I have been thinking about the attack by 6 RTR again and think that we have perhaps misunderstood what Davy was saying in his book "The Seventh and Three Enemies".
David R quotes:
Brigadier Davy of 7th Armoured Brigade had left 6th Royal Tanks with Campbell to execute the plan, but he had reservations about how his tanks were ultimately used. "Brigadier Davy believes that it was 'a tactical error to have ordered the 6th Royal Tanks to go beyond the Trigh Capuzzo to an objective which was not immediately to be occupied by our own riflemen and before there was a reasonable certainty of being joined on it by the leading troops of 70th Division' ".
What Davy actually says [pp. 152 - 153] is as follows:
"At about midnight General Gott arrived at the headquarters of the 7th Armoured Brigade to co-ordinate the operation for a junction with the 70th Division, whose sortie had been ordered to begin at 6.30 a.m. Placing the commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade in command of all troops in the Sidi Rezegh area, he ordered him to recapture the lip of the escarpment the next morning, so as to restore observation over the Trigh Capuzzo and to send forward a force across the Trigh Capuzzo to join hands with the 70th Division on El Duda. He then returned to his headquarters.
At 2 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Byass attended a conference at which orders were given for the attack. This was to be carried out by the 1st Battalion of the 60th on the right and A Company of 2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade on the left. The 6th Royal Tanks were to lead the latter in close co-operation and to establish themselves on an objective beyond the Trigh Capuzzo. A special detachment of the 6th Royal Tanks was to be prepared to advance to El Duda to join hands with the 70th Division...The whole of the guns of the Support Group (forty-two 25-pounders) with Brigadier Campbell of the Support Group acting as Commander Royal Artillery, were to support the attack and it was hoped that they would be able to give adequate cover against the anti-tank guns on the escarpments. Zero was fixed for 8.30 a.m.
This plan was fairly reasonable in so far as the reoccupation of the lip of the northern escarpment was concerned. But it seems to have been a tactical error to have ordered the 6th Royal Tanks to go beyond the Trigh Capuzzo to an objective which was not immediately to be occupied by our own riflemen and before there was reasonable certainty of being joined on it by the leading troops of the 70th Division."
In the WD of the Support Group for 20 November it says:
"2000 Comdr was called to a conference by Comdr 7 Armd Div at the HQ of 7 AB ½ a mile south of HQ 7 Support Group. Here orders were received to capture and hold the escarpment north of the aerodrome and east of SIDI REZEGH itself. Commanding Officers attended the conference at HQ 7 AB, and 1/KRRC were ordered to carry out the attack next morning – the first infantry attack to be made by a motor battalion in the Middle East during this War."
So, General Gott came to Davy at HQ 7 Armd Bde at about midnight (or earlier according to Support Group) and told him to take charge at Sidi Rezegh and organize an attack to capture the escarpment. Davy then called a conference for 0200, 21 Nov, of COs (i.e from both 7th Armd Bde and the Support Group) and there gave out his orders. Those for 6 RTR are recorded in their WD [thanks Andreas!] as: "A Sq’s task was to occupy Pt 167 (432404), establish 2 RB in that area and protect the left flank of 60th [KRRC] who were making a similar attack on our right with 7th Hussars (though this regiment was later withdrawn to meet an enemy attack from the east.) B & C Sqns were then to go through, capture the cross-roads and link up with 38th Bde at Ed Duda".Therefore, what he is actually saying in his book (although not making it absolutely obvious!) is that it was his plan, and that in retrospect he "seems" to have made a "tactical error"
by ordering the 6 RTR to go beyond the Trigh Capuzzo.
Indeed, on p.154 he says:
"Accordingly [the need to delay the advance north by the Germans while the attack on the escarpment went in] the Brigade Commander [i.e. Davy, comdr of 7th Armd Bde] placed Brigadier Campbell in command of all the troops allotted for the northern operation and ordered him to carry out the attack as planned [i.e. including the "tactical error" of moving some of 6 RTR north of the Trigh Capuzzo]."
It seems, therefore, that when Davy handed over the northern attack to Campbell, he intended 6 RTR to continue with the task beyond the Trigh Capuzzo as the original objective at Map Ref 432404 is well south of it.
The supposition that Davy was trying to lay the blame on Campbell or Gott therefore seems to have come about due to the way that the SA Official History quoted him, rather than something he positively attempted in his own writing.
I hope all that makes some sense - it did when I started to think about it