L'vov Sandomierz

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Andreas
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Post by Andreas » 24 Apr 2005 14:14

No worries, these things happen when transcribing data from text. Makes more sense now, but still understating what went on.

Thanks a lot for the link, it will be interesting to see what other interesting stuff they may have there.

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Qvist
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Post by Qvist » 24 Apr 2005 14:41

To a degree - I am not sure how much the Hungarians got involved in the fighting. Do you know if 14.SS would have been included under Germans, BTW?
Well, whatever the Hungarian losses were, the specifically German losses through the quarter are a good context for the specifically German losses during the L-S operation, what? :) 14.SS: Would think so, on a general basis.


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Post by Andreas » 24 Apr 2005 15:31

Qvist wrote:
To a degree - I am not sure how much the Hungarians got involved in the fighting. Do you know if 14.SS would have been included under Germans, BTW?
Well, whatever the Hungarian losses were, the specifically German losses through the quarter are a good context for the specifically German losses during the L-S operation, what? :)


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Well yes. But not anymore if you compare them to total Soviet losses over the whole period.

The 879,127 are what kind of losses? KIA/MIA/POW/WIA evacuated or just the first three categories, i.e. irrecoverable losses? Does that include Romania or were those only booked in September?

Anyway, the US Army study (which BTW I can not get from the site you linked Aps, I can only find an abstract) says 198,000 losses for the Germans, and seems to understate Soviet losses considerably, compared to Krivosheev. Since there were about 220,000 German irrecoverable losses in August (although that may not have counted in the quarter) in Romania alone, and 350,000 odd or so in Bagration, that could roughly be correct, but would mean the 879k are probably all be irrecoverable then? 198,000 KIA/MIA/POW seems high to me for this operation BTW.

From memory I think that quarter cost the Germans roughly 1,000,000 or a bit more irrecoverable on all fronts? I am therefore not certain whether your comparison of German loss numbers to the Soviet combat losses is not apples (only counting irrecoverable for the Germans) and oranges (counting all combat losses for the Soviets) at this stage? The 1,756 million figure for the Soviets looks suspiciously like total losses to me (770k in Bagration, 300k in L'vov/Sandomierz, 70k (I think) in Romania that would still leave a lot more for the other smaller operations)
Qvist wrote:14.SS: Would think so, on a general basis.
Hmm, does anyone know for sure?

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Post by Aps » 24 Apr 2005 17:47

Andreas,

The direct link for the document I quoted:

http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/fulcrum_ ... 087722.pdf

The reference of the document is ADB087722, in case the previous link wouldn't work.

There is also, among other things, the Volume 5 which might be of some interest for you, it covers North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe (1944).

Direct link:
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/fulcrum_ ... 087721.pdf

Reference: ADB087721

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Post by Michate » 25 Apr 2005 08:11

As for the question of Hungarian allies:

On 1. May 1944 the number of allied soldiers and Eastern volunteers together (but not including Hiwis, it seems) was 196,020.

The Iststaerke of German forces in army group North Ukraine was 449,000, but due to subordination of the most southern corps of Army group Center (around Kovel) during May and due to replacements arriving the latter number increased significantly as Qvists figures show.

Source is a dissertation Thomas Kröker: "Die Fehleinschätzung der sowjetischen Operationsabsichten im Sommer 1944", based on a strength report of the German general staff/Organisational division.

As to the German losses, I have a Heeresarzt document breaking down combat losses by month and type (KIA/WIA/MIA), I will see what I can find this evening.

Andreas, Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe field personnel losses (but not air units, Flak etc.) were included into Heersarzt figures.

Best regards,
Michate

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Post by Andreas » 26 Apr 2005 20:21

Michate wrote:As for the question of Hungarian allies:

On 1. May 1944 the number of allied soldiers and Eastern volunteers together (but not including Hiwis, it seems) was 196,020.
Thanks for that. Much less than I thought.
Michate wrote:The Iststaerke of German forces in army group North Ukraine was 449,000, but due to subordination of the most southern corps of Army group Center (around Kovel) during May and due to replacements arriving the latter number increased significantly as Qvists figures show.
That is interesting. The Soviet general staff study claims that the German strength (excluding Hungarians) was 300,000. In terms of casualties inflicted they claim 'as many as 200,000' KIA/MIA/POW/WIA by July 31st.

47,000 of these from the Brody encirclement. Their claim for this again gets endorsed by a German commanding officer participating in the battle, the GOC Korpsabteilung C. Since the encirclement covered six divisions, a Korpsstab, and presumably assorted Heerestruppen, and since not a lot of Germans escaped (3-5,000 from what I have read - even though the Red Army GSS would give you the impression that none did), this figure maybe a useful upper limit. Korpsabteilung C lost 4,120 KIA/MIA in the battle, but it was not completely encircled, and did better than the others in breaking out, due to its location in the encirclement.

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Post by Michate » 27 Apr 2005 08:14

As for the question of Hungarian allies:
On 1. May 1944 the number of allied soldiers and Eastern volunteers together (but not including Hiwis, it seems) was 196,020.
Oops, sorry, my mistake. These numbers are for AG North Ukraine only. Totals for the eastern front at this date were around 546,000 (249,000 for AG South Ukraine and around 50,000 each for AG Center and North).

During the next months Romanians and Hungarians put additional forces to the front, by 1. July the allied/volunteer forces total on eastern front had increased to 774,000, according to a FHO strength comparison report.

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Post by Andreas » 27 Apr 2005 18:37

Michate wrote:
As for the question of Hungarian allies:
On 1. May 1944 the number of allied soldiers and Eastern volunteers together (but not including Hiwis, it seems) was 196,020.
Oops, sorry, my mistake. These numbers are for AG North Ukraine only. Totals for the eastern front at this date were around 546,000 (249,000 for AG South Ukraine and around 50,000 each for AG Center and North).

During the next months Romanians and Hungarians put additional forces to the front, by 1. July the allied/volunteer forces total on eastern front had increased to 774,000, according to a FHO strength comparison report.

Best regards,
Michate
Thanks for the corrections, and I am glad to see I was not that far mistaken as I originally thought. That is quite interesting. In the GSS there is little mention of the Hungarians in the parts I have skimmed so far. Maybe a Hungarian expert can shed some light on their involvement in the battle?

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Post by Michate » 27 Apr 2005 19:03

That is quite interesting. In the GSS there is little mention of the Hungarians in the parts I have skimmed so far. Maybe a Hungarian expert can shed some light on their involvement in the battle?
Not that I am a Hungarian expert even applying the highest euphemism :lol:, but according to "When Titans clashed", Hungarian forces were mostly in the Southern part of the army group's front, while the main effort of the attack fell on the Northern part, so the hungarian forces were not too much involved. Perhaps that may be the reason.

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Michate

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Post by Andreas » 27 Apr 2005 19:11

Yep, could well be. I guess that once 4th Ukrainian Front started ops against the Carpathian frontline (which I guess would be the southern part of the AG NU line), it was no longer the L'vov/Sandomierz operation. But I have no information about that.

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Post by Qvist » 28 Apr 2005 09:15

Yep, could well be. I guess that once 4th Ukrainian Front started ops against the Carpathian frontline (which I guess would be the southern part of the AG NU line), it was no longer the L'vov/Sandomierz operation. But I have no information about that.
That would presumably come under "The East Carpathian Offensive operation", starting on 8 September and involving 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts.

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Post by Andreas » 28 Apr 2005 18:30

Qvist wrote:
Yep, could well be. I guess that once 4th Ukrainian Front started ops against the Carpathian frontline (which I guess would be the southern part of the AG NU line), it was no longer the L'vov/Sandomierz operation. But I have no information about that.
That would presumably come under "The East Carpathian Offensive operation", starting on 8 September and involving 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts.

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That's what I thought, I am just not so sure about that, since that appears to cover the Dukla pass fighting, and not so much dealing with any Hungarians, at least that was the impression I got from looking at Grechko's memoirs 'Ueber die Karpaten'.

BTW - what are peoples' views on Generaloberst Harpe's performance in the battle?

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Post by Qvist » 28 Apr 2005 20:19

Yes, this operation did take place well to the North of the Romaina offensive, and was not contiguous with it, it seems.

Here's Krivoisheev's brief text to the operation:
The operation was conducted by troops of the 4th ukr Front and the left wing of the 1st Ukr Front, with the aim of giving support to tthe Slovak national uprising. The 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps also took place in the operation. In addition, the 4th Guards and 31st Tank Corps and five divisions were brought in during the operation. The EC operation included the Carpathian-Dukla and Carpathian Uzhgorod army group operations.
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Post by Andreas » 20 Jul 2005 19:12

Some information on Soviet use of Maskirovka as part of operational maneuver in the article by Armstrong that is very interesting. It appears that the Soviet staff officers gave the Germans a good and expensive lesson.
On the night of 14-15 July, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade (GTB), 8th GMC, as the forward detachment of the 1st GTA, joined the battle and was committed in the direction of Porytsk.67 Yet this was not the direction the 1st GTA followed.
While German intelligence sources did not identify the forward detachment of the 1st GTA immediately, they located and overestimated the size of the commitment. The OKH situation maps showed 100 tanks for a unit normally half that strength.68 While this erroneous estimate remained on the OKH situation map until 16 July, the XXXXII Army Corps took prisoners in the fighting on the 15th. By 2000, 15 July, the chief of staff of XXXXII Army Corps reported to Fourth Panzer Army "that the enemy committed elements of the 8th GMC against the front of the corps."69 At that time, the German corps expected the 8th GMC to commit more elements, estimating its strength at ninety-two tanks. The panzer army's daily war journal indicated that the presence of the 8th GMC raised the potential for the Soviets to commit a tank army: "We must expect the rapid commitment of enemy operational reserves. Their movement to commitment has not been detected yet, however."70

On 15 July, the 3d GA and 13th Army committed their second-echelon corps. The German Fourth Panzer Army believed that the sector on 15 July "is now under control."71 But, in the next twenty-four to thirty-six hours of fighting, the Soviets created a ten- to twelve-kilometer gap south of Gorokhov in the 13th Army sector, well south of the 1st GTB's commitment in the 3d GA fight.

General V. K. Baranov's CMG, consisting of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 25th Tank Corps (TC), began moving through the breach made by 13th Army on 16 July. These corps, while identified as separate entities early on OKH situation maps, were never depicted as moving until 19 July.72 The Germans failed to identify the formation of cavalry mechanized groups in this operation. As Baranov's CMG moved into the gap, the Germans were confused by reports of the 25th Tank Corps, mingled with identification of other armored forces.

During the afternoon of 16 July, after the CMG had moved, the 1st GTA began moving toward the gap. The 1st GTB, with reinforcements, continued to fight actively in the 3d GA sector toward Porytsk (see map 7A). Based on the level of activity and the firm evidence of the presence of the 8th GMC, the deputy commander of Army Group Northern Ukraine shared his opinion with Fourth Panzer Army "that indicators for the commitment of the 1st Soviet Tank Army are on hand."73

By 17 July, the German estimate of the situation in the area of the 1st GTB was reduced to a more realistic forty tanks,74 and German intelligence identified other tank brigade-size forces moving into the widening breach, now southeast of Sokal. However, the Germans, after five days of combat with the 1st Ukrainian Front in the northern sector, had not identified Baranov's CMG or moved its corps on their maps. The 1st GTA remained unidentified on OKH's situation maps.75 The Fourth Panzer Army identified the 25th Tank Corps in contact but had not linked it to a CMG configuration. Also, the Fourth Panzer Army had not positively identified 1st GTA in its sector.

On 17 July, following the movement of Baranov's CMG southeast toward Lvov to assist in the encirclement of German forces at Brody, 1st GTA began moving through the breach. The 11th Guards Tank Corps, with two reinforced tank brigades in the first echelon, met no resistance and was followed quickly by the 8th GMC, minus the 1st GTB. The 8th GMC, which was screening the 1st GTA's right flank repelled counterattacks by the 17th Panzer Division and 291st Infantry Division. By 1200, the 1st GTA advanced into the operational depth of the German defense. The German command failed to identify and prevent the commitment of two Soviet mobile groups through the breach.

On 18 July, the 1st GTA finally appeared on the German OKH situation maps and had been placed correctly in the breach.76
However, by the end of the day, the 1st GTA forced the Western Bug River against relatively unprepared opposition-the tank army was on the loose in the German rear. The 1st Ukrainian Front's operation in the Rava Russkaya sector progressed better than the strike toward Lvov. Konev's creation of two major Front efforts paid off. The widening fracture in the north, combined with the solid thrust in the Front's center sector, crumbled the German defense.

In the Lvov sector, despite great difficulties from hard fighting and constrained maneuver, the 3d GTA and 4th Tank Army advanced through the four- to six-kilometer-wide "Koltov Corridor." In the area southwest of Brody, units of the 3d GTA began to encircle a large German grouping of seven to eight divisions. Baranov's CMG eventually closed the northern half of the encirclement.

The command of the Army Group Northern Ukraine concluded that Lvov was the Front's objective. They believed that the 1st GTA would strike south across Zholkov and, in conjunction with the two tank armies attacking directly from the east, conduct a three-prong attack on Lvov (see map 7B).

In its assessment of the situation on 18 July, the Fourth Panzer Army concluded that "it is to be expected that the enemy will concentrate the mass of his armored forces (11th GTC and 25th TC) under concealment oriented to the west so that he may thrust through Zholkov and Lvov."77 The assessment also illustrates the Germans' inability to separate Baranov's tank corps from the 1st GTA. The German defenders simply could not read through the riddle of battlefield confusion and realize that two operational entities were moving through the breach in two different directions.

On 19 July, the Fourth Panzer Army committed the 16th Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized and 168th Infantry Divisions in the vicinity of Zholkov to block the 1st GTA's advance toward Lvov. But the 1st GTA, meeting no serious resistance, continued west and did not turn south where the Germans were waiting. By the end of the day, the tank army s forward detachment had advanced to a depth of thirty-five to forty kilometers and was approaching Rava Russkaya.

At the same time, the 1st Belorussian Front forces participating in the Belorussian operation to the north provided additional alternatives for the Germans to consider. The Germans could see a potential for the 3d GA and 1st GTA to move northwest and complement the 1st Belorussian Front's drive for Lublin and Brest that had begun on 18 July. Such a course of action conformed with the Germans' original assessment of how the Soviets would deal with the Belorussian balcony (see map 7C).
Still confused by the, Soviet order of battle, the Fourth Panzer Army assessed the situation on 19 July: "Employing elements of the Ist Tank Army (11th TC, apparently also the mass of 8th GMC, and probably one additional tank corps) supported by 5-6 rifle divisions, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Bug between Krystynopol and Ulvovsk and gaining ground to the west and northwest in our army right flank."79 Even on 19 July, the divergent paths of Baranov's CMG and the Ist GTA were not evident to the Germans.

Instead of moving as the Germans predicted, the 1st GTA advanced southwest to Yaroslava and forced the San River. Continuously moving on a westward path, the 1st GTA, by 30 July, secured important crossings over the Vistula River in the vicinity of Sandomierz, a sustained deep operation of nearly 400 kilometers.

The 1st Ukrainian Front succeeded in clearing German forces from the Ukraine and gained an invaluable foothold in southeastern Poland across the Vistula River. The success of this startingly swift operation owed much to operational-level deception. Despite an unwanted strategic focus and an initially poorly disposed force, Konev veiled the scope of his intentions and the scale of his operation. Putting into practice three years of war experience against the German Army, the Red Army forces, as exemplified by the 1944 operations, and in particular the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, ushered in an instrumental dimension to warfare at the operational level. Their capabilities and practice in deception set the stage for the final year of the war.
Article by LTC Armstrong on FMSO

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Post by Molobo » 20 Jul 2005 21:34

Lvov was encircled and captured by Russian forces.
Polish Home Army started an uprising on July 23 1944 in Lwow as part of Operation "Ostra Brama"(during that operation a uprising in Wilno also took place).During the fighting Polish and Soviet forces cooperated in fighting German soldiers, after the fights Home Army soldiers were either executed, put into Gulags or drafted into Red Army which reoccupied the territory.Polish forces were led by col. Władysław Jakub Filipkowski „Cis".
Its a rather less known fact of WWII.
The account of the operation and the aftermath are described in Bulletin of the Institute of National Remembrance, which is a state institution researching crimes commited on Polish soil.

The issue in question is Issue nr 47 from 2004.
The article is written by dr. Tomasz Balbus and titled "Soviets and Żymiersk and Lvov AK", or in Polish "Sowieci i Żymierski a lwowska AK"
the issue can be download for free(it's in Polish) from IPN site :
http://www.ipn.gov.pl/biuletyn12_47.pdf

They are some photos of Lwow Home Army soldiers included.

The article in question also contains a report by major Henryk Pohocki "Walery" the chef of intelligence of Home Army in Lwow in which he describes fights and later persecutions made by Soviet authorities towards Home Army.
A photo of Lwow during the fighting with Home Army.
http://www.poland.gov.pl/ww2/?command=f ... oly&id=186

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