Duncan_M wrote: ↑
26 May 2021 23:18
The definition of doctrine doesn't specify it has to be a field manual, and it specifies "used for the conduct of operations" so if a "planning appreciation" explains the fundamental principles with supporting TTPs to carry out an operation, that is doctrine. By definition.
You do realize that definition is modern, formulated c. 1980? In any case, the Field Manuals as created beginning in 1940, did describe War Department Doctrine in detail. They were, and their successors still are, expressed doctrine. The overarching doctrinal publication being FM 100-5 Operations, which succeeded the previous doctrinal publications,the Field Service Regulations, the last of which was published in 1939. If you are really interested in the development of U.S. Army doctrinal development and expression between the world wars you should look for William Odom's, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939
No, a planning appreciation was and is not doctrinal, since it applied only to the operation in question and was not universal, which is necessary for it to be "doctrine" throughout the Army.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑
26 May 2021 16:44
Hewitt complained about US Army doctrine immediately after Husky (and again after Avalanche). After Husky, he used the planning appreciation I linked to as evidence of flaws in terms of ignoring available assets they could have used, namely Navy shore bombardment.
Yes, he did, and rightly so, since what was done in TORCH, HUSKY, and AVALANCHE specifically violated Navy doctrine, although it did not violate specifically the current, watered down, Army doctrine.
Fifth Army wasn't involved in Husky, nor was VI Corps, why would they and their opinions on amphibious landing doctrine been what guided how Husky went down (which also relied on surprise/low light, and did not use naval bombardment)? Was Clark still on Ike's staff involved heavily in amphibious planning? Didn't he assume command of Fifth Army on 5 January 1943, seven months before Husky?
I guess we're really getting confused now. You brought up Clark, so that is Fifth Army and AVALANCHE. HUSKY was Seventh Army and II Corps, so Patton and Bradley...I believe it was you who mentioned Bradley initially? No, army and corps commander "opinions" do not define doctrine, but their experience can modify doctrine. TORCH, HUSKY, and AVALANCHE were all predawn assaults and the experience gained from them was incorporated into doctrine.
BTW, Fifth Army was constituted and Clark made its commander on 12 December 1942. It was activated and Clark assumed command on or about 4 January 1943. It's original mission was actually security of French Morocco and Algeria. Its real mission quickly became training, which included amphibious training exercises with the 36th Inf Div in late July and then the 34th Inf Div in late August 1943. It began planning for various possible invasions in mid June 1943, including Sardinia and landings on the Italian mainland. Planning for AVALANCHE formally began on 26 July 1943.
The actual provision for NGF was included, with a target list in the final plan for AVALANCHE, with the proviso that the element of surprise should be maintained "as practicable" and that the bombardment would not begin before H-15 "unless directed by Attack Force Commanders". i.e., Dawley for the Americans and McCreery for the British. McCreery chose to exercise that option, Dawley did not.
The author, Andrian Lewis, wrote the doctrine was pervasive among "the Anglo-American generals." I'm trying to figure out who the ringleader of that flawed doctrine was. Since the US Army copied the British, I'm guessing a lot of this was coming from the British Army. But who?
Sorry, edited to correct attribution of this statement. Sheldrake is quite correct, then Major Lewis's work is badly flawed. You could say the War Department General Staff, which wrote the doctrinal documents before the Army Ground Forces took responsibility in March 1942, was responsible for deleting the paragraph found in the Navy version I quoted (the Army version was a near mirror image otherwise). In effect, it gave the Army planners too much leeway on that point.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018