"The 7,5cm PAK has further proven itself as an outstanding antitank weapon. An tank hunter gun it is admittedly not as it is fixed to its respective position because of its high weight.
The mud period has also shown that it is a heavy burden for 3 ton Zgkw during marches.
....
The sIG on SF 38 t has proven itself further, only has it been shown during the mud period that the undercarriage is too weak for bad road conditions. In both the panzergrenadiere regiments all sIG broke down through motor damage
With the 2 cm Flak a number of kills were achieved with Panzergranat shells, used also by the PzGrenrgts against ground targets its fire is devastating. The loading on 1 ton Zgkw has proven to be practical and sufficient, also in mud'
The equipment of engineer platoons is at this time fully inadequate because of the high losses in gear. The equipment with rubber boats for the rgt engineer platoons is no priority, urgently needed on the contrary are material and gear for improvised footbridges, digging equipment and gear for making barriers."
To be continued
Experience report 24 pz div 1944
Re: Experience report 24 pz div 1944
".....
F) supply
The supply of the troops offered special difficulties in February and March. After the early failing of the last supply Maultiere in the beginning of February and after it was not possible anymore to perform the suplly over muddy roads with wheeled vehicles, the division had to rely exclusively on its own kolumn 15/40 and air supply. The load room of the 10 ton column did not nearly suffise, especially because the vehicles also had to be used for the transport of wounded and because of the mud needed long time between the supply base and the issuing. In addition, no replacement horses could be obtained, so that one was forced to insert pauses between the individual trips. Only in individual exceptional cases transport capacity was made available by corps or army.
The air supply had the following defects.:
Besides that almost never the needed quantities were flown in, the composition of what was delivered had clearly been made according to a specific schema and often did not satisfy the specific needs of the division. So, for example, a few times ammo was was flown in for weapons that were not present, in other cases too much ammo for a weapon, for example Hornisse while artillery remained without ammo. Finally, it also happened that one time 80 shots l FH shells were dropped with only 12 cartridges.
The airdrop of supply goods has so many defects that if possible one should land. On average 40 percent of ammo and fuel are unusable, because the bombs hit too hard. "
To be continued
F) supply
The supply of the troops offered special difficulties in February and March. After the early failing of the last supply Maultiere in the beginning of February and after it was not possible anymore to perform the suplly over muddy roads with wheeled vehicles, the division had to rely exclusively on its own kolumn 15/40 and air supply. The load room of the 10 ton column did not nearly suffise, especially because the vehicles also had to be used for the transport of wounded and because of the mud needed long time between the supply base and the issuing. In addition, no replacement horses could be obtained, so that one was forced to insert pauses between the individual trips. Only in individual exceptional cases transport capacity was made available by corps or army.
The air supply had the following defects.:
Besides that almost never the needed quantities were flown in, the composition of what was delivered had clearly been made according to a specific schema and often did not satisfy the specific needs of the division. So, for example, a few times ammo was was flown in for weapons that were not present, in other cases too much ammo for a weapon, for example Hornisse while artillery remained without ammo. Finally, it also happened that one time 80 shots l FH shells were dropped with only 12 cartridges.
The airdrop of supply goods has so many defects that if possible one should land. On average 40 percent of ammo and fuel are unusable, because the bombs hit too hard. "
To be continued
Re: Experience report 24 pz div 1944
"The collection of the airdopped supplies was often made much more difficult because, in spite of laying down cloth signs and light signals the dropping happened in a 5 km radius from the destination. Panje teams that were urgently needed for other purposes were fixed because of this and part of the supplies were lost because they could not be found..
In a landing there was also the advantage that the evacuation of wounded could be done better.
A few times the requested supply by air was not performed while the supply by air had to be communicated until 1200 of the day before. However this is impossible in the fighting as that during the retreat, as the drop zone cannot be determined so long before. A possibility had to be found to get through the drop zone in the course of the night before. "
To be continued
In a landing there was also the advantage that the evacuation of wounded could be done better.
A few times the requested supply by air was not performed while the supply by air had to be communicated until 1200 of the day before. However this is impossible in the fighting as that during the retreat, as the drop zone cannot be determined so long before. A possibility had to be found to get through the drop zone in the course of the night before. "
To be continued
Re: Experience report 24 pz div 1944
"G) medical services
Because of the breaking down and loss of medical vehicles and the impossibility to use wheeled vehicles in mud, the evacuation and care for the wounded was faced with new challenges. It was shown that a Panzer division also has to be equipped with a sufficient number of horse-drawn vehicles, which are available exclusively for the transport of wounded. Because of a lack horse-drawn vehicles the wounded were given to the empty ammo columns that were driving back,which meant a serious delay for these. It is to be demanded that at least one horse-drawn vehicle for transport of wounded is available in each squadron. In addition 10 vehicles are needed for the establishment of vehicle stopping places and further 10 vehicles for the making mobile of one main aid station platoon for the the transport of medical material and for the transport of wounded from the main aid station. This gives a requirement for the medical services of the division of at least 55 horse-drawn vehicles.
Despite special difficulties the medical care of the wounded could be fully performed. However there were always complaints about the further transport of wounded from the collection points into the rear area. Partially the makeshift wounded trains, and collection points are not sufficiently equipped to protect the wounded against cold and wetness. Often there is not enough medical care and above all the further transporting of the wounded often takes too long. "
To be continued
Because of the breaking down and loss of medical vehicles and the impossibility to use wheeled vehicles in mud, the evacuation and care for the wounded was faced with new challenges. It was shown that a Panzer division also has to be equipped with a sufficient number of horse-drawn vehicles, which are available exclusively for the transport of wounded. Because of a lack horse-drawn vehicles the wounded were given to the empty ammo columns that were driving back,which meant a serious delay for these. It is to be demanded that at least one horse-drawn vehicle for transport of wounded is available in each squadron. In addition 10 vehicles are needed for the establishment of vehicle stopping places and further 10 vehicles for the making mobile of one main aid station platoon for the the transport of medical material and for the transport of wounded from the main aid station. This gives a requirement for the medical services of the division of at least 55 horse-drawn vehicles.
Despite special difficulties the medical care of the wounded could be fully performed. However there were always complaints about the further transport of wounded from the collection points into the rear area. Partially the makeshift wounded trains, and collection points are not sufficiently equipped to protect the wounded against cold and wetness. Often there is not enough medical care and above all the further transporting of the wounded often takes too long. "
To be continued
Re: Experience report 24 pz div 1944
"In the retreat to the Bug the situation of the army medical fafilities was neither known nor near enough to the troop. The supply with medical material was sufficient. The material that was once delivered by air was convenient, well packed and abundant.... "