Could the Baltic States have resisted to the Soviet Union?

Discussions on WW2 in Eastern Europe.
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Marcus
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Post by Marcus » 01 Oct 2005 16:23

An off-topic post by killchola and the discussion that followed was removed.

/Marcus

Vykintas
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Post by Vykintas » 10 Oct 2005 10:36

Liluh wrote:Ah, one more thing! I can`t restrain myself from thinking about the hair styles of those people. Also, facialhair styles. Long hair, long beards seem common. Any particular reason for that? This reminds me of some (paradox) commie fighters in Latin America. Type of anarchic nonconformists.

And no offense intended, of course.


I believe there is also romantic aspect. Old Lithuanian wariors were always associated with long hairs and beards. Some partisans probably wanted to look as those old warriors of Lithuania and in deed they were.

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Post by Karman » 10 Oct 2005 15:40

Lit. wrote:It was executed by the same vets who will parade soon in Moscow Red square, decorated with the medals "For freeing Soviet Baltic states" in front of the many leaders of democratic countries. Sorry, dear guests from EU and USA for this teacher and her pupils. They will not be able to attend this event...


I have never heard of such a medal? When was it introduced and in which country?

tjs
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Book Question

Post by tjs » 29 Nov 2005 15:43

Has anybody read Red Web by Tom Bower? It discusses how the Soviets managed to infiltrate the British efforts to support partisan movements in the Baltics following WW2.

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Post by Nocturne » 18 Dec 2005 10:35

too little too late... all i can say about "forgotten war". it would have been better to fire 20 shells from regular army guns than thousansd of bullets from partisans. Maybe ppl wouldn't ask "were the baltic states occupied?" and russians wouldn't say that we joind soviet union with flowers if regular army had resisted. Baltic armies didn't need much back then. 2-3 days if lucky maybe a week just to photograph several destroyed soviet columns or burning tank, city blazing in the horinzon( maybe it's sounds drastically but it would have been lesser price comparing to what we chose). it would have been better to sign surrender act than a document of "happy joining" , to put somebody on radio just to anounce " we fought hard..thats it we are defeated- here comes dar ages" Lter resistance was not a war it was just a slow agony of dying state...it did some good but too little and in my mind too late

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Baltic State resistance to an armed Soviet attack

Post by Arvo L. V. » 22 Dec 2005 07:01

Esteemed Cipiao;

In regards to your query – could the Baltic nations have defended themselves against an armed attack from the Soviet Union in 1939 – please permit me to use the herewith afforded opportunity to provide the following thoughts for your consideration.

The short answer is – no. In 1939, and given the existing economic, political and military situations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the three Baltic nations were in no position to resist an armed attack from the Soviet Union.

That said, I opine that much work could have been made during the interwar era to make a Soviet attack much more problematic for the leaders in the Kremlin.

Let’s consider the Baltic States on their own; that is, no alliance with Finland or Poland, etc. Just the three. Theoretically, if Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had combined all of their armed forces into one large “Baltic Army" in 1939, they could probably have fielded close to 500,000 men within 72 hours of mobilization - and this figure is surely on the high side. This “Baltic Army” would have contained the following land forces (regular army and reservists have been combined here):

Estonia: Four infantry divisions (120.000 men)
Latvia: Eight infantry divisions (200.000 men)
Lithuania: Six infantry division (170.000 men)

A theoretical “Baltic Army”: 18 infantry divisions (490.000 men)

For this discussion, it is fully understood that these infantry divisions would have included a number of antiquated armored units and a slightly larger number of over-aged artillery units, not to mention that they would have been rather weakly armed.

On the Baltic Sea too, a combined Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian naval fleet would have had a little punch, as it would have contained:

Four submarines (2-Estonian, 2-Latvian)
One torpedo boat (1-Estonian)
Eight gunboats (6-Estonian, 1-Latvian, 1-Lithuanian)
Six minelayers (4-Estonian, 2-Latvian)
One submarine tender (1-Latvian)
Other minor naval vessels combined from the fleets of all three Baltic States

Although the Estonian Air Defense Force was very small in 1939, it did have close to 30 reasonably modern aircraft available. And Estonian pilots were very competent by international standards. The Latvian Aviation Regiment had roughly 60 combat aircraft and the Lithuanian Aviation Division had close to 100 combat aircraft that could have been available for use. Their pilots were, however, not as highly qualified as their Estonian counterparts. Although both Latvia and Lithuania had basic aviation workshops available, that could have geared up for mass production of combat aircraft with little difficulty, critical components, such as engines and instrumentation packages, still had to be imported from abroad.

A “Baltic Army” in 1939 would have had several advantages. First and foremost, an army of nearly 500.000 soldiers would not have gone unnoticed in the international community of the post World War One era. In the long run, a combined Baltic State armed force would have been very beneficial factor towards maintaining their independence in a rather hostile environment. But this very point, divide-and-conquer, was also not lost on the major European powers. They found it very much in their interest to conclude individual alliances and treaties with the Baltic States, taking full advantage of a politically weaker Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, instead of having to deal with a stronger, collective union of the Baltic States. Had the Baltic States combined their military forces into one larger entity, they could have been a more formidable deterrant force to deal with.

Realistically speaking, the establishment of a “Baltic Army” would have been a difficult undertaking. There were many differences that Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians would first have to overcome, if they were ever to combine their military forces. The largest hurdle was the language barrier. Each Baltic State had (and still has) its own, unique language; although it need be noted that the Latvian and Lithuanian languages are related to each other. But a common language did not exist among the Baltic people in the interwar period.

Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian soldiers had served in the Imperial Russian Army prior to 1918; many with great distinction. Older and higher ranking Estonian and Latvian military officers were well versed in the Russian language (and to a lesser degree, many also spoke German as a second or third language). This would have been a good “language binder” for Estonia and Latvia. However, higher-level Lithuanian military officers tended to profess Polish as a second language over Russian. Conversely, the younger Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military officers and soldiers, that is, those who were educated after 1918, were for the most part more limited in their German and Russian language skills.

It would have been ideal, but hardly realistic, to have each Baltic nation learn the language of the other two. The use of a more internationally utilized language, such as English, French or German, should have been of paramount concern to Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military planners contemplating a unified military command. But regretfully, during the interwar era, the Baltic States were not focused on the issue of a common language.

Right after the Baltic wars of independence (1918 to 1921) the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania publicly declared their desires to integrate their economic and political fortunes with those of Western Europe. For this reason, English, German and French were selected to be the primary foreign languages required in international affairs, commerce and military circles. But then there was disagreement as to which foreign language would be the primary foreign language to learn. A consensus was reached among Baltic educators when it was decided to teach the next generation of Baltic citizens English and French as the primary foreign language, and German as a second foreign language.

But in practical terms, formal language learning did not go much beyond the 10th grade level. In addition, the opportunities to use these foreign languages in practical, every day situations were, for the average Baltic citizen, were simply not available in the 1920’s and the 1930’s.

Only two attempts were made to form a unified Baltic military command. Both came at the urging of the British. The first attempt was put forward by the British General Frank G. Marsh, on 26 August 1919. His plan was to combine the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish armed forces, the anti-Bolshevist Russian troops and German-Russian forces of General Yudenic, General von der Golz and Count Bermondt into one large army that would be able to contain the communist revolution. This plan never materialized beyond a few rounds of exploratory discussions.

A second attempt at forging a unified Baltic military command came in 1920. At the urging of the British General Arthur J. Turner, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military representatives met in Valga on the Estonian-Latvian border to discuss the merits of the British proposal. Interestingly, when they met in Valga, not only did the Baltic representatives actually agree in principle to create a unified Baltic military command, they also agreed in principle to standardize weapons and weapons systems then in use by the armies of the Baltic States. Regretfully, this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to acquire needed security and international prestige was not followed up on by the political leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In retrospect, so much more could have been accomplished by the Baltic States to improve their defensive plans.

Military Co-operation Efforts Between The Baltic States (1918 to 1940):

Estonia and Latvia were the only northern European nations, which formed a military alliance during the interwar period. In addition to a similarly shared historical fate, the origins of the Estonian and Latvian alliance can also be traced back to the Estonian and Latvian wars of independence. It was then that both nations worked together to fight the Soviet Union and the German Landeswehr. On 07 July 1921, Estonia and Latvia publicly announced the official creation of an Estonian-Latvian military alliance. This alliance was reaffirmed and expanded on 01 November 1923 and again on 17 February 1934. Lithuania joined the alliance in the fall of 1934.

The Estonian-Latvian military alliance was purely defensive in nature. A vaguely worded clause was added to the text of the 1934 treaty by Estonia and Latvia allowing other interested nations to join the alliance. It was hoped that this gesture would give Lithuania an added incentive to join. It did, and within a short while Lithuanian joined the Estonian-Latvian military alliance. This was on 12 September 1934.

Despite many public praises towards their Lithuanian partner, privately, Estonia and Latvia greatly feared adding Lithuania to the alliance - until Lithuania had solved her border disputes with Germany and Poland. Even after Lithuania was forced to re-establish diplomatic relations with Poland in early 1938 and even after Lithuania ceded the Klaipeda (Memel) district to Germany in 1939 - Estonia and Latvia were still very hesitant to talk to Lithuania about more formal military matters within the framework of the Baltic alliance.

The Baltic defensive treaty of 01 November 1923 only called for each member nation to work for the good of the alliance in the most general of terms. This included cabinet level meetings, invitations to send observers to military maneuvers and so on. The Baltic defensive treaty did not include articles or clauses, which focused on any specific military co-operation matters. In 1930 and again in 1931, Estonia and Latvia even held numerous joint ground and naval exercises. Regretfully, this was not repeated much after 1931.

Despite the very conservative nature of the Baltic military alliance, much was actually accomplished through more subtle means. On a number of occasions, lower level Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military officers were exchanged, so that one Baltic State could learn more about the other. These individuals worked to establish new contacts and strove to gain a better understanding as to the land and culture of the host nation. These contacts were, for the most part, a win-win situation for everyone.

Theoretically, much more could also have been done to establish a common Baltic ranking system or equivalent values of military authority, but again nothing was done in this area either. For example, having an Estonian Army Captain holding the equivalent authority and rank of a Captain in the Latvian or Lithuanian Army would have gone a long way to ease common Baltic command and control issues, especially in combat situations.

In retrospect is seems that each Baltic State seemed to be more interested in its own self-preservation than it was on focusing its energies towards the formation of a common defensive union. Each believed that it could preserve its independence on its own, even at the expense of the other two.

During the interwar period, a prime political goal of all three Baltic States was to minimize any provocative gestures towards the Soviet Union. Because each Baltic State recognized the fact that a common Baltic military alliance would be seen as an aggressive step by the Soviets, great care was taken by all three to ensure that the Soviet Union would not find the Baltic defensive alliance a threat to its existence. After the rise of Adolf Hitler to the chancellery of Germany, all three Baltic States did all they could not to antagonize this powerful neighbor as well.

Yet, the creation of a more formally based Baltic defensive alliance would have been very much in the interest of the Soviet Union. Such an alliance could have served in part to block the growing aggressive moves of Hitler. But the Soviet Union did not see things this way. From Moscow’s perspective, a Baltic military alliance was seen as a threat to the eventual re-integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Russia, that is, a direct annexation of the Baltic region (to include Finland) to the Soviet Union.

German diplomats of the German Nationalist Socialist era and Polish political circles also had their own agendas. While Hitler and Germany frequently lectured Estonia and Latvia about the aggressive stance of Lithuania, especially as it pertained to the Klaipeda (Memel) district. Poland and Polish diplomats often viewed Estonian and Latvian regional military initiatives with great suspicion, especially because of Estonias/Latvias desire to form a military union with Lithuania. Poland often thought that a closer Estonian/Latvian (military) union with Lithuania might allow Lithuania to take a more aggressive stance re the Vilnius region. Thus, a Baltic military alliance was not viewed as being in the best interest of Poland.

By the middle and late 1930’s, all three Baltic States were feeling the political pressures from all sides. The Baltic States had hoped that by declaring themselves as neutrals in any future European armed conflict, they could preserve their independence. They even went so far as to weaken their overall position in the League of Nations by abstaining to accept Article XVI of the League’s charter. But this did not help in the long run, for the Baltic States were occupied, then annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and they ceased to exist as nation for the next 51 years.

The international economic and military situation of the Baltic States during the interwar period:

During the interwar period (1918-1939), regretfully, no Baltic State entered into any economic alliance with any of its European neighbors. In fact, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania often competed against each other on the international market with similar goods and products. Estonian and Latvian butter was cheaper in price in London than it was in Tallinn or Riga. Individual economic strengths could have been managed much better by all three Baltic States to support their common defensive needs.

Estonia for example, could have used her oil-shale deposits to greatly ease the petroleum products supply problem for Latvia and Lithuania. However, large-scale Estonian oil-shale production efforts were initiated too late. Interestingly, a significant percentage of Estonia’s oil-shale exports were purchased by the German Kriegsmarine. In fact, up to 80% of the German Kriegsmarine’s fuel needs were satisfied by Estonia’s oil shale deposits – and it was not until 1943 and 1944 that the Germans took a serious interest in expanding this production, but by then it really did not matter any more. Having no other choice, Latvia and Lithuania were forced to depend on expensive Polish or other western petroleum deliveries.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were very financially challegned nations throughout their interwar existence. Yet each nation spent approximately 20% or more of their annual state budgets on defense expenditures. As large as this sum was, and given the enormity of the defensive tasks required, the amounts expended were still not sufficient for small nations forced to take care of themselves, without seeking additional international aid. Fortunately, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were able to feed their nations and their armies well, provide their commercial and military sectors with adequate transportation capabilities and provide their armies with domestically produced personal military gear and uniforms.

In terms of military command competencies, western military observers were generally in strong agreement. For the most part, the Latvian and Lithuanian armies were riddled with political and social challenges, which were not adequately addressed until the late 1930’s. Conversely, though Estonia’s army was the smallest and the worst-equipped of the three, its soldiers and officers were rates as being the most professional and competent. Western intelligence findings generally concluded that during the interwar era, only Estonia’s army was capable of undertaking offensive as well as defensive action – Latvia and Lithuania were scored as being only “average” to “above average” for defensive actions. It need be noted that Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian soldiers, taken as individuals, were deemed as being very tough and able to operate independently. This fact more than evidenced itself through the combat actions of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian freedom fighters fighting against the Soviet Union both during, and after the Second World War – especially so in the case of Lithuanians.

Problems arose with the procurement of quantitative and qualitative military goods such as, but not limited to aircraft, artillery guns, naval vessels, etc. For the most part, the weapons available to the armies of the Baltic States during the interwar era were of 1918 vintage or earlier. Compounding the problem was the fact that these old weapons systems were no longer available in sufficient numbers. In fact, many of the older weapons sat idle because of lack of spare parts, exhausted barrel lives or because they were simply outdated for modern combat. Latvian military pilots were only allotted 13 gallons/50 liters of aviation fuel per year to maintain their aviation skills. Not the amounts of fuel a modern and competent air wing needs to help maintain its skill levels and defend its nation.

Had the Baltic States worked together on arms standardization and procurement efforts, they would have found purchases to have been much cheaper and easier to do as large group, than as single customers. But local Baltic politics prevented this type of thinking to take root and as a result, each nation had its own military standards.

Estonians, for example, primarily used Russian ammunition; Latvians used British ammunition; and Lithuanians had a preference for German ammunition. In time of conflict, while Lithuania could probably have obtained additional German ammunition and war materiel on the international markets, supplying Estonian and Latvian war needs with British and Russian military goods would have been a logistical nightmare for anyone to undertake.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should have taken a different approach to their defensive needs in the interwar period. They should have agreed on joint military standards for their armed forces from the very beginning of their relationship. Their eventual goal should have been to manufacture in common, many of the less sophisticated military goods, such as ammunition, mortars, pistols, rifles, etc. This would have drastically minimized the need to obtain these items from foreign sources in times of national crisis.

By the 1930’s, Finland for example, produced excellent anti-tank rifles and grenade launchers, mortars and machine guns. The Baltic States had nearly twice the population of Finland and they should have been able to produce similar military goods with much greater ease. Both Latvia (Cukurs, Irbitis, JDM and LKOD) and Lithuania (ANBO), and to a much lesser extent Estonia (PTO), built and sought to export civilian and military aircraft. But rather than combine their knowledge and construction expertise, each nation attempted to sell its commercial and military goods on the same market - in effect, they were competing against each other and undercutting each other in price.

The Baltic States should also have given more serious thought to purchasing military arms and goods from closer sources. A key question, which should have been answered right from the start, was: Who could deliver additional arms and supplies in time of War? Sweden would have been an optimal choice, but because of Sweden’s general avoidance of the Baltic States during the interwar period and because the Baltic nations could not comply with Sweden’s cash and carry policy, Sweden was largely discounted as a source of military assistance. France and Great Britain often threatened the Baltic States not to seek military assistance from other sources except their own; then they proceeded to sell the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians older and used weapons for double the price that these weapons were being sold for to the French and British reserve armies.

In general terms, the Baltic States preferred not to purchase weapons from a nation, such as the Soviet Union, which posed a direct threat to their very existence. Purchasing arms from Moscow would have meant establishing closer ties with the Soviets at a time when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were doing their utmost to sever all possible “colonial” ties with their former Russian masters. By the late 1930’s, weapons and weapons systems were growing rapidly in cost and complexity and the Baltic States were clearly behind the re-armament curve. For example, one British Spitfire Mark I General Purpose fighter (type 332 or the like) cost the equivalent of 1/40th of the entire Latvian defense budget.

Taken as individual nations, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were, relatively speaking, military zero’s throughout the interwar period. But, had they combined their defensive capabilities more optimally, they could have represented a more effective deterrent to potential aggressors. One could have done so much more to prepare for 1939.

Thank you kindly in advance for the honour of your time.

Regards;

Arvo L. V.

rico23
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Post by rico23 » 31 Dec 2005 22:03

Arvo L. V.
hea ylevaade /Good rewiu

in 1941 in estonia was summer war/suvesõda... i live citi Kilingi-Nõmme and one biger batel was here - Liivamäe lahing /batel of Sandhill estonian forestbrothers vs. destroyer unit

sri my writing

Mark V
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Post by Mark V » 31 Dec 2005 22:36

Interesting post Arvo.

I believe, even unified military forces of Baltic States would not had deterred Soviets from attacking. At that time (late 30s, turn of 30/40s) Stalin was haunted by megalomaniac dreams about future Soviet naval supremacy of 7 Seas. As an first step Soviets sorely needed break the stranglehold that Finland and Baltic States had on Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Stalin would had attacked anyway... and even the combined force of Baltic States would not had made much difference to the outcome. Finnish Armed Forces were roughly comparable to this force - bit smaller, but more unified, protecting an area much more easy to defend, with harsher climate, and it did not deter Soviets from attacking.


Regards, Mark V

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rico23/Mark V. - Thanks/Tänan väga/Kiitos

Post by Arvo L. V. » 03 Jan 2006 06:40

Esteemed rico23/Mark V.;

Thank you kindly for your responses. Am most appreciative of same. Mark, I full agree with your thoughts. A unified Baltic military force would have done little to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking same in the late 1930's or early 1940's.

Again, many thanks. Tänan väga/Kiitos.

Regards;

Arvo L. V.

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Post by batu » 05 Jan 2006 11:09

Mark V wrote:Interesting post Arvo.

I believe, even unified military forces of Baltic States would not had deterred Soviets from attacking. At that time (late 30s, turn of 30/40s) Stalin was haunted by megalomaniac dreams about future Soviet naval supremacy of 7 Seas. As an first step Soviets sorely needed break the stranglehold that Finland and Baltic States had on Soviet Baltic Fleet.

Stalin would had attacked anyway... and even the combined force of Baltic States would not had made much difference to the outcome. Finnish Armed Forces were roughly comparable to this force - bit smaller, but more unified, protecting an area much more easy to defend, with harsher climate, and it did not deter Soviets from attacking.


Regards, Mark V


Mark,
where have you got this "Stalin-megalomaniac dreams aboutr future Soviet naval supremacy of 7 seas"?

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Post by Mark V » 05 Jan 2006 18:58

Hi,

batu wrote:
Mark,
where have you got this "Stalin-megalomaniac dreams aboutr future Soviet naval supremacy of 7 seas"?


It was Stalins long-term objective - to challenge RN, Imperial Japanese Navy and USN in control of high seas. And there is concrete proof of it:

You won't build 40.000+ ton battleships for coastal defence...

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/20 ... 4-sp04.pdf
http://web.ukonline.co.uk/aj.cashmore/r ... aina1.html
http://www.voodoo.cz/battleships/pics1/ ... olayev.jpg


4 battleships (Sovyetskiy Soyuz, Sovyetskaya Ukraina, Sovyetskaya Byelorussiya, Sovyetskaya Rossiya
) were started in ways in 1938-39, and two of them were quite advanced state of construction when Barbarossa started. One slipway was overrun by Germans/Romanians.

Construction of those ships consumed huge amounts of skilled labour hours, armour steel, engineering talent, and heavy machinebuilding industry capacity. All for nothing, because they were never finished, and at critical timeframe.

Plan also involved large cruisers and battlecruisers, plus more reasonable classes of ships, like submarines and destroyers. Soviets built vast new shipyards to remote areas of Empire, mostly with slave labour, and bought from abroad (from Italy and Germany mostly) much of the expertice on weaponry, ship design, and even machinery components (even bought the incomplete heavy cruiser Lutzow from Germans and towed it to Leningrad).

What truly makes those plans megalomaniac, was that USSR could NEVER had been able to challenge the established naval superpowers with those battleships and battlecruisers. RN or Japan alone could had whacked their newly built Navy from the surface of seas only with their surface assets - and US Navy would not even had an good battle excercise when sinking them.

Above all, USN, RN and Japanese Navy had moved much beyound BBs in their force projection in turn of 30/40s, thought many in their own ranks would not fully appreciate it before conflict started... read = aircraft carriers. The greatness of these naval powers was that they could build and develope an formidable carrier force even under the influence of battleship dedicated Admirals - as an side project.

Making an BB an workable and efficient fighting machine is almost an whole nation effort. It needs decades long experience from navy personnel, yard construction workers, ship designers, turbine machinery builders, gearing manufacturers, armour steel producing firms, naval rifle and mounting producing firms, ammunition manufacturers, chemical industry, optical industry, etc, etc - Soviets lacked all this (what Russia had, had been lost in Revolution, breakdown of industry, and construction pause of large naval ships of 20+ years), and you can't bought EVERYTHING from abroad. This is clearly an case where the craft of Soviet "shock-workers" can't help a bit, instead most propably would cause an catastrophe.

It would had been nice if they would had finished even one of those - just to look how it would had fared against say King George V, or Bismarck, or Alabama, or Yamato, or Richelieu, or any of the latest generation battleships. Naah.. it would had miracle if Soviets would had been able to build an propulsion plant that would had propelled the 40.000+ ton hulk above 20 knots, building watertight hull they were capable of - so with propability not an embarassing sinking when launching episode. For sure i would not volunteer to be aboard the ship on the first firing trial of main weaponry, when some 25 years old, non-educated comissar, eager to please his superiors and prove his dedication, is howling to men working in magazines: "forget the handling procedures - give me powder charges faster !! - our great leader is watching the firing trials from the shore !!" - somewhere in the depth of hull of battleship - and there would be tens of such comissars, in many places equal in danger in such vessel...

Germans had difficulties with Scharnhorst and Bismarck classes even with their heritage of High Sea fleet, especially in machinery and latest protection schemes. They had an construction pause of major naval vessels of only 10 years (counting pocket-battleships), and started with with very great head-start compared to Russian Empire. German shipbuilding and machinebuilding industry, plus designing offices were intact and working on other tasks during whole time between the wars, thus maintaining the core of workers, and designers. Also navy kept the talented, young officer core and trained new recruits for future.

Not even talking about sanity of starting an BB cored naval construction program that would cost an sizeable chunk of national wealth at late 30s.

Long post and off-topic, sorry.

Regards, Mark V

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Re: rico23/Mark V. - Thanks/Tänan väga/Kiitos

Post by Bacilla » 14 Jan 2006 00:25

Arvo L. V. wrote:Four submarines (2-Estonian, 2-Latvian)
One torpedo boat (1-Estonian)
Eight gunboats (6-Estonian, 1-Latvian, 1-Lithuanian)
Six minelayers (4-Estonian, 2-Latvian)
One submarine tender (1-Latvian)


Lithuania had one minelayer "Prezidentas Smetona"

Talking about Soviet Invasion: Don`t you think that Stalin had bigger plans, than just adding three little countrys?
500 000 men army is SOMETHING, that you can`t just walk trough. Stalin was preparing for war with Germany, not Baltic states, he was preaparing for something big, why he should start with atacking small unimportant countries? Stalin sayd "Everybody knows, that who will start the war, will lose", and he didn`t started any wars. He was allways "defending"

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Re: rico23/Mark V. - Thanks/Tänan väga/Kiitos

Post by Desert Foxas » 26 Jan 2006 20:22

Bacilla wrote:Lithuania had one minelayer "Prezidentas Smetona"


Correction, it was a simple training warship, not a minelayer.

Image

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Post by Bacilla » 26 Jan 2006 21:07

Commissioned on 30 Nov, 1917 as German M-59 of the Minensuchboot 1916-class. On 2 Aug, 1922, bought by Lithuania and renamed "Prezidentas Smetona". The ship served as patrol ship, training ship and presidental yacht. On 22 Jun, 1940, the ship was taken over by the Sovietunion and initially renamed Primunas, but in August 1940 taken over by the NKVD as board guard ship in the Second Baltic detachment and renamed Korall. On 19 Aug, 1941, the ship was included in the Baltic Fleet as minesweeper T-76 Korall.

Yes, in Lithuania it served as patrol ship, training ship and presidental yacht, but he was designed as minelayer.

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Post by e.polis » 26 Jan 2006 22:54

This is a very interesting post and I have to commend the Lithuanians for their determined and continuous courage in trying to throw the yoke of communisum from their country.

I am just wondering why there was no such resistance fro the other two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia, or was there but we just don't know about it.

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