Panzer-Regiment 5; Panzers Damaged/Destroyed

[Urmel]

Oh man. Rocking horse sh*t.

[MarkN]

The whereabouts of each of the 'missing' pantsers during the latter half of April and early May cannot be fully explained. The information regarding those passing through the werkstatt kp provides clues to a large proportion of them. Schorm provides an excellent summary of the 5 Pz.III under his command and hints at a few others.

The following provides an interesting insight into a single tank which appears to be Pz.IV 801 of 8./Pz.Regt.5. It is my shorthand from translated extracts from Unteroffizier Kurt Martin's captured personal diary. The translated extracts appear in various WDs.

7 April: breakdown 30km out of Msus heading for Mechili
12 April: recovered from breakdown back to Msus (also notes werkstatt still not yet arrived and set up in Msus)
19 April: repairs completed and set off for Benghazi
20 April: arrive Benghazi, but pantser u/s again so await spares
23 April: repairs completed and set off along via Balbia towards Derna/Tobruk etc. However, pantser breaks again before the day is out so they pull off the road into a farmyard

After this date there is just a brief 7-line translators summary of the following days which includes, "They have to wait until 1st May until a small tow-waggon comes for them. But its engine is soon out of order, and they cannot leave."

Nowhere in the 3-page translated extracts does it mention any combat at all against ground forces. There is no indication that this pantser has received any 'foreign' attention at all let alone combat damage. Nevertheless, it clearly was not available for any of the assaults on Tobruk during April or the big one on 20 April / 1 May.

[Don Juan]

The following provides an interesting insight into a single tank which appears to be Pz.IV 801 of 8./Pz.Regt.5. It is my shorthand from translated extracts from Unteroffizier Kurt Martin's captured personal diary. The translated extracts appear in various WDs.

7 April: breakdown 30km out of Msus heading for Mechili
12 April: recovered from breakdown back to Msus (also notes werkstatt still not yet arrived and set up in Msus)
19 April: repairs completed and set off for Benghazi
20 April: arrive Benghazi, but pantser u/s again so await spares
23 April: repairs completed and set off along via Balbia towards Derna/Tobruk etc. However, pantser breaks again before the day is out so they pull off the road into a farmyard

After this date there is just a brief 7-line translators summary of the following days which includes, "They have to wait until 1st May until a small tow-waggon comes for them. But its engine is soon out of order, and they cannot leave."

This indicates an extremely poor standard of repair does it not?

The 5 Panzer Workshop report indicates that they received 83 tanks "up to the time that the Regiment moved into position before TOBRUK" i.e. around 11th April-ish. These were all repaired within a period of three weeks, which was an impressive turnaround time compared to the 11+ weeks of the British. The tanks were fitted with "new or overhauled engines", and in the latter case "As far as possible the old engines were repaired by fitting new bushes, pistons and crankshafts." The "As far as possible" indicates that not all the overhauled engines received new parts i.e. in some or many instances, the old components were re-ground or otherwise reconstituted.

The Workshop Report also complains about the supply of spares being "insufficient" and "inadequate". I think this report really only explains the origin of what would have been a constant stream of tanks being sent out and returned for repair. That is to say, it doesn't describe a one-off epidemic of failures that were effectively dealt with - it describes the beginning of a "new normal". It may have been the case that the DAK's recovery was very efficient, but I suspect its repair was very far from being so. I also suspect that this was far from the only report of this kind that this workshop issued.

[MarkN]

This indicates an extremely poor standard of repair does it not?

Yes and no...

The British had been in Egypt for donkeys' years and thus had considerable insight into the likely and actual wear and tear inflicted by the terrain and conditions on their tanks and other equipment. Their 'front-line' quick turnaround of damaged tanks was no better than what is described in the report. Their 'rear-area' turnaround to do a 'proper' job over overhaul and fixing produced far better results but took forever.

The Germans were novices to the region and had little or no experience of how the terrain and conditions would affect them. To have kept as many pantsers rolling as they did - seems to me to be a pretty good achievement despite the reality that the numbers were low.

***

Changing the focus back to the how many damaged/destroyed question.

I found this and thought it might be of interest to others. Not sure if it is document which enlightens or represents just another red herring.

This is the top of page 1 of Anlage 1 of Gen Paulus': Bericht uber die Anwesenheit beim Deutschen Afrikakorps vom 27.4 bis 8.5.41 ref OKH O Qu. 1 Nr. 276/41 g.Kdos.



Paulus met with Streich on 29 April 1941 and enquired about the state of the division. This is noted in the 5.lei-Div Ia KTB. As you can see above, Paulus notes that he was informed that on 29 April 1941 Pz.Regt.5 consisted of 52 pantsers of which half were Pz.III and IV. He then, ex post, notes that this had increased to 74 by the time of the large-scale attack against Tobruk in the wee hours of 1 May.

This contradicts the information contained in both the Hohman after-action report (the English translation of which has previously been posted on this forum) and the draft II.Abt/Pz.Regt.5 KTB (relevant excerpts also previously posted on this forum). The II.Abt/Pz.Regt.5 KTB clearly identifies (down to Kp level) the number and types of pantsers held on 29 April. A total of 82. It also describes the pantsers used for the assault - down to 81 with a single Pz.I seemingly dropping out in the intervening period.

Two things struck me. Despite the numbers not tallying, it seems Paulus has assumed that the number given to him reflect the pantsers assigned to Hohman for the attack. Because the numbers do not tally, I suspect that the numbers Streich gave him refer to pantsers still under his command and are thus NOT those assigned to Hohman - who was at that time under command Kircheim not Streich.

If this latter thought is correct - and not a red herring - then the 52 pantsers noted on 29 April represent the pantsers under command Olbricht (ie pantsers assigned to Stab/Pz.Regt.5), Bolbrinker (I.Abt/Pz.Regt.5) and those in Pz.Regt.5 workshops.

52 + 82 = 134. Solid evidence shows 17 pantsers lost on 14 April (Olbricht, 5.lei-Div KTB), 3 lost on 2 April (DAK KTB, 5.lei-Div KTB) and 1 lost on 24 March (5.lei-Div KTB). Similarly reliable information describes 2 further pantsers assigned to Herff (5.lei-Div KTB, II.Abt/5.Pz.Regt.5 KTB). So, the 'location' of another 23 can be ascertained. The total now comes to 155. Is this too good to be true? The exact same number as those initially landed in Tripoli.

Where the 74 comes from is troubling. Jentz states the 13 replacement pantsers lost on Leverkusen arrived at the front-line on 29 April. Perhaps these make up 13 of the 22 increase. But????

Enlightenment on totausfalle up to the end of April or just a red herring?

[Don Juan]

The British had been in Egypt for donkeys' years and thus had considerable insight into the likely and actual wear and tear inflicted by the terrain and conditions on their tanks and other equipment. Their 'front-line' quick turnaround of damaged tanks was no better than what is described in the report. Their 'rear-area' turnaround to do a 'proper' job over overhaul and fixing produced far better results but took forever.

The Germans were novices to the region and had little or no experience of how the terrain and conditions would affect them. To have kept as many pantsers rolling as they did - seems to me to be a pretty good achievement despite the reality that the numbers were low.

Agree with you on the British - more than the conditions, they should really have better understood the distances involved, and fed that back into their tank development.

I remain deeply sceptical about the repair performance of the Germans - they may have kept a lot of panzers rolling, but they didn't seem to roll very far.

But we shall see.

[ClintHardware]

Interesting figures Mark. Don't forget the panzer "shattered" on the 4th April by a 3.7-inch seen by Captain Constant (probably a Panzer II), and then the three knocked out at Mechili by the Australian gunners. Only the commander of one of those panzers escaped alive from his panzer such was the internal damage. IIRC that is.

At the moment I believe Streich was so happy to give Paulus the worse possible totals for the whole regiment (Schmidt informs us of Striech's moments of anger with Rommel) that he did so. Streich's lower figure also ties in more easily with the numbers not later seen in Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe. However, your theory is very interesting. If correct why so few later seen?

The British had been using armoured cars since the early 1920s only in Egypt (3rd and 4th Armoured Car Companies RTC and then the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers) but the few interwar Vickers Mediums were not numerous enough to provide a great depth of tank wear and tear experience and were too valuable for show purposes to risk wearing out. The advance to Mersa Matruh in 1935 as a show of force for the Italians and back again and other exercises count but they are not under combat conditions.

[MarkN]

A long time ago...

About the number of III and IV in PR5, they arrived with 61 and 17 respectively, but according to Jentz TCiNA, page 37:

"Replacements for the ten Pz.Kpfw.III and three Pz.Kpfw.IV were immediately issued.
The ten replacements were Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.F and G with 5cm Kw.K.L/42 requisitioned from those previously issued to Panzer-Regiment 6. The three replacement Pz.Kpfw.IV were new production Ausf.E that were issued directly from the ordnance shop.
Shipped to Tripoli with 18th or 19th convoy, the replacements did not catch up to the unit at the front until 29 April 1941."

and Page 157:

"Panzer-Regiment 5 with 5.Leichte Division were back by Tobruk. Panzer-Regiment 5 reported 39 Pz.Kpfw.II, 38 Pz.Kpfw.III and 19 Pz.Kpfw.IV as operational on 15 June 1941; some of these belonged to Panzer-Regiment 8."

viewtopic.php?p=1881115#p1881115

That was part of the response to:

Interesting. Your [the rather skewed data created by clinthardware] returns "slightly" disagree with the ones I have:



Note that 15 June return is impossible for PR5, they never had that many IIIs and IVs in Africa in 1941. On the other hand, it perfectly matches the expected PR8 numbers for that date. I consider July and August numbers correct. The total numbers seem about right. As far I can tell 14/IV total for July-August 1941 is entirely correct.
viewtopic.php?p=1879738#p1879738

For those with an adblocker running - like me - who cannot see the image Brevity posted, it is a page from a GHQ ME Intsumm giving translated details from a captured German document. It states that on 15 June 1941, Pz.Regt.5 had ready for action 39/II, 38/III, 19/IV and in workshops 6/II, 32/III, 1/IV. There is no mention of Pz.I. You will also notice that the totals equate to a full complement of pansters bar a single Pz.III. It is my belief that this document is the source of Jentz's data as he has pulled alot of his information from the GHQ ME Intsumms.

Poster Brevity believes the numbers cannot be right. Jentz seems to have come to the same conclusion hence why he added "some of these belonged to Panzer-Regiment 8". I too believe that they are incorrect. But we will never get to the bottom of it as GHQ ME had a far more effective system of destroying captured documents than the Great Potsdam Fire.

To contrast, the 5.leiDiv KTB Ia shows the following einsatzbereit for 13 June 1941: 27/I, 26/II, 57/III and 10/IV.

These numbers seem to dovetail with the einsatzbereit for 20 June 1941 found in the DAK KTB: 19/I, 8/II, 33/III and 8/IV and also another einsatzbereit from the 5.leiDiv KTB Ia for 22 June 1941: 19/I, 8/II, 33/III and 11/IV.

More recently...

At the moment I believe Streich was so happy to give Paulus the worse possible totals for the whole regiment (Schmidt informs us of Striech's moments of anger with Rommel) that he did so. Streich's lower figure also ties in more easily with the numbers not later seen in Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe. However, your theory is very interesting. If correct why so few later seen?

Babbling.

The British had been using armoured cars since the early 1920s only in Egypt (3rd and 4th Armoured Car Companies RTC and then the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers) but the few interwar Vickers Mediums were not numerous enough to provide a great depth of tank wear and tear experience and were too valuable for show purposes to risk wearing out. The advance to Mersa Matruh in 1935 as a show of force for the Italians and back again and other exercises count but they are not under combat conditions.

More babbling interdispersed with deliberate misdirection if not outright falsehoods. Where did you get the idea from that "the few interwar Vickers Mediums ... were too valuable for show purposes to risk wearing out"? Did you just make that up?

Moreover, in November 1937, the Egypt tank state was 19 Vickers Medium and 73 Vickers Light (20 of which were Mk.VI). In the first half of 1938, at least a further 60 Light Tanks Mk.VI/VIa were sent to and arrived in Egypt. That's plenty of tanks and plenty of time to gain "a great depth of tank wear and tear experience". And, even more importantly, a significant part of the 'problem' was engine related regarding the intake of abrasive sand and dirt. A problem experienced by all motor vehicles. A problem being experienced for a loooonnnnnggggggggggg period of time. Whereas the Germans had how much prior experience?

[Don Juan]

Moreover, in November 1937, the Egypt tank state was 19 Vickers Medium and 73 Vickers Light (20 of which were Mk.VI). In the first half of 1938, at least a further 60 Light Tanks Mk.VI/VIa were sent to and arrived in Egypt. That's plenty of tanks and plenty of time to gain "a great depth of tank wear and tear experience". And, even more importantly, a significant part of the 'problem' was engine related regarding the intake of abrasive sand and dirt. A problem experienced by all motor vehicles. A problem being experienced for a loooonnnnnggggggggggg period of time. Whereas the Germans had how much prior experience?

The Germans sent tanks to Spain did they not?

The problem of dust/sand in the desert is somewhat over-emphasized, because the overhaul life of UK based Crusaders was no different to that in the ME - 1200 to 1500 miles - and in summertime in the UK, a Liberty engine would not last any longer (distance-wise) than it did in the ME. Similarly, Maybach HL 120 engines did not last any longer in the dusty conditions of the Soviet Union in summertime than they did in the ME. The big difference being that invading the Soviet Union with tanks that were incapable of enduring for long distances was massively more consequential than sending a comparatively small number to Libya. As what the Germans were planning to do was significantly more ambitious/psychotic than what the British were, there really was a greater emphasis on them to ensure that they had the equipment to do it.

The major factor with the ME and SU was the distances involved, and it was these distances that ensured that engine wear became a significant factor in operations. The British weren't particularly stupid because they had been in the desert previously. They were stupid because they hadn't looked at a map and measured the distance between Mersa Matruh and Tripoli, and then drawn the obvious conclusions. Similarly, the Germans should have looked at a map to ascertain the distance between Brest and the A-A line, compared that with the overhaul life of their tank engines, and also drawn the obvious conclusions.

[MarkN]

Moreover, in November 1937, the Egypt tank state was 19 Vickers Medium and 73 Vickers Light (20 of which were Mk.VI). In the first half of 1938, at least a further 60 Light Tanks Mk.VI/VIa were sent to and arrived in Egypt. That's plenty of tanks and plenty of time to gain "a great depth of tank wear and tear experience". And, even more importantly, a significant part of the 'problem' was engine related regarding the intake of abrasive sand and dirt. A problem experienced by all motor vehicles. A problem being experienced for a loooonnnnnggggggggggg period of time. Whereas the Germans had how much prior experience?

The Germans sent tanks to Spain did they not?

The problem of dust/sand in the desert is somewhat over-emphasized, because the overhaul life of UK based Crusaders was no different to that in the ME - 1200 to 1500 miles - and in summertime in the UK, a Liberty engine would not last any longer (distance-wise) than it did in the ME. Similarly, Maybach HL 120 engines did not last any longer in the dusty conditions of the Soviet Union in summertime than they did in the ME. The big difference being that invading the Soviet Union with tanks that were incapable of enduring for long distances was massively more consequential than sending a comparatively small number to Libya. As what the Germans were planning to do was significantly more ambitious/psychotic than what the British were, there really was a greater emphasis on them to ensure that they had the equipment to do it.

The major factor with the ME and SU was the distances involved, and it was these distances that ensured that engine wear became a significant factor in operations. The British weren't particularly stupid because they had been in the desert previously. They were stupid because they hadn't looked at a map and measured the distance between Mersa Matruh and Tripoli, and then drawn the obvious conclusions. Similarly, the Germans should have looked at a map to ascertain the distance between Brest and the A-A line, compared that with the overhaul life of their tank engines, and also drawn the obvious conclusions.

I fear you have conflated 3 or 4 different - and for the most part discrete - concepts/issues to come up with this post. I'm not sure how I can respond as that conflation makes it impossible for me to see what point(s) you are trying to get across.

[ClintHardware]

A long time ago...

Babbling...

falsehoods...

All the data I have given over the last five years has been from those who shot up the panzers they were fighting or those who were beside those doing the shooting and saw the results.

Along the way there have been corrections from reasoned arguments (usually cases of double accounting) and I have been happy to accept them once tested against other sources and logic. The knocked out panzer numbers are well over one hundred 24th March - 14th May. A knocked out panzer may be recovered but may also not re-appear in battle for hours, days, weeks, or months. The job done on them was done one way or another.

Striech's contempt for Rommel probably was also not helped by others I forgot to mention above: i.e. the three panzers knocked out on the advance to Mersa Brega 31st March by 5 RTR's troop covering the road well to the west, the two panzer knocked out at Mersa Brega by 'J' Battery at long range, the two panzers knocked out by the Australians at Er Regima with an anti-tank rifle and an Italian mortar, and then the three or two panzers knocked out at Er Regima by 203 Battery 51st Field Regiment using 18 Pdrs on Mark V Carriages.

I hold with the veterans and with Leutnant Schmidt's description of Streich because you have not fully delivered a convincing alternative to them.

In respect of the 1935 - 1939 Egypt information it comes from various veteran and regimental accounts covering the too little too late problems and the Abyssinian Crisis histories.

[ClintHardware]

A long time ago...

Babbling...

falsehoods...

All the data I have given over the last five years has been from those who shot up the panzers they were fighting or those who were beside those doing the shooting and saw the results.

Along the way there have been corrections from reasoned arguments (usually cases of double accounting) and I have been happy to accept them once tested against other sources and logic. The knocked out panzer numbers are well over one hundred 24th March - 14th May. A knocked out panzer may be recovered but may also not re-appear in battle for hours, days, weeks, or months or never again. The elimination job done on them was done one way or another.

Striech's contempt for Rommel probably was also not helped by others I forgot to mention above: i.e. the three panzers knocked out on the advance to Mersa Brega 31st March by 5 RTR's troop covering the road well to the west, the two panzer knocked out at Mersa Brega by 'J' Battery at long range, the two panzers knocked out by the Australians at Er Regima with an anti-tank rifle and an Italian mortar, and then the three or two panzers knocked out at Er Regima by 203 Battery 51st Field Regiment using 18 Pdrs on Mark V Carriages.

I hold with the veterans and with Leutnant Schmidt's description of Streich because you have not fully delivered a convincing alternative to them.

In respect of the 1935 - 1939 Egypt information it comes from various veteran and regimental accounts covering the too little too late problems and the Abyssinian Crisis histories.

[Don Juan]

I fear you have conflated 3 or 4 different - and for the most part discrete - concepts/issues to come up with this post. I'm not sure how I can respond as that conflation makes it impossible for me to see what point(s) you are trying to get across.

I'm not really participating in yours and Clint's discussion, Mark.

I hijacked your post to make a general point, viz. experience of operating in a particular climate is far less useful than being able to imagine how real, large scale operations are going to be conducted. I think only the Americans ever really did this.

[Don Juan]

The British had been in Egypt for donkeys' years and thus had considerable insight into the likely and actual wear and tear inflicted by the terrain and conditions on their tanks and other equipment. Their 'front-line' quick turnaround of damaged tanks was no better than what is described in the report. Their 'rear-area' turnaround to do a 'proper' job over overhaul and fixing produced far better results but took forever.

I've returned to this quote because I've just realised that I've been a bit thick, and overlooked what it implies. From the British point of view, the Base Ordnance Workshops in the Delta were not strictly tasked with tank repair but with overhaul. This basically meant receiving tanks from frontline formations, gutting them of all their automotive and otherwise moving parts, and replacing them with either:

i) New parts
ii) Reconditioned parts
iii) The same parts after they had been reconditioned
iv) The same parts after they had been thoroughly checked for wear.

The purpose of an overhaul was to return a tank's life mileage back to zero. So once a Crusader had racked up 1200 miles, or a Stuart had racked up 3500 miles in a unit, they would be sent back to Base Workshops for overhaul, even if they were performing perfectly satisfactorily. Once out of overhaul, they would then be returned to a unit, who should then, theoretically at least, have had total confidence that the Crusader had another 1200 miles of running left, and the Stuart had another 3500 miles of running left. During operational periods, Base Workshops would undertake repairs of tanks that had received battle damage beyond which divisional or brigade workshops were capable of fixing. They would also accept for repair the "overspill" of damaged or broken down tanks that divisional or brigade workshops didn't have time to fix. In reality it wasn't as cleanly demarcated as I've described, but I think this was the general principle.

Hitherto, I've assumed that the German organisation largely mirrored the British one. As such, I assumed that somewhere in Tripoli was the German equivalent of the AFV Branch administering the various requirements of German armoured formations, there was the German equivalent of AFV (Tech) doing all the technical investigations into breakdowns etc., and that there were workshops undertaking the overhaul of German tanks. I had also assumed that the reason all of this organisation was obscure was because the documentation had been destroyed, or that nobody had bothered to research it. It has now occurred to me, however, that the reason I haven't heard anything about all this is because it didn't exist. Indeed, even if the Germans had set up workshops in Tripoli, it wouldn't have been possible to send tanks back from the front for overhaul because firstly there was no railway, and secondly the Germans had no tank transporters.

So essentially, if the above is correct, then the Germans were attempting to maintain their not particularly durable tanks in the Middle East solely on what were, effectively, brigade workshops. This in turn implies that no German tank in this theatre ever received an overhaul. Because the automotive components of a tank tended to wear out in a staggered manner (e.g. gearboxes tended to last longer than engines), a German commander couldn't be sure how long the bulk of his tanks would last, as none of them would have had their life mileage returned to zero. As a result a feature of German armoured operations would have been a necessity to operate over short distances, and an expectation of running repairs. I should say in mitigation that the British system tended not to work as well as it should have because a couple of inherent defects in the Crusader tended to compromise the value of the overhaul system.

Nonetheless, if I'm correct that the Germans were not overhauling their tanks, then that is really quite amazing.

[Urmel]

The unit you imagined did not exist.

The main workshops were divisional and based in the Tobruk/Bardia area north of the Via Balbia up to mid-December 1941, when they were all lost. Fortunately enough they also lost at least 88% their tanks in Operation CRUSADER (yes, you read that right), so they started in 1942 with what amounts to a clean slate.

[Don Juan]

Thanks Urmel,

So am I correct to think that the divisional workshops were an echelon behind, and a tier above, the regimental (i.e. brigade) workshops? Also, am I right to assume that the divisional workshops didn't undertake overhauls either?