up in the cleared areas, was confirmed in these months in a growing measure. Often they are equipped with captured German weapons, however only 5-10 rounds per man. The technical and moral battle worth of these troops is low. Often men can be seen also in the first line who prevent retreat with weapons.
Where the attacks of the enemy do not lead to success immediately.,he often does not retreat to his start position but digs in where he was stopped and tries at night and from attack to attack to push closer and closer to our main battle line. He is then difficult to seize with infantry weapons and his stay near the main battle line must be made difficult through artillery, above all by the feared ricochet firing as by infantry guns and mortars. "

To be continued

Where can we find this record? NARA? BA-MA?

[Aida1]

NARA T 78 roll 620. Can be acquired from Digital history archive.

[Aida1]

"b) this spring showed again that mud is the biggest enemy of the Panzer division. Movements like that from Scholochowo to Jampol over several 100 km during the mud period mean a premature diminishing of its combat value. While the fulltrack and halftrack parts and the four-wheel driven vehicles as the most important combat vehicles of the division can also be temporarily moved in light mud.,this possibility is not applicable for all commercial - therefore the mass of the supply vehicles. Through this all far-reaching missions have their natural limitation.
The numbers of broken down vehicles mentioned in the combat report show the expensiveness of this deployment in which the losses through enemy action are low.
When one cannot do without the use of Panzer divisions during the mud period, a reorganisation is needed before their deployment in which the wheeled vehicles that have to be shifted are replaced by horse-drawn vehicles to the degree necessary for the supply. Out of this would come an armored, all-terrain mobile battlegroup and one that fights on foot. The latter needs however to be also equipped temporarily with all the horse-drawn vehicles that are evident for an infantry regiment. (need see paragraph 2)."

To be continued

[Westphalia1812]

NARA T 78 roll 620. Can be acquired from Digital history archive.

Thank you very much.

[Aida1]

c) Despite the breaking down of the highly developed technical apparatus as a Panzer division has, the conduct of combat can be made possible through improvisations. By using men more and the highest demands of the individual it has to be replaced what technical means would perform. The conveying of orders for example was secured by a few mounted officers and NCO's and often soldiers had to be used to transport wounded over long stretches.
In all the retreats, especially under the factual terrain conditions, in which all war organisation breaks down and the utmost is required from each man, a sufficient supply in which food has an essential role, remains decisive to keep up the nerves of the men .
Especially in such times the setting up of the command posts near the frontline has proven itself because the man has the feeling that where the flag of the division stands, things are in order.
In the retreat also the officer has to be with his troops because otherwise he will have no influence on them because of the mostly insufficient means of communication. Through this serious crises are overcome the easiest.

3)Structure
The absence of a Panzer jager Abteilung has, as has been reported multiple times, again had a negative influence, because tanks had to be taken away from the armored group for antitank missions.
Likewise, the experience remains unchanged that the infantry forces of the Panzer division are too weak with 2 regiments of 2 Abteilungs each. "

To be continued

[Aida1]

B. Panzergrenadiere
Nothing has been changed in the tactical experiences in the use of the panzergrenadiere since the last experience report. New however is the converting of the motorised squadrons to pure combat on foot during the mud period. It has been shown that with full equipment of the troop with weapons and gear a minimum of horse-drawn wagons(Panjewagen) is necessary, which have to be supplied to the division in time.
Are needed:
per platoon 2-3 vehicles for gear and baggage
For the squadron 2 vehicles for supply and transport of wounded and one horse-drawn field kitchen
For the Abteilung 1 V column to 5 vehicles, 1 medical echelon to 2 vehicles 1 ammo column to 5 vehicles and one signal troop to 2 vehicles
In addition for the squadron chief, platoon commander and messengers riding horses.
For the regiment a few horses as means for recce.
In case of a lack of supply vehicles, it has to be checked if one can leave back individual weapons in favor of more ammo. This is particularly applicable to the MG 42 with its strong ammo use and the 8 cm medium mortar.
The fire discipline also gains more importance from this viewpoint. "

To be continued

[Aida1]

"The tank attack by night on 06.03 which was used for the first time against the division again proves the importance of antitank defense at night. Fighting this by own tanks is only possible at dusk but not in full darkness because the gunner sees nothing through his optics. The heavy PAK can however be used with use of nightlighting equipment. Even when the most favorable firing range is lowered to 400 m, a certain accuracy of firing is still given by the firing of flares.
In close combat with enemy tanks at night the flare gun has proven itself very well. The crew will be blinded by firing flare ammo at close range. This makes the work of close combat troops much easier. By continued putting up of smokescreens around the tanks it was succeeded in blinding them, getting themselves stuck and the crews were forced to dismount.
For the artillery, fighting tanks by night is only possible with great concentrations of tanks and with incendiary ammunition. It has been shown that phosphor shots make warm tanks catch fire very easily. "

To be continued

[phaze]

When one cannot get around enemy PAK fronts, then their overcoming will generally be done through infantry attack., multiple times however PAK fronts are also put out of action by being overrun by tanks and also by APC.
In the mounted tank or APC attack, thorough deployment and sudden coming forward from it are the prerequisite for the successful outcome. The recognized PAK front must at the moment of the start be overwhelmed with fire of all weapons whereby the targets for the individual weapons have to be precisely established beforehand. Through the rolling over the PAK front in high speed, multiple times guns were captured or destroyed without own losses. "

To be continued

So the answer to a concentration of antitank guns, is to valiantly charge these with your tanks ? Maybe British in the desert had it right all along.

[Aida1]

When one cannot get around enemy PAK fronts, then their overcoming will generally be done through infantry attack., multiple times however PAK fronts are also put out of action by being overrun by tanks and also by APC.
In the mounted tank or APC attack, thorough deployment and sudden coming forward from it are the prerequisite for the successful outcome. The recognized PAK front must at the moment of the start be overwhelmed with fire of all weapons whereby the targets for the individual weapons have to be precisely established beforehand. Through the rolling over the PAK front in high speed, multiple times guns were captured or destroyed without own losses. "

To be continued

So the answer to a concentration of antitank guns, is to valiantly charge these with your tanks ? Maybe British in the desert had it right all along.

From what is stated, it is clear that the charging of the antitankguns with high speed was not the norm. But when terrain allows you to come relatively close to them and lauch a high speed attack all weapons firing you could certainly suppress and destroy them .

[Sean Oliver]

Gracias, Aida1!

I think this report is also available in dramatic, exiting color at BAMA's website, under RH-10 (Gen.Insp.Pz.Truppen)

24th Panzer was formed in 42 from the 1st Kav Div, and remained consistently above average even after it was mostly destroyed at Stalingrad. The survivors rebuilt the division and returned to the east in late 43, and fought very well until the end.
The grenadiers did not typically remain mounted when attacking, unless certain preconditions could be met, as mentioned above. But they still had plenty of cavalry dash, it seems.
For a lot more on these very same engagements around Nikopol and Targul Frumos check out https://www.casematepublishers.com/coun ... xul3nbMJEZ
AKA Die Gegenschlag, this little classic of armoured warfare was originally written in 1959 by an officer of the 24th Panzer, F.W. von Senger u. Etterlin, (he was son of Gen. Fridolin v.Senger u.Etterlin, of Cassino fame) and is now finally available in English translated by Linden Lyons. Yess!

[Aida1]

C) Artillery
Because of the breaking down of the means for towing and the total lack of spare parts, not much artillery could be used by the division in February and March, above all during the retreats. For weeks only 2 Hummel and 3 Wespe were used.
The mud period showed that it is absolutely necessary to equip the II. Abt (light field howitzer mot) with 1 8 ton Zgkw. It would have been possible then to tow away many vehicles that were stuck in the mud, also 3 ton Zgkw.
The new Kstn drops the light armored observer vehicles in the mot Zug Abteilungen. This is very detrimental to the efficiency as because of this the art. Rgt. can only execute a mobile observation, with the self propelled Abteilung in attacks with tanks or panzer Grenadiere. The forming of a focal point in the armored group with all Abteilungen of the Rgts is through this made more difficult.
The demand for an armored observer vehicle for all Abt commanders and battery chiefs must therefore be made emphatically.
It would be expedient to equip the forward observers with periscopes so they could observe from cover in forward slope observer positions."

To be continued

[Aida1]

"In muddy terrain the Hummel has proven itself better than the Wespe, which has a too low chassis and too weak and small tracks and often suffers from clutch damage. The Hummel got through all terrain difficulties well. and in addition towed away many other vehicles.....
The penetrating power of the sFH against tanks is good. It succeeded to kill T 34 at a distance of 600-800 m in direct fire.

D) Weapons and equipment

The MG42 has proven itself also during the mud period, just as in winter. It is however necessary that besides it the carbine should not fully recede in the background and that above all special emphasis should be placed on the training of sharpshooters.A few good carbine shooters or sharpshooters have the same worth as a machine-gun. The same as with us, also with the enemy it has a strong moral effect when it gets around that sharpshooters monitor each movement.
The medium mortar has also continued to prove itself, the ammo bottleneck is known, the equipment with heavy mortars is desirable.
Often it was needed to do without a few mortars in case of ammo shortage and give all the ammo to the others. "

To be continued.