Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

[Starinov]

Romania was the key to stop Germany: cut off its petrol supplies and the German war machine stops no matter what. The moment that this vein is cut, RKKA could destroy the Wehrmacht in Central Poland and then go to Berlin.

Germany had enough reserves to resist to an initial attack and then take back what it had lost (supposing that it would lose the oil fields in the first place).

How much did they have and for how long would that last??? Consider that according to the May 15th variant, the supply line from Romania is cut off. There are no new supplies available.

[Victor]

IIRC, they had 8 million tons, but I will have to lok it up.

[Reigo]

Reigo wrote:
Their disastrous performance was related to things which you just doesen't seem to understand. They were caught in the middle of concentration, not fully mobilized. They lost initiative and lost quickly most of the cadre-army. There were absolutely no defense plans for the country. If the Wehrmacht would have been attacked when in similar situation, then the outcome wouldn't have been different.

Victor:
That's impossible, since Wehrmacht would have never allowed itself to be caught with its pants down in 1941.

At first: and please pay carefully attention: it's irrevelant whether Wehrmacht would have allowed this happened in 1941 or not. What I meant was: if it would have happened then the results would have been the same. To make it more clear: I wasn't talking about the possibility if Wehrmacht would allow this and that.

Secondly: when I said "pants down," I meant that the Soviet Army was caught in the middle of buildup without any warning. The Soviets didn't wait any attack in the near future. Now, like Starinov already implied: the German intelligence was poor when we are talking about Soviet Union. And now let's suppose that Soviets would have started by some reason their preparations, lets, say 1,5 months earlier. And they would have finished them let's say at the beginning of June. At this time the German army's phase of build-up in the East were in similar or even in worst condition as the Soviet buildup on 22nd June - it means that they weren't ready for attack nor for defense. And if the Soviets would have now made a surprise attack (in the beginning of June) then it would have been a disater for the Germans. On 5th June the Germans had at Soviet borders 52 Infantry Divisions, 9 Security D, 1 Light Inf Div and 1 Tank Division. The other divisions were either on their way or had not even started to move yet. Also note that these divisions, which were on Soviet borders on 5th June weren't in alarmed condition. They didn't wait there for Soviet attack. They didn't prepare for defense.

Reigo wrote:
there were almost 2 000 T-34 and KV. There were over 2 000 modern fighters. How many tanks the Germans had which were equal to T-34 and KV. The answer is 0. The Soviet modern fighter force was actually as big as almost the whole German fighter force. And that the other tanks, planes etc were crap, is only your imagination. It's ignorance. It's BS. Obviously you don't know much. They were deployed and organized badly, because the deploiment and organisation was in the middle of the 22nd June. But Soviet Tank Divisions, Mech Divisions, and Infantry Divisions, when properly equpied and mobilized and ready for German attack, wouldn't have been defeated so easily. By 10th of July the Soviets had lost 11 783 tanks. Most of them were abandoned, because the logistics of the Soviet Army weren't ready on 22nd June to enter the war and sudden German invasion didn't make things better.


The answer is that any Mk III or Mk. IV was better than a T-34. Why? Experienced and very well trained crews and better communications (radios, not flags or hand signs like the Soviets) and targeting systems. Also, Soviet fighter and bomber tactics were inferior to German ones. Not to mention the fact that the Soviet fighters had no radios to communicate between them in a dogfight!

Again: pay attention! I said that most were abandoned. That means they were just left because of no fuel or breakdowns. And there was no fueltruck nearby or field-workshop-service nearby. A slightly damaged tank couldn't be recovered since there were no tow-service nearby. Instead there was a great havoc. Also show me the proof that Soviets thought in 1941 that T-34 is inferior to German equipment. The answer is that there are no such proof, all the proof indicates the opposite.

And how many of these T-34s and KV-1s had trained crews. Also, how many of these were serviceable?

I haven't heard that there were no crews for tanks. Please provide the statistics how many crews were missing. T-34 and KV entered into army already in 1940. I am pretty sure that they trained also crews for them. How many of them were serviceable? I don't exactly know, but here are some clues: the overall % of serviceable tanks on 1st June was 77,9. When considering that the T-34 and KV series were quite new, we can safely assure that the % was well over 90.

The same for the airplanes. How many pilots were trained on these new fighters? How many aircraft were serviceable? Tanks and airplanes aren't cars. You can't just jump into one and start driving it to Berlin.

There were over 24 000 airplanes on 1st June 1941 in Soviet airforce. We can say that 21 400 of them were "old types." Of these "old types" 18 000 planes were serviceable, that is 84 %. It is realistic that the % was even higher with the "new types." It is my understanding that the new fighters were sent to units which had pilots with flight-experience. We can be sure that not all of the new planes weren't fully adapted by pilots on 22nd June. But let me remind you that even if Soviets planned to attack, it wouldn have happened on 22nd June.
Also if during WW II a German fighter unit was equpied with FW-190, but they had previously flown with Me-109, then what happened? This unit remained out from combat a month? Two months?

Reigo wrote:
But Soviet Tank Divisions, Mech Divisions, and Infantry Divisions, when properly equipied and mobilized and ready for German attack, wouldn't have been defeated so easily.


Well, now you say that the Soviets were waiting for a German attack. Make up your mind. Were they preparing to attack the Germans or to repulse them?

Like Starinov already implied: pay some attention.

Reigo wrote:
By 10th of July the Soviets had lost 11 783 tanks. Most of them were abandoned, because the logistics of the Soviet Army weren't ready on 22nd June to enter the war and sudden German invasion didn't make things better.


So in how many weeks, would the logistics of the Red Army be ready for a major offensive? Would they able to attack before autumn comes?

There is an educated guess made that the Soviets would have ended their buildup in the middle of July. Then also Soviet supply-units would have been fully mobilized, would have been located properly and ready to act.

But I was talking that Soviet doctrine needed 3:1. Stalin also thought that a ratio which is bigger than 1:1 is needed. On 22nd June there were 303 Divisions in the Red Army, so in divisions Stalin had also superiority.


Comparing number of divisions can be tricky. A 1941 Soviet infantry division had 14,000 men (IIRC), while a German one had 17,500, not to mention the fact that a German one had twice the firepower of a Soviet division.

In Soviet Rifle Division (when mobilized) there would have been in 3 Rifle Regiments 324 Rifle squads, each 14 men. That is 4 536 active fighters. The Germans had also in their three Regiments 324 squads, but if I remember correctly they had only 10 or 11 (but not 14) men in a squad.
Soviet Rifle division had 13 armoured cars and 16 light tanks. Also had 15-152mm, 32-122mm, 34-76mm guns. Also 54-45mm AT guns. 12-120mm mortars, 54-82mm mortars. 4-76mm and 8-37mm AA-guns. There were also a great amount of 50-mm mortars.

[Roberto]

At first: I have a proposal. After you have read to this post, please don't respond to it. We have demonstrated our point of views and everybody can judge by themselves. Further discussion on these points would lead only in repeating and insults.

I won’t be the one to start using insulting language. That I leave to you.

This is what Overy writes:

Not even the repeated violations of Soviet air space – an estimated 180 incursions – made any difference. Stalin remained utterly, almost obsessively, convinced that Germany would not invade. On June 14 the Soviet news agency Tass published a stinging rejection of the any suggestion of imminent attack. The rumors were spread ‘by forces hostile to the Soviet Union and Germany, forces interested in the further expansion and spreading of the war’. When watertight information was supplied from a Czech espionage source, Stalin said, ‘Find out who is making this provocation and punish him.’ Even when Soviet spies in Berlin, many in positions of responsibility, reported on June 16 that ‘the blow may be expected at any time’, Stalin rejected the report on the ground that no Germans, even Communist sympathizers, were to be trusted. A courageous German soldier crossed the frontier on June 21 to tell the Red Army that Germany would attack the next day. Stalin ordered him shot: more disinformation and provocation.

So what? This proves my point that Stalin didn't believe in German attack.

The question is not whether Stalin believed or not in a German attack. The question is whether his disbelief (or shall we say “obsessive refusal to believe”?) can be considered an indication of aggressive intentions on the part of Stalin. I don’t think this is so. See below.

Why after the war Soviet historiography didn't say like: we concentrated our troops against the German threat. Instead they said like: we didn't suspect anything.

Which Overy dismisses as a myth:

The Soviet Union was not, as Hitler knew, ready for a major war, and would not be for at least a year. Stalin has often been pictured as a man blinded by appeasement, leading an unprepared country to the brink of ruin in 1941. It is certainly true that right up to the moment of the German attack Stalin did not want war and hoped that it could be avoided by negotiation – a view not very different from Neville Chamberlain in 1939 – but the absence of preparation is a myth. The Soviet political and military leadership began to prepare the country from the autumn of 1940 for the possibility of a war with Germany. The problem was not the absence of preparation but the fundamental flaws in strategy and deployment that underpinned it.

a) Hitler didn't know much about Soviet Union.

Well, his assessment was correct in that the Soviet Union was not ready for a major war at the time of the German attack, wasn’t it?

b) Overy didn't dismiss my claim as a myth. Note Roberto, that I talked about Soviet historiography. Overy doesen't disprove that in Soviet historiography it was said so.

He said that the claim of utter lack of preparation made by Soviet historiography was a myth, didn’t he?

Learn to read.

That’s what I’m telling you. Careful with that arrogance.

We discussed this a year ago. Stalin didn't believe in German attack. The new Soviet doctrine demanded that the war would be started with sudden Soviet strike. Maybe Stalin really concentrated the troops for just in case. So if there would be a threat of attack by Germany, then Soviets would make a preventive strike and the war would be waged on enemies territory. I admit that this is possible version.

No objection so far, except that this doesn't explain Stalin's strange behavior in the face of all the warnings of an impending German attack that he received.

I explained to it last year Roberto. Obviously you didn't read it. I explain it now again for the last time for you: Stalin's intelligence indicated many things. His agents said for example that the Germans would attack in May. But there weren't no such attack in May. And there was a lot of such confusing information. There were strong rumours (released by the Germans BTW) that the buildup was for putting up pressure on Soviet Union. Now after the war, we know which information was right, which was not. But Stalin didn't know that in June 1941.

That’s all very fine, but Stalin’s refusal to grasp intelligence reports, whether or not he considered them reliable, speaks against rather than in favor of his having been planning an attack. This because such intelligence reports would have come in handy to claim that he was being provoked by the Germans and thus having a pretext before world public opinion before striking at them. When Hitler attacked Poland, he had to stage the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station to give himself such a pretext. When Stalin attacked Finland, he had to falsely claim that the Fins had fired on Soviet territory. Here now he had dozens of intelligence reports clearly pointing towards a German intention to attack, which would have made it easy for him to justify his own attack as a pre-emptive move. Yet instead of picking up these heaven-sent pretexts and denouncing them as proof of German hostile intentions, he chose to ignore them. That doesn’t fit much into the picture of the aggressor about to strike, does it?

The other version is that Stalin concentrated his troops because planned to attack Germany even if there wouldn't be a German threat right now. These are the two possible versions. All there is, is to choose, which one you want to believe.

The problem with the second version is that it is not only unsupported and even countered by evidence, but contrary to everything that is known about Stalin's character and policies. Would the man who had planned to wait on while Germany and the Western Allies took each other apart, who had attacked Finland because he thought it was a walkover and found himself confronted with the woeful insufficiencies of his armies there, whose actions in matters of foreign policies had so far shown the cunning and cautious manipulator rather than the adventurer, risk an all-out attack with a force he had every reason to consider unprepared, against a formidable enemy that had never been defeated so far?

That Stalin had done usually this way, it doesen't mean that he can't make it other way.

It certainly would not, if there was evidence that and why he broke with his standard operating procedures in this case. But there is none.

Yes, Stalin planned to wait until West weakens herself. But everything happened surprisingly quickly. France surrended. And Britain was implying to Stalin that they may make peace too.

Were they? From what statements of the British government is this assertion inferred?

BTW, your claim that Stalin had an

attack with a force he had every reason to consider unprepared

is an opinion only. Actually they didn't consider themselves as a weak.

As they had every reason to be skeptical about their capabilities, some evidence supporting the assertion that they nevertheless were not would be required. What do we have?

Yes they have. At first an example: The German army was alerted on the evening of 21st June. But we don't really know, when the Soviets planned to attack.

If they planned to attack at all, that is.

A meaningless comment.

Hardly so, given that Reigo is assuming what he is out to demonstrate.

If they planned in the middle of July then they would be alerted a day or maybe two before, but not on 22 June. On 22nd June the Red Army was in the midst of troop concentration and mobilization.

That's insufficient insofar as it doesn't explain the strange behavior of Soviet frontline units requesting instructions on whether to fight back when confronted with the German attack. The enemy they are supposedly preparing to attack suddenly attacks them, and they ask their superiors what they are supposed to do? Such behavior makes sense for an army instructed to avoid provocations that might be used by the enemy as a pretext for attacking, not for an army preparing to jump at the enemy's throat.

You asked: why they weren't in alerted condition if they planned to attack soon?
I answered: because they didn't plan to attack on 22nd June, but at least 3 weeks later and so they would have been alerted also 3 weeks later.
That's all plain and simple. If Red Army was instructed to avoid provocations, then this doesen't mean that it couldn't be alerted let's say on 15th July.

No. But it suggests that they weren’t instructed to prepare for an attack on the Germans. For if they had been, they wouldn’t have felt the need to ask how they were to react to their intended victim’s attack on themselves. That’s really plain and simple.

That the troops asked from superiors indicates only that they were afraid that this is a provocation.

Why would an army on the verge of attacking be afraid of a provocation, instead of welcoming it as a heaven-sent opportunity of unleashing its forces without being burdened with the odium of having been the aggressor – something that even Stalin obviously took care to avoid in his preceding small-scale aggressions?

Yes and after the Germans refused the Soviet terms in the end of 1940, the anti-German propaganda started to grow in Soviet Union.

Such as? Was the term "fascist" re-introduced as a derrogatory, for instance?

I don't know that really and this is not important also.

If it’s not important, why did you mention it?

The propaganda especially increased amongst political workers and military. It was clearly indicated to them that Germany is a hostile country and enemy. There is a documented book written about this propaganda (in Russian) and also Meltiukhov quotes documents. There is no doubt that the propaganda started.

Well, then let’s see some illustrative statements signaling a change of attitude toward the Germans after the failure of Molotov’s visit to Berlin.

Moscow, BTW, didn't have any illusions that Germany is a good friend. They thought that the clash was inevitable.

Any illustrative contemporary statements in this direction?

For example: in May 1941 for the Politburo and for the candidates of Politburo a report was made: "Contemporary international situation and Soviet Union's Foreign Policy."

I will translate it soon. This is the document I was talking about at the beginning.

I’m looking forward to the translation.

It would be ridiculous to believe that Stalin really thought that Hitler would fulfill such large demands.

It would be at least as ridiculous to conclude on a plan for an all-out attack from Stalin's founded skepticism about the outcome of further negotiations.

Read the "Contemporary international situation and Soviet Union's Foreign Policy." and find out what Soviet leadership thought about friendship with Germany.

I’m eager to see whether that statement offers any hints at an intention to solve the Soviet Union’s problems with Germany by means of an all-out aggression.

That Stalin "liked to play it safe," is not an serious argument.

Why not? In a totalitarian dictatorship, decisions and actions are considerably if not primarily influenced by the dictator's character and his willingness or reluctance to take risks.

People are not always acting, like they have done it previously.

Folks like Stalin and Hitler usually remain true to themselves. Where they act outside their behavioral pattern, it should be possible to identify a good reason for their doing so. Which would it have been in this case?

Again: you said "usually remain true..." This "usually" is not a fact. Sometimes they don't do as "usually".

Sure, but the unusual requires evidence. Stronger evidence than the usual.

Drop this alraedy. What reason he had? Well I have talked about it alraedy. Check my posts to valdajez.

If the arguments in your posts to valdajez are the same that you have used in our discussions so far, they are not exactly convincing. Unusual behavior on the part of Stalin would be understandable in the face of i) an unusual prize to be gained and/or danger to be avoided and ii) an unusually favorable opportunity to gain that prize or eliminate that danger.

The prize? OK, let’s say it was supremacy in Europe.

The danger? A German attack. But as you tirelessly point out, Stalin did not believe in that.

The opportunity?
I don’t see it. We’re talking about an all-out attack
- on an enemy force three million strong
- which had vanquished every previous enemy,
- with an army that had not exactly given proof of great military prowess, especially in attack,
- requiring a threefold numerical superiority according to Soviet military doctrine of the time,

aren’t we?

If Stalin really intended to attack, then it is obvious that the best time for attack is when Germany is still in war against British.

"War against British" alone meant no advantage as long as no major German land forces were tied down by it and Germany could use the bulk of their air force against the Soviet Union.

Yes it is as an advantage. A part of German Army, a considerable part of Airforce (1560 planes) and large part of Navy were tied with the British in June 1941. If Stalin would have attacked, the Germans would have not been able to concentrate all their forces against Soviets.

No, just over three million men, supported by 3,500 – 4,000 tanks, 2,000 to 3,000 planes – that’s nothing, really, is it?

Besides If Stalin attacks after British and Germans have made a good peace, who will guarantee that Britain will not act against Soviet Union? British technology could be used by Soviet Union. And as I have demonstrated already, now matter what you may have thought, in Stalin's eyes German-British peace wasn't welcomed.

That needs no demonstration, as it is obvious that peace between Britain and Germany would have worsened the Soviet Union’s chances. The question is whether Stalin saw the possibility of such a peace as i) realistic and ii) threatening enough to attempt anticipating this situation by a highly risky all-out attack on Europe.

Reigo wrote:
How could Stalin know that in 1942 the war would be still raging?

Why would he have to fear that this would not be so? Were there any indications that the British were about to throw in the towel? With American support on the increase, this was hardly so.

You obviously don't bother to read the other post's on this thread. Like I have demonstarted, the British-German peace was very feared by Moscow for example in May 1941 because of Hess' flight. So you see even if there were american help, Stalin still was afraid of British-German peace.

Hess’ flight, oK. As you wrote “for example”, there must have been other indications. Which are those supposed to have been?

Note that Moscow hoped at first that the war between Germany and Allies will be a very long and destructive one, but it developed so that the French were defeated surprisingly easily.

A clever and cautious attitude: Sit back, wait and move in when your enemies are weakened enough. Why would that all of a sudden be changed into the gamble of attacking a so far undefeated enemy force that was free to wield almost all of its resources against the Soviet Union?

Sorry, but you seem to forget that France was defeated and in 1941 Stalin was afraid that Britain will make peace. For the last time: in Stalins eyes the wars end in 1941 was realistic. If war ends with Britain then Germany can collect not allmost but all her resources for possible attack against Soviet Union.

Just what idea are you trying to sell us, Reigo?

That Stalin saw the threat of Germany making peace with Britain and then attacking the Soviet Union with all of her resources, a threat he tried to avoid by a rather desperate move of striking first?

This would mean he started preparing for attack only after Hess’ flight in May 1941, unless you can demonstrate that there were significant indications of an upcoming British-German peace before that, and that Stalin was conscious thereof and concerned about it. But how would you marry this contention
with your repeatedly uttered conviction that Stalin did not believe in aggressive intentions on the part of Germany?

Or that Stalin wanted to strike at Germany no matter what and hastened preparations for this when he saw the advantage of Germany still engaged against Britain slipping away?

This again would require metamorphosing Stalin, the cunning and cautious manipulator, into Stalin, the gambling conqueror. It would also require demonstrating that Stalin saw the opportunity to gain the prize he was striving for in an all-out attack in the summer of 1941. Which beside Germany being engaged by Britain would require confidence that such an attack stood a real chance of success. Which in turn would require confidence that the Red Army was prepared for such an attack in organizational, armament and logistical terms and that it could achieve the threefold numerical superiority that Soviet military doctrine of the time (according to Reigo) considered an essential factor of success (it had taken more than that to break through the Mannerheim Line).

What Overy et al fail to mention is that before 1940-41 the propaganda said that Soviet Union will be offensive only when it is attacked by other country.

Any illustrative contemporary statements to back up this contention?

"Until this time we were following the doctrine of defense." From Stalin's speach of 5th May 1941. What else you need? Why were the huge fortified lines built?

Because the military approach was to repel an enemy’s attack from behind fortified lines instead of taking the initiative and carrying the war onto enemy territory, most likely. What you’re doing here is confounding statements regarding military doctrine with such regarding foreign policy in political terms. The former being the ones to which your first quote above referred – at least that’s how I understood it – the request for illustrative contemporary statements showing i) a policy not to be offensive against other countries and ii) a change of that policy (rather than a mere change in military doctrine, is still standing.

On 5th May, during this speech Stalin also said that: "Until this time we were following the doctrine of defence - until this time we hadn't finished the reequipment of our army and supplied it with modern equipment. But now - when we have reconstructed our army, gave it plenty of equipment for modern battle and we have become strong - now there is the need to change defense against offense. To defend our country we must act offensively. From defence we must be go to the military politics of offensive actions." Why didn't Overy et al to mention this pasage of Stalins speech? It doesen't fit their version that "Stalin said nothing that had not been said a hundred times before."

I'd say it does, because the quoted statements may well be interpreted as containing nothing other than the assertion that attack is the best defense and that the Red Army would be put into conditions to apply this "active" kind of defense instead of the "passive" one that, as Overy writes:

was regarded neither as an acceptable option for a revolutionary state, nor as militarily desirable.

No, you are pipe-dreaming.

Watch the arrogance, my friend.

Stalin said: "Until this time we were following the doctrine of defense." And also said:"But now - when we have reconstructed our army, gave it plenty of equipment for modern battle and we have become strong - now there is the need to change defense against offense. To defend our country we must act offensively. From defence we must be go to the military politics of offensive actions."

He’s talking about a change in military doctrine, or about the Red Army being given the capability of living up to its original doctrine – just my point.

You see: until this time they did it this way, but now they are going to do that that way. Stalin said something new. And Overy is a manipulator with documents. He omitts which doesen't fit with his view. A coward he is, ignores what can't be explained. Meltiukhov et al don't do such tricks. You see they confront everything and try to explain. But Overy's whole theory is based on omitting.

Cool it, my friend, lest you make a fool out of yourself with such hollow accusations. Overy’s assertion is that Stalin’s statement referred to military doctrine, not to political intentions. And that’s exactly what is borne out by the text of Stalin’s speech you quoted. Which makes the accusation that Overy is manipulating documents by omission seem rather ridiculous.

Did he have reasons to believe that the Red Army was an army ready for large-scale offensive operations not only on propaganda posters, but in actual fact?Evidence points to exactly the contrary. There was the disastrous experience of the Winter War against Finland, in which entire Soviet divisions were annihilated by much smaller Finnish detachments and it took the deployment of an enormous numerical superiority in manpower and armament to eventually break the Mannerheim line, Soviet casualties being five times higher than those of the Finns.

And this is your evidence that Stalin had no reasons to believe in 1941 that the Red Army was capable of large-scale offensive?

A very significant part of it. How could an army that had to deploy more than a million men in order to win a comparatively small local conflict by the hair of its teeth be expected to successfully launch an all-out war of aggression against the most powerful armed forces of its time?

I have explained in my posts to valadejaz.

“I already told so-and-so” is not an argument. You may, however, start with “As I already told so-and-so,…”

Actually all the evidence there is shows that in 1941 the Soviet leadership was convinced that their army is not an impotent, which can't be used for large-scale offensives.

Let's see that evidence. This is the information I have:

The war games followed a week-long conference that began on December 23. The object was to thrash out the lessons of the year and to review the current state of military planning. No serious attempt was made to challenge the central principles upon which Soviet war-planning rested. The war games were staged to confirm what was seen as a received wisdom. The first was fought between Zhukov and General Dimitri Pavlov, chief of the Soviet mechanized forces, on New Year’s Day, 1941. Zhukov was the German side, Pavlov the Soviet. Although Pavlov was able to bring his forces to bear on East Prussia, consistent with the strategy of the massive counter-offensive, he was routed by Zhukov. In the second game, played a week later, the players were reversed. This time Zhukov pushed successfully across the frontier into Hungary; Pavlov’s weak counter-attack attempted to parry. The outcome said a great deal about Zhukov’s battlefield skills, even on a table-top. But there were worrying signs for Soviet strategy. When Stalin assembled the commanders and officials for the second game, a curious drama unfolded.
The chief of staff was asked to report on the outcome of the games. Meretskov spoke hesitantly. Rather than say out loud that the Zhukov Germans had won the first game, Meretskov applauded the early stages, when Pavlov with sixty divisions had overcome the fifty-five German divisions defending the Reich frontier. Stalin angrily took the floor and exposed as nonsense the view that a ratio of little more than one division to one could overcome the fixed German defenses. It was all right ‘for propaganda purposes’, he told the assembly, ‘but here we have to talk in terms of real capabilities’. The uncomfortable Meretskov was then asked about the second game but would give no definite answer on the outcome, which was inconclusive. When one of Timoshenko’s deputies followed the discussion by insisting on voicing his own belief that infantry divisions should be horse-drawn rather than mechanized, Stalin’s patience was stretched to the limit. The General Staff left the conference in a despondent mood. The following day Zhukov was appointed Chief of the General Staff, and Meretskov was put in charge of training.

Overy, as above, pages 66/67.

What evidence is this.

Documentary or eyewitness, most likely. Where is yours?

An utterly non-understandable, messy text,

How come I had not problem understanding it?

which is based on what? Memoirs most probably.

A general Kazakov. Ever heard of him?

So Zhukov and Meretskov were chosen by Stalin. Rightly did so Stalin. What Mr. Overy doesen't mention is that the game had such legend: the Germans invaded. But they didn't play the German attack, but it was just pretended that the Germans were pushed back to the borders and then the Red Army "counter-attacked." They started to play from this "counter-attack"

Reigo obviously didn’t bother to read the text, which says exactly that:

Zhukov was the German side, Pavlov the Soviet. Although Pavlov was able to bring his forces to bear on East Prussia, consistent with the strategy of the massive counter-offensive, he was routed by Zhukov. In the second game, played a week later, the players were reversed. This time Zhukov pushed successfully across the frontier into Hungary; Pavlov’s weak counter-attack attempted to parry.

Overy also omitts that there were also games in January during which it came out that the Soviets were more successful on the South-Poland direction, than on the East-Prussian direction. And on the basis of these games operation plans were designed against Germany.

Source?

For example the plan of the 15th May (which is published by historians now, though it hasn't been really proven that it was put into use) is well known and is proposing the main thrust on the direction of Warsaw from the Lvov area.

Overy on this plan:

In May 1941 Zhukov and Timoshenko produced what turned out to be the last version of the deployment plan before the German invasion. It varied little from the plan drawn up the previous October, except that it now postulated two counter-offensives into German-held territory: one towards Cracow, to cut Germany off from her southern allies; one towards Lublin, with the ultimate object of securing German-occupied Poland and East Prussia. A section of this document has been seized upon as evidence that the Soviet Union was planning a pre-emptive strike against Germany in the summer of 1941, a strike undone by the sudden launching of Barbarossa. The document in question, an unsigned memorandum dated May 15, was not an order or directive but an explanatory recommendation for force deployment entirely consistent with the planning of the previous two years. There is no evidence that Stalin saw it, but even if he had there are no grounds for thinking that this was anything other than a continued review of the forward defense posture on which Soviet strategy had relied since the 1930s. Some form of pre-emption through spoiling attacks on the mobilizing forces of the enemy was an integral part of that posture. It did not signify a Soviet intention to launch unprovoked war but was, on the contrary, a desperate gambit to obstruct German mobilization against the Soviet Union.

Richard Overy, Russia’s War, page 68

Objectively, the Soviet leadership probably even overestimated the capabilities of the Red Army.

Considering its disastrous performance throughout 1941 and most of 1942, especially when on the offensive, that's something of an understatement.

Their disastrous performance was related to things which you just doesen't seem to understand. They were caught in the middle of concentration, not fully mobilized. They lost initiative and lost quickly most of the cadre-army. There were absolutely no defense plans for the country. If the Wehrmacht would have been attacked when in similar situation, then the outcome wouldn't have been different.

The factors you mention may have contributed significantly, but to blame the whole disaster on them is an oversimplification. How about other contributing factors such as

- lack of training;
- widespread lack of motivation;
- the inefficient dual command system;
- incompetent leadership (especially at the highest level);
- inappropriate tactics (like spreading out armored forces instead of concentrating them);
- insufficient logistics;
- shortage of automatic weapons among infantry;
- mostly inferior heavy weapons ?

That they may have been not believing in succesful offensive because of the Winter War difficulties is not anyhow proved. It is just an opinion of Overy et al.

Considering that they had no reason whatsoever to be optimistic about the Red Army's performance, however, it is this supposed optimism unwarranted by circumstances that would require proof, not the opposite.

Read the report and see, how inferiorly the Soviets felt.

I will. Hopefully the “report” is not just some propaganda screed.

What was there, beside numerical superiority, to make Stalin assume that his forces were capable of staging an all-out offensive against the Wehrmacht with a good chance of success?

Better quality of some Soviet equipment than Germans.

In 1941? How many T-34s, Katyushas, 76.2 mm anti-tank guns and modern fighter planes? Against what quantities of old crap? And how deployed and organized?

there were almost 2 000 T-34 and KV.

Deployed where? And what’s the source?

There were over 2 000 modern fighters.

As above.

How many tanks the Germans had which were equal to T-34 and KV. The answer is 0.

Indeed it is, but the question is how many of the tanks that Soviet forces were mostly equipped with in 1941 were a match for the German tanks.

The Soviet modern fighter force was actually as big as almost the whole German fighter force.

Size doesn’t matter when most of it is old stuff and pilot training leaves much to be desired, as was the case with the Red Air Force.

And that the other tanks, planes etc were crap, is only your imagination. It's ignorance. It's BS. Obviously you don't know much.

Again, watch the arrogance. Instead of throwing insults around, better give us some arguments as to why Soviet tanks other than the T34 were a match for German tanks. And what about their crews? How many tank crews had a level of training and experience comparable to what the Germans could offer?

They were deployed and organized badly, because the deploiment and organisation was in the middle of the 22nd June.

That may have been a factor, but was hardly the whole story. See above.

But Soviet Tank Divisions, Mech Divisions, and Infantry Divisions, when properly equpied and mobilized and ready for German attack, wouldn't have been defeated so easily.

I presume they had a chance to show that on occasion. How did they fare? I mean such units that didn’t happen to be equipped with T34s.

By 10th of July the Soviets had lost 11 783 tanks. Most of them were abandoned, because the logistics of the Soviet Army weren't ready on 22nd June to enter the war and sudden German invasion didn't make things better.

And also: Soviet production was already in June producing only new models, mostly superior to Germans. But German industry was still producing their old models.

Two good reasons not to launch an all-out attack on Europe in 1941.

Most important: the sudden attack, which would destroy the German forces at the borders and will let the Soviets to take initiative.

Surprise against an enemy who had been building up his forces for almost a year, ostensibly to attack the British? Whose reconnaissance planes crossed the Soviet border every other day unobstructed?

That enemy has been building it's forces is not a reason, why can't be achieved surprise.

No, but an enemy building up for attack is not exactly a wholly unsuspecting prey.

You see, Soviets were also building their forces, but were still caught by surprise.

Because their government systematically ignored warnings of an impending attack and refused to put them on alert until the last moment. And because they were instructed not to respond to “provocations”.

German planes made recon-flights is irrevelant.

Why, did the Germans constantly enter Soviet airspace just for the fun of it?

You know that's why Soviets concentrated their troops in ultimate secrecy and under cover, because it wasn't wanted that Germans would notice the concentrations.

Looks like not much came of that “ultimate secrecy”. Looks like the Germans knew exactly where to strike. Thanks to their unimpeded reconnaissance flights, perhaps?

What numerical superiority did he reckon to be necessary in view of previous experiences, especially the Winter War, to overcome the German armed forces? Did he consider the Soviet Union able to achieve such numerical superiority?

If he planned to attack he obviously considered that SU will achieve necessary superiority.

Hardly an argument. On what basis would he have considered that, and what evidence is there that he did?

The basis would have been huge Soviet human reservs, also great number of tanks, planes, and artillery. What evidence? You want to see the papersheet where Stalin made his calculations? Stop the stupidquestions please.

There are no stupid questions. There are only stupid answers. The Germans had over three million soldiers on the borders of the USSR. Attacking them with a chance of success would have required nine million Red Army troops, according to contemporary Soviet military doctrine. When and how could Uncle Joe have expected to muster, equip, feed, organize and co-ordinate such an enormous force for attack, especially considering the Red Army’s limited tactical capabilities at the time?

IIRC Soviet doctrine then demanded 3 times bigger forces in the breakthrough sector.

That's not what came out of the disastrous wargames described by Overy, see above quote. What evidence is there that the enraged Stalin considered he would eventually be able to muster the required superiority nevertheless?

Mr. Overy-the-omitter said: "rather than say out loud that the Zhukov Germans had won the first game, Meretskov applauded the early stages, when Pavlov with sixty divisions had overcome the fifty-five German divisions defending the Reich frontier. Stalin angrily took the floor and exposed as nonsense the view that a ratio of little more than one division to one could overcome the fixed German defenses. It was all right ‘for propaganda purposes’, he told the assembly, ‘but here we have to talk in terms of real capabilities’."

So the ratio was there 1:1. But I was talking that Soviet doctrine needed 3:1. Stalin also thought that a ratio which is bigger than 1:1 is needed.

Exactly.

On 22nd June there were 303 Divisions in the Red Army, so in divisions Stalin had also superiority.

303 divisions on the Soviet Western Front? A 3:1 superiority on the Soviet Western Front?

That Stalin was a cautious and cunning manipulator isn't proof that he wasn't planning to attack.

It's a strong indication that he was not. Which in the absence of any evidence that he was - for the considerations about troop deployments that Suvorov et al come up with can hardly be termed evidence - is a very strong argument.

Well, you have the right to believe this.

As long as Suvorov et al can come up with nothing better than what they have, it’s actually a reasonable conclusion rather than a belief.

Events showed that strong doubts as to the offensive capacities of the Soviet forces were all too justified.

Soviets made a good offensive at Halhin-Gol.

A limited local affair. Is there any evidence, by the way, that the tactical approach to an eventual war against Germany was based on or incorporated the experiences of Halhin-Gol?

I haven't searched such evidence.

Well, the question is a rather interesting one, don’t you think so?

It was a limited local affair but the Soviets encircled and defeated the Japanese. That means the Soviets weren't idiots who made only frontal assaults, like it is so popular to think.

That’s certainly not what I think. It only seems to me that Soviet commanders with Zhukov’s skills were a rarity in mid-1941.

In Finland the situation was completely different and that's what you don't seem to understand.

I understand quite well, so keep the rhetoric to yourself.

The Finnish campaign was a disaster for the Red Army. It exposed to the world how feeble was the offensive capability of the purged forces and underlined foreign assessments of the damage the terror had done.

An opinion, not considering the many facts and circumstanses (see below).

Despite a numerical advantage [of more than 5 to 1 IIRC, Roberto], the armies assigned to the Winter War were broken on a solid set of fortifications, the Mannerheim Line.

No, at the beginning of the War Soviets sent 425 640 men (against Finnish 265 000). The advantage wasn't even 2 to 1. No wonder that the Soviets stayed behind the Mannerheim line.

Well, in the end they had more than a million troops in action, and it still was everything other than a pushover.

Soviet soldiers fought stubbornly but took exceptional casualties, a total of 126,875 dead in four months. Their frozen corpses lay in grotesque heaps where they fell. The troops were untrained for storming fixed defenses; there were shortages of automatic weapons and winter clothing; the food supply system soon broke down and transport was poorly organized Frostbite and hunger added to the casualties inflicted by fast-moving Finnish ski troops and snipers. The commanders were too closely controlled from the center by political officers who knew little about the battlefield. Initiative and flexibility were sacrificed to the rule book.

This all demonstrates that there were made mistakes. Do you really think that the same mistakes would be repeated?

Some of the more grievous ones were not or insufficiently corrected.

Victory over the Japanese relied on Zhukov's exceptional battlefield skills, but also on the more effective deployment of modern weapons in open terrain against an enemy with poor mobility. Zhukov ensured that the logistical tail was well in place before risking battle. None of these things were present against Finland. Here the Red Army fought as an unmodernized army, relying on primitive infantry tactics, with poor intelligence, weak supply lines and, significantly, no Zhukov. Against the Japanese Zhukov acted with characteristic independence, rejecting recommendations from senior officers and instilling in poorly trained troops a better sense of purpose than their comrades displayed in Finland.

Overy omitts that these things started to be present when the war went on. Soviets learned.

Maybe you should read Overy’s book instead of making a fuss about it. Much of it is about how the Soviets improved tactical prowess throughout the war from a disastrous beginning to a level of quasi-parity with the enemy.

The Winter War was fought in very difficult conditions (especially for the Soviets, who had to attack). In these difficult conditions Soviets couldn't use properly their superiority in armament.

What superiority? One of the reasons for the Finnish success was their being much better equipped with automatic weapons, IIRC.

Overy and you haven't of course heard about tanks and planes and artillery.

Not much use in the Finnish woods in wintertime, even if they had been used more intelligently – at least the former two.

And the Finns were very tough soldiers.

So were the Japanese, the Germans - or the Soviets, for that matter.

You don't seem to understand that I am trying to show that there were many reasons why Red Army had such difficulties. All this reasons put together we see that the Red Army was actually facing a hard task, not some "easy task for every other army, except the lousy Red Army." Did the Japanese maybe had a Mannerheim line with deep snowy forests in the Mongolian deserts?

I’m not saying that the Red Army was “lousy” (though in 1941 it was but a shadow of what it eventually became). I’m saying that severe shortcomings, which were duly noted by foreign observers, contributed significantly to its difficulties in carrying out a task that would not have been a piece of cake for any army.

Believe me there wouldn't have been any blitzkrieg if Wehrmacht would have been instead of the Soviet Army.

A blitzkrieg is one thing. The disastrous performance of the Soviet army in Finland is another.

I mean that the German Army wouldn't have been more successful. IMHO it would have been even less succesful, because the German commanders would have probably waited for summer to defeat the Finns, because otherwise they would have suffered just too big casualties. The Red Army actually showed that after the first unfortunes, it recovered and proved that it can fulfill the mission even in such hard conditions. Instead of considering all this Overy, Roberto et al just robotically repeat: "disastrous performance, disastrous performance."

Well, please excuse “us” if “we” consider a casualty rate of five to every one of the enemy to speak against an army’s tactical prowess, especially if the enemy is not routed altogether as the result of such sacrifice. The certainly remarkable performance of Soviet infantry doesn’t change the fact that its commanders used it rather incompetently most of the time, thus achieving their comparatively moderate goals only at the cost of enormous casualties.

The lessons of the Finnish war were taken into account by the Soviets.

How so? Did they abolish the political commissars, grant commanders mor independence, increase the number of automatic weapons available to the troops, etc.?

One of the direct results of the war was the decision to expand drastically the use of mortars in Red Army. Lessons in logistics and tactics were taken. Yes automatic rifles were further-developed and submachineguns were further developed.

To a level comparable with the German forces?

Obviously the political comissars weren't a problem in Soviet eyes, that's why they didn't abolish them. And now pay attention: if they didn't abolish them, they thought that they are needed. And because they thought that they are needed, they just couldn't have thought that their army is a bad one because there are political comissars in this army.

Or then Stalin couldn’t bring himself to relinquish what he considered an instrument of control over the armed forces. Control was something he was so obsessed with that he had included the Red Army’s leadership in his purges, after all. In any case, the Soviets eventually learned that dual command was a nuisance and accordingly abolished it when they were in deepest shit during the German attack, didn’t they?

tere is always modernization ongoing in world's armies. In 1942 there are new types of tanks and planes engineered and by your logic again it would be "total nonsense" to attack before "obsolete" ones are replaced.

Well, if waiting until 1942 will enable me to attack with a tank force made up wholly of T-34s and supported by large quantities of Katyusha rocket launchers, instead of the stuff I have in 1941, it would be utterly stupid to stage an all-out offensive against a powerful, so far undefeated enemy in 1941 indeed.

I repeat: You have to understand that Soviets didn't consider their equipment in 1941 as unworthy. That's as simple as that. They considered as completely offensive-capable.

1. As it obviously was everything other than “completely offensive-capable” (except for the new stuff), some evidence to this unwarranted optimism would be appreciated.

2. I’d still rather wait for more of the cream, unless I was in a big hurry. Why the hurry?

You have to understand that Soviets didn't consider their equipment in 1941 as unworthy.

Still, why not wait for reconversion to be completed? Why the hurry? Haste makes waste, as a Russian saying goes.

Look above. Also I have said hundred times why it would have been better to attack in 1941.

It sure would have been a lot better – for the Führer. But Stalin was not that daring – or that stupid.

Also these Russian sayings are not serious arguments.

Why not? There’s a lot of wisdom in popular sayings.

If you want to discuss with me Roberto, then I propose some rules: you quote my passage and then try to disprove it.

That's what I've been doing throughout this post, rather successfully I dare say.

Now that’s definitely not an argument.

:I don't respond to the end of the post, which contains mostly self-admiration.

I wouldn’t call this “self-admiration”:

See, Reigo, the problem that you and other fans of Suvorov et al have is that, while you can submit lots of speculations and defend them with sometimes fairly reasonable arguments, you can present not a single piece of evidence proving that Stalin intended to carry out an all-out attack on Europe in the summer of 1941. Your arguments boil down to "this and that may be taken as an indication that he ..." - to which I will reply that it may just as well be taken as an indication to the contrary or have an innocuous explanation. Take that and the very significant indications against your speculations, and these "Did Stalin plan to attack ..." - discussions begin to seem rather pointless - what we down here would call a discussion about the sex of the angels.

I would call it a rather accurate assessment of what makes all of your arguments moot: You can write a lot about why it would have been advantageous for Stalin to do this and that and why his forces were much more capable than events showed them to be, but you can provide no evidence at all that Stalin intended to use his “completely offensive-capable” forces to engage in an all-or-nothing gamble that was contrary to everything that is known about his character and procedures. Better get used to the idea.

Cheers,

Roberto

[Reigo]

Roberto,

I have no interest in debating with you since I have said already everything necessary. You can consider yourself as a winner if you like, I don't care. Obviously we have chosen to believe different views and different sources.

Regards,
Reigo

[valadezaj]

You still never answered why Hitler would lie to Mussolini about invading Russia.

[Reigo]

zdds

[Reigo]

zdds

[Mait]

Comparative strength of the Soviet rifle division and the German infantry division in summer 1941

Vehicles and weapons Soviet rifle division German infantry division
Total strength, men 14 483 16 859
Rifles and carabines 10 420 11 500
Heavy machine-guns 166 142
Light machine-guns 392 434
Antiaircraft machine-guns 33 --
Sub machine-guns 1 204 486
Antitank rifles -- 81
Guns 144 161
Mortars 66 54
Cars and trucks 558 902
Horses 3 039 6 358
Tanks 16 --
Armored cars 13 16
Tractors 99 62

Source:
"Strategical essay about the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945", Moscow, 1961.

Twice the firepower? Doubt it.

Best Regards,

Mait.

[Mait]

Please quit sending mails 45cm long mostly full of quotas, re-quotas, re-re-requotas and very short sentence after it mostly being the next line in endless dialog with Reigo containing no information or decent opinion about the subject.

I know You have points and arguments about the subject and i am interested in them. But could You post them by themes and in your own words. You don´t have to answer or counter EVERYTHING Reigo says.

Please, don´t take offense, it was not my attempt. The problem is that I am really interested in the topic and would like to hear opinions and quotas of everyone informed or interested in the subject. But lets take theme by theme, fact by fact, everybody interested posting his opinions with facts/theories/sources that validate them.

Best Regards,

Mait.

PS! It is not about who has longer ...., or why You know Your opponent has shorter ...., its about what You think about the topic and why You think so

[Roberto]

What I think?

This has been discussed before at length. There is some evidence, as presented by the Soviet writer Victor Suvorov, that Stalin was indeed planning an assault on Germany, but there is also a lot of evidence to the contrary. Basically, there is no clear answer to your question. I am of the opinion that Stalin did not wish to invade Germany until it had been sufficiently weakened to the extent of not being able to resist much; Stalin was no adventurer.

Except that I wouldn't call Suvorov's speculations "evidence", the above is also my opinion.

[Reigo]

Twice the firepower? Doubt it.

Mait,

Starinov was talking about Rifle Corps. Here what he said:

Each Soviet Rifle Corps had 9 Rifle Regiments and 8 Artillery Regiments. It has twice as much Artillery Regiments in each of its Corps that the Wehrmacht had. So how about the firepower???

Anyway Soviet RD and German ID were pretty much equal in firepower.

[Victor]

It's irrevelant what we think in year 2002 which tank was better. It's important what the Soviet leadership thought in 1941. All the evidence (not opinions) supports that the Soviets considered their Army and it's equipment in 1941 as offensive capable.

I was not arguing what the Soviets thought about their equipment. I was only arguing what b_c_ries thought of it.

And BTW do you think that the Soviet optics was useless? They couldn't hit anything? I doubt it. Also tanks were not meant as anti-tank weapons. The main anti-tank weapons were by theory AT-guns.

I didn't say Soviet optics were useless. I just said the German ones were better.
Tanks are the best AT weapon. An AT gun does not have the mobility of a tank (i. e. the turret). Why do you think they carry AP shells? To destroy an AT gun you only need a HE shell.

Germans had on 1st June 6 292 tanks (of these 5 821 combat ready, that is 92, 5%).
The Soviets had on 1st June 25 479 tanks (of these 19 810 combat ready, that is 77,9 %).

This only proves my point that the Soviet tanks weren't as good as the German ones as b_c_ries said.

See, the older fighters weren't really meant as interceptors. That doesen't mean that they couldn't combat with German fighters if needed. During Barbarossa they showed that I-16 could combat if good pilot handles them. For combatting against German fighters there was the new generation of Soviet fighters. The Germans concentrated at the beginning of Barbarossa nearly 1 000 fighters to the East. The Soviets had two times more of the new Soviet fighters at this moment. Also the Soviet doctrine was: at the very beginning to suddenly attack enemy's airfields so to achieve as big superiority in air as possible. The older generation would have had the primary task of ground support. The I-16 actually had more powerful armament than Bf-109.

Who said anything about interceptors. I was talking about the main fighters available in June 1941. On both sides.
The Bf-109F was the best Germany could put in the field then. It had a top speed of 625 km/h at 7000 m. The armament consisted in 2 nose mounted 7.92 mm MGs and a 15 or 20 mm cannon. The Bf-109E had a top speed of 560 km/h and was armed with 2 20mm cannons and 2 7.92 MGs. The E-3 version had 3 20 mm cannons. Both versions were vastly superior to the majority of the VVS fighter force.
The main fighter of the VVS was the I-16 Ishak, which was outclassed by the Bf-109 in most aspects. It had a top speed of 450 km/h (the older types) or 489 km/h (Mk. 24). The armament consisted of 2 7.62 mm MGs at the Mk. 5, 4 7.62 MGs at the Mk. 10, 18 and 24 and 2 7.62 mm MGs and 2 20 mm cannons at the Mk. 17, 27, 28. You see, not all versions of the I-16 "outgunned" the Bf-109F (one extra 20 mm cannon). According to German pilots, the I-16 easily caught fire if struck from above or from the sides.
The I-153 biplane was the best of the I-15 biplane series (the other two's characteristics aren't worth mentioning). The top speed was 444 km/h and was armed with 4 12.7 MGs. According to German pilots a few rounds fired into the sides were often enough to set them on fire.
Now let's get to the modern Soviet fighters:
The first new-generation aircraft that arrived in the Soviet fighter regiments was the MiG-3. It was intended as a high-altitude interceptor. But the low altitudes where most of the air engagements over the Eastern Front took place it was heavy and slow. It was less maneuverable than the Bf-109 and had a weaker armament (2 7.62 mm MGs and 1 12.7 mm MG). The German pilots reported that it easily caught fire if hit from any direction.
Another Soviet "modern" aircraft was the LaGG-3, which in fact was inferior to the I-16 in many aspects. It was outclimbed, outmaneuvered and outgunned by the Bf-109. The Soviet fighter pilots nicknamed it Lakirovannyy Garantirovannyy Gron=Varnished Guaranteed Coffin.
Out of the new Soviet fighters, the only one that was comparable to the Bf-109 was the Yak-1. but unfortunately for the Soviets only a small number of these were available on 22 June 1941.

During the war, the Axis airmen were submitted to countless attacks on their airfields by the VVS, but none proved to have devastating effects. Not even when the Soviets had a huge air superiority. As for the new fighters taking care of the Bf-109s, permit me to laugh…

Besides that the claim is completely unsupported by evidence, it completely ignores the international situation in 1941. BTW, the T-34 in 1941-42 had also inferior optics when compared to Germans. How could they attack even in 1942?

So far you have failed to provide any substantial evidence that the Soviets were going to attack in 1941. Common sense tells us that Stalin was going to wait. As the war progressed, the Soviets only grew stronger.

Actually you are wrong. On 22nd June in the Odesssa military district there were 21 divisions and in the 18th army, which was also facing Hungary, were 9 divisions. Against Germany there were a lot more divisions.

I read this somewhere, I don't have the actual numbers. But I was referring to the mechanized forces and the best the VVS could offer. I never said that the majority of the infantry divisions were concentrated in the southern part of the frontier. Anyway looks like my source was wrong.

[Victor]

Destroy the oil supplies and even if the Germans had some quantities stored (according to Halder not that much) its war machine will stop: the reserves they had would vanish and no more stocks would be added since the route from Romania would be cut-off.

You seem to forget one small detail: they would actually have to get to the oil fields I order to take them.

The 18th Army existed at that time only under the name, it had no troops attached. On the other hand, the 9th Army was formed from the Odessa MD under the command of Col-Gen Tcherevitchenko. It was composed of 3 Rifle Corps, 2 Mechanised Corps and 1 Calvalry Corps. All in all, about 3,000 tanks. I guess that this army alone was able to conquer Romania or, at least, the fuel plants. It was the strongest Army in USSR at that time.

Do you actually have any idea of how many troops it had to face? Or are you just guessing.
There were: 14 infantry divisions, 6 cavalry brigades, 4 mountain brigades (these brigades were the size of an Italian division), 1 armored division, 1 frontier-guard division, 2 fortification brigades plus at least 6 infantry divisions in reserve, several frontier-guard regiments etc, etc. And these are only the Romanian forces. There was also the German 11th Army there. Not to mention Fliegerkorps IV.

It is higly possible. On the other hand, 797 tanks were counted only in the 2 Mech Corps. I would like to know how many tanks were already in the 3 Rifle Corps and in the Cavalry Corps. Even if none was available at that time, 800 tanks is a lot compared to the Romanian Army.

How many of these were T-34s? How many could withstand a direct hit from a 37 or a 47 mm AT gun? I really don't think there were that many that could. The Romanian Army was well equipped for fighting in 1941.

Right, It was so never caught with its pants down that it had no winter clothing for its men after six months of combat, its intelligence network in USSR was so poor that the Wehrmacht discovered only after June 22nd that there were some armies concentating behind the main line of defense (i.e. 16th, 19th, 20th, etc.)

You didn't get or didn't want to get my point. Through "caught with the pants down" Reigo meant that the Soviets were not deployed for war, many soldiers were on leave (it was Sunday), some units were not fully mobilized etc. If the Germans wouldn't have decided to attack, they would have started building defenses on the frontier with the SU. They wouldn't be caught in the same situation as the Soviets were.

Each Soviet Rifle Corps had 9 Rifle Regiments and 8 Artillery Regiments. It has twice as much Artillery Regiments in each of its Corps that the Wehrmacht had. So how about the firepower???

It's no use comparing apples with oranges. What part of division didn't you understand? A corps doesn't have a fixed structure. It could vary from 2 to even 5 divisions. It can also have additional artillery regiments included. But you missed the point. Comparing units with the same name (i. e. regiments, divisions)from different armies can be tricky, because of the different organization. Also, included in a divisions firepower, are the mortars, AT guns, MGs. The caliber of the guns is also important. I know that a German infantry division had 3 infantry and 2 artillery regiments.

[Victor]

Note: I write the big posts offline I I can't afford to be online all day). This is why it appears I am behind your replies. You might say a have a lag