Hi Omeganian. As always, nice to hear from you. ... Gorodetsky used numerous sources in addition to Zhukoff in his book. Gorodetsky did not fully dismiss Hitler's anti-Bolshevik motivation, but did speculate that Hitler might have not made his decision to invade the Soviet Union until after Molotoff's visit in late 1940. However, Hitler did invade and Gorodetsky extensively covers how Stalin sought to avoid or delay war with Germany. Gorodetsky's book covered Stalin's manoeuvres extensively, but not necessarily Hitler's motivations, except for contemporary speculations from Germans, Russians, British, Bulgarians, Turks, etc., including diplomatic, secret service, and military sources.
Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
From the above link:
Historians of Soviet foreign policy and the Second World War will welcome the arrival of Garbriel Gorodetsky's Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, the first study of Soviet decision-making between the Nazi-Soviet pact and the outbreak of the German-Soviet war to be based upon thorough research in Soviet as well as western archives. This is often an insightful and thought-provoking book that fills an important gap in the existing literature on the origins of the terrible struggle between Hitlers Germany and the USSR.
Gorodetsky's stated aim is twofold. First, he seeks to discredit further the "preventative war" thesis popularized in works such as Victor Suvorov's Icebreaker: Who started the Second World War? (London, 1990). Gorodetsky has already published extensively on this question and has succeeded admirably in revealing Suvorov's case (and that of like-minded German-speaking authors) as a tissue of speculation and distortion. It therefore comes as no surprise that Grand Delusion further undermines the flimsy edifice of right-wing revisionist works on the roots of operation "Barbarossa". Accordingly, this review will concentrate on Gorodetsky's other objective, namely, his painstaking effort to explain Stalin's policy toward Nazi Germany in this period, a policy that culminated in the Red Army being caught unprepared by the German onslaught of 22 June 1941.
Gorodetsky sets about this task by offering a very detailed look at the actual conduct of Soviet, German, and British diplomacy between the invasion of Poland and the start of "Barbarossa". His approach is very similar to that of Donald Cameron Watt in How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (London, 1989), which Gorodetsky praises in his introduction. At the same time, he provides the reader with exhaustive documentation on the intelligence flowing to Stalin from myriad sources, including his foreign ministry, the NKGB and Soviet military intelligence (the GRU). Gorodetsky maintains that when we place this intelligence in its elaborate diplomatic context, Stalin's decisions - long derided by western historians as colossal blunders - become much easier to understand. According to Gorodetsky, Stalin's intelligence about Hitlers intentions and military preparations was far from unambiguous, and tended, catastrophically, to reinforce his quite rational assumptions about Germany's aims and probable course of action. Stalin belatedly recognized the scale of the German threat and took steps to prepare the Red Army for the worst. At the same time, however, he clung desperately to the hope that he could avoid war by appeasement, and this delusion hamstrung the Soviet military's efforts to make ready for the onslaught up to the very last moment.
Gorodetsky's argument largely discounts the role of ideology in shaping either Stalin's or Hitlers actions, and unfolds thematically and chronologically in the following manner. Stalin, whose main concern was the security of Soviet Russia, scored a major success in the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This success was shattered, however, by Germany's unexpectedly swift victory over France, which demonstrated the superiority of the Wehrmacht. Faced with such a dramatic shift in the balance of power, Stalin reacted by occupying the Baltic states as a buffer zone, and by attempting to negotiate a new power-sharing relationship with Hitler. The Soviet leaders objectives were to keep the peace with Germany and at the same time to gain control of the Danube estuary against Russia would fall, for none of these historians questions the seriousness of Hitlers interest in the East.
Most readers who are familiar with the extensive literature on Hitlers foreign policy will find Gorodetsky's case less than convincing. It is hamstrung by his failure to take the pre-war history of Nazi Germany into account, especially Hitler's relationship with the armed forces and his decision for war in 1939. Gorodetsky simply does not deal with German motives for the Nazi-Soviet pact, or with Hitlers explanations of the pact at the time:
Alles was ich unternehme, ist gegen Rußland gerichtet; wenn der Westen zu dumm und blind ist, um dies zu begreifen, werde ich gezwungen sein, mich mit den Russen zu verständigen, den Westen zu schlagen, und dann nach seiner Niederlage mich mit meinem versammelten Kräften gegen die Sowjetunion zu wenden.
(Everything I undertake is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I will be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians, strike the West, and then after its defeat turn with my assembled forces against the Soviet Union.)
Hitler never considered the Nazi-Soviet pact to be anything but a "marriage of convenience" (Vernunftehe), and the step-by-step appearance of the Barbarossa decision should not be interpreted simply in the light of immediate diplomatic circumstances. There is no scope in this review for a detailed comparison of multiple studies, but Jürgen Förster's balanced account, which takes the entire sweep of Hitlers foreign policy into consideration, answers Gorodetsky's objections to "ideological" interpretations perfectly well. This is perhaps particularly true of Gorodetsky's claims regarding the primacy of the Balkans in Hitlers thinking.
Happily, Gorodetsky's treatment of Hitlers decision does not prejudice the balance of Grand Delusion, which offers a very valuable discussion of the final weeks before the outbreak of war. Gorodetsky has left no stone unturned in his quest to understand the information flowing to Stalin, and his blending of dozens of sources into a smooth and convincing narrative is very deft indeed. Using documents in many cases brought to light for the first time from a plethora of archives (Russian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, British, Swedish, French and American) Gorodetsky demonstrates the often equivocal character of the reports that came to Stalin from his best informed sources, including Maisky, Golikov (head of the GRU), Dekanozov (the Soviet ambassador in Berlin) and Beria himself. Often, these reports contained highly accurate raw intelligence about the nature of German deployments, together with soothing predictions about German intentions. Beria, for example, gave Stalin a very detailed description of German deployments on 2 June 1941 which nevertheless concluded:
With the capture of Crete the next stage of the Anglo-German war will come to an end. If Germany really wants to start a war against the Soviet Union, then it will probably be the result of an Anglo-German agreement which will lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities between Germany and England (pp. 275-76).
Gorodetsky also illustrates how German disinformation (which flowed from the highest levels of the Reich government) dovetailed with the misleading anti-war machinations of the German ambassador, von der Schulenburg. Gorodetsky's discussion of Soviet-British diplomacy is particularly good, and shows emphatically how mutual suspicion fed Stalins misperceptions of British maneuvers, even when Churchill was intent upon helping him. Gorodetsky reminds us that there was in fact a consistent element of deception in British approaches to Stalin, the best example of which was the attempt to accentuate Soviet fears of a peace between Germany and Britain in the wake of Hess flight.
None of this to say the Gorodetsky excuses Stalin for clinging to his delusions even after the German attack had begun, or for creating the general climate of terrified toadyism that led to such a profound distortion of his intelligence in the first place. The last two chapters of the book are largely devoted to demonstrating how Stalin confounded Timoshenko and Zhukov in their attempts fully to mobilize and deploy the Red Army to meet the coming blow. Gorodetsky levels the blame for Soviet unpreparedness squarely where it belongs with Stalin. Nevertheless, the book ends on an oddly equivocal and somewhat contradictory note, for Gorodetsky finishes by asserting that there was ultimately little that Stalin could have done to improve the overall strategic position of the USSR:
Stalin's failure to prepare for the German onslaught primarily reflected the unappealing political choices which the Soviet Union faced before the outbreak of the Second World War, and even more so on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It was however aggravated by Stalin's self-deception and miscalculation, a reflection of his authoritarian rule. And yet, even with hindsight, it is hard to devise alternatives which Stalin could have safely pursued. If he had made a pre-emptive strike, the blow would at best have been softened but definitely not averted.
If nothing else, this statement seems to contradict his very strong statements about the (false) inevitability of Hitlers decision to turn east. It is also worth remembering (as Gorodetsky himself points out) that one of the crucial stumbling blocs to better Soviet-British relations prior to Barbarossa was Molotov's demand that Britain recognize the annexation of the Baltic states. Stalin's problems with Britain were, to an extent, of his own making, and he had greater flexibility than Gorodetsky's closing remarks would seem to imply.
There are minor stylistic and editing problems in Grand Delusion. Gorodetsky's diction is not always clear, but most of these shortcomings reflect badly on the Yale University Press rather than the author. There is consistent trouble with German names ("Jödl" instead of "Jodl", "von Schulenburg" instead of "von der Schulenburg", "Ueberschör" for "Ueberschär", "von Paulus" instead of "Paulus"). There is also an inconvenient inconsistency in the citation of sources, in that some works cited in the notes do not appear in the bibliography.
On balance, Grand Delusion is a valuable work. Greater attention to the background development of foreign policy, particularly with respect to Germany, would have strengthened the book, but Gorodetsky's ambitious reach has not exceeded his grasp. His contribution to the "preventative war" debate, though not discussed in this review, is commendable, but more important, Gorodetsky has offered a detailed and revealing look at Soviet decision-making on the eve of operation "Barbarossa".
Due to outstanding work commitments the author has not yet been able to respond to this review
September 2009
Here's another excellent book on Stalin:
Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar
Excerpt from the above link:
The most fascinating chapters in this fascinating biography deal with Stalin's actions during the war with Germany. The motives behind his 1939 deal with Hitler are not delved into, but there is ample evidence of his unwillingness to believe a steady stream of intelligence, Soviet as well as Western, that his Nazi partner was about to attack him. Afterward he privately admitted that he had been wrong: ''When you're trying to make a decision, NEVER put yourself into the mind of the other person because if you do, you can make a terrible mistake.'' Apparently he had reasoned that if he were in Hitler's shoes he would not have invaded a country that assured him of a stable Eastern front, while supplying him with the raw materials he needed for his assault on Britain and its empire.
Once he had overcome his shock, Stalin took personal charge of the war effort, bullying and cajoling everyone including his generals but, unlike Hitler, in the end always acquiescing to their advice. Montefiore's biography leaves no doubt that his leadership was essential to Soviet victory both in organizing Russia's defenses and in sustaining public morale. But it was a victory that, in good measure, was gained by the unstinting expenditure of Red Army lives. Stalin emerged from the war utterly exhausted and more than ever convinced of his infallibility.
As an American raised during the Cold War, I've never really considered Hitler a danger to the U.S. He was a danger to American troops sent to Europe to fight the Nazis, but the Germans were incapable of invading the U.S. due to logistics. The Soviet Union subverted America's strategic interests, especially during Lenin's and Trotsky's time and later after WWII, due mainly to the U.S. post-war occupation of western Europe. The biggest danger to America from the Soviet Union occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis, given that it materialized in the Western Hemisphere to counter-balance the nuclear face-off in Europe. ... Therefore, due to anti-Soviet indoctrination throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s within America, I'm more ideologically inclined to believe the Soviet Union was more of a threat to America's strategic interests than were the Nazis. Consequently, I would love to find out that the evil Stalin had planned to invade Germany all along and that Hitler's blitzkrieg was in fact a preemptive strike required by the Soviet military buildup in the 1930s. However, Hitler's invasion was preemptive only for the purposes of establishing his own backyard colonization of the Ukraine for economic purposes before Stalin's military expansion made the blitzkrieg un-militarily feasible.
I agree with 1st Calvary regarding Stalin's support of world revolution during the Spanish Civil War. To further explain what I was saying in 1st Calvary's quote: For Lenin, world revolution was priority
No. 1; For Stalin, socialism in one country was priority
No. 1 and world revolution was priority
No. 2. To Stalin, the primary objective for world revolution was to counter the encirclement and potential capitalist invasion of the Soviet Union, a slight modification by Stalin of Lenin's ideology which would have left the Soviet Union overextended by relying more on foreign revolutions instead of internal revolutions.
On the Final Victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.
Excerpt:
...the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the working class of our country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This concerns the sphere of external, international relations.
Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our country?
Can our working class and our peasantry, by their own efforts, without the serious assistance of the working class in capitalist countries, overcome the bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words :
Can we regard the victory of Socialism in our country as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, assuming that Socialism is victorious only in one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues to exist?
Such are the problems that are connected with the second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.
Leninism answers these problems in the negative.
Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" (c.f. resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).
This means that the serious assistance of the international proletariat is a force without which the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one country cannot be solved.
This, of course, does not mean that we must sit with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside.
On the contrary, this assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilise the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.
This is what Lenin says on this score :
"We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military organization." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P. 122.)
And further :
"We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from invasion." (Collected Works, Vol. 27. P. 117.)
This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able to speak.
On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in "Problems of Leninism" that :
"The final victory of Socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and that means against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital.
"Hence the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of Socialism," (Problems of Leninism, 1937. P. 134.)
Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think that our external enemies, the fascists, for example, will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt at a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. Only blind braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the vigilance of our people can think like that.
No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention, the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet system in the districts they occupied and restore the bourgeois system.
Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak?
Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilise the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.
Can the victory of Socialism in one country be regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, and if it is not fully guaranteed against the danger of intervention and restoration?
Clearly, it cannot, This is the position in regard to the question of the victory of Socialism in one country.
It follows that this question contains two different problems :
1. The problem of the internal relations in our country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete Socialism; and
2. The problem of the external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration.
We have already solved the first problem, for our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism has already been built in the main. This is what we call the victory of Socialism, or, to be more exact, the victory of Socialist Construction in one country.
We could say that this victory is final if our country were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded by numerous capitalist countries.
But as we are not living on an island but "in a system of States," a considerable number of which are hostile to the land of Socialism and create the danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our country is not yet final.
But from this it follows that the second problem is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved.
More than that : the second problem cannot be solved in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., solely by the efforts of our country.
The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people.
The international proletarian ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organized in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organized; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.
The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise . . .
From your letter it is evident that Comrade Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist opinions. He, it appears, asserts that "we now have the final victory of Socialism and full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."
There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong.
Comrade Urozhenko's assertion can be explained only by his failure to understand the surrounding reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited young bureaucrat.
If it is true that "we have full guarantee against intervention and restoration of capitalism," then why do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Society, more and stronger ties with the international proletariat?
Would it not be better to spend the milliards that now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether?
People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous to it because by their boastfulness they - willingly or unwillingly (it makes no difference!) - lull the vigilance of our people, demobilise the workers and peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise in the event of international complications.
As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade Ivanov, have been "removed from propaganda work and the question has been raised of your fitness to remain in the Y.C.L.," you have nothing to fear.
If the people in the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L. really want to imitate Chekov's Sergeant Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will lose on this game.
Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country.
Now you can judge whether the passage from the book "Problems of Leninism" on the victory of Socialism in one country is out of date or not.
I myself would very much like it to be out of date.
I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant things still exist.
(Signed) J. Stalin.
February 12, 1938.
Pravda
14 February 1938
The next link is from 1943. It shows Stalin disassociating himself from world revolution, but this was due to the appeasing of his capitalist allies fighting against Hitler. However, after the defeat of the Nazis, Stalin returned to his "socialism in one country"-defended-by-world-revolution concept, somewhat similar to the above 1938 excerpt.
Moscow Dissolves Communist International
Globalization41.