Not that this has much impact on the question discussed, but I think at least the first table in the first link is quite strange (maybe I just have difficulties to understand). It gives the number of vehicles at various dates and at the end adds them together to arrive at a "total" which is completely meaningless.Here are a pair of links i'd like to bring to attention:
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlelendlease.htm
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticle ... uction.htm
Importance of eastern front
It shows that the total of domestic trucks was 77%, and lend lease trucks made up only 19% of the total.Michate wrote:Not that this has much impact on the question discussed, but I think at least the first table in the first link is quite strange (maybe I just have difficulties to understand). It gives the number of vehicles at various dates and at the end adds them together to arrive at a "total" which is completely meaningless.Here are a pair of links i'd like to bring to attention:
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlelendlease.htm
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticle ... uction.htm
Yes indeed, and that's when it turned into a war of attrition.VDV wrote:Karri: Operation Barbarossa called for a swift, decisive defeat of the Soviet Union - not a prolonged attrition war. Op. Barbarossa had failed to reach it's objectives already by December 1941.Germany could have won the attrition warfare against Soviet Union
Then apparently Germany could not have won a war of attrition.Karri wrote:Yes indeed, and that's when it turned into a war of attrition.VDV wrote:Karri: Operation Barbarossa called for a swift, decisive defeat of the Soviet Union - not a prolonged attrition war. Op. Barbarossa had failed to reach it's objectives already by December 1941.Germany could have won the attrition warfare against Soviet Union
And how exactly did you reach that conclusion? In Barbarossa Soviet Union was the loser. Sure, the Germans didn't capture all their main objectives, but they still wiped out millions of men and conquered vast areas. Failure of the operation doesn't mean they lose the war...Kunikov wrote:Then apparently Germany could not have won a war of attrition.Karri wrote:Yes indeed, and that's when it turned into a war of attrition.VDV wrote:Karri: Operation Barbarossa called for a swift, decisive defeat of the Soviet Union - not a prolonged attrition war. Op. Barbarossa had failed to reach it's objectives already by December 1941.Germany could have won the attrition warfare against Soviet Union
Well, considering that USSR suffered 4-6 men killed for each german soldier killed, and that the population of USSR was 'only' 3 times bigger than Germanys, then Germany could win? If you count in Germany's allies it will add several million more soldiers.VDV wrote:The biggest problem for Germany in a prolonged attrition war was sustaining manpower - not industrial capacity.
You're wrong though, industrial capacity was what determined the winner.
It didn't mean they would win it either.. the failure of Barbarossa, despite the tremendous losses suffered by the Red Army, meant that the war would take significantly longer than the German command had anticipated.Failure of the operation doesn't mean they lose the war...
Thats about as baseless a statistic as i've ever seen. Perhaps next time you could refrain from pulling statistics out of your head and actually try to substantiate your claims with some credible evidence?Well, considering that USSR suffered 4-6 men killed for each german soldier killed
Several million more?If you count in Germany's allies it will add several million more soldiers.
Those wouldn't be the same allies of whom entire armies were completely routed in a matter of days during Operation "Uranus"??Well, Germany occupied almost all of Europe and thus had an industrial capacity that was potentially several times larger than Soviet industry. Still, Soviet industry was able to outproduce German industry in every aspect. The fact that Germany's economy only switched to total wartime output in 1943 proves that they were never planning a prolonged attrition war.You're wrong though, industrial capacity was what determined the winner.
They in fact achieved none of their objectives, the millions of men lost was a set back, yet one that was overcome. And the failure of Operation Barbarossa, is what in fact spelled their defeat in the years to come.Karri wrote:And how exactly did you reach that conclusion? In Barbarossa Soviet Union was the loser. Sure, the Germans didn't capture all their main objectives, but they still wiped out millions of men and conquered vast areas. Failure of the operation doesn't mean they lose the war...Kunikov wrote:Then apparently Germany could not have won a war of attrition.Karri wrote:Yes indeed, and that's when it turned into a war of attrition.VDV wrote:Karri: Operation Barbarossa called for a swift, decisive defeat of the Soviet Union - not a prolonged attrition war. Op. Barbarossa had failed to reach it's objectives already by December 1941.Germany could have won the attrition warfare against Soviet Union
And again, when they in 1943 tooled to total war they also had western allies in their back. Now imagine if there are no western allies...well actually you said it yourself: the german industrial potential was so much more that they could outproduce Soviet Union.VDV wrote:Yes, and that again doesn't mean they automatically lose it.It didn't mean they would win it either.. the failure of Barbarossa, despite the tremendous losses suffered by the Red Army, meant that the war would take significantly longer than the German command had anticipated.
Credible evidence? Are you talking about soviet propa...I mean studies? Such as finnish losing their entire army during Winter War etc. etc. or do you actually mean credible evidence that everyone but russian historians seem to accept? Because those do state that russians losses were much higer than german losses. In fact there are several threads in this forum alone those statistics.Thats about as baseless a statistic as i've ever seen. Perhaps next time you could refrain from pulling statistics out of your head and actually try to substantiate your claims with some credible evidence?
Yes, the same allies. Btw. was it the same army that routed these allies during operation Uranus, that was completely routed during operation Barbarossa?Several million more?
Well, Germany occupied almost all of Europe and thus had an industrial capacity that was potentially several times larger than Soviet industry. Still, Soviet industry was able to outproduce German industry in every aspect. The fact that Germany's economy only switched to total wartime output in 1943 proves that they were never planning a prolonged attrition war.
Hello all
Just one points:
cheers
Just one points:
Actually, in terms of overall combat casualties (ie, killed, missing and wounded) in 1941, this is accurate. According to Krivosheev, Soviet combat losses (ie, with sick etc deducted) in 1941 amounted to 4,158,107, while the German combat losses are well established as being ~830,000 (831,050, according to DRZW 5/1). This gives a relation of 1:5.2. With the very major insecurities pertaining to the Soviet losses in this period, the Soviet figure here must be regarded as rather a minimum. For the same reason, it is essentially pointless to make any comparison based on killed, because it is impossible to make any clear distinction between killed and missing on the Soviet side. If one should compare just killed and missing, the relation would be far worse from the Soviet point of view, as roughly three quarters of the Soviet figure consists of this category, while the great majority of the German losses were wounded. My general preference is however for basing any general comparison on the totality of casualties.Well, considering that USSR suffered 4-6 men killed for each german soldier killed
Thats about as baseless a statistic as i've ever seen. Perhaps next time you could refrain from pulling statistics out of your head and actually try to substantiate your claims with some credible evidence?
cheers
Do you have evidence to support your exaggerations or not? It's a simple enough question.Karri wrote: Credible evidence? Are you talking about soviet propa...I mean studies? Such as finnish losing their entire army during Winter War etc. etc. or do you actually mean credible evidence that everyone but russian historians seem to accept? Because those do state that russians losses were much higer than german losses. In fact there are several threads in this forum alone those statistics.
No, he means the one that couldn't take Odessa until it was evacuated.Yes, the same allies. Btw. was it the same army that routed these allies during operation Uranus, that was completely routed during operation Barbarossa?
It wasn't numbers of planes and tanks that they only needed, the men they lost could not be replaced at a fast enough rate nor could they perform as they did in 1941, something you do not at all take into account.And again, when they in 1943 tooled to total war they also had western allies in their back. Now imagine if there are no western allies...well actually you said it yourself: the german industrial potential was so much more that they could outproduce Soviet Union.
Another small point
cheers
Actually they could, by and large, for the first 24 months of the war in the East. But that didn't help much given that their opponent could not just replace their losses, but vastly expand their forces.It wasn't numbers of planes and tanks that they only needed, the men they lost could not be replaced at a fast enough rate
cheers
A simple answer to simple question: yes.Kunikov wrote: Do you have evidence to support your exaggerations or not? It's a simple enough question.
Well that's some poor performance from the red army.No, he means the one that couldn't take Odessa until it was evacuated.
Actually, quick peak at the Axis History FactbookIt wasn't numbers of planes and tanks that they only needed, the men they lost could not be replaced at a fast enough rate nor could they perform as they did in 1941, something you do not at all take into account.
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3633
Tells us that their strenght did indeed increase well until 1944. So I guess they could indeed replace their losses fast enough. Furthermore the same facbook tells us following:
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=5956
If you look at it you can see that the soviet losses were higher in '42, '43 and '44 than they were in '41. Total of ~10,5 million irrecoverable losses between '41 and '44.
This page on the other data reveals the german losses on eastern front up to 1944.
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=2844
Now, if you divide the 10,5 million with the 2,7 million suffered by germans you end up with 3,89. This means that for every german soldier lost 3,89 soviet soldiers were lost.
Now the german population at the start of the war was about 70 million while Soviet population was around 200 million. 200 divided with 70 is 2,86. So tell me this, if soviets could in theory mobilize 2,86 soldier for every 1 german soldier mobilized but lose 3,89 soldiers for every german soldier killed, how can they win the attrition warfare?