Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

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Omeganian
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1126

Post by Omeganian » 06 Oct 2013, 18:47

Globalization41 wrote:Throughout his career, Stalin in general used standard chess strategy, i.e., consolidate one's opening position before expanding outward, overextended expensive pieces are vulnerable to attacks from cheap pawns, and, with the advantage in material, simply exchange pieces until winning. Hitler disrupted Stalin's strategy in 1941, which was still several years from consolidation.
Stalin had seven times as many tanks as Hitler, twenty thousand planes and over five million armed men. Why would it be insufficient? Even more importantly, why would Stalin believe it was insufficient? The offense was played out on the maps in January 1941, and worked out quite well despite the massive exaggeration of German force.
Stalin's brand of isolationism could be either temporary or permanent. The defenseless Baltic States became available and Stalin snatched them. They weren't far away; they weren't vast; they had few natural obstacles. If Hitler had been picked off by a sniper while in the trenches during WWI, and if Europe had adopted a pacifist and liberal system, then Stalin could have "swallowed" more, depending on his situational progress toward consolidation of his starting position through the "socialism in one country" concept at any given time.
And Hitler was engaged against Britain (supported by the USA) and was dealing with constant internal rebellion. Sounds pretty defenseless to me.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1127

Post by Globalization41 » 06 Oct 2013, 20:05

Operational inefficiency due to poor leadership skills greatly attenuated the Soviet superiority in numbers of men and equipment. ... Britain was only a minor nuisance to Hitler. The British expeditionary force in France was easily defeated by a German diversionary attack before the main offensive against the French was launched. ... A small German detachment sent to Tripoli, for defensive purposes only, quickly pushed the British back to Egypt. ... Hitler diverted a couple or three German divisions from the massive build up on the Eastern Front to secure Yugoslavia and Greece. ... The British retreat from Greece turned out to be a second Dunkerque. The British inflicted heavy losses on the Germans in Crete, but these numbers were small compared to the forces assembling against the Soviet Union. ... U.S. material and moral support for Britain amounted to very little until Pearl Harbor resulted in Congress giving Roosevelt a blank check to fund industrial armaments production and expand the military, which did not begin to affect the strategic situation until mid-to-late 1942.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1128

Post by Omeganian » 07 Oct 2013, 09:43

Globalization41 wrote:Operational inefficiency due to poor leadership skills greatly attenuated the Soviet superiority in numbers of men and equipment.
It is unclear how much it would have helped the Germans, with the first attacks being directed at vulnerable strategic resources. And no army responds well under a sudden attack, you know. Also, all the statements by Stalin (like at the conference in March 1940, after the Winter War) point at a simple fact - he did not believe in any Soviet shortcomings in this respect.
Britain was only a minor nuisance to Hitler.
The Bismarck cost more than all German tanks put together. Now, who destroyed it?
U.S. material and moral support for Britain amounted to very little until Pearl Harbor resulted in Congress giving Roosevelt a blank check to begin industrial armaments production, which did not begin to affect the strategic situation until mid to late 1942.
Well, Hitler stated outright in his letter to Mussolini that the entry of the USA into the war can change nothing, since it already supports their enemies with all possible resources. There are plenty of resources which are not armaments and which can shift the balance dramatically, and the lend-lease law was already in place.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1129

Post by Globalization41 » 07 Oct 2013, 19:20

Hi Omeganian. As always, nice to hear from you. ... Stalin hoped for a war of attrition between Hitler and the Allies in France, weakening both sides. He was overconfident in the Red Army's capabilities, even after Finland in 1940, but his strategic instincts led him to make incremental positional moves. He considered the Allies and the Nazis as threats, but he underestimated Hitler and overestimated the Allies. If he wanted to support the Allies in total war, the best time to launch an offensive would have been the Spring of 1940 while the bulk of the German Army was arrayed against France. ... But Stalin's hatred of the Allies blinded him to the danger of Hitler. Had he attacked in 1940, the French would have sat in their defensive bunkers just as they did in the Polish-German conflict. Stalin, and the rest of the world, did not know the French would fold up and collapse almost instantly when full-scale engagements began. Even Hitler was surprised. ... The Germans would have had to transfer units from the West to the East in the event of a Soviet surprise attack. Hitler would have been boxed in. ... The Red Army would have made some headway, but would have become overextended. How far would they have made it? The Germans were no pushovers. The offensive against the French would had to have been canceled. It's possible, however, Hitler would have been overthrown by panicky Generals. ... A Soviet intervention in 1938 or 1939 before September, coordinated with the Allies, would have been even better. But Stalin was just stringing the Allies along with any hints of a united effort. Besides, Poland knew from recent history in the Ukraine that letting the Soviets use Polish territory meant loss of freedom. ... The Nazi-Soviet Pact allowing the Red Army to occupy eastern Poland actually overextended and weakened the U.S.S.R. The Soviets had built up its defense lines facing Poland, but the Red Army moved forward to the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line. When the Germans attacked in 1941, the Soviets did not benefit from the permanent infrastructure painstakingly fabricated before September 1939. If Stalin had left his main forces behind these lines instead of moving them forward, the Red Army would have been better warned and positioned to defend against the Germans. ... Any time before the Spring of 1941 would have been better for Stalin to have intervened. But he wanted no part of the Germans. He was disappointed that the Allies and Yugoslavia didn't fight better and weaken Hitler's armies. ... A full-scale Soviet buildup was in progress, but not ready. ... Stalin assumed Hitler had the common sense to realize the Soviet Union would fight much harder than the French and thus failed to consider a German surprise attack. Zhukoff knew the Germans were about to attack, but Stalin said, it's not going to happen without Hitler making demands first, as the Fuhrer did in Poland. ... ... "The Bismarck cost more than all German tanks put together." I totally agree with the spirit of that statement, even if it were a slight exaggeration. Tanks, U-boats, or Stukas would have been a much better investment than the expensive Bismarck, which was easily neutralized by a cheap, obsolete torpedo bi-plane. Once the Bismarck was disabled, the British sent in every naval asset available to finish it off. However, that left Atlantic supply convoys unprotected while weakening defenses near the in-progress Battle of Crete. ... Hitler miscalculated when he claimed bringing the U.S. into the war would change nothing. Hitler and Mussolini lost the war on December 11, 1941, when Hitler declared war on the U.S. ... Congress authorized a blank check to Roosevelt, who then prosecuted the war to its logical conclusion, unconditional surrender. Switching from autos and washing machines, a fully mobilized U.S. war industry and mass production overwhelmed the Axis. Otherwise, Germany and the Soviet Union would have eventually stalemated.

Globalization41.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1130

Post by Omeganian » 08 Oct 2013, 14:10

Globalization41 wrote:If Stalin had left his main forces behind these lines instead of moving them forward, the Red Army would have been better warned and positioned to defend against the Germans.
Meaning that at the very least, no attack was expected.
Any time before the Spring of 1941 would have been better for Stalin to have intervened. But he wanted no part of the Germans.
Or his army wasn't mobilized yet.
Zhukoff knew the Germans were about to attack
His first wartime order doesn't give that impression

http://www.fotomaterial.narod.ru/Source ... iveno2.jpg

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1131

Post by Globalization41 » 08 Oct 2013, 16:41

Stalin, as I've been saying all along, did not expect Hitler to order an attack. Stalin was worried the German Generals would launch a military action on their own, as the Japanese Generals were prone to do in East Asia. ... Whatever the Red Army's state of deployment, strength in numbers and equipment, or reported mobilization on paper, they were not ready to fight the Germans in 1941 judging from their performance throughout the Summer. The Germans knew what they were doing; the Russians didn't. The Soviets learned from the school of hard knocks, just as the U.S. did from its initial engagements with the Germans. ... Hitler was a military buff with leadership skills who loved war. Stalin ruled more out of fear motivation which did not automatically convert to military operational efficiency. Clues for the above observations are taken from the German victories in 1941. ... Zhukoff lucked out in surviving the purges. His military tactical efficiency exceeded Stalin's, but not by much. Zhukoff did not participate in Soviet politics or attempts to negotiate with Hitler. German concentrations on the Soviet border were well known to Zhukoff (as a front-line commander who believed the Germans would attack), to Stalin (who's wishful thinking allowed him to believe he could avoid war), and to the rest of world as reported in the mass media. ... Zukhoff's first orders were straight from Stalin who was not convinced the invasion was more than an attempt by German Generals out to start a war on their own initiative without central authorization from Berlin. It was Molotoff, as finally authorized by Stalin a few hours after the start of the invasion, who gave the initial orders for the Soviet Union to defeat Hitler by engaging in total war.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1132

Post by Omeganian » 10 Oct 2013, 17:04

Zukhoff's first orders were straight from Stalin who was not convinced the invasion was more than an attempt by German Generals out to start a war on their own initiative without central authorization from Berlin. It was Molotoff, as finally authorized by Stalin a few hours after the start of the invasion, who gave the initial orders for the Soviet Union to defeat Hitler by engaging in total war.
Zhukov is big on shifting the blame to others, but even he didn't go so far as to claim the orders were literary dictated to him - which is the only thing which can, if just barely, explain the format of the order. No man who knows what's going on would have made such a mess.

The rest of your arguments are too difficult to analyze since you forgot to remove the pure speculation from them.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1133

Post by Globalization41 » 10 Oct 2013, 20:47

Hi Omeganian. Nice to hear from you, as always. ... It's not uncommon for high-level officials to shift blame away from themselves. Sometimes they're at fault; sometimes they're not. ... However, Zhukoff did admit later that his proposal to launch a preemptive strike before the invasion would not have worked. According to Zhukoff, the Red Army divisions taking part in his proposed preventative offensive, against strong, assembling German concentrations, would have been destroyed. ... Zhukoff was straining at the leash, but Stalin was holding him back in hopes of avoiding a provocation resulting in a German retaliation. Once Stalin realized a few hours after the German attack that it was real thing, then it was Stalin who wanted to counterattack at all costs while Zhukoff cautioned Stalin to avoid overextention via more defensive positioning. ... I disagree that I forgot to remove pure speculation from the bulk of my arguments. Instead, I arrived at logical conclusions based on historical facts from a variety of sources.

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1134

Post by Omeganian » 12 Oct 2013, 08:27

It's not uncommon for high-level officials to shift blame away from themselves.
Meaning we need something more than Zhukov's own words. Mind providing that?
Zhukoff was straining at the leash, but Stalin was holding him back in hopes of avoiding a provocation resulting in a German retaliation.
Evidence?
I disagree that I forgot to remove pure speculation from the bulk of my arguments. Instead, I arrived at logical conclusions based on historical facts from a variety of sources.
What sources? Why should they be trusted more than others?

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1135

Post by 1st Cavalry » 13 Oct 2013, 09:26

Globalization41 wrote: ... Stalin had already abandoned Lenin's "world revolution" ideology long ago for a "socialism in one country" concept.

Globalization41.
It certainly did not abandoned it during the spanish civil war .

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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1136

Post by Globalization41 » 14 Oct 2013, 06:43

Hi Omeganian. As always, nice to hear from you. ... Gorodetsky used numerous sources in addition to Zhukoff in his book. Gorodetsky did not fully dismiss Hitler's anti-Bolshevik motivation, but did speculate that Hitler might have not made his decision to invade the Soviet Union until after Molotoff's visit in late 1940. However, Hitler did invade and Gorodetsky extensively covers how Stalin sought to avoid or delay war with Germany. Gorodetsky's book covered Stalin's manoeuvres extensively, but not necessarily Hitler's motivations, except for contemporary speculations from Germans, Russians, British, Bulgarians, Turks, etc., including diplomatic, secret service, and military sources.

Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia

From the above link:
Historians of Soviet foreign policy and the Second World War will welcome the arrival of Garbriel Gorodetsky's Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, the first study of Soviet decision-making between the Nazi-Soviet pact and the outbreak of the German-Soviet war to be based upon thorough research in Soviet as well as western archives. This is often an insightful and thought-provoking book that fills an important gap in the existing literature on the origins of the terrible struggle between Hitlers Germany and the USSR.

Gorodetsky's stated aim is twofold. First, he seeks to discredit further the "preventative war" thesis popularized in works such as Victor Suvorov's Icebreaker: Who started the Second World War? (London, 1990). Gorodetsky has already published extensively on this question and has succeeded admirably in revealing Suvorov's case (and that of like-minded German-speaking authors) as a tissue of speculation and distortion. It therefore comes as no surprise that Grand Delusion further undermines the flimsy edifice of right-wing revisionist works on the roots of operation "Barbarossa". Accordingly, this review will concentrate on Gorodetsky's other objective, namely, his painstaking effort to explain Stalin's policy toward Nazi Germany in this period, a policy that culminated in the Red Army being caught unprepared by the German onslaught of 22 June 1941.

Gorodetsky sets about this task by offering a very detailed look at the actual conduct of Soviet, German, and British diplomacy between the invasion of Poland and the start of "Barbarossa". His approach is very similar to that of Donald Cameron Watt in How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (London, 1989), which Gorodetsky praises in his introduction. At the same time, he provides the reader with exhaustive documentation on the intelligence flowing to Stalin from myriad sources, including his foreign ministry, the NKGB and Soviet military intelligence (the GRU). Gorodetsky maintains that when we place this intelligence in its elaborate diplomatic context, Stalin's decisions - long derided by western historians as colossal blunders - become much easier to understand. According to Gorodetsky, Stalin's intelligence about Hitlers intentions and military preparations was far from unambiguous, and tended, catastrophically, to reinforce his quite rational assumptions about Germany's aims and probable course of action. Stalin belatedly recognized the scale of the German threat and took steps to prepare the Red Army for the worst. At the same time, however, he clung desperately to the hope that he could avoid war by appeasement, and this delusion hamstrung the Soviet military's efforts to make ready for the onslaught up to the very last moment.

Gorodetsky's argument largely discounts the role of ideology in shaping either Stalin's or Hitlers actions, and unfolds thematically and chronologically in the following manner. Stalin, whose main concern was the security of Soviet Russia, scored a major success in the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This success was shattered, however, by Germany's unexpectedly swift victory over France, which demonstrated the superiority of the Wehrmacht. Faced with such a dramatic shift in the balance of power, Stalin reacted by occupying the Baltic states as a buffer zone, and by attempting to negotiate a new power-sharing relationship with Hitler. The Soviet leaders objectives were to keep the peace with Germany and at the same time to gain control of the Danube estuary against Russia would fall, for none of these historians questions the seriousness of Hitlers interest in the East.

Most readers who are familiar with the extensive literature on Hitlers foreign policy will find Gorodetsky's case less than convincing. It is hamstrung by his failure to take the pre-war history of Nazi Germany into account, especially Hitler's relationship with the armed forces and his decision for war in 1939. Gorodetsky simply does not deal with German motives for the Nazi-Soviet pact, or with Hitlers explanations of the pact at the time:

Alles was ich unternehme, ist gegen Rußland gerichtet; wenn der Westen zu dumm und blind ist, um dies zu begreifen, werde ich gezwungen sein, mich mit den Russen zu verständigen, den Westen zu schlagen, und dann nach seiner Niederlage mich mit meinem versammelten Kräften gegen die Sowjetunion zu wenden.

(Everything I undertake is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I will be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians, strike the West, and then after its defeat turn with my assembled forces against the Soviet Union.)

Hitler never considered the Nazi-Soviet pact to be anything but a "marriage of convenience" (Vernunftehe), and the step-by-step appearance of the Barbarossa decision should not be interpreted simply in the light of immediate diplomatic circumstances. There is no scope in this review for a detailed comparison of multiple studies, but Jürgen Förster's balanced account, which takes the entire sweep of Hitlers foreign policy into consideration, answers Gorodetsky's objections to "ideological" interpretations perfectly well. This is perhaps particularly true of Gorodetsky's claims regarding the primacy of the Balkans in Hitlers thinking.

Happily, Gorodetsky's treatment of Hitlers decision does not prejudice the balance of Grand Delusion, which offers a very valuable discussion of the final weeks before the outbreak of war. Gorodetsky has left no stone unturned in his quest to understand the information flowing to Stalin, and his blending of dozens of sources into a smooth and convincing narrative is very deft indeed. Using documents in many cases brought to light for the first time from a plethora of archives (Russian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, British, Swedish, French and American) Gorodetsky demonstrates the often equivocal character of the reports that came to Stalin from his best informed sources, including Maisky, Golikov (head of the GRU), Dekanozov (the Soviet ambassador in Berlin) and Beria himself. Often, these reports contained highly accurate raw intelligence about the nature of German deployments, together with soothing predictions about German intentions. Beria, for example, gave Stalin a very detailed description of German deployments on 2 June 1941 which nevertheless concluded:

With the capture of Crete the next stage of the Anglo-German war will come to an end. If Germany really wants to start a war against the Soviet Union, then it will probably be the result of an Anglo-German agreement which will lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities between Germany and England (pp. 275-76).

Gorodetsky also illustrates how German disinformation (which flowed from the highest levels of the Reich government) dovetailed with the misleading anti-war machinations of the German ambassador, von der Schulenburg. Gorodetsky's discussion of Soviet-British diplomacy is particularly good, and shows emphatically how mutual suspicion fed Stalins misperceptions of British maneuvers, even when Churchill was intent upon helping him. Gorodetsky reminds us that there was in fact a consistent element of deception in British approaches to Stalin, the best example of which was the attempt to accentuate Soviet fears of a peace between Germany and Britain in the wake of Hess flight.

None of this to say the Gorodetsky excuses Stalin for clinging to his delusions even after the German attack had begun, or for creating the general climate of terrified toadyism that led to such a profound distortion of his intelligence in the first place. The last two chapters of the book are largely devoted to demonstrating how Stalin confounded Timoshenko and Zhukov in their attempts fully to mobilize and deploy the Red Army to meet the coming blow. Gorodetsky levels the blame for Soviet unpreparedness squarely where it belongs with Stalin. Nevertheless, the book ends on an oddly equivocal and somewhat contradictory note, for Gorodetsky finishes by asserting that there was ultimately little that Stalin could have done to improve the overall strategic position of the USSR:

Stalin's failure to prepare for the German onslaught primarily reflected the unappealing political choices which the Soviet Union faced before the outbreak of the Second World War, and even more so on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It was however aggravated by Stalin's self-deception and miscalculation, a reflection of his authoritarian rule. And yet, even with hindsight, it is hard to devise alternatives which Stalin could have safely pursued. If he had made a pre-emptive strike, the blow would at best have been softened but definitely not averted.

If nothing else, this statement seems to contradict his very strong statements about the (false) inevitability of Hitlers decision to turn east. It is also worth remembering (as Gorodetsky himself points out) that one of the crucial stumbling blocs to better Soviet-British relations prior to Barbarossa was Molotov's demand that Britain recognize the annexation of the Baltic states. Stalin's problems with Britain were, to an extent, of his own making, and he had greater flexibility than Gorodetsky's closing remarks would seem to imply.

There are minor stylistic and editing problems in Grand Delusion. Gorodetsky's diction is not always clear, but most of these shortcomings reflect badly on the Yale University Press rather than the author. There is consistent trouble with German names ("Jödl" instead of "Jodl", "von Schulenburg" instead of "von der Schulenburg", "Ueberschör" for "Ueberschär", "von Paulus" instead of "Paulus"). There is also an inconvenient inconsistency in the citation of sources, in that some works cited in the notes do not appear in the bibliography.

On balance, Grand Delusion is a valuable work. Greater attention to the background development of foreign policy, particularly with respect to Germany, would have strengthened the book, but Gorodetsky's ambitious reach has not exceeded his grasp. His contribution to the "preventative war" debate, though not discussed in this review, is commendable, but more important, Gorodetsky has offered a detailed and revealing look at Soviet decision-making on the eve of operation "Barbarossa".

Due to outstanding work commitments the author has not yet been able to respond to this review

September 2009
Here's another excellent book on Stalin:

Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar

Excerpt from the above link:
The most fascinating chapters in this fascinating biography deal with Stalin's actions during the war with Germany. The motives behind his 1939 deal with Hitler are not delved into, but there is ample evidence of his unwillingness to believe a steady stream of intelligence, Soviet as well as Western, that his Nazi partner was about to attack him. Afterward he privately admitted that he had been wrong: ''When you're trying to make a decision, NEVER put yourself into the mind of the other person because if you do, you can make a terrible mistake.'' Apparently he had reasoned that if he were in Hitler's shoes he would not have invaded a country that assured him of a stable Eastern front, while supplying him with the raw materials he needed for his assault on Britain and its empire.

Once he had overcome his shock, Stalin took personal charge of the war effort, bullying and cajoling everyone including his generals but, unlike Hitler, in the end always acquiescing to their advice. Montefiore's biography leaves no doubt that his leadership was essential to Soviet victory both in organizing Russia's defenses and in sustaining public morale. But it was a victory that, in good measure, was gained by the unstinting expenditure of Red Army lives. Stalin emerged from the war utterly exhausted and more than ever convinced of his infallibility.
As an American raised during the Cold War, I've never really considered Hitler a danger to the U.S. He was a danger to American troops sent to Europe to fight the Nazis, but the Germans were incapable of invading the U.S. due to logistics. The Soviet Union subverted America's strategic interests, especially during Lenin's and Trotsky's time and later after WWII, due mainly to the U.S. post-war occupation of western Europe. The biggest danger to America from the Soviet Union occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis, given that it materialized in the Western Hemisphere to counter-balance the nuclear face-off in Europe. ... Therefore, due to anti-Soviet indoctrination throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s within America, I'm more ideologically inclined to believe the Soviet Union was more of a threat to America's strategic interests than were the Nazis. Consequently, I would love to find out that the evil Stalin had planned to invade Germany all along and that Hitler's blitzkrieg was in fact a preemptive strike required by the Soviet military buildup in the 1930s. However, Hitler's invasion was preemptive only for the purposes of establishing his own backyard colonization of the Ukraine for economic purposes before Stalin's military expansion made the blitzkrieg un-militarily feasible.

I agree with 1st Calvary regarding Stalin's support of world revolution during the Spanish Civil War. To further explain what I was saying in 1st Calvary's quote: For Lenin, world revolution was priority No. 1; For Stalin, socialism in one country was priority No. 1 and world revolution was priority No. 2. To Stalin, the primary objective for world revolution was to counter the encirclement and potential capitalist invasion of the Soviet Union, a slight modification by Stalin of Lenin's ideology which would have left the Soviet Union overextended by relying more on foreign revolutions instead of internal revolutions.

On the Final Victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.

Excerpt:
...the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the working class of our country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This concerns the sphere of external, international relations.

Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our country?

Can our working class and our peasantry, by their own efforts, without the serious assistance of the working class in capitalist countries, overcome the bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words :

Can we regard the victory of Socialism in our country as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, assuming that Socialism is victorious only in one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues to exist?

Such are the problems that are connected with the second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the negative.

Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" (c.f. resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

This means that the serious assistance of the international proletariat is a force without which the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one country cannot be solved.

This, of course, does not mean that we must sit with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside.

On the contrary, this assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilise the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.

This is what Lenin says on this score :

"We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military organization." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P. 122.)

And further :

"We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from invasion." (Collected Works, Vol. 27. P. 117.)

This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able to speak.

On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in "Problems of Leninism" that :

"The final victory of Socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and that means against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital.

"Hence the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of Socialism," (Problems of Leninism, 1937. P. 134.)

Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think that our external enemies, the fascists, for example, will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt at a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. Only blind braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the vigilance of our people can think like that.

No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention, the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet system in the districts they occupied and restore the bourgeois system.

Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak?

Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilise the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Can the victory of Socialism in one country be regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, and if it is not fully guaranteed against the danger of intervention and restoration?

Clearly, it cannot, This is the position in regard to the question of the victory of Socialism in one country.

It follows that this question contains two different problems :

1. The problem of the internal relations in our country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete Socialism; and

2. The problem of the external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration.

We have already solved the first problem, for our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism has already been built in the main. This is what we call the victory of Socialism, or, to be more exact, the victory of Socialist Construction in one country.

We could say that this victory is final if our country were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded by numerous capitalist countries.

But as we are not living on an island but "in a system of States," a considerable number of which are hostile to the land of Socialism and create the danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our country is not yet final.

But from this it follows that the second problem is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved.

More than that : the second problem cannot be solved in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., solely by the efforts of our country.

The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people.

The international proletarian ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organized in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organized; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.

The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise . . .

From your letter it is evident that Comrade Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist opinions. He, it appears, asserts that "we now have the final victory of Socialism and full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong.

Comrade Urozhenko's assertion can be explained only by his failure to understand the surrounding reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited young bureaucrat.

If it is true that "we have full guarantee against intervention and restoration of capitalism," then why do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Society, more and stronger ties with the international proletariat?

Would it not be better to spend the milliards that now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether?

People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous to it because by their boastfulness they - willingly or unwillingly (it makes no difference!) - lull the vigilance of our people, demobilise the workers and peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise in the event of international complications.

As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade Ivanov, have been "removed from propaganda work and the question has been raised of your fitness to remain in the Y.C.L.," you have nothing to fear.

If the people in the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L. really want to imitate Chekov's Sergeant Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will lose on this game.

Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country.

Now you can judge whether the passage from the book "Problems of Leninism" on the victory of Socialism in one country is out of date or not.

I myself would very much like it to be out of date.

I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant things still exist.

(Signed) J. Stalin.
February 12, 1938.

Pravda
14 February 1938
The next link is from 1943. It shows Stalin disassociating himself from world revolution, but this was due to the appeasing of his capitalist allies fighting against Hitler. However, after the defeat of the Nazis, Stalin returned to his "socialism in one country"-defended-by-world-revolution concept, somewhat similar to the above 1938 excerpt.

Moscow Dissolves Communist International

Globalization41.

Omeganian
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1137

Post by Omeganian » 14 Oct 2013, 21:13

Globalization41 wrote:Hi Omeganian. As always, nice to hear from you. ... Gorodetsky used numerous sources in addition to Zhukoff in his book. Gorodetsky did not fully dismiss Hitler's anti-Bolshevik motivation, but did speculate that Hitler might have not made his decision to invade the Soviet Union until after Molotoff's visit in late 1940. However, Hitler did invade and Gorodetsky extensively covers how Stalin sought to avoid or delay war with Germany. Gorodetsky's book covered Stalin's manoeuvres extensively, but not necessarily Hitler's motivations, except for contemporary speculations from Germans, Russians, British, Bulgarians, Turks, etc., including diplomatic, secret service, and military sources.
You know, the mere existence of Gorodetsky's book is a powerful argument in my favor. Because if a man who wants to refute Suvorov somehow gets access to a lot of top secret documents, that means the guy really touched someone's sore spot. Mind you, the man is a foreigner with somewhat problematic knowledge of Russian, but native writers aren't trusted in Russia; their agenda is too well known.

As for the books... here are excerpts from a review for the "Icebreaker's Myth" (By Zeev Bar Sela.), Russian edition"
Gorotesky's refutal: "The documents of the German intel, quoted later, are definitively proving that the deployment of the Soviet forces had a defensive character and posed no threat to the Wehrmacht." (pg 10). Page 29 states "see pg 115-119". In other words, there is a promise to quote some documents which shatter Suvorov's arguments. We open the book at these pages - no documents are quoted nor referenced. There is only a note that "even Paulus, who would have loved to present such data in Nuremberg, had to admit reluctantly that "no facts have reached our field of vision which would point at Soviet Union's preparation to attack"" (pg 117)

I, unlike Gorodetsky, do not know what was supposed to make the former Field Marshal sad or happy, but I know with certainty, that long before the Nuremberg Trials (in 1943) Paulus fell into Soviet captivity, became a leader of the National Committee for a Free Germany, was a captive at the moment of the trials and remained one for many years afterwards (a strangely light fate for the man who developed the Barbarossa plan - O.). If the evidence of such a witness (unsupported by any document) are considered a proof by Gorodetsky - whatever.

However, as Gorodetsky notes, all the other German generals in Nuremberg insisted that the Wehrmact did expect a Soviet attack. However, these redundant statements are brushed off by Gorodetsky without a problem - "the favorable circumstances of the Cold War". After wards he notes in cold blood "But the archive materials are evidence that the German intel provided no such data". No references to archive materials are given. And where would they come from? All the materials of the OKW are in the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense and were never given to any western historian.

In an interview Gorodetsky gives most interesting data about the Komintern. First, he states that he looked through all of the Komintern's archives.

The Komintern existed from 1919 to 1943. Try to imagine how many papers were written in 24 years of hard work. Besides, it worked by sections. I can assume the language of the German, American or Palestinian sections is available to Gorodetsky, but I dare not insist he understands the materials of the Japanese or Chinese sections as freely. Most likely, Gorodetsky has no idea about the nature nor scale of the Komintern's work, nor, therefore, of the volume of the materials. But that's just a note. Out of all the documents he gives but a single one - an unpublished diary of Georgy Dimitrov. From reading this diary, he comes to the conclusion that Stalin wanted to dissolve Komintern. Without Komintern, there can be no revolutionary war - therefore, Suvorov is wrong.

The ability to read and to understand what you read are as different as looking and seeing. And Stalin told Dimitrov the following: "the Communist parties should be completely independent, not K.I. sections. They should turn into national parties, under different names - worker party, Marxist party etc. The name is irrelevant. What's important is for them to infiltrate their nation and concentrate on their own particular tasks." What are they talking about? The national Communist parties, long since discredited as Moscow agents, should infiltrate (pay attention to the term - infiltrate) the political life of their countries. What for? So that when a certain country is occupied, the Red Army won't look like an invader. The example of Finland is an obvious one - the old Moscow man Otto Kuusinen announced he establishes the Finnish Democratic Republic and called for Soviet help. That's all.

In an interview, Gorodetsky claims he also has the protocols of the very Politburo conference where Stalin has harshly rejected Zhukov and Timoshenko's plans for a preventive attack, and even threatened to shoot Timoshenko. If it's true - Suvorov's position is problematic. Is it true? Depends on the source, and the source is no protocol, but a note given to Gorodetsky by Lev Bezymensky, which is signed by General N. Paschenko, who was told about this conference by Timoshenko (LOL). When was the note written, what and when did Timoshenko told, did he at all - all of that is questionable. We should only remember that both him and Zhukov shared the responsibility for the beginning of the war with Stalin, and had to give some justifications after his death. In any case, Gorodetsky either has trouble remembering what he wrote, or understanding what a document is.

We can talk for awhile about all the problems with the book - plenty of material; 350 pages. But let's stop on a single one - about Stalin's speech before the military academies' graduates on May the 5th 1941. There are several variants of the speech. Gorodetsky thinks for a long time how to compromise, and finally comes to a stunning conclusion - Stalin, it appears, has read three speeches before three groups of graduates. I an give a small note; there one speech, but it had two parts. The first part was published immediately, the second, secret - never. The second part was the one containing the famous words that "our policy of peace and security is, at the same time, the policy of preparing for war. There is no defense without offense. We must raise our army in the spirit of offense. We must prepare for war" I know it because one of the people present was my father.

But for Gorodetsky, the idea of three different speeches is not enough - he thinks he caught Suvorov himself by the arm. He states as much in an interview - forgery, from the word "counteroffensive" Suvorov leaves out the "counter" part, and what remains is "offensive"!

Here is how he states it in the book (pg 293)"

"The reader must pay attention that Stalin repeats several times the word "offensive" (nastupleniye) meaning a counterattack, that is, the opposite of "attack" (napadeniye) which would have meant a war starting by personal initiative".

For a man knowing Russian there are no puzzles here: "offensive" - is an offensive, "counteroffensive" - a counteroffensive, but an "attack" - that's not an offensive. People are attacking us (Germany, for example), but we - we attack no one, we - conduct an offensive.

One shouldn't discuss Russian without knowing it. No matter how much one wants to.

Gorodetsky is no rival to Suvorov. He's no rival to anyone. He writes about war without having military education, about archives without reading them... What forced him to start this pointless task? First of all, of course, it's nice - the same Soviet colleagues who formerly turned their backs, are now turning their other side. They give documents. And if they don't want to give, they claim there aren't any. And why shouldn't one trust them? ("there is no reason not to trust Dmitry Volkogonov, who ... attests that ... there were no documents showing hostile intentions of Stalin toward Germany" - pg 18). Second, of course, Gorodetsky has his own interest - it is inconvenient for a Russian historian to defend Stalin, but for an Israeli Jew - that's just the thing. Doesn't matter who he is. Especially if he's one of their own.

"Suvorov chose an intellectual organ of white emigrants in order to start a crusade against..."

"During the Cold War it was customary to assume that Stalin consistently led an ideologized policy, targeted toward starting a war... Suvorov, of course, studied ... the Marxism-Leninism course, and that makes his false interpretation of the basic Marxist positions all the more surprising."

"Suvorov waves about the bugbear of Communism... the Cold War historians used this method, scaring the West"

I would say the eternally frozen ground of the Socialist Israel, is, it seems, the only place where such a leftover could have been preserved.

Globalization41
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

#1138

Post by Globalization41 » 15 Oct 2013, 06:58

Hi Omeganian. Nice to hear from you, as always. ... I didn't really see Gorodetsky's book as an amendment or change of history, but more as a supplementary explanation of strategic manoeuvrings between Hitler and Stalin. I've always felt that Stalin was given a free pass. To me, Stalin used every dictator trick available to fool Hitler, but Hitler wanted to set up a land-locked, backyard empire, instead of a logistically difficult empire across sea lanes. Hitler mistrusted and hated the Bolsheviks from early on. ... Empires were fashionable back in those days. ... Look at the British. They fed information to a neutral America that Hitler wanted to occupy South America and replace the bible with Mien Kampf. They tried to "frame a guilty man." ... Churchill aided the criminal Soviets by sacrificing the Baltic States. He accused Hitler of crimes in Poland known to have been committed by Stalin. ... Herbert Hoover, ex-U.S. President, said on June 29, 1941, on national radio, "If we go further and join the war and we win, then we have won for Stalin the grip of communism on Russia and more opportunity for it to extend over the world," further explaining, "We should at least cease to tell our sons that they would be giving their lives to restore democracy and freedom to the world." ... Suvorov makes excellent points. Luckily his book is available online and I've linked to it below. I think if Hitler had went all out for the British Isles, the Straits of Gibraltar, Malta, North Africa, and on towards Iraq and Iran while extending the 1939 Pact with the Soviets, Stalin would have strengthened the Red Army to the point that a "cold war" would have developed between Hitler and Stalin. The Germans would have needed who knows how many divisions to check Stalin's expansionism. Stalin would have filled any void available. ... If you haven't read Gorodetsky's book, Omeganian, I highly recommend it. Believe it or not, he does provide many supplementary facts. It's not necessary for me if he doesn't criticize Stalin or Hitler, but I'll be more than happy to read Suvorov's anti-Stalin indictments. The political cartoon on the front of Suvorov's book says it all.

Icebreaker: Who Started the Second War?

Globalization41.

ljadw
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#1139

Post by ljadw » 28 Oct 2013, 13:01

Everyone knows that Suvurov is an imposter and a charlatan.

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LWD
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Re: Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?

#1140

Post by LWD » 28 Oct 2013, 14:31

ljadw wrote:Everyone knows that Suvurov is an imposter and a charlatan.
Unfortunately your are not correct here. Almost everyone should know that at this point but some have drunk the kool aid.

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