Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#31

Post by Gastolli » 17 Jan 2023, 01:55

14.02.1944

VI. AK:
08.00 Uhr: Austausch 131. ID und 197. ID soll in der kommenden Nacht beginnen.
10.00 Uhr: Am frühen Morgen versuchte der Feind noch einmal die Brückenköpfe bei Nowiki anzugreifen, wurde dabei abgeschlagen oder in der Entwicklung durch Artilleriefeuer gehindert.
15.00 Uhr: Nach Zusage einer Sonderzuweisung Munition durch Pz.AOK 3 wird für 16.2. ein Gegenangriff zur Wegnahme von Pawljutschenki geplant, für das Füs.Btl. 195 und Pz.Abt. 5 zur Verfügung gestellt werden (Unternehmen „Paulus“).

Im Einbruchsraum griff der Gegner lediglich am frühen Morgen nach starker Feuervorbereitung die Brückenköpfe bei Nowiki mit Panzerunterstützung an. Er wurde so frühzeitig durch Vernichtungsfeuer der eigenen Artl. und Werfer gefaßt, dass der Angriff nur nordostwärts Bukschtyny zur Auswirkung kam und dort in harten Nahkämpfen abgeschlagen wurde.

Einsatzbereit: 5 Tiger (501), 9 Stug (190), 10 Stug (667), 4 Stug (177), 17 Hornissen (519 ohne 3.)

131. ID:
Zugang: Restteile 3./Stug.Abt. 190
Einsatzbereit: 6 s.Pak, 1 s.Pak G.R. 11, 4 s.Pak (1./664), 10 Stug (667), 4 Stug (190), 2 Hornissen (519).

206. ID:
Nachmeldung für 13.2.44: 1 Panzer bei Michalowo durch 519 vernichtet.

Einsatzbereit: 18 s.Pak, 4 Stug (177), 5 Tiger (501), 5 Stug (190), 10 Hornissen (519).

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#32

Post by Gastolli » 17 Jan 2023, 01:58

15.02.1944

VI. AK:
08.00 Uhr: In der Nacht hat Austausch der Kgr. 131. ID mit 197. ID begonnen.
13.00 Uhr: Pz.Abt. 5, für den 16.2. der 131. ID unterstellt, wird ab dem 17.2. der 206. ID unterstellt. Zuführung durch 131. ID, Antreten 17.2. bei Hellwerden.
Nach Eintreffen der Pz.Abt. 5 bei 206. ID werden Stab und 1./Stug.Abt. 190 der 131. ID unterstellt. Zuführung durch 206. ID.
20.00 Uhr: Die Vorbereitungen für Unternehmen „Paulus“ (Wegnahme von Pawljutschenki) sind fast abgeschlossen. Füs.Btl. 195 und Pz.Abt. 5 werden in der Nacht durch 131. ID herangezogen.

131. ID:
8-Uhr-Meldung: 7 s.Pak, 16 Stug (667), 4 Stug (190), 4 s.Pak 8,8 (1./664), 2 Hornissen (1./519), 0 Tiger.

206. ID:
8-Uhr-Meldung: 15 s.Pak, 3 Sfl. (2./206), 10 Hornissen (2./519), 5 Tiger (501), 5 Stug (1./190), 4 Stug (177).


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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#33

Post by Gastolli » 17 Jan 2023, 01:58

16.02.1944

VI. AK:
09.00 Uhr: Ab 8.10 Uhr fdl. Artillerievorbereitung im Abschnitt 131. ID und im rechten Abschnitt 206. ID, Schwerpunkte scheinen bei Karpowitschi, Nowiki – Pawljutschenki und beiderseits der PK-Straße bei 206. ID zu liegen.
09.20 Uhr: Füs.Btl. 195 und Pz.Abt. 5, für Unternehmen „Paulus“ im Bereitstellungsraum im Waldgebiet nordostwärts Ssossnowka, werden nach Letoki vorgezogen.
12.00 Uhr: Einbruch im Brückenkopf Nowiki, Lage nicht geklärt, übrige Angriffe bei 131. ID abgeschlagen.
Bei 206. ID sind durch Tiger 5 Panzer abgeschossen.
14.00 Uhr: Korpschef meldet dem O.B. Pz.AOK 3 Absicht, Unternehmen „Paulus“ um 15 Uhr durchzuführen.
Die 4. Fliegerdivision sagt Stuka-Einsätze für 14.30 Uhr und 15.00 Uhr zu.
17.00 Uhr: Einbruch in Brückenkopf Nowiki circa 400 m breit und 400 m tief, damit ist Brückenkopf wesentlich verkleinert worden. Bei Pawljutschenki hat nach Art.Vorbereitung und Stuka-Angriffen der eigene Gegenangriff in einem Zug den Ort genommen, noch Kämpfe am Südrand des Ortes um zwei Stützpunkte.

Am Vormittag des 16.2. griff der Feind erneut die West- und Nordwestfront des Einbruchsraumes nach heftiger Feuervorbereitung mit Inf. und Begleitpanzern mit Schwerpunkt bei Karpowitschi, Nowiki, Porotkowo – Pawljutschenki und beiderseits der PK-Straße an. Er wurde unter hervorragender Beteiligung der eigenen Artl. und Nebelwerfer und mit Unterstützung von Tigern und Sturmgeschützen blutig abgeschlagen. Ein örtlicher Einbruch am Nordostrand Nowiki ist abgeriegelt. 7 Panzer und 2 Pak wurden vernichtet. Ladungsträger wurden mit Erfolg zur Abwehr eingesetzt.

Einsatzbereit: 4 Stug (177), 8 Stug (667), 5 Stug (190), 11 Hornissen (519), 10 Tiger (501), Pz.Abt. 5: ..

Die s.H.Pz.Abt. 501 hat seit Beginn der 2. Schlacht von Witebsk (3.2.) 100 Feindpanzer und 12 Pak vernichtet, davon allein am Brückenkopf Nowiki 86. Damit hat die Abt. seit dem 19.12.43 250 Feindpanzer und 142 Geschütze vernichtet. Nach Meldungen der Panzerbesatzungen sind vom 3.2. – 13.2.44 mindestens 2000 bis 3000 Feindtote vor den Panzern liegengeblieben.

131. ID:
Nach Trommelfeuer aller Waffen 8.30 Uhr bis 9.30 Uhr griff Feind, unterstützt von Panzern und Schlachtfliegern, auf breiter Front mit mehreren Btln. mit Schwerpunkt bei Nowiki, Porotkowo und Pawljutschenki an. Trotz sofortigen Gegenstoßes konnte ein bei Schule Nowiki erzielter feindlicher Einbruch (400 m tief) nicht beseitigt werden. Vor G.R. 11 wurden die in mehreren Wellen angreifenden Russen im zusammengefaßten Feuer aller Waffen (dabei 2 Goliath) abgewehrt, ein bei Porotkowo erzielter schmaler Einbruch im Gegenstoß mit Sturmgeschützen bereinigt, dabei 2 Feindpanzer vernichtet, weitere zum Abdrehen gezwungen.
Erneute Bereitstellung des Feindes am Nordrand Bananenwald, ostwärts Porotkowo, Pawljutschenki sowie Bewegungen bei Nowiki durch Artl., auch Sturmartillerie, Nebelwerfer und schwere Infanteriewaffen wirkungsvoll bekämpft.
Gegen 14.40 Uhr Feindangriff in Btl.-Stärke auf Friedhof Bondino – Mossino – Südrand Porotkowo im zusammengefaßten Feuer aller Waffen abgewehrt. Nach schlagartiger Feuervorbereitung aller Waffen sowie wirkungsvollem Niederhalten der fdl. Artl. durch Stuka trat um 15.00 Uhr das Div.Füs.Btl. 195 unterstützt von Pz.Abt. 5 zum Angriff auf Pawljutschenki an und erreichte in einem Zuge den Südausgang des Dorfes. Die Kämpfe sind noch im Gange.

Zugang: Pz.Abt. 5
Einsatzbereit: 6 s.Pak, 1 s.Pak (GR 11), 5 Pak (1./664), 8 Stug (667), 1 Stug (190), 2 Hornissen (519), 2 Tiger (501)
8-Uhr-Meldung: 7 s.Pak, 11 Stug (667), 3 Stug (3./190), 0 Tiger (501), 5 Pak (1./664), 2 Hornissen (1./519)

206. ID:
Feind nahm unter 8.15 Uhr beginnender mehrstündiger starker Feuerunterstützung durch alle schwere Waffen, Ansetzung künstlichen Nebels, Panzerunterstützung seine Angriffe mit Schwerpunkt im Abschnitt Sseljuty – Eisenbahn wieder auf. 8.10 Uhr Angriff 200 Mann westlich zu Sseljuty, 08.10 Uhr und 10.30 Uhr Angriff von je 400 Mann beiderseits PK-Straße blutig abgeschlagen, 11.45 Uhr Angriff von etwa 100 Mann und 12.45 Uhr Bereitstellung von 100 Mann nordostwärts Schapury.
Durch Tiger-Abt. 501 5 Panzer T34 bei Popowka und 2 Pak ostwärts Schapury vernichtet.

8-Uhr-Meldung: 17 s.Pak, 4 Sfl. (2./20), 10 Hornissen (2./519), 7 Tiger (501), 5 Stug (1./190), 4 Stug (177).

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#34

Post by Gastolli » 17 Jan 2023, 01:59

17.02.1944

VI. AK:
08.00 Uhr: Südteil von Pawljutschenki ging in der Nacht wieder verloren.
Nach einem neuen Befehl des Pz.AOK 3 wird Pz.Abt. 5 wieder Armeereserve in Witebsk, dafür bekommt das Korps die Stug.Abt. (neuerdings Stug.Brig.) 237. Sie wird der 206. ID unterstellt, die dafür die Reststeile der Stug.Brig. 190 an die 131. ID abgibt.
10.15 Uhr: Fernschreiben von VI. AK Ia an 131. ID, 206. ID:
In Abänderung F.S. VI. AK vom 15.2. ist Pz.Abt. 5 nach Abschluss Unternehmen „Paulus“ zur Verfügung Pz.AOK 3 nach Witebsk herauszuziehen. Sobald Pz.Abt. 5 Witebsk erreicht hat, wird Stug.Abt. 237 der 206. ID zugeführt und unterstellt. Stug.Abt. 190 ist bei Eintreffen der Stug.Abt. 237 bei 206. ID geschlossen der 131. ID unterstellt, Zuführung entsprechend.
11.00 Uhr: Fernschreiben von Pz.AOK 3 Ia an VI. AK:
Pz.Abt. 5 tritt als Pz.Armeereserve zur gepanzerten Gruppe nach Witebsk zurück. Stug.Brig. 237 wird VI. A.K. unterstellt.
12.00 Uhr: Keine feindlichen Angriffe. Dies bestätigt die Auffassung des Gen.Kdo., dass die 2. Schlacht von Witebsk sich ihrem Ende zuneigt.

Einsatzbereit: 5 Stug (190), 23 Stug (237), 5 Stug (667), 14 Tiger (501), 13 Hornissen (519).

131. ID:
Abgang: Pz.Abt. 5
Einsatzbereit: x s.Pak, 1 s.Pak (GR 11), 4 Pak (1./664), 5 Stug (667), 3 Hornissen (519), 3 Tiger (501)
8-Uhr-Meldung: 7 s.Pak, 8 Stug (667), 1 Stug (1./190), 2 Tiger (501), 5 Pak (1./664), 2 Hornissen (1./519)

206. ID:
Zugang: Stug.Brig. 237 / Abgang: Stug.Abt. 177 zur Verladung
Einsatzbereit: 14 s.Pak, 4 Sfl., 5 Stug (190), 10 Hornissen (519), 22 Stug + 1 Bef. (237), 7 (14) Tiger (501)
8-Uhr-Meldung: 11 s.Pak, 4 Sfl. (2./206), 10 Hornissen (2./519), 8 Tiger (501), 4 Stug (1./190), 4 Stug (177)

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#35

Post by Gastolli » 17 Jan 2023, 02:07

O.k., that's it.

I must say that I could have done some more pictures of Lagekarten, but I may add some during my next visit to Freiburg :-)

The numbers of "Einsatzbereit" are the numbers reported during the "Tagesmeldung" on the evening, for some days I was able to add some numbers of tanks, Sfl. and Pak from the 8-Uhr-Meldungen, so of course you can see some differences.

Of particular interest is that the PK-report in the newspaper obviously is based on the claimes of the German troops, even this 29 tank kills by 3 Tigers is confirmed as that day just 3 Tigers where ready for combat, but also the destroyed bridge over the Lutschessa river is mentioned and the claim of many soviet Infantry killed by the Tigers you can find in that original reports.

Unfortunately there are no Ic files from VI. AK available for that time, so not easy to find out the soviet troops as reported by the German staff. I may check Pz.AOK 3 files for some Ic reports for that time.

So, I don't know if the one unit reported by the Germans, 730th independent assault-gun-regiment, really existed and was hit hard!?

You're welcome for any comments, additions and of course: questions!

Oliver

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#36

Post by Gastolli » 14 Mar 2023, 21:21

Hello,

during my last stay in the German Archives in February I had a look at some other files dealing with the 2nd battle of Witebsk, here find attached a small chart showing the Lutschessa brigdes off Nowiki.

Of course the 60 t should be used by the Tigers of s.Pz.Abt. 501, until she was destroyed!

Source: BArch RH 24-6/168.

Oliver
RH 24-6-168 (Lutschessa-Brücken), Jan. 1944.png

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#37

Post by Gastolli » 17 Mar 2023, 19:43

Hello all,

here's another addition, charts from Abteilung Ic of Pz.AOK 3 (BArch RH 21-3/288)

First one shows the general situation and direction of the attacks of the Soviet forces during the "2. Winterschlacht um Witebsk", the second chart shows the numbers of the Soviet units (divisions, tank brigades etc.) as reconnoitered by the German forces.

Might be of interest for cross checking?

Kind regards
Oliver
RH 21-3-288 K - 2. Abwehrschlacht um Witebsk (Lage).jpg
Attachments
RH 21-3-288 K - 2. Abwehrschlacht um Witebsk (sowj. Einheiten).jpg

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#38

Post by Art » 18 Mar 2023, 21:59

Formally speaking there were the following Soviet forces in the area:
33 Army with 10 rifle divisions and 1 rifle brigade
5 and 39 Armies, each with 7 rifle divisions

Total 24 divisions, so the German estimate was generally correct. Not all of them took part in the first wave of attack.

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#39

Post by Gastolli » 21 Mar 2023, 21:10

Hello Art,

I can add two good charts showing the situation on 10.2.1944 and on 12.2.1944, both from Bundesarchiv file RH 24-6/172 a.

It's always nice to have such detailled charts available :-)

Oliver

RH 24-6-172a - (10.2.1944).jpg
Attachments
RH 24-6-172a - (12.2.1944).jpg

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#40

Post by Art » 25 Mar 2023, 21:34

Maps attached to the war diary of the Soviet 33 Army.

Initial plan of operations (orders given on 2 February 1944)
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884258

Situaton on 3 February 1944 (start and end of the day)
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884268

Situation on 4-5 Ferbuary:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884278

Plan of operations from 6 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884285

Situation on 6-9 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884296

Plan of operations from 10 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884307

Situation on 10-13 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884315

Plan of operations from 12 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884319

Situation on 13-14 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884329

Plan from 16 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884333

Situation on 15-16 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884337

Situation on 16-17 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884351

Planned grouping according to the orders from 17 February (end of offensive)
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884346

Situation on 18-26 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884368

Situaion on 27-29 February
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=273884382

In short the 33 Army consisted of 10 rifle divisions and 1 rifle brigade. Of them committed to the initial attack on 3 February were
69 Rifle Corps - 144 and 222 Division in the first line and 42 Division in reserve
60 Rifle Corps - 164 and 247 Division in the first line and 36 Brigade in reserve

Other 5 divisions (95, 173, 199, 215, and 371) were initially in the Army's reserve.

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#41

Post by Art » 25 Mar 2023, 21:45

End from the same war diary:
During the month of February troops of the 33 Army conducting active operations had the task to encircle and destroy the hostile Vitebsk group in cooperation with armies attacking from the north. The army was breaking the hostile defense with four rifle divisions on the frontage of 4.8 km. In the process of offensive additional six rifle division and one rifle brigade were committed. In the breakthrough sector the Army had 137 guns per 1 kilometer of frontage. During active offenensive operations troops of the Army expended 515900 artillery and mortar shells. As a result of offensive 19 square kilometers of territory was occupied, 10 settlements were liberated, the advance inside hostile defenses was up to 3 kilometers. Troops of the Army coulnd't develope success.
...
Formations of the Army suffered casualties:
...
Total 5175 killed, 19933 wounded, 169 missing, total 25277 casualties.
During February formations of the Army recieved replacements:...Total replacements - 16292 men.

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#42

Post by Art » 26 Mar 2023, 10:58

Recollections of the former cheif of staff of the West Front general A.P. Pokrovsky, recorded by K. Simonov on 26 May 1968:
…What can I say about Sokolovsky? He was a very controversial person. He was very clever. I would say exceptionally clever, broadly educated. When you started talking with him about operational, strategic, general political questions, you just couldn't stop listening to this man. He considered questions very broadly, thought broadly. I would say he thought politically. Strategically and politically. In a word, he was a cleverest, highly educated commander with vast experience. But in the role of commander of the front, he fared badly. And it is even difficult to explain why it happened. He conducted, one after another, a whole series of unsuccessful operations costing us very heavy losses. And after all these failures, he was sacked by a special commission of the State Defense Committee arriving from Moscow.

Operations were undertaken by insufficient forces. During operations, in the course of them, it became especially clear that we would not be able to fulfill the task, that there were not enough forces and means for this. This was reported to Sokolovsky, but he did not take this into account and continued the operations.

I think that his attitude towards Gordov, the commander of the 33rd Army at that time, on whom he relied, also played a certain role in this. I don't know how others view Gordov; my own opinion about him is sharply negative. He was a man who fought disregarding casualties, organized offensives without thinking about casualties, made ill-thought promises, tried to fulfill them at the cost of huge sacrifices, and in the end did not fulfill them. In the final run he was sacked and for a good reason.

But in many operations carried out by Sokolovsky as a front commander it was exactly the 33rd, the former Yefremov’s Army, commanded by Gordov which was put in the decisive areas of the offensive and made a strike force

When the train with the commission arrived, first the members of the commission - Malenkov was there at the head of the commission, there was also Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, head of the intelligence administration at that time, several more persons - at first they spoke with the Military Council, and then they called us, including me as chief of staff of the front.

I remember how Malenkov asked Sokolovsky in a calm tone: “How did all these failures happened? Here they explain that there were insufficient forces, insufficient means, that these operations could not be carried out with these forces and means. What can you say? You could not but understand that. Why didn’t you ever pick up the phone, call comrade Stalin and say your opinion about why these operations cannot be carried out, why there are not enough forces and why the fulfillment of the assigned tasks cannot be ensured?”

There was a long pause. Sokolovsky did not answer anything. I was simply shocked. But the fact stands. He didn't answer a single word. And he didn't really make a call...

Sokolovsky did not say a word in response to the question. I don't know how to explain it, I can't. Either he did not dare to call Stalin, or he believed that he would be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to the front with the insufficient forces and means that he had. And there were little of them precisely in this last operation, after which he was removed. There were few tanks. There were few shells. There were few men. Nothing to carry out the tasks with.

Maybe it also played a role that he belived that Gordov would be able to fulfill the task assigned to the 33rd Army. Maybe Gordov promised, and Sokolovsky trusted him. Hard to say.

Work with Sokolovsky as a commander of the front at first proceeded normally. The headquarters functioned normally, as always; present at the command post was him, a member of the Military Council, chief of staff, chiefs of military branches, artillery, tank troops, chief of communications, engineering troops, commander of the air army. And then, after the first failures, Sokolovsky took a strange stance. He left the front command post for 20-30 kilometers, there he ordered to organize a separate point for himself, there he had communications, he had adjutants. And that was all, there was nothing else. From there, he made calls to the staff, to Moscow and to the armies by telephone, and spoke directly with the commanders from there. It was such a strange seclusion, which, of course, interfered with the normal work of the staff, and the normal work of the commander. Why he did that is hard to say.

Perhaps the fact that the staff reported the true state of affairs to him as commander played a role here. It reported on the actual availability of personnel, ammunition, reinforcements. That is, it reported a picture which made obvious that the operation could not achieve success. In essence, in this form it presented objections to the operation. Maybe he did not want constant pressure from the staff and thus separated from it, in essence, he commanded bypassing the staff. Although, of course, the staff continued to do its job.

This created a very difficult situation, abnormal.

When Sokolovsky was removed, a number of other officers were removed with him, in particular the head of intelligence, a very good one, by the way. But Kuznetsov arrived as the head of the Intelligence Administration and, apparently, considered it necessary to remove someone, punish someone in his realm.

I wasn't sacked. I received a reprimand and remained chief of staff.
http://rkka.ru/memory/pokrovskiy/main.htm

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#43

Post by Gastolli » 28 Mar 2023, 22:48

Hello art,

many thanks for your contribution, much appreciated!

Interesting charts of course, I have to dig deep to see everything from russian Archives and more so, to understand ;-)

I think it's a little know (or let's say, neglected) area of operations ...

Did you see: in two or three reports from that time the Germans mentioned a captured Tiger used by the soviet troops (which was disabled, but not destroyed by the Germans), curious thing, haven't seen that before.

Oliver

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#44

Post by Art » 29 Mar 2023, 12:16

That's a known thing: one Tiger tank was captured by the 28 Guards Tank Brigade on 28.12.43 and was employed in combat, in the February operation south of Vitebsk in particular.

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Re: Tiger-Abteilung 501 off Nowiki bridgehead (Witebsk area) / February 1944

#45

Post by Art » 01 Apr 2023, 16:18

A small detail about employment of "Tiger" tanks near Vitebsk from the memoir by Illarion Tolkonyuk (operations officer of the Soviet 33 Army's staff during events in question).
The Germans here for the first time had new heavy tanks "Tigers", invulnerable to our anti-tank artillery of small and medium calibers. "Tigers" easily knocked out our tanks with their powerful guns from long distances. It became impossible to repel counterattacks by conventional means. We had to find methods and means of combating these steel colossuses. There was an idea, I don’t remember whose initiative it was, to place on direct fire near the front line 122-mm guns, 152-mm howitzers and 152-mm howitzers-guns, intended only for firing from closed firing positions. The very first practice demonstrated that this was the only reliably remedy against the dreadful "Tigers". But heavy artillery guns could occupy firing positions close to the frontline only at night and should be carefully camouflaged before dawn, for if the Germans managed to detect these guns, they immediately destroyed them with massive artillery and air strikes.
The commander [of the 33 Amy general Gordov] attached paramount importance to the correct placement of heavy guns for direct fire and demanded each gun to be checked by the army staff. One day after having gathered the leadership of the staff, he instructed several generals and officers to personally check one gun by each man. He took gun for himself and assigned guns to the army artillery commander, chief of staff, me and other comrades. All of us in the morning
returned to the command post and reported that the firing positions had been checked, everything was good. But when the counterattacking "Tigers" and "Panthers" appeared and our heavy guns met them well-aimed fire from a distance of 2 kilometers, the commander noticed that one 152-mm howitzer cannon fired inaccurately, its shells fell away from the target. He sent to check what the matter was.

It turned out that the gun was placed in such a way that its left wheel was much lower than the right wheel, which led to a shift in the sighting line. This gun had to be examined by the artillery commander General V.S. Bodrov, but, as it turned out, did not do this, relying on the report of the gunners subordinate to him. Indignation of the commander had no limits.
- You, Vasily Semenovich, are responsible for all artillery, and I have the right to demand from you personal responsibility for all guns put on direct fire. And I entrusted to you only one of them. And you failed to carry out even this simple order.
The commander limited himself to reprimanding General Bodrov only because the rest of the artillery successfully repulsed the counterattack, knocking out about three dozen "Tigers" and "Panthers"
The mention of "Panthers" must be a mistake of memory.

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