Yes. Not that Creveld is the final authority on everything, but he is one of very few historians who pay more than passing attention to German use of railroads in war, but his chief point seems to be that the 1914 advance did not break down due to the inadequacy of the Eisenbahntruppen, but rather despite of it. There were alternative means of supplying the troops when the railroads fell behind schedule.Qvist wrote:I seem to remember though from Creveld that the Germans had extremely large problems keeping their advance supplied through Railways in 1914, mainly because of absence of means to move supplies up from the railheads to the advancing troops. What you are describing is rather an advantage in speedy mobilisation and pre-war deployment. Once the German armies crossed the frontier it was a different story - as in 1941.I think some of the unwarranted optimism with which the Germans invaded the USSR in 1941 was due to their very successful use of railroads in 1914
In 1914, the troops could still to a degree get away with living off the land for many of their needs (especially fodder); this was not the case in 1941.