The Enigma wrote: See Appreciation number 4, issued by John Harding part of 8th Army staff
Then The Enigma wrote: I would assume the actual document is at Kew; however there is mention of it in the OH with the relevent snippets on the first page of this topic.
So you tell me it is in Appreciation number 4, and then you tell me you have never seen it, but you assume it is in Kew (whatever Kew means or where it is located), then you state that it is in the OH (Official History) with the relevant
snippets on the first page of this topic. Could you post those relevant snippets? On this first page of this thread? is that where the snippets are located?
From Masters and Commanders cited above:. . page 517
If the British wished to get entangled in Balkan intrigues and struggles, Marshall seemed to be saying, he might provide some landing craft but would otherwise leave it entirely up to them.
“It was a dazzling idea, this grand project of reaching Vienna before our Russian allies,” wrote General Alexander in his memoirs, “and we discussed it informally at my headquarters.”
. . .Furthermore, the Ljubljana Gap concept was effectively killed off – with the help of Brooke, who had by then had time to examine the operation more closely – and the British were also persuaded to go on the defensive in Italy and move five divisions from there to fight under Eisenhower.
No mention of an appreciation from the British from what I have found.
From the book entitled: “Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944” by Maurice Matloff.
The President would not yield. He immediately replied to Churchill unequivocally: "The exploitation of 'OVERLORD,' our victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France, combined with the Soviet drives to the west-all as envisaged at Teheran-will most surely serve to realize our object-the unconditional surrender of Germany." Roosevelt reminded Churchill that Stalin had favored ANVIL and that they would have to inform the Soviet leader of any change in plans. The President clearly set forth his position on political objectives: "I agree that the political considerations you mention are important factors, but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany." To conduct an operation against Istria, he went on, would be to disregard two important considerations-the agreed grand strategy for an early defeat of Germany, and the time factor involved in a campaign to
debouch from the Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. It was doubtful whether, on purely logistical grounds, more than six divisions could, "within a decisive period," be put into the fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap. "I cannot agree," he declared, "to the employment of United States troops against Istria and into the Balkans, nor can I see the French agreeing to such use of French troops." If ANVIL were not launched, the whole question of French troops would have to be reopened. The President concluded:
Obviously someone in a planning staff in the US had done a preliminary estimate of this idea and found it wanting. Read the description of the terrain and then look at the google earth map and you will see that this plan was a nonsense.