British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

[Don Juan]

Well this thread, from post #22 onwards, tends to indicate that the operational efficiency of German armoured divisions during Barbarossa was every bit as abysmal as in North Africa.

[Michael Kenny]

The books 'Repairing The Panzers' has lots of figures from late 1941 and the German Panzer situation was indeed dire.

[Don Juan]

This is the problem when you don't think through the ramifications of the scale of the operations you are about to undertake, and therefore fail to anticipate that fitting your tanks with a low durability engine like the Maybach HL 120 is going to be catastrophic.

[Urmel]

, I'm pretty sure that his tank force was burnt out, and I find it curious that he didn't launch another major offensive for over a year (i.e. Unternehmen Venezia). It's interesting that he didn't follow up Battleaxe with an incursion into Egypt, which if his tank state on paper was correct, he should have been perfectly able to do, considering the destruction inflicted on 7th Armoured Division.

Well, no. The assault on Tobruk was a planned for 21 or 23 November 41 CRUSADER intervened. That was a major operation involving half the German tank force in the assault, and the other half in a reserve role to deal with an expected Commonwealth spoiling attack. Also, another major operation involving all the German tank force was the counteroffensive. Nevertheless, the state of the German tanks that originally arrived had no bearing on the Axis ability to conduct major ops after Christmas, since 90% of them were irretrievably lost during CRUSADER.

There is in my view zero evidence that the German tanks were not mechanically fit for ops in the period from May to November. Note SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM in September which saw the whole of 21. Panzerdivision committed. The reason that BATTLEAXE was not followed up is that Tobruk had not been taken. By that time even a logistics muppet like Rommel had realised that he couldn't rely on Tripoli to feed an excursion into Egypt.

but anyway, the point is that the German organisation didn't really expand beyond this level of recovery and repair,

That's true, but context is important. The Germans had a decent recovery and repair system. Their problem was that again, CRUSADER destroyed it completely and forced them to use scarce transport capacity for rebuilding rather than expansion. The workshops had been placed on the coast between Tobruk and Bardia, and Bardia itself and were lost in their entirety when the retreat order was given. South African engineers blew up 35 tanks which had been under repair at these workshops in December.

[Don Juan]

Well, no. The assault on Tobruk was a planned for 21 or 23 November 41 CRUSADER intervened. That was a major operation involving half the German tank force in the assault, and the other half in a reserve role to deal with an expected Commonwealth spoiling attack. Also, another major operation involving all the German tank force was the counteroffensive. Nevertheless, the state of the German tanks that originally arrived had no bearing on the Axis ability to conduct major ops after Christmas, since 90% of them were irretrievably lost during CRUSADER.

There is in my view zero evidence that the German tanks were not mechanically fit for ops in the period from May to November. Note SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM in September which saw the whole of 21. Panzerdivision committed. The reason that BATTLEAXE was not followed up is that Tobruk had not been taken. By that time even a logistics muppet like Rommel had realised that he couldn't rely on Tripoli to feed an excursion into Egypt.

Those are fair points, but when I said "burnt out" I didn't mean that the tanks were mechanically unrecoverable, but that they were essentially mileage expended, so that yes, they could be repaired to operate over restricted mileages, but en masse, little more than that. The question is not so much if they were "fit", but how far that fitness would take them. The assault on Tobruk would, I think, have been a low mileage operation. Do you know how far the panzers travelled during SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM?

I would also venture that a major influence on the extent of the winter counteroffensive after Crusader was how much of the participating tanks' operational mileage had been eroded during the journey to the front from Tripoli. This was the same problem that would have affected the tanks prior to CRUSADER, of course.

That's true, but context is important. The Germans had a decent recovery and repair system. Their problem was that again, CRUSADER destroyed it completely and forced them to use scarce transport capacity for rebuilding rather than expansion. The workshops had been placed on the coast between Tobruk and Bardia, and Bardia itself and were lost in their entirety when the retreat order was given. South African engineers blew up 35 tanks which had been under repair at these workshops in December.

If the Germans had developed tanks with 3000 mile overhaul lives (like e.g. the Sherman) then recovery and repair becomes far less of an issue. If they had introduced a standard mass-produced truck based tank transporter then recovery and repair becomes far less of an issue. Rommel was not an isolated logistics muppet - he was wholly representative of an army that was commanded from the very top by logistics muppets. This is why they were doomed from the start, not only in North Africa, but also in the Soviet Union.

In 1941 all apart from the Ankara shipment of 22 or 23 arriving in December landed in Tripoli. The same for all shipments from January to March 1942 I think. My understanding is that they went by road, there weren't enough tank transporters, and unlike the M13 they could not be transported on a heavy lorry.

Thanks for this info. Would you happen to know if Rommel managed to get any tanks delivered to Benghazi prior to Unternehmen Venezia? It would have done him the world of good if he could have.

[Urmel]

Those are fair points, but when I said "burnt out" I didn't mean that the tanks were mechanically unrecoverable, but that they were essentially mileage expended, so that yes, they could be repaired to operate over restricted mileages, but en masse, little more than that. The question is not so much if they were "fit", but how far that fitness would take them. The assault on Tobruk would, I think, have been a low mileage operation. Do you know how far the panzers travelled during SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM?

It wasn't a deep penetration, but substantially more than an assault on Tobruk would have been.

I would also venture that a major influence on the extent of the winter counteroffensive after Crusader was how much of the participating tanks' operational mileage had been eroded during the journey to the front from Tripoli. This was the same problem that would have affected the tanks prior to CRUSADER, of course.

No, the radius of action was reduced because of lack of fuel, leaving the tank force stranded at Mechili.

Thanks for this info. Would you happen to know if Rommel managed to get any tanks delivered to Benghazi prior to Unternehmen Venezia? It would have done him the world of good if he could have.

Need to look it up, and the book is on its way to the other side of the earth. But until early March 1942, none other than the Ankara shipment.

[Tom from Cornwall]

I found this signal in the file WO106/3133 today - it's a file mainly about the Greek campaign in 1941, but I thought this would be of most interest on this thread:

281A
SECRET CIPHER TELEGRAM

From: C. in C. Middle East.
Desp. 0500. 6/6/41.
Recd. 1145. 6/6/41.
To: The War Office.

OS/70498. Cipher. 5/6.

Your 68736 (D.M.M.) 26/5.

First and Second. Track part No. 15751T on cruiser mark 1. Part No. 19414T on cruiser mark II. Part No. DD(M)3105(1) and T 73804 on cruiser mark IV. Art No. 50/2/1A on tanks infantry mark IIA and IIA star.

Third. Forces in Greece equipped with Cruiser Mark II. Forces in Cyrenaica with Cruisers mark I and II and IV Infantry Mark IIA and IIA star.

Fourth. In Greece continual trouble. Track pins shattering close to head. Link eyes fractured. In Cyrenaica tracks of cruiser Mark I and II good generally. Cruiser Mark IV track short life otherwise satisfactory. Infantry Mark IIA and IIA Star satisfactory provided solid type track pins used. Breakages occurred with hollow pins.

Fifth. Forces in Greece average mileage to evacuation (?300 or 3000) in Cyrenaica Cruisers Mark I and II 1200 miles Mark IV Part No. DD(M)3105(1) 600 miles part No. T73804 800 miles. Infantry Mark IIA and IIA star 900 miles.

C.4 (Telegrams). To: D.M.M. (for action).
Copies to: M.O.5.
D.A.F.V.
A.F.V.1.
D.M.M.
M.M.4.

The details of average mileage before 'evacuation' from front-line units back into the repair cycle (rudimentary as it was at this stage) should also be required reading for all the "On to Tripoli" what-if threads!

Regards
Tom

[Don Juan]

Well, I can tell you that DD(M)3105(1) was a cyanide hardened whiteheart malleable cast iron track with unmachined cannelures manufactured by John Maddock & Co. Ltd. I could also explain the difference between whiteheart and blackheart cast iron, and what a "cannelure" is, but I shan't bother, because by mid-1941 this track was obsolescent, having been replaced by the generic Cruiser tank track MB 1137A, which was in turn replaced by the generic Cruiser tank track TD 507. Note that "DD(M)" signifies that the track was designed by the Design Department (M Section) at Woolwich Arsenal, "MB" signifies that the track was designed by the Mechanization Board, and "TD" signifies that the track was designed by the Department of Tank Design (DTD). As far as Cruisers Mk.I and II were concerned, part nos. 15751T and 19414T were Vickers part numbers, which were replaced by DTD designs, but I'm not sure when.

I should also say that there was (probably) nothing wrong with any of the tracks fitted to the early Cruisers, but that the track problems encountered with the A10 Cruiser Tank Mk.II's sent to Greece were most likely down to the crews not knowing that there was a specific technique for driving the A10 in the kind of deep agricultural soils met in the Greek plains. There was almost certainly an issue here with 3 RTR being issued with these tanks at the last moment, but as I've not yet reached this episode with my research, I shan't comment further.