Battle of Vukov klanac

[streljko1]

Final results- casualties

According to some postwar Yugoslav writers, in Vukov klanac battle entire 369ID was badly mauled, but after reading more detailed account, it becomes clear that in Vukov klanac were only some parts of 369ID, of around 4000 man of KG Becker part were “devils”, other were remains of 19. Fortress battalion <999>(my guess around 300 soldiers), Navy rifle battalion, remains of 9.Ustaša / HG garisson brigade, parts of 9.Ustaša brigade and San Marco Legion and artillery units.
Obviously units of 26. division quickly abandoned battlefield, many dead remained unburied (even today, according to locals, in the crass hills around Neum still are many unburied bones) and 2000 killed is estimation only, common for the reports of both sides and is inflated.
Higher units usually manipulated with enemy casualties in the reports, so is quite possible that HQ of 26 DD invented new casualties for their superiors and didn`t even consulted brigades operational accounts(for casualties and destroyed equipment). 2000 KIA, the most known and quoted number, is first time mentioned in 8. Corps report, soon that number arose to 2600(Supreme HQ of NOV Croatia).
It was much harder to manipulate with quantities of captured equipment, so I held them more or less accurate.
According to some German reports around 1700(including 500 members of navy units) soldiers of KG Becker reached Metković (I`m not sure are these numbers for German units only, or include their allies), 370IR droped to 510 soldiers and officers and was later reorganised and strenghtened with German fortress battalions.
Reason for such high casualties and drop of strenght was not only debacle in Vukov klanac, but also heavy combat in september and first half of october in Hercegovina and south Dalmatia.

Yugoslav report(from 23.10.) states that commander of column is killed, but commander of German troops in later operation “Bura” was Becker, so I guess that part of report is wrong(Becker was killed during the Mostar operation).
Also significant were indirect results of the battle, most of the NDH units in the area fell apart, soldiers deserted with or without weapons, and either joined Yugoslavs, went underground or tried to evade both sides.
My opinion is that only number of POWs and of captured equipment are near real numbers and that German losses were around 2000 KIA/WIA/MIA.
According to reports of IV Coastal sector, Yugoslav navy was quite busy for some time transporting captured equipment to Split area.

From report of 11. Dal. brigade 16-22. October (without 4.battalion):
Enemy losses: 128 soldiers and officers killed, 320 captured, in total 448 soldiers and officers
Captured 15 howitzers, 2 AT guns, 2 AA guns, one 82 mm mortar, 33 different MG, 4 trucks, 1 damaged tank
Brigade losses: 29 killed, seriously wounded 43 and wounded 87.

According to 1. Dalmatian brigade report (26.10.1944)
1250 enemy soldiers were killed or captured, brigade destroyed 11 tanks, 2 armoured cars, 20 trucks.
Brigade captured around 200 vehicles (trucks, cars) including one tank, 40 guns, 78 MG 283 horses and mules, 37 carriages...


Report of 26. Dalmatian Division from 17.11.1944:
Killed: 2000, captured: 1070
Destroyed 12 tanks, 2 armoured cars and 20 trucks
Captured 211 different vehicles (trucks, cars), 1 tank (13 t, in good condition), 60 guns (most of them damaged), 89 MG, 289 horses, 37 carriages.

About German tank losses: Yugoslavs sometimes as tanks included all tracked vehicles, so even half -tracks with mounted AA guns could be listed as tanks, I have seen on different pictures 3 destroyed tanks, one assault gun and one armoured car.

From NDH Report about the fate of 9.Garisson brigade:
“.... 1,3,4,5. and 6. Battalion of 9. Brigade (Southdalmatian militia) exist no more. 76 officers, 300 NCO and 4800 men with all weapons, disappeared, killed or wounded. Most of the men remained in their houses and refused to retreat. One part of them were disarmed in Dubrovnik, and weapons were destroyed during the retreat....”.


Even more strange are reports on Yugoslav casualties, Rako/Družijanić book quotes Yugoslav casualties (26DD without detatchments) for Ston – Vukov klanac as 56 KIA/260WIA, but also lists by NAME 50 dead member of 11. Dal. brigade and 2 missing soldiers, and according to that 1. Dal. brigade suffered only 4-6 killed?
If we know that main brunt of attack, and biggest casualties to the enemy were inflicted by 1. Dal. brigade that sounds very strange. So my guess is that actuall casualties of 26. DD and other units operating under division`s command were around 100 killed (if we estimate that 1.Dal. brigade suffered equal casualties as 11DB).
Many wounded Yugoslavs died some time after the battle, and are not mentioned as KIA in 17.11. report and that could be that diference ( 11.brigade had 43 seriously wounded, many of them died).
More losses would seriously damaged 1. and 11. Dal. brigade performance (each brigade had around 1800+ soldiers) and in that case brigades could not be used in operation against Šibenik garisson (first days of november) that led to almost complete destruction of KG Allerman.

Yugoslav and German commanders made lot of mistakes during the operation; mining road and leaving only few soldiers to guard it was the biggest German mistake. Also the counterattack of KG Kaene showed that Germans underestimated 26DD, that was not suprising because 26DD was unusual Yugoslav formation (fresh, well trained and armed), I read many accounts of German tank columns pushing with ease poorly armed partisan brigades – arrival of unit that could defeat the tanks turned the tide.
Break of communication between 26. and 29. Division gave Germans enough time to form large battle group which was able (at least part) to break to the Metković, order to retreat of 11.Dal. brigade from the battlefield to the port, where it waited for two days for ships while 1. Dalmatian brigade alone faced stronger, but exhausted enemy, showed that higher Yugoslav command was not prepared for battle development, and only orders of officers who were with the troops saved the day, anyway part of KG Becker escaped.
I think that is main reason why Vukov klanac is very briefly covered in some post-war main YU literature. Still it was great victory, German troops lost all heavy weapons and vehicles. 369 ID retreated to Mostar, where it was reorganised and could not help German group during Knin operation (XI/XII.1944), some units of 118JD were delayed during the retreat, and held in Hercegovina to stabilise the front and to bring 369ID back on the feet.
Also is interesting that most of the troops both on German(not counting NDH troops) and Yugoslav side, were Croatian.
369 Infanterie Division was made of Croatian troops and German officers and NCO-s.
In 612. Navy Artillery Regiment served many members of Navy NDH.
1. and 11. Dalmatian brigade were almost pure Croatian formations (except for 5.battalion/11.DB that was dominantly Slovenian unit.

My sources were:
Novović, Stupar...:1. Dalmatinska proleterska NOV brigada
Kažimir Pribilović: IV Pomorski obalni sektor mornarice NOVJ 1943-1945
Todor Radošević: Ofanziva za oslobođenje Dalmacije
Milan Rako Slavko Družijanić: 11. Dalmatinska udarna brigada
Nikola Anić`s articles in Slobodna Dalmacija newspaper

[G. Trifkovic]

Thanks for the interesting article,Jure.

Cheers,

Gaius

[streljko1]

BTW Here are few links to pictures of Ston fortifications that were taken few years ago:
http://www.rrm.cl/img/viajes/europa2004/ston/ston.html
http://www.croatia1.com/images/pelj-sites/ston.jpg

[Petra]

Thank you all for such a detailed account of movements during German withdrawl in Dubrovnik area.

I am looking for details about German naval activities in Slano 19 or 20.10.44. Was this the port as staging area for retreat from Dubronvik since Ston was under attack?

[streljko1]

Hello Petra,I couldn`t find any trace of German naval action in Slano at that time, all I have is transport of 1.300 soldiers(navy rifle battalion) on 17. october to Slano- to help open road Dubrovnik – Metković.
Slano was used because it was port nearest to German positions in Neum area.
I doubt that Ston as port was of any use for naval retreat, only importance was strategically position that allowed best possible defence of Metković-Dubrovnik road from Pelješac peninsula,at that time retreat by ships to north became very dangerous, especially near the coast, in september Yugoslavs liberated Pelješac peninsula, Korčula, Hvar and Brač islands and set there artillery that could easily target any German ship.
So in october German ships used route south and west of Vis island, but altrought that route evaded Yugoslav guns, it increased danger of allied sea and air attack, and only German MTBs were able, because of their speed, to use it successfully.
Here is all that I could find about German naval activity in area:
On 24. october 3 MTB transported from torpedo boat base in Boka kotorska “important material.”
In Dubrovnik before retreat Germans sunk one artillery ferry, 4 HZ (Harbour Protection) boats and 4 assault landing boats.
7. assault landing boats (with crews of destroyed ships) moved north, near Palagruža island one boat was abandoned(later discovered by Allies) , one was sunk by crew and one was captured near Ancona.
Four remaining boats were attacked by British ships near Dugi otok (Long island), two were sunk and two captured with 96 sailors, officers and NCO.
Two assault landing boats were given to Yugoslavs as reparation for quite common friendly fire incidents and they became PČ 7. “Osvetnik” and PČ 8. “Udarnik”.

[streljko1]

Few photos taken after Vukov klanac battle, some I have already posted, but not in this thread:
Two destroyed tanks(L6/40), probably from KG Kaene:

Destroyed assault gun: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... kov+klanac
Well known picture of Yugoslav soldiers and captured vehicles:

First photo is, as second, from Todor Radošević: “Ofanziva za oslobođenje Dalmacije”
Third photo could be find in Anić`s 8.Corps history and in monography “Dalmacija 1941-1945”

[Orret]

Yes, PČ 22 Streljko was patrol boat of JRM.

[streljko1]

Thanks for the photos, Orret, btw photos were taken in fortress Gripe, Split.

[streljko1]

Here is report of 10.L.-Flottille, MAL-Gruppe(artillery craft) about retreat from Dubrovnik, in many aspects it confirm „my“ previously sources
English translation is result of Babel Fish translation:
http://forum-marinearchiv.de/smf/index. ... pic=4455.0

Oblt. z. S. Müller
O.U., den 03.11.44
10.L.-Flottille, MAL-Gruppe

An
Admiral Adria
10. L.-Flottille

Bericht über den Rückmarsch aus Dubrovnik.

Am 18. Oktober erhielt ich den Befehl vom Seeko Süddalm. Für die Autokolonnen bei der Durchfahrt durch die Ombla-Bucht den Flakschutz zu übernehmen. Die Bucht lag unter MG- und Gewehrfeuer der Partisanen. MAL 6 und MAL 7 verteilten sich in der Bucht und durch Einsatz aller Waffen (4 x 8,8 cm, 2 Vierlinge und 4 Oerlikon 2 cm) gelang es die Kolonnen durchzuschleusen.
20.00 Uhr sollte ich mit den Booten zum Hafen Gruz verholen und die Nachhut aufnehmen. Jeder MAL lud 350 Soldaten. MAL 6 (b.K.B., lief nur 2,5 sm) verliess gegen 22.00 Uhr den Hafen nach Slano. Oblt. Ritter mit 3 I-Booten und MAL 7 folgte in ca. 2 Stunden Abstand.
Es ist gelungen, alle Mannschaften aus Dubrovnik nur mit geringer Feindeinwirkung abzutransportieren.
Gegen 02.00 Uhr am 19. Oktober 44 trafen die Boote in Slano ein. Es begann sofort die Entladung. 7 Boote übernehmen den Pendelverkehr, da die MAL wegen der gelegten Hafensperre nicht in den Hafen einlaufen konnten. Bis zum Morgengrauen waren alle Soldaten an Land gebracht. Ich erhielt vom Seeko Süddalm. Nun den Befehl, MAL 6 zu sprengen, sowie mit 3 I-Booten im Hafen zu verbleiben, um etwaige Transporte nach Doli (lag unter Feindfeuer und war abgeschnitten) durchzuführen. Oblt. Ritter bekam Befehl, sich mit MAL 7 und 7 I-Booten zu tarnen, um gegen 17.00 Uhr zum Durchbruch auszulaufen.
Am 19. Oktober 44 07.00 Uhr sprengte ich befehlsgemäss den schwerbeschädigten MAL 6.
Die B.B. Maschine war vollkommen ausgefallen. Ausserdem war das 1. Geschütz durch Rohrkrepierer, wie bereits gemeldet, unbrauchbar geworden.

Die freiwerdende Besatzung unter Führung von Ob.Btsm. Schrader wurde der 3. S.-Flottille angeschlossen und sofort zum Einsatz befördert. Ich persönlich verblieb gemäss Befehl bei den 3 I-Booten, I-O-15, I-O-46, I-O-68. Hinzuzufügen ist noch, dass am 17. Oktober 1944
I-O-2 von der 15. L.-Flottille in Dubrovnik einlief. Das Boot hatte sich von Korfu aus durchgeschlagen. Beide Maschinen waren restlos a.K.B. und so wurde das Boot am
18. Oktober 1944 in der Ombla-Bucht gesprengt. Die Besatzung fuhr auf MAL 6 bis nach Slano mit und schloss sich dann dem Verband an. Ich fand 2 Soldaten nach dem Durchbruch wieder, die später dem Marine-Schützen-Batl. " Wachtel " in Mostar angegliedert wurden.

Am Nachmittag des 19. Oktober 44 erhielt ich plötzlich den Befehl, alle 3 I-Boote sofort zu sprengen und mit einem 2 to Lkw der abrückenden Kolonne zu folgen. Ich baute sofort an Bord eine 2 cm Waffe aus und auf dem Lkw auf. Die Sprengungen zogen sich sehr in die Länge. So kam es, dass ich mit den Soldaten und dem Lkw etwas zurückblieb. Da es unmöglich war, alle Soldaten auf dem Lkw zu verladen, gab ich der Besatzung von I-O-15 den Befehl, sich dem Geleit Ritter anzuschliessen. Freiwillig machten dies noch 2 – 3 Soldaten, darunter ist auch der Matr.Ob.Gefr. Heinz von I-O-68.
Wir holten dann das Geleit ziemlich schnell ein und blieben auf Befehl am Gefechtsstand von Major Becker in Rudine stehen. Auf dieser Höhe sammelte sich dann der gesamte Verband und blieb den 20. Oktober 1944 dort liegen.
Die Höhen waren besetzt und in Richtung Doli – Stone war Feindberührung. Im Laufe des Tages gelang es mir alle Männer der 10. L.-Flottille zu sammeln. Am Nachmittag griffen 4 Jäger den Verband an. Ein Abschuss konnte erzielt werden. Verluste und Schäden entstanden nicht. Auch die am Nachmittag einsetzende Artillerie erzielte fast keine Erfolge.
________________________________________
So, hier nun, wie versprochen der Rest.
________________________________________

Am 20. Oktober 1944 20.00 Uhr begann der Abmarsch. Laut Befehl Korv.Kapt. Wachtel gehörte ich mit meinen Soldaten zur Nachhut, ausser dem Personal der Fla-Waffe (4 Mann).
Während der Nacht gab es keine Feindberührung mehr. Mit Morgengrauen begann die Feindtätigkeit. Von allen Höhen, längs der Strasse, wurde mit MG und Gewehrfeuer geschossen. Dieses Feuer verstärkte sich nachher noch durch Einsatz von Granatwerfern und schwerer Artillerie. Trotz der starken Feindtätigkeit kamen die Soldaten der 10. L.-Flottille ohne Ausfälle am 21. Oktober 1944 gegen 14.00 Uhr nach Duzi. Dort wurde bis zum Abend gelagert. Gegen 16.00 Uhr erfolgte ein Fliegerangriff durch Jäger. Verluste waren gering, wahrscheinlich 1 Abschuss.
In Duzi sollte der Abmarsch am 21. Oktober 1944 19.00 Uhr erfolgen. Ich hatte diesmal die Nachhut übertragen bekommen. Als die Männer auf Position gegangen waren und der Verband sich gerade in Bewegung setzte, setzte ein Artilleriefeuer von Schiffseinheiten ein, so dass alles durcheinander geriet. Nach dem Feuerüberfall war die Lkw-Kolonne, Spitze u.s.w. abgefahren. Teile des Trosses standen herrenlos herum, sowie die Nachhut war teilweise schon abmarschiert.
Nachdem es gelungen war, die Versprengten zu sammeln, begannen wir Männer für die Pferdewagen abzuteilen. Mit Hauptmann Dickhoff und ca. 200 Soldaten traten wir dann als Nachhut den Marsch an. Die Ausfälle durch die Schiffsartillerie waren ziemlich hoch. Infolge Sprengung der Brücke im Neum-Tal kam die Spitze nicht weiter, so dass wir den Verband bald einholen konnten. Der Befehl des Seeko Süddalm. " alles klarmachen zum Sprengen" wurde widerrufen, da die Brücke in 24 Std. wieder hergestellt sein sollte. Die Nachhut lag bereits in schwerem Infanteriefeuer der banden. Der Tross wurde im Laufe der Nacht in das Tal von Neum hereingeholt und alle umliegenden Höhen wurden besetzt.
Die Nacht verlief verhältnismässig ruhig. Die durch den Artillerieüberfall durcheinander gewürfelten Truppen konnten nicht wieder restlos zusammen gebracht werden. So kam es, dass im Morgengrauen, als das Gefecht im Tal von Neum begann, die eigene Truppe restlos verteilt war und anderen Truppenteilen angeschlossen war. Ich selbst hatte eine Gruppe von Italienern, Heeressoldaten und Marine.
Das Zusammenstellen der eigenen Soldaten gelang erst wieder in Metkovic.
Die Männer schlugen sich am Abend mit den jeweiligen Einheiten durch die Berge zur Strasse nach Metkovic durch. Der Tag im Tal von Neum, es war der 22. Oktober 1944, war für alle beteiligten eine wahre Hölle. Schwere und leichte Artillerie, Granatwerfer, MG und Gewehrfeuer waren fast ununterbrochen vom Gegner eingesetzt. Die Verluste stiegen und waren zum Schluss sehr beträchtlich.
In den Bergen selbst und auf dem Marsch nach Metkovic war keine Feindberührung mehr. Am 22. Oktober 1944 gegen 17.00 Uhr setzten sich die ersten Truppen von Neum ab, unter Mitnahme fast aller Verwundeten. Der Kfz-Park, sowie die persönlichen Ausrüstungsstücke der Männer gingen restlos verloren.
Bei den Soldaten, überhaupt bei Jedem machte sich das Fehlen von Trinkwasser und Verpflegung sehr unangenehm bemerkbar. Trotz der Wärme mussten die Soldaten den Marsch, sowie die ganzen Gefechte ohne Trinkwasser bzw. sehr schlechter Wasserversorgung durchführen.
Sehr bewährt haben sich die mitgeführten 2 cm Fla-Waffen. Die Partisanen haben vor dieser Waffe einen ungeheuren Respekt. Meine persönliche Auffassung ist es, dass wir diesen Waffen in erster Linie den gelungenen Durchbruch zu verdanken haben. Am 23. Oktober 1944 gegen 10.00 Uhr trafen die Soldaten in Metkovic ein. Sie wurden nach Mostar weitergeleitet. Am 24. Oktober 1944 gegen 09.00 Uhr hatte ich die Soldaten der 10. L.- Flottille wieder erfasst. Es ergab sich folgender Stand:

Vermisst wurden:
Matr.Ob.Gefr. Grebe
Matr.Ob.Gefr. Schindler

Report on the rear march from Dubrovnik.

On 18 October I received the instruction from the Seeko Sueddalm. To take over for the autocolumns with the passage by the Ombla bay the Flakschutz. The bay was to partisans under mg and rifle fire. TIMES 6 and MARK 7 distributed themselves in the bay and by employment of all weapons (4 x 8.8 cm, 2 Vierlinge and 4 Oerlikon 2 cm) succeeded it through a lock the columns to pass. I should get 20,00 o'clock with the boats to the port Gruz and take up the Nachhut. Each MARK loaded 350 soldiers. TIMES o'clock the port left 6 (b.K.B., ran only 2.5 sm) after Slano against 22.00. Oblt. Knight with 3 i-boats and MARK 7 followed in approx.. 2 hours distance. , all crews from Dubrovnik succeeded only with small enemy action abzutransportieren. Against 02.00 o'clock on 19 October 44 the boats in Slano arrived. It began immediately unloading. 7 boats take over the shuttle traffic, since those could not run MARK because of the put port embargo into the port. Up to the morning-grey all soldier was brought ashore. I received from the Seeko Sueddalm. Now the instruction to blow up MARK 6 to remain as well as with 3 i-boats in the port in order to accomplish any transportation after Doli (was under enemy fires and was cut off). Oblt. Knight got instruction to camouflage itself with MARK 7 and 7 i-boats in order to run out against 17.00 o'clock to the break-through. On 19 October 44 07,00 o'clock I blew up the heavydamaged MARK 6 as ordered. The B.B. machine had failed perfectly. In addition that was 1. Cannon by Rohrkrepierer, as already announced, uselessly become. The freed crew under guidance of Ob.Btsm. Schrader became the 3. S. flotilla attached and immediately to the employment carries. I personally remained in accordance with instruction with the 3 i-boats, I-O-15, I-O-46, I-O-68. To add it is still that on 17 October 1944 I-O-2 of the 15. L L in Dubrovnik ran in. The boat had pierced itself from Korfu. Both machines were completely a.K.B. and the boat on 18 October 1944 in the Ombla bay were in such a way blown up. The crew rode along on MARK 6 until Slano and followed then the federation. I regained 2 soldiers after the break-through, who were attached later the navy contactor Batl. "quail" in Mostar. In the afternoon 19 October 44 I kept the instruction sudden to blow up all 3 i-boats immediately and follow with 2 tons a truck of the moving away column. I developed immediately on board 2 cm a weapon from and on the truck. The breakups pulled themselves much into the length. Thus it came that I stayed with the soldiers and the truck somewhat. Since it was impossible, all soldiers on the truck to ship, I gave the instruction to the crew of I-O-15 to follow the escort knight. Made this voluntary still 2 - 3 soldiers, among them is also the Matr.Ob.Gefr. Heinz of I-O-68. We caught up then the escort rather fast and stopped on instruction at the command post of major Becker in Rudine. On this height then the entire federation collected itself and remained 20 October 1944 lying there. The heights were occupied and toward Doli - Stone was enemy contact. In the course of the daily it succeeded to me all men of the 10. To collect l L. In the afternoon 4 hunters attacked the federation. A firing could be obtained. Losses and damage did not develop. Also in the afternoon the using artillery obtained nearly no successes ________________________________________ as, here now, as promised the remainder ________________________________________ On 20 October the Abmarsch began 1944 20,00 o'clock. According to instruction Korv.Kapt. I belonged to quail with my soldiers to the Nachhut, except the personnel of the Fla weapon (4 men). During the night there was no more enemy contact. With morning-grey the enemy activity began. By all heights, along the road, with mg and rifle fire one shot. This fire afterwards still strengthened by employment of garnet who far from and heavy artillery. Despite the strong enemy activity the soldiers of the 10 came. L L without losses on 21 October 1944 against 14.00 o'clock after Duzi. There up to the evening one stored. Against 16.00 o'clock took place a fliegerangriff via hunters. Losses were small, probably 1 firing. In Duzi the Abmarsch should take place on 21 October 1944 19,00 o'clock. I had transferred gotten this time the Nachhut. When the men had gone on position and the federation sat down straight in motion, an artillery fire of ship units began, so that everything turned out in disorder. After the fire assault the truck column, point etc. had driven off. Parts of the unit train stood abandoned around, as well as the Nachhut was partly already abmarschiert. After had succeeded to collect the stragglers we began to divide men for the horse cars. With captain thick-hope and approx.. 200 soldiers began we then as Nachhut the march. The losses by the ship artillery were rather high. Due to breakup of the bridge in the Neum valley the point did not continue to come, so that we could catch up the federation soon. The instruction of the Seeko Sueddalm. of "everything make clear for blowing up" one recalled, since the bridge should be repaired in 24 hr.. The Nachhut lay already in heavy infantry fire bound. The unit train was brought in in the course of the night into the valley of Neum and all surrounding heights were occupied. The night passed relatively calmly. The troops gewuerfelten in disorder by the artillery assault could not be brought back completely together. Thus it came that in the morning-grey, when combat in the valley of Neum began, which was completely distributed own troop and was attached other troop units. I had a group of Italians, army soldiers and navy. Arranging the own soldiers succeeded only again in Metkovic. The men pierced themselves in the evening with the respective units by the mountains to the road after Metkovic. The day in the valley of Neum, it was 22 October 1944, was for all took part a true hell. Heavy and light artillery, garnet thrower, mg and rifle fires were nearly continuously assigned from the opponent. The losses rose and were very considerable in the end. In the mountains themselves and on the march after Metkovic was no more enemy contact. On 22 October 1944 against 17.00 the first troops set o'clock off from Neum, under taking along of nearly all wounded ones. The Kfz park, as well as the personal pieces of equipment of the men were lost completely. With the soldiers, at all with everyone the absence of drinking water and food supply became very unpleasantly apparent. Despite the warmth the soldiers had to accomplish the march, as well as the whole engagements without drinking water and/or very bad water supply. Very much the carried 2 cm Fla weapons worked. Partisans have for this weapon a tremendous respect. My personal view is it that we have to owe primarily the successful break-through to these weapons. On 23 October 1944 against 10.00 o'clock the soldiers in Metkovic arrived. They were passed on after Mostar. On 24 October 1944 against 09.00 o'clock I had the soldiers of the 10. L - flotilla again seizes. The following conditions resulted: Were missed: Matr.Ob.Gefr. Grebe Matr.Ob.Gefr. Schindler

[Gothard]

So basically you are saying there are no primary sources which give these casualties?

national archives has divisional records of the 369 on microfilm its available for purchase online

[HBilic]

Streljko can you be so kind to tell me who was in comand in village Imotica at time of 29.09.1944.
I am looking for Ivo Tolja, that was capture by German solders on 19.09.1449. Some say that he has been taken to Neum and then killed.
As family, we are just looking to find his remains.

Pozdrav

Hrvoje: Mob: 098 9483480

[HBilic]

The year was 1944.

He was captured on 29.09.1944.

[streljko1]

I could not find many details about events in that period, here is what I find:
Around Topola and Imotica at that time was 2.battalion/369.Artillery Regiment(13 guns),2 AT guns of 14.AT company(369. ID) there were also deployed small units of Ustasha militia(locals) and Gendarmes, commander of one battery or entire artillery battalion was captain(leutanant) Schmoele.
In village Oslje was HQ of 370.IR.
Partisans were operating in smaller groups near that villages, but I could not confirm what unit(maybe elements of South Dalmatian Detachments).
Also, in Schraml`s book there is short account of forestalled attack on that unit, without exact date of that event, but I guess it was end september.
According to survivors, one partisan agent(officer) made contacts with several Croatians serving in 2/369.AR, and tried to made coordinate attack on battalion with their help.
Somebody told the plan to Germans and partisans didn`t attacked, in next few days many Croats deserted.
There is no details on partisan losses.

Also, on 27.09. Germans attacked Yugoslav positions near Ston(manned by Group of South Dalmatian Detachments), attack failed when Yugoslavs got reinforcements(11.DB), attack was done by penal battalion and parts of 370. Regiment.

Was your relative partisan(and if he was do you know what unit)?

Sorry, I could not find more.

[ktolja]

I think my grandfather (Ivo Tolja)who was a partisan found out something about the German's plans but some of the people he talked to revealed partisan's plans to the Germans. He was tallking to the Germans the night before he disappeared,they wouldn' have let him go home,but they took him to Neum,he was held in one civilian house for a night,and when my grandmother came to ask for him, the 369 AR soldiers told her if he hadn't come home then that he left to join the partisans again. She was 20 years old girl and scared,many times after his disappearance she wanted to find something but people were always looking at her like they know more than they told her. Nine months after my father was born,sometimes I think what if my grandfather is alive somewhere and knows nothing about us.

[ktolja]

"According to survivors, one partisan agent(officer)made contacts with several Croatians serving in 2/369.AR, and tried to made coordinate attack on battalion with their help. "-I think this was my grandfather,can you tell me where I can find those survivors,or if you know their names. I also remember that my granny told me he freed three Ustascha's soldiers from nearby village Duži that were captured by the partisans,although some partisans told him not to do that as he may had problems. He did that because his sister Manda Katić) who was married in that village begged him to help those men.miss