British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#16

Post by MarkN » 22 Jun 2017, 19:59

I thought this may be of interest to some...

It is two (consecutive) paragraphs from an official report entitled "The Nine Days War, April 6-14, 1941" and is dated 22 September 1944. They are part of the final summing up/conclusion.

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The British knew all along that the Yugolsavs would not be concentrating in South Serbia to defend Salonika and Greece. Many chose not to believe it.

Does any documentary evidence exist that supports Papagos and the Greek's belief that Yugoslavia was going to provide the defensive deployment that their (the Greek's) own defensive strategy and deployment required?

Please note the mobilisation of Yugoslav troops in November 1940, some of whom were moved from Central Serbia southwards, was predicated on being a force to seize Salonika from the Greeks not to defend it from a German attack. (MarkNote: This information comes from several Yugoslav documents not the British report above.)

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#17

Post by jwsleser » 30 Jun 2017, 16:11

The British knew all along that the Yugolsavs would not be concentrating in South Serbia to defend Salonika and Greece. Many chose not to believe it.
This is a good indicator of that. It would be good to understand what this assessment was based on. Regardless, what the British should have believed and what they used to inform their actions/decisions in 19140-41 appear to be two different things.
Does any documentary evidence exist that supports Papagos and the Greek's belief that Yugoslavia was going to provide the defensive deployment that their (the Greek's) own defensive strategy and deployment required?
Since neither Papagos or the Greek leadership knew what the Yugoslavians would do, why do you think their is there would be any documentary evidence stating that Yugoslavia would provide support? The answer to this question was the raisons d'être for the British trip to Yugoslavia in late February.

The actual question that needs to be addressed is:

Did the Greeks believe they could defeat the Germans without Yugoslavian involvement, the Italians still undefeated, and with the limited aid the British offered?

That was the strategic situation facing the Greeks. That is the question that needs to be asked as it sets the framework for exploring the Greek decisions.
Please note the mobilisation of Yugoslav troops in November 1940, some of whom were moved from Central Serbia southwards, was predicated on being a force to seize Salonika from the Greeks not to defend it from a German attack. (MarkNote: This information comes from several Yugoslav documents not the British report above.)
No, that is incorrect. The Yugoslavians were planning to seize Thessaloniki only if they felt the Greeks couldn’t prevent the Italians from seizing it. It was a preventive move to protect the port city from that country, not to take it from the Greeks. The Yugoslavians preferred that the Greeks control the city. So yes, the planned Yugoslav action was to protect the city from the Italians. This is well documented. To give the Yugoslav action any other meaning is to ignore the historical record.

Why mention the Germans and not the Italians. This action was in 1940 and the German were not yet part of the operational considerations. Strange.

If you have any Yugoslavian documents that state otherwise, please feel free to post them. I don’t believe you do have any Yugoslav documents that support your carefully scoped statement.

I have supported my statement by citing:
Qui habet tempus habet vitam" la question de Thessalonique et la crise dans les Balkans la Yougoslavie au seuil de la guerre Bosko Bojovic 2003
Prince Paul, Hitler and Salonika Dragisha Tsvetkovitch 1951
The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919-1941 Dragan Bakić 2012
I have others sources supporting this understanding.
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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#18

Post by MarkN » 04 Aug 2017, 17:02

Unashamedly quoting my own post to indicate to what I am rferring and adding...
MarkN wrote:I thought this may be of interest to some...

It is two (consecutive) paragraphs from an official report entitled "The Nine Days War, April 6-14, 1941" and is dated 22 September 1944. They are part of the final summing up/conclusion.

Image
Image

The British knew all along that the Yugolsavs would not be concentrating in South Serbia to defend Salonika and Greece. Many chose not to believe it.

Does any documentary evidence exist that supports Papagos and the Greek's belief that Yugoslavia was going to provide the defensive deployment that their (the Greek's) own defensive strategy and deployment required?

Please note the mobilisation of Yugoslav troops in November 1940, some of whom were moved from Central Serbia southwards, was predicated on being a force to seize Salonika from the Greeks not to defend it from a German attack. (MarkNote: This information comes from several Yugoslav documents not the British report above.)
The War Office (WO) in London held and maintained a 7 volume 'Yugoslav Handbook' which was regularly updated by the various military attaches in Belgrade (and other sources). It runs well over 1,000 pages in total. A copy is extant and resides exactly where you would expect it to be at Kew. Chapter 49 was entitled "War Plans". The chapter runs to 14 pages and sub-divided into 3 sections: General Strategic Problems; General Strategic Principles; and, Conclusions. Each page is dated separately: the oldest March 39, the latest Oct 40. The 'study' indicates how it is expected that the Yugoslavs will conduct the defence of their country. In brief, they will defend it all and, in the case of an attack by Germany and/or Italy, only make tactical withdrawals as the fighting dictates and not major strategic withdrawals employing the surrender of large chunks of terrority without a fight - the latter being what Papagos and the British felt strategically more sensible if Salonika was to be of prime concern.

MarkNote1: from Yugoslav language literature, the YU war plans changed subsequent to the one written about in this study prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Those changes placed ever greater emphasis on defending the whole border at the expense of a central located strategic reserve - the opposite of what Papagos and the Greeks would have liked.

The WO also held a fairly accurate and up to date orbat for the YU forces including bases, locations, command structure and in many instances the names of the commanding officers etc. That document ran to 32 pages and, similar to the Handbook was regularly updated. The latest updates/pages were inserted in Jan 41.

Other documents also exist listing in great detail equipment stocks, condition etc etc.

MarkNote2: As a rule, the WO (and the FO) were kept well up to date with YU military plans, capabilities and military-political intentions.

A study dated 6 Jan 41 by LtCol Clarke, Military Attache in Belgrade, concerning his views on YU's strategic position was handed to the British Ambassador who forwarded it immediately to London. It runs to 9 pages and is a fuller account of his telegrams 220 and 223 sent to the WO the previous November. Just one brief extract (note it is the very beginning of his summing up) to indicate that the British had all the info they needed - it just didn't suit them to believe it.
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MarkNote3: everybody seems to have recognised that, militarily speaking, defending the entire country at the border was not strategically sound; it was a political decision to do so. But, that political decision was known by the British - and no doubt the Greeks too.

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#19

Post by jwsleser » 17 Aug 2017, 22:37

No documents supporting your contention that the Yugoslavs were planning to take Salonika away from the Greeks.

From my post in the Tatoi thread.
So why does Mark continue to claim “Yugoslavia taking planning and taking measures wholly AGAINST Greece's interest!” Maybe footnote 49 in Bakić’s paper will shed some light [28-29 Oct 40 discussing the mobilization of Yugoslav troops to seize Salonica to prevent the Italians from doing so]

[Page 207 fn]
49. Aprilski rat 1941, vol I, doc 293. It should be noted that the editor has commended (n. 8), in blatant disregard for the content of this document, not to mention the wider context of Yugoslavia’s situation, but typical of the biased view of communist Yugoslav historiography, that Prince Paul decided to “traitorously attack Salonica justifying such an action by the alleged interests of the country”.
[Aprilski was published during the communist regime [vol I 1969 vol II 1987].

So how many of Mark's sources are communist era? How [many] reflect this communist party line?
Why do I feel something is missing from this paragraph?
MarkNote3: everybody seems to have recognised that, militarily speaking, defending the entire country at the border was not strategically sound; it was a political decision to do so. But, that political decision was known by the British - and no doubt the Greeks too.
Yes it was likely known to the Greeks. Does this have any specific meaning or are you letting people guess?
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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#20

Post by MarkN » 20 Aug 2017, 14:48

Hello Tom,

Just taking a step back to your original post.
Tom from Cornwall wrote:I came across this document today in CAB121/674 and thought it might be of interest:
Yugoslav Plan

3. As regards the outline plan contained in the telegram:-

(a) Withdrawal of left flank of Yugoslav army into Bosnia where it would be supported by our Fleet from bases at Sibanik and Cattaro.
As you can see, the Yugoslavs, as late as February 1941 were still not in the frame of mind that they were surrounded and that Salonika (Greece) provided their only outlet to the outside world; they were still under the impression that the RN could resupply them via Croatian and Montengrin ports on the Adriatic. This is counter to the British and Greek argument/attitude/belief that only Salonika provided that oulet.

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#21

Post by jwsleser » 21 Aug 2017, 18:01

Where to start… so much wrong...

First, let me examine Mark’s statement.

Mark likes to misrepresent the facts in such a way that forces others to disprove something that is not true. Mark stated:
As you can see, the Yugoslavs, as late as February 1941 were still not in the frame of mind that they were surrounded…
No one has stated that Yugoslavia was actually surrounded in late February 1941, including the Yugoslavians. That wasn’t the strategic issue facing that nation. The strategic issue was that the Yugoslav feared that they would be completely surrounded. Something completely different from Marks statement.

Of course, Yugoslavia wasn’t fully surrounded as long as Thessaloniki remained in Greek hands. The central theme in Yugoslavian’s decision-making during this entire period.
…and that Salonika (Greece) provided their only outlet to the outside world;
Disproven too many time to bother with doing it once again (but see below re: Yugoslav plans).

What is it Goebbels stated “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”

Let me address the document upon which Mark is basing his erroneous statement.

1. It is not the actual Yugoslav war plan, but a summation of that war plan given to a third party. It is highly unlikely that the UK officers were allowed to read the actual plan, let alone have the time to read it carefully and fully comprehend its many nuances. This information was likely gleamed from a briefing/presentation provided by the Yugoslav General Staff and was ‘broad-brush’ in nature.

So we have third party telling of a complex plan that has been condensed for brevity and simplicity.

2. At the start of an actual war plan, there is a section call an appreciation/assessment (or some similar language). This section presents the reader with a detail explanation of how the writers of the plan viewed the strategic/operational situation the plan was created to address. It addresses the political climate, the geography of the likely theater of war, the resources of the possible combatants, possible alliances and enemies, etc. It is this section that would tell us whether strategic encirclement was seen as a concern or not. This section is approved by the government (through whatever process the country has) before any operational planning is started. This section then becomes the framework for determining the military's end state based on operational capabilities and political desire. The UK note doesn’t provide any of this information. Absolutely none.

It is dangerous to infer the strategic and operational situation without this information.

3. What he quoted doesn’t actually state that the Yugoslavs didn’t feel surrounded. It doesn’t provide any statement near that meaning.

So he takes a statement out of context that doesn’t say what he states it says, and uses it to address an issue that wasn't the intent of the document.

4. He ignores the remainder of the note. Only part of the Yugoslav army would retreat to Sibanik and Cattaro (actually the smaller part). The bulk of the army would retreat to, wait for it, Thessaloniki.
(e) An Army of 300,000 men to be Established in Southern Serbia for the Defence of Salonika, and Eventual Withdrawal from Yugoslavia if forced.
5. Do we have some detailed insight into the Yugoslav plan and the associated logic? Yes. Jozo Tomasevitch’s War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945 is a three volume series covering Yugoslavia’s participation in the war. The first volume, The Chetniks, discusses the various Yugoslav war plans leading up to April 1941 using Yugoslavian sources (pgs. 55-64). We read:
[Plan S (Late 39)] Because a successful and prolonged defense of these borders were considered impossible, the plan foresaw a gradual and orderly withdraw of all the forces in a southeasterly direction throughout the mountainous center of the country towards Greece, where strong Allied armies would be presumably in control. The most important considerations were to prevent a piecemeal breaking up and loss of the armed forces and to keep open the lines of supply and the withdraw route.

[Plan R-40 (early 1940)] This plan took into account the Italian forces in Albania and included several new features, but it followed Plan S in calling for initial defense of the western and northern borders and a gradual withdrawal of all forces in a southeastern direction towards Greece.

[Plan R-41 (Feb 1941)]. Plan R-41 was intended to provide a cordon defense of the entire land border of Yugoslavia, nearly 3,000 kilometers in all (abut 1,860 miles), excluding only the Albanian border, where combined Greek-Yugoslav offensive action was anticipated in order to eliminate the Italian Army in Albania and thus protect the withdrawal towards Greece.
For a port that Mark states was not critical to the Yugoslavians, it features in every single plan as the end state of any Yugoslavian action.

In summation, we have a very misleading statement by Mark that doesn’t reflect the actual historical situation. He uses a document completely out of context. And he once again misrepresents the central importance of Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia’s strategic situation and planning.

The trend continues.
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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#22

Post by MarkN » 23 Aug 2017, 16:16

Tom,

I know you're busy with the final writing effort on your paper, but when you eventually find time, this may pique your interest...

As you already know the context of diplomatic effort in the latter half of January through to the end of February 1941 was dominated by the expected move south of German troops from Romania - be it through Yugoslavia and/or Bulgaria.

During early January, the Greeks had become quite animated by stories that the Yugoslavs were discussing transit for German troop movement across Yugoslavia and the refusal by Belgrade to give a clear and unambiguous statement to refute that (see the flurry of diplomatic cables and commentary in FO file R131/73/92). This extract seems to sum up nicely the issue...
Image


Notwitstanding the possible poor language which initiated this animation, from start to finish, the Yugoslavs never wavered from their intention and determination to resist any miltary attack upon them and the refusal to allow any troop transit. Like the almost identical panic in Greece during November 1940 regarding alleged transit of Italian forces, this seems to point far more to Greek thinking and concerns than anything else.

After this, attention was drawn to the likely passage of German troops into and through Bulgaria. Greece and Britain were, for their own selfish national interests, very keen for that to be prevented and had convinced themselves that if Yugoslavia and/or Turkey would publically declare their opposition to this, the Germans could well think twice about it. Much diplomatic effort was thus expended on trying to convince the Yugoslavs and Turks to make such statements which, as can reasonably be expected, they declined to make since it would of course prejudice their own national interest and strategic efforts to remain out of the war. Neither had any intention of going to war with Germany, nor even risking going to war with Germany, to support Greek - or British - interests.

The argument repeatedly put to the Yugoslavs was that they ought to be fight the Germans if they "invade" Bulgaria otherwise "you'll be encircled" argument. Each time this was deployed, over the next 4-5 weeks, a different 'flavoured' response was illicited depending on who and when the argument was placed.

On 19 January, Campbell cabled (see Belgrade Cable No.92) that the Yugoslav Prime Minister (PM) intimated that if Germany entered Bulgaria it would mean war for Yugoslavia - but also noted that it would not be his decision.

On 21 January, Campbell cabled (see Belgrade Cable No.105) that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister (FM) downplayed the complete issue and, whilst recognising the arguments presented, was unwilling to commit.

On 22 January, Campbell cabled (see Belgrade Cable No.109) that the PM again intimates a German move in Bulgaria meant immediate war for Yugoslavia.

However, on 25 January, Campbell cabled (see Belgrade Cable No.129) a summary of Prince Pavle's, the key Yugoslav Prince Regent (PR), meeting with Colonel Donovan from the USA.
Image

And around and around it went....

By early February, Campbell enquires why Yugoslavia is not doing anything to prepare for this eventuality. The PR huffed and puffed (see Belgrade Cable No.190) and only gave the impression of being "depressed and tired". Other cables suggest that no action would be taken and the reason given was lack of war material - which they asked the British for and which couldn't be supplied. Excuses, excuses.

But what about the military leadership; what did they think?
Image


And finally (for now) an extract from Prince Pavle's response to a letter from King George delivered the day before...
Image

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#23

Post by jwsleser » 24 Aug 2017, 17:26

Tom

I didn’t realize you are writing a paper. I hope it is going well. I don't know whether your paper is a university paper or a academic paper for publication, or if the topic is related to these threads on Greece and Yugoslavia. Good luck!

In general:

There is a difference between offering a supported position and that of presenting unsupported speculation. The former is what academic writing is about; exploring events to discern truth. The latter can have a place, but without support it is merely a possibility requiring further research. When unsupported speculation becomes an agenda that flavors everything you write, it is a distraction and devalues even the factual argument you might be presenting.

An example is Mark’s latest post. It clearly is pushing his agenda without offering anything to support it. Mark can claim anything he wants, he has yet to demonstrate that any of it is true.
Like the almost identical panic in Greece during November 1940 regarding alleged transit of Italian forces, this seems to point far more to Greek thinking and concerns than anything else.
When I read a student’s thesis, I look for words that are emotional and out of place. Emotional language that can be cited, and that moves the argument forward can be very effective writing. When emotional words appear ‘out of nowhere’ without any attribution, I immediately question their validity and value.

The word ‘panic’ struck such an off tone when I read it as it did nothing to move the argument. It was completely unnecessary. I have not read any accounts that state or imply that the Greeks were panicked in November 1940 or again in February-March 1941 over the issue of Yugoslavia. Neither has Mark.

Nor do these reports reflect 'Greek thinking'. They do indicate Greek concerns, but how they were thinking about those concerns is not contained in these messages.
Neither had any intention of going to war with Germany, nor even risking going to war with Germany, to support Greek - or British - interests.
Again back with the canard that everyone expected Yugoslav to act in the UK or Greece’s interest.

As for the rest of his post, nothing new. Read Hoptner for a detail discussion of these events.

BTW, Yugoslavia did go to war and fight the Germans.
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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#24

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 28 Aug 2017, 13:11

Jeff,
I didn’t realize you are writing a paper. I hope it is going well. I don't know whether your paper is a university paper or a academic paper for publication, or if the topic is related to these threads on Greece and Yugoslavia. Good luck!
Thanks, it has been a dissertation for university. I'm just about finished now, just got to get rid of annoying duplications and then post it off with a huge sigh of relief. :thumbsup:

Regards

Tom

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#25

Post by jwsleser » 29 Aug 2017, 01:56

Tom

Congrats! That is an achievement. May I ask what you are reading? Just curious if it is history or not. No need to answer.

Done your orals, I assume you have done your defense. Yes, definitively pub time once the dissertation is in the mail.

Looking forward to when you can get back to important things like posting here on AHF.

v/r Jeff
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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#26

Post by MarkN » 31 Aug 2017, 18:54

Meanwhile (February 1941) back in the UK....

M.I.3 Dept of the WO circulated a paper within the WO and FO entitled "Possible course of a German and Italian attack on Yugoslavia". It was dated 29 January 1941. It is a paper that looks at what they believe the Germans/Italians/Yugoslavs would do rather than should do.

In brief, it outlines Yugoslavia defending its entire border equally and only falling back tactically when compelled to do so. It suggests that the Germans will strike at many points but the main thrust being from Romania towards Belgrade then Nis. It anticipates the forces in the northwest will be separated from those in the south as, "For political reasons it will be difficult for the Yugoslavia government to abandon more than half the country". It discusses the expectation that the 8 divisions already in the south may be joined by the equivalent of 4 retreating from the north and that the 12 would be able to put up significant resistance due to topography. It then says, "Once the industrial area north of the SARAJEVO - NISH line was lost, the army would sooner or later have to be maintained from SALONICA and the burden of this would in the main fall on Great Britain." It then initimates that the Germans would likely seize Salonika fairly quickly.

Dixon of the FO misread the paper and believed he could use it to get Campbell and the MA in Belgrade to approach the Yugoslavs to concentrate all their forces in the south (4 Feb). He drafted a telegram which included the suggestion that Campbell impress on the YU government that they should tell the Croats that they should "sacrifice" their homes for the greater good.

The following day (5 Feb), Nichols of the FO wrote to Col Hollis and DMI to enquire whether they approve of the draft telegram and the recommendation to the Yugoslavs to "... at the initiation of a German invasion, to fall back on southern Yugoslavia."

A Mr Norton and the DMI himself (7 Feb), Major-General Davidson, sent rather stern rebukes that the FO had got it all wrong and that they (as in MI) did not believe or recommend a "rush back to the Sarajevo - Kragujevac line at once".

The matter was closed with Dixon remarking on 10 Feb: "Both the Prince Regent and the Yugoslav General Staff appear to realise fully where their strategic needs lie, but make it equally certain that political considerations will make it impossible for them to carry out the right plan. Anything that we might say would, therefore, likely fall on deaf, if sympathetic, ears."

Over the next week, a series of handwritten notes were added to the file by senior faces at the FO concurring.

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#27

Post by MarkN » 08 Sep 2017, 15:31

Also in London, on 16 February, General Kennedy the DMO&P was briefing the PM. The following day he wrote up what he had said and forwarded it to the VCIGS who presented at a meeting of the War Cabinet on 24 February.

DMO&P's briefing began with the following:
Image

After the War Cabinet meeting of the 24th, DMO&P sent another note to the VCIGS which included:
Image

So, the British generally, and Papagos in particular, bemoaned the Yugoslavs for setting up their military effort unsoundly for political reasons.

Papagos set up the Greek military effort unsoundly for (allegedly) 'diplomatic' reasons which he explains post war as being the only way to encourage Yugoslavia to join the Anglo-Greek effort.

And the Director of Military Operations and Plans in London believes the whole enterprise was militarily unsound but needed to be done for "prestige".

O what a lovely war!!!

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#28

Post by jwsleser » 08 Sep 2017, 15:57

So, the British generally, and Papagos in particular, bemoaned the Yugoslavs for setting up their military effort unsoundly for political reasons.
Why does Mark bemoan that fact the British and the Greeks both realized that the Yugoslavs were making a bad decision? Even the Yugoslavs knew they couldn't defend their country but they still decided to make a bad decision.

Why does Mark bemoan the fact that Pagagos was correct in his understanding of the strategic and operational situation?

Why is it important to know that Pagagos 'bemoaned'? What does his 'bemoaning' mean in terms of our understanding what happened? Did Pagagos actually bemoaned or has Mark introduced a falsehood into the discussion? Mark hasn't provided any evidence that Pagagos bemoaned.

Is the act of bemoaning itself a bad thing given the object of the bemoaning is wrong and everyone knows it is wrong?
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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#29

Post by MarkN » 17 Sep 2017, 14:54

Hello Tom,

Back to the original post and its follow up...
Tom from Cornwall wrote: I've now found the COS response to the JPS paper on the "Attitude of Yugoslavia" of 25 Feb 41 (same reference: CAB121/674):
PRIME MINISTER.

You asked for the comments of the Chiefs of Staff on the attached Telegram from Belgrade (Flag A) [3 – No. 289, 23.2.41]. These are as follows:

2. Tupanyanin’s party is in receipt of a subsidy from His Majesty’s Government; we must therefore view with some scepticism the attitude and plans of Yugoslavia as outlined in this Telegram.

3. Parts of the plan are sound, particularly the attack by the Yugoslav Southern Army on the Italians in Albania (paragraph 2 (c)). As a whole, however, the plan is idealistic and impracticable owing to maintenance difficulties. For example, our Fleet could not support and supply the Yugoslav Southern Army in Bosnia.

4. As regards the proposal in paragraph 6, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean is fully aware of the desirability of staging another naval demonstration in the Adriatic and can be relied on to do so, but his other commitments would probably preclude him from doing so at the present time.

5. It was clear that we could not enter into conversations with the Yugoslavs on this plan without disclosing the source of our information and at the same time making clear how little help we can give.

6. More will be known about this position when Mr. Eden returns.

[sgd: A.D. Nicholl]

26th February, 1941.
Seen by Prime Minister.
No Comment.

[sgd: ??]
2/3.
Interestingly, this was the period when Churchill appears to have given Wavell, Eden and Dill several opportunities to back out of the Greek enterprise - perhaps under the influence of the Chiefs of Staff?

I also noted that one of the members of the JPS team was I.S.O. Playfair who would later be the author of the British Official History for this period.

There are several more appreciations by JPS and JIC in this file that I will post up over the next few days.
Whilst it is quite right for Playfair et al to question the veracity of Tupanjanin's words, it should have been clear to those in London, Cairo and Athens that the substance regarding Yugoslav defensive plans and intentions was pretty accurate: The Yugoslav's were set up to defend their entire border and not to concentrate in 'Old Serbia' and they expected a German thrust from Hungary/Romania towards Belgrade that would separate their forces into 'northern' and 'southern' armies which would then each need separate external resupply through different routes - and perhaps subsequent evacuation. The 'southern army' via Salonika and the 'northern army' via ports on the Adriatic coast.

You will notice in the very same file Tom (just before your extracts - the green paper) there is a copy of a telegram from the Naval Attache in Belgrade to the DNI in London and the CinC Med which covers similar ground. It was sent from Belgrade as ref 1148 on 28 February and recirculated on 3 March in London. The source of his information is also 'W' - although the Naval Attache refers to him directly rather than in code.

From the Yugoslav perspective, Salonika was perceived as important/'vital' to the resupply of the 'southern army' once it had been cut off from the main manufacturing and support bases in the north. Points recognised and understood in London as noted in the M.I.3 paper I mentionned earlier. However, Salonika was not perceived as the sole 'vital interest'. Indeed, the ability of the British to provide that war material and other supplies was more 'vital' than Salonika itself. What was the point of holding Salonika if there was nothing to deliver to it?

Also, remember, Papagos' defensive posture was dependent not on Yugoslavia resisting the Germans which they always said they would - and did - but on the Yugoslavs leaving half their country (essentially) undefended whist concentrating all their forces in 'Old Serbia'.

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Re: British Plans and Yugoslavia - Feb 1941

#30

Post by jwsleser » 17 Sep 2017, 20:10

Also, remember, Papagos' defensive posture was dependent not on Yugoslavia resisting the Germans which they always said they would - and did - but on the Yugoslavs leaving half their country (essentially) undefended whist concentrating all their forces in 'Old Serbia'.
Completely untrue. Mark can't provide any evidence (a cite) where Papagos stated the Yugoslavs must concretrate in the south or all is lost.

Mark is intentionally mixing what Papagos thought provided the best defense for YUGOSLAVIA (to which the UK, Germany, and Yugoslavians themselves agreed was the BEST defense) in his prewar writings with what Greece's strategic situation required given the Yugoslavian political realities in February 1941. The best defense allowed the Yugoslavs to maintain control of part of their country. The actual plans show that abandonment of Yugoslavia was predicted and that the fight would continue in Greece.

Mark completely misses the critical point that in ALL the Yugoslavian plans their army would retreat into northern Greece and WOULD attack into Albania. Such a movement means that the Yugoslavians would be defending what Papagos hoped they would defend and attacking what he wanted them to attack (the northern access into Greece and the Italians in Albania). Even if forced out of Yugoslavia (as predicted in the plan), the Yugo Army would, along with the Greek, be fighting the enemy in northern Greece. The additional military force is what is important, not that they successfully defend southern Yugoslav (although that was a highly desirable outcome). The key fact is that the Yugo Army would RETREAT into Greece, meaning the Yugo Army was between the enemy and Greece.
Indeed, the ability of the British to provide that war material and other supplies was more 'vital' than Salonika itself. What was the point of holding Salonika if there was nothing to deliver to it?
This statement doesn't pass the 'so what test'. Greece required UK supplies as well. If the UK can't provide the material support, Greece falls no matter what Greece or Yugoslavia decide. The Greeks could do something about holding Thessaloniki, they can't do anything about the UK's ability to provide material. Strawman.

The strategic problem in February 1941 is that Greece alone lacks the forces to fight both Italy and Germany at the same time. The forces offered by the UK are inadequate. Even those inadequate forces can't (and didn't) arrive in time. The best solution is to defeat Italy. By this date, Greece can't do it alone but can achieve Italy's defeat with Yugoslav assistance. The second best solution is gain the Yugoslav military against Italy and Germany. Both positive solutions require active Yugoslav participation.

Greece falls without additional forces, forces only Yugoslavia can offer in February 1941. By insuring that the Yugoslav war plans are still viable (holding Thessaloniki), Papagos maintains the possibility of Yugoslav participation.

The fact that Yugoslavia acted too late to change the outcome is immaterial to this discussion. We don't know what a fully mobilized Yugoslavia could have achieved. We do know that without it, Greece would fall.
Jeff Leser

Infantrymen of the Air

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