Rzhev: A winter of death, 1942.

[Udet]

Deleted!

[Oleg Grigoryev]

considering the fact that you managed to get number of Soviet forces involved (545070), actual Soviet casualties( 70373
KIA, MIA and 145301 medical) , missed one of the Soviet intentions, and misplaced the role of Zhukov - no it is not really interesting

btw Soviet casualties at Stalingard were 323856 KIA and MIA and 319986 medical between July 18- November 18th 1942 and 154885 KIA and MIA and 330892 medical between 19.11.42 - 2.243. Consequently number of "perished" is just below 500000. As for number of German casualties it seems to me that you managed to arrive to this by subtracting number of POWs from the supposed number of people that got encircled – where is exactly losses suffered by the German forces prior to that? How about losses of German allies? What about losses of failed deblocade attempt?

[Udet]

Deleted!

[Oleg Grigoryev]

It is proved mr. Zhukov wanted to pinch off the Rzhev salient. How could that be achieved? By first encircling and destroying the German 9th Army in the Rzhev-Sychëvka area.

I am sorry – have you found the source that published original orders for the second Rzhev-Sichevka?

I repeat, it is proved Zhukov wanted to destroy Model´s army, to immediatly proceed to destroy the entire Army Group Centre. While he would achieve that near Moscow, the other offensive would destroy the 6th army at Stalingrad, and perhaps trap the German forces in the caucasus, closing the door at Rostov. Something proving the man was disconnected from reality. His achievements:

1. Destruction of the 9th Army at Rzhev: FAILED
2. Destruction of Army Group Centre: FAILED
3. Destruction of 6 th Army: DONE (Vasilevsky)
4. Trapping German Army Group B in caucasus: FAILED

repeating the same thing without showing the reasoning behind it is shall we say –useless. Soviet operations always had objective maximum and objective minimum. The objective maximum for the second Rzhev-Sichevka was to pinch out Rzhev salient. The objective minimum was to tie down German armor in the sector so it could not be moved to Stalingrad –this one was obviously successful. As for you number 3 – you do know that operation Uranus was started by telegram signed by Zhukov? As for number 4 – that would be the case if operational plan Saturn would be put in action – it never was and Little Saturn was implemented instead.

70, 373 soviet soldiers killed? Such an accurate number? seventy thousand, three hundred and seventy tree?
Is there a source nowadays that can tell the perfect precise number of soviet soldiers killed at Rzhev? That, is very unlikely.

70, 373 who died from whatever reason including chocking up on borsht and execution by firing squad as well as people who went missing including deserters and POWs – this is the number calculated by adding up casualty figures from the units involved in fighting – published in second edition of Soviet Casualties and Combat losses in XX century.

Wherever you got that number from, at Rzhev in 1942, soviet casualties (KIA; MIA; wounded; POW), while impossible to assess with the accuracy of your numbers, were somewhere between 400,000-450,000 men.

based on what exactly

The numbers about losses in Stalingrad seem, however, more accurate.
323,000 soviets killed at Stalingrad, plus those of Rzhev, can certainly reach more than 700,000 men erased from the soviet order of battle.

where did you see me write 323,000 were killed? Moreover any specific reason due to which you are comparing all Soviet irrevocable casualties suffered over approximately 6 months period at two different fronts to the losses suffered by the 6th alone during relatively short period of time – that is after it got encircled and till it surrounded? Where are the casualties suffered by this grouping prior to the encirclement? Where are the casualties suffered by Italians and Romanians? Where are the casualties suffered by Mansheting failed deblocading attempt? How about losses suffered by Germans who were fighting in Rzhev-Sichevka area? Finally Soviet casualty figures do include those who went into German captivity -any specific reason you have excluded German POWs from German losses?

Zhukov was not a brilliant general

Germans seem to disagree with you.

[Kunikov]

Hello people:

Before this goes any further, a preliminary remark;
In order to avoid starting a thread that could have been discussed in the past, I did a search, and it seems like it has not been discussed.

I would like to hear all kinds of opinions about the issue.

This is not an issue that needs opinions, it has been researched and perhaps will be again in the future. What you wrote up, on the other hand, has no basis in factual information that is available today. Accusation after accusation with horribly inaccurate numbers, nitpicking of what numbers to show and which to ignore, etc is not something that any opinions can be based on. If you'd like to actually show where your information comes from and how you came to your conclusions, which are horribly wrong when one looks, once more, at the information available today, we can proceed to give our 'opinions' on what you've just written up.

[Udet]

Deleted!

[Kunikov]

Sorry, Mr. Oleg, but your comments are not accurate. Zhukov intentended to destroy the German Army Group Centre in the winter of 1942. And the main argument for success was his emphasize in numerical superiority over the German forces in Rzhev.

The number of forces opposite Army Group Center and the forced who took part in Operation Mars are very much different, look it up.

"The objective minimum was to tie down German armor in the sector so it could not be moved to Stalingrad –this one was obviously successful."

Excuse me?

Mr. Oleg please stop giving me new and fresher ideas about soviet commanders!

So this was more or less, like this: We will pinch off the Rzhev salient, but hey guys, one of the advantages of this will be the Germans won´t be able to send their armor from Rzhev to Stalingrad!


What kind of planning is that?

It was planning that held up vast quantities of troops in the North which allowed Operation Uranus to succeed. You didn't know?

I do not think so; that would be a logical effect of an offensive: that the forces under attack of course will not be deployed elsewhere!!!

Well what you think hardly matters, it is the facts that we're concerned about.

Of course it was not moved to Stalingrad, because the panzer reserves Model launched were used to exterminate huge numbers of soviet tanks and soldiers.

Say it isn't so! So then the occupation of German forces in the north as a diversionary operation was a success, yay for Zhukov.

That a few, or many Germans -I do not care- consider Zhukov a brilliant commander does not change the truth about him.

Your truth is a relative term, we have no idea what your beliefs and ideas revolve around thus it doesn't matter to anyone here what you THINK or THINK YOU KNOW, present facts not opinions.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

Sorry, Mr. Oleg, but your comments are not accurate. Zhukov intentended to destroy the German Army Group Centre in the winter of 1942. And the main argument for success was his emphasize in numerical superiority over the German forces in Rzhev.

"The objective minimum was to tie down German armor in the sector so it could not be moved to Stalingrad –this one was obviously successful."

Excuse me?

Mr. Oleg please stop giving me new and fresher ideas about soviet commanders!

So this was more or less, like this: We will pinch off the Rzhev salient, but hey guys, one of the advantages of this will be the Germans won´t be able to send their armor from Rzhev to Stalingrad!


What kind of planning is that?

I do not think so; that would be a logical effect of an offensive: that the forces under attack of course will not be deployed elsewhere!!!

Of course it was not moved to Stalingrad, because the panzer reserves Model launched were used to exterminate huge numbers of soviet tanks and soldiers.

That a few, or many Germans -I do not care- consider Zhukov a brilliant commander does not change the truth about him.

Sorry, Mr. Oleg, but your comments are not accurate. Zhukov intentended to destroy the German Army Group Centre in the winter of 1942. And the main argument for success was his emphasize in numerical superiority over the German forces in Rzhev.

In any military operation it is advisable to achieve numerical superiority over your opponent. That said your failure to back your supposition noted.

Excuse me?

you are excused. Rzhev-Sichevka offensive prevented transfer of German armor to Stalingrad sector.

So this was more or less, like this: We will pinch off the Rzhev salient, but hey guys, one of the advantages of this will be the Germans won´t be able to send their armor from Rzhev to Stalingrad!


What kind of planning is that?

the kind that was in Soviet military regulations since 1936. According to the theory attacking groupings were separated into “tie-down” and striking. After 1943 this approach was modified- and the group that achieved greater success was the one that got reinforcements. As such Mars-Uranus is the same thing on the grander scale.

I do not think so; that would be a logical effect of an offensive: that the forces under attack of course will not be deployed elsewhere!!!

Of course it was not moved to Stalingrad, because the panzer reserves Model launched were used to exterminate huge numbers of soviet tanks and soldiers.

yes that is precisely the effect that was counted on. One of the reasons Uranus succeeded was the fact that Germans did not have enough mobile reserves to counter it – the direct result of Rzhev-Sichevka.

That a few, or many Germans -I do not care- consider Zhukov a brilliant commander does not change the truth about him.

yes you of course would know better. How about answering my question for a change?

[Andreas]

David Glantz on Rzhev

More David Glantz on Rzhev

Seems like Udet could benefit from some reading to correct his misperceptions.

[Qvist]

So, German losses IN COMBAT, Stalingrad and Rzhev, were at least, repeat, at least 5 times smaller than those the soviets endured.

Well, they should be - considering that overall Soviet casualties in 1942 were roughly 6 times greater than German . Obviously, this was not all due to any shortcomings of Zhukov's.

Have a look at Andreas' excellent links for Glantz' comments on Mars. Casualty-wise, he concludes that Soviet losses exceeded German by a factor of more than ten.


cheers

[Oleg Grigoryev]

So, German losses IN COMBAT, Stalingrad and Rzhev, were at least, repeat, at least 5 times smaller than those the soviets endured.

Well, they should be - considering that overall Soviet casualties in 1942 were roughly 6 times greater than German . Obviously, this was not all due to any shortcomings of Zhukov's.

Have a look at Andreas' excellent links for Glantz' comments on Mars. Casualty-wise, he concludes that Soviet losses exceeded German by a factor of more than ten.


cheers

actually Glantz got his strenghts for Soviet Units as welll as their losses wrong for this one.

[Qvist]

How's that? How can you know that Glantz's figures are wrong? I have noticed, incidentally, that his strength figures also in other cases deviate from Krivosheev's, and are always higher (Rumyantsev, f.e.). For Kursk, Krivosheev provides a strangely low figure that obviously does not include any forces from Steppe Front. Since Glantz is working from Soviet sources, I would presume he has some basis for his figures. I wonder if there is any structural reason why the two give different figures - different strength definitions? In any case, why are Krivosheev's strength figures neccessarily better, if Glantz derives his from Soviet sources?

cheers

[Andreas]

Rumours I heard say that there is still a bit of a debate going on between Glantz and Soviet military historians about his interpretation of MARS. Clearly, if the other side's contention is that he is overstating strength, and losses, that would fit with an interpretation as a holding attack, instead of a serious attempt to deal with 9.Armee.

Incidentally, Lt.-Gen. Popjel, then Commisary of Katukov's Tank Corps in the Luchesa Valley, states quite clearly in his memoirs (Vol.II of the German edition) that the battle was aimed to destroy 9. Armee, and was seen as a twin, not a supporting battle to the Stalingrad offensive. Other Soviet officer memoirs, most notably Zhukov's, are far more circumspect or gloss over it completely. I am not sure what Konev has written on it.

[Oleg Grigoryev]

How's that? How can you know that Glantz's figures are wrong? I have noticed, incidentally, that his strength figures also in other cases deviate from Krivosheev's, and are always higher (Rumyantsev, f.e.). For Kursk, Krivosheev provides a strangely low figure that obviously does not include any forces from Steppe Front. Since Glantz is working from Soviet sources, I would presume he has some basis for his figures. I wonder if there is any structural reason why the two give different figures - different strength definitions? In any case, why are Krivosheev's strength figures neccessarily better, if Glantz derives his from Soviet sources?

cheers

Glantz included in his strehngh calculation Moscow zone of defense, which while was in relatevly close proximity to the action was not part of the plan.
In general go fight with Sheremet over this one http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/s ... readid=473

[Oleg Grigoryev]

How's that? How can you know that Glantz's figures are wrong? I have noticed, incidentally, that his strength figures also in other cases deviate from Krivosheev's, and are always higher (Rumyantsev, f.e.). For Kursk, Krivosheev provides a strangely low figure that obviously does not include any forces from Steppe Front. Since Glantz is working from Soviet sources, I would presume he has some basis for his figures. I wonder if there is any structural reason why the two give different figures - different strength definitions? In any case, why are Krivosheev's strength figures neccessarily better, if Glantz derives his from Soviet sources?

cheers

btw why did you assume that I used Krivosheev - (and I did not)