The wisdom behind Merkur

[Jon G.]

So, apart from those two days' discrepancy from February 1941 - you can't really say from the section I've posted up from Lucas how substantial the differences really are between what he detailed, and what she noted - except that one factoid?

Lucas' claim of 76 days of disruption clashes with Behrens' figure for 82 days of closure during 1941 alone, read my first post. Unless Lucas means something else with 'disruption'.

Also, Lucas' recount of 64 air strikes 'during the war' should be compared with OHara's figure of 64 air strikes between January 1941 and July 1942.

Similarly, the effect of mining operations isn't just that it might sink ships - the main benefit (for the mine-layer that is) is that your enemy has to spend time and effort finding and disarming the mines you've laid.

[phylo_roadking]

Similarly, the effect of mining operations isn't just that it might sink ships - the main benefit (for the mine-layer that is) is that your enemy has to spend time and effort finding and disarming the mines you've laid.

Or not laid See RN operations in the Norwegian Leads...

Lucas' claim of 76 days of disruption clashes with Behrens' figure for 82 days of closure during 1941 alone, read my first post.

And as I noted from my first post regarding Lucas' account, he notes total closure as being different to partial closure. He makes it clear that there was traffic through the Canal when Behrens says there wasn't...

but the worst consequence was the restriction of passage only to ships drawing less than 8m for which the channel was reduced to just 26m width.

....and Lucas would know; until he left for London in 1944 he was in charge of pilotage on the Canal!

Also, Lucas' recount of 64 air strikes 'during the war' should be compared with OHara's figure of 64 air strikes between January 1941 and July 1942

Should it? First I'd like to see a more exact reference to Roskill than "January 1941 and July 1942 the canal experienced 64 air raids, sinking sixteen ships in transit and eleven other vessels. I dug this out of the staff history, the Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Volume II". Again, Lucas provides more detail....

The most important air attacks on the Isthmus took place in 1941 after the Germans relieved the Italians. 48 air raids were carried out that year; 2 in January, 2 in February, 2 in March, 5 in May, 7 in July, 14 in August, 12 in September and 4 in November. The enemy's main efforts came at night during the summer but attacks earlier in the year were the most successful because of surprise coupled with slow improvements in defence.

Forgot this earlier...

BTW, there's no way of knowing from what you linked to that he wrote his article in 1958. Only that it was published that year.

In this you are correct; he could for instance have written it much closer to the wartime events he took part in...

[Jon G.]

...and Lucas would know; until he left for London in 1944 he was in charge of pilotage on the Canal!

See my comment, above, about Lucas being a party to the events he describes, and therefore possibly biased. The comment which you dismissed by naming Lucas' blurb 'a historical article'.

First I'd like to see a more exact reference to Roskill than "January 1941 and July 1942 the canal experienced 64 air raids...

But Lucas' unsourced '64 air attacks carried out during the war' is good enough for you?

BTW, there's no way of knowing from what you linked to that he wrote his article in 1958. Only that it was published that year.

In this you are correct; he could for instance have written it much closer to the wartime events he took part in...

I'll quote you for good measure, then

....and it may be of note that he wrote this article in 1958!

You seem quite willing to contradict yourself on this point, too.

I just restate that I have more faith in the official histories than I do in an un-sourced interweb blurb. The official histories could well be in error, of course, you just have to come up with something better sourced than Lucas.

[phylo_roadking]

See my comment, above, about Lucas being a party to the events he describes, and therefore possibly biased. The comment which you dismissed by naming Lucas' blurb 'a historical article'.

I just restate that I have more faith in the official histories than I do in an un-sourced interweb blurb. The official histories could well be in error, of course, you just have to come up with something better sourced than Lucas.

You've been given the source - "Revue Maritime", specifically edition no.258 "Revue Maritime" February 1958. Nor is it blurb, its the official organ of the IFM, the Institut Francais De La Mer http://ifm.free.fr/

First I'd like to see a more exact reference to Roskill than "January 1941 and July 1942 the canal experienced 64 air raids...

But Lucas' unsourced '64 air attacks carried out during the war' is good enough for you?

In comparison to Roskill at the moment, yes. You're the one suggested the comparison, not me. I take it then you're happy with the accuracy of Roskill?

In this you are correct; he could for instance have written it much closer to the wartime events he took part in...

I'll quote you for good measure, then

....and it may be of note that he wrote this article in 1958!

You seem quite willing to contradict yourself on this point, too.

Yes, I'm quite happy to advance his date of writing closer to the historical events as you suggest. After all - aren't personal recollections much more accurate the closer they're written down to the live events they're recording?

[phylo_roadking]

Yes, I'm quite happy to advance his date of writing closer to the historical events as you suggest. After all - aren't personal recollections much more accurate the closer they're written down to the live events they're recording?

In fact - you're quite right, we CAN advance Lucas' history of events closer to WWI, by a whole five years. In File 1995060 1788 Statistiques Ebasco sur le trafic du canal de Suez in the Archives Nationales, there's a footnote...

"note « Le canal de Suez pendant la guerre » de l'amiral Lucas (mai 1953) "

[Jon G.]

You've been given the source - "Revue Maritime", specifically edition no.258 "Revue Maritime" February 1958. Nor is it blurb, its the official organ of the IFM, the Institut Francais De La Mer http://ifm.free.fr/

And you of course went through the original text, checked it for translation errors, noted down Lucas' references, and then decided not to post them?

But Lucas' unsourced '64 air attacks carried out during the war' is good enough for you?

In comparison to Roskill at the moment, yes. You're the one suggested the comparison, not me. I take it then you're happy with the accuracy of Roskill?

No. I pointed to OHara's post, above.

You see, I generally defer to the contributions of more knowledgeable members - in this case he even wrote a book covering the war in the Med himself.

I don't count myself as part of that company. I just pulled a book from my shelf and found some figures. Unlike you, I don't make it up as I go along.

Yes, I'm quite happy to advance his date of writing closer to the historical events as you suggest. After all - aren't personal recollections much more accurate the closer they're written down to the live events they're recording?

Generally speaking, yes. Here is a hint for you. Look up if the figure of 64 air raids 'during the war' matches with Roskill's figure, then go check if Roskill's volume about the war in the Med predates Lucas' article. Then ditch your tertiary, translated sources.

[phylo_roadking]

And you of course went through the original text, checked it for translation errors, noted down Lucas' references, and then decided not to post them?

No. Because that's NOT what I'm answering, I'm answering your statement that what I printed up was unsourced. As you can see - it wasn't.

You see, I generally defer to the contributions of more knowledgeable members - in this case he even wrote a book covering the war in the Med himself.

Excellent. Then hopefully he can confirm or otherwise that Lucas' recollections on specific numbers of air raids on the Canal in 1941 as listed in detail is correct or not.

Unlike you, I don't make it up as I go along

Jon, kindly illustrate what I have made up in this discussion. That is a serious accusation.

Look up if the figure of 64 air raids 'during the war' matches with Roskill's figure, then go check if Roskill's volume about the war in the Med predates Lucas' article. Then ditch your tertiary, translated sources

In fact - you're quite right, we CAN advance Lucas' history of events closer to WWI, by a whole five years. In File 1995060 1788 Statistiques Ebasco sur le trafic du canal de Suez in the Archives Nationales, there's a footnote...

"note « Le canal de Suez pendant la guerre » de l'amiral Lucas (mai 1953) "

It doesn't Roskill Volume 1 1954, Volume 2 1956, Volume 3 1960, Volume 4 1961.

[Jon G.]

No. Because that's NOT what I'm answering, I'm answering your statement that what I printed up was unsourced. As you can see - it wasn't.

You've given a reference to where Lucas article originally appeared. A reference which BTW also appears on the translated page which you seem to be drawing your conclusions from. That does not in and of itself lend any additional weight to the claims made by Lucas. Nor does your statement that you don't know if his original article had sources and references somehow make Lucas anything more than a reference which turns up to anyone who punches 'suez 1941 mines' in his search engine of choice.

What I asked for was one or more sources for Lucas' claims. Can you provide that?

Jon, kindly illustrate what I have made up in this discussion. That is a serious accusation.

Umm, Behrens' change of gender or your query on ww2talk going unanswered? Anyway, let me rephrase that. You seem to be taking Lucas' account uncritically and at face value. That is your prerogative.

But if you want to contradict Behrens' and Playfair's findings re the duration of Suez Canal closures in 1941, you should be able to come up with something more substantial than that. For example by showing us that you can verify Lucas' figures/alternatively falsify Behrens' figures.

Without anything verifyable and check-able to go on, your observations regarding Lucas' claims will remain speculation.

I'm not telling you that Lucas is wrong (or right), mind. I just want to be able to check if he is.

[OHara]

Let me type the complete section from the Naval Staff History (these were originally confidential documents produced by the Admiralty's Historical Section for the edification of naval personnel).

“Foremost among the Commander-in-Chief’s problems at this time was the defence of the Suez Canal against mining, which on several occasions assumed a serous aspect. The first raid occurred on 30th January 1941, and was carried out by German aircraft operating from Benina airfield near Benghazi. During February the Canal was closed, either wholly or in part, for 21 days and in March for 15 days, the raids being launched from airfields in Rhodes. No raids occurred in April, presumably because the enemy was otherwise employed in Greece and Libya. In May, however, the situation again became threatening, the Canal having to be closed for 17 days. June was a clear month; thereafter, except for four days in July, the Canal was clear until the end of August, though in the later month there were several heavy mining raids and attacks by torpedo aircraft on shipping in Suez. Between January 1941 and July 1942 a total of 64 air raids were made on the Canal, causing in all a loss of 16 ships in transit, six Admiralty small craft, two of which had been lent by the Suez Canal Company, and five of the Company’s own craft. Most of the ships were eventually salved. The total period during the war in which the Canal was closed amounted to 76 days, but only in February, March and May 1941 did suspension of traffic last for more than seven days in succession.”

The next several pages give some particulars. Ranee, 8,500 tons was mined on 5 February. Derwenthall, 4,934 tons on 3 February. 4 February it was Aghios Georgios, 3,283 tons. But I’m not going to type all that.

Finally, here’s a nice little quote from Cunningham’s War Diary of February 1941. It’s from the General Appreciation written at the end of the month:

“The Canal was mined afresh on 19 and 22 February . . . At the end of the month the Canal was still closed and there was a serious congestion of 110 ships at Suez.”

Hope this clarifies. I personally consider the Naval Staff History an authoratative source.

Vince

[Jon G.]

Thank you for that, OHara.

Regarding the discrepancy between Behrens and the staff histories, I guess that it's because Behrens counts every day of closure, also partial closure, whereas the staff history makes the distinction between partial and full closure...

...During February the Canal was closed, either wholly or in part, for 21 days...

...Behrens has 20 days where the Canal was closed to through traffic in February 1941.

“The Canal was mined afresh on 19 and 22 February . . . At the end of the month the Canal was still closed and there was a serious congestion of 110 ships at Suez.”

Yes, this is the part of the story which is closer to Behrens' main subject. She only makes passing reference to the minings etc. but spends rather more time describing the chaotic effects they had on shipping at either end of the Canal.

[Andy H]

Hi Jon & Phylo

Enjoying the discussion about the Suez mining.

I found this in CAB66/15/38 which covers March 13th - March 20th 1941

The Suez Canal was reopened to traffic in both directions on the 19th March

This statement above is at odds with Behrens
plus:-

Foreign Waters.
15. Three mines were detonated in the northern part of the "Suez Canal
during the week, thus enabling traffic to be moved in this section. In the southern
sector of the Canal mines failed to respond to treatment, but it was possible to
restart traffic on the 19th March, and H.M.S. Illustrious and 25 Merchant Vessels
arrived at Suez on the 20th

.

and this from CAB66/15/4 which covers February 6th - February 13th 1941

Foreign Waters.
15. Mines were dropped in the Suez Canal again on the 3rd, 4th and
5th February. After the Ranee, 5,060 tons, was mined on the 5th February traffic
was again stopped except for tugs and small craft. The next day a Minesweeping
Hopper and a Canal Hopper were mined and a skid detonated one mine,
whereupon traffic was stopped again until the 9th February, when tugs and small
craft were allowed to proceed freely throughout the Canal. Southbound ships,
including one of 15,000 tons, were allowed to proceed to Suez on the 11th February,
and northbound traffic was to start on the 12th February. Sixteen mines have
been accounted for in the Canal and six were dropped along the shores.

It may well be down to how different persons or departments interpreted what closed actually meant!

Regards

Andy H

[Dave Bender]

I think chromium was the primary reason Germany invested so many resources to secure the Aegean. The perceived threat was great enough that significant resources were siphoned from Operation Barbarossa to ensure the Aegean operations were successful.

A sustained campaign from Crete against Suez shipping was militarily possible. I doubt it was a factor in German strategic planning as the KM placed so little emphasis on land based airpower. However it was a possibility Britain couldn't entirely dismiss just as Germany could not entirely dismiss the possibility of RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete.

[Dili]

British declined to attack directly due to its proximity to the Turkish coast

An apart in this discussion. Not quite. Bristish invaded Castelorizzo just a few miles from Turkish coast in a ill fated mission and airbases in Rodi(Rhodes) were bombed.

[Graeme Sydney]

A sustained campaign from Crete against Suez shipping was militarily possible.

But not without making strategic choices and reducing the Air Effort to achieve other strategic objectives. In other words, IMHO, highly improbable. The LW was already strategically at full stretch if not overtaxed.

I doubt it was a factor in German strategic planning as the KM placed so little emphasis on land based airpower.

Was there any strategic planning or purpose to the German Med operations? And I meaning planning not justification after the fact.

To my knowledge Hitler/Germany had no stated strategic objective/ambition in the Med. The nearest to a strategic objective/ambition I know of was Hitler was trying to save his political ally Mussolini from military defeat, political embarrassment and possible demise.

Rommel seems to have seen a strategic objective, the Suez and Britain's Middle East oil. I don't think Hitler shared his vision. On the contrary, Hitler was focused on the USSR and virtually ignored the Med (until disaster was imminent and pride was on the line).

However it was a possibility Britain couldn't entirely dismiss just as Germany could not entirely dismiss the possibility of RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete.

Is there any evidence that Germany was aware of the possibility of RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete? I know that Churchill was annoyed about losing the potential of Suda Bay. To the best of my knowledge any lost potential for the RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete was not mentioned.

Was this a real possibility anyway? One of the other posts to this thread argued (successfully in my mind) that the potential to develop Crete as a major airbase was limited and would require massive resources, time and money.

[Urmel]

A sustained campaign from Crete against Suez shipping was militarily possible.

But not without making strategic choices and reducing the Air Effort to achieve other strategic objectives. In other words, IMHO, highly improbable. The LW was already strategically at full stretch if not overtaxed.

It depends. Before reaching that conclusion I'd like to see what would have been required in terms of assets. If LG1 and KG26 between them could handle it, I don't see that having a major impact on operations.

However it was a possibility Britain couldn't entirely dismiss just as Germany could not entirely dismiss the possibility of RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete.

Is there any evidence that Germany was aware of the possibility of RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete? I know that Churchill was annoyed about losing the potential of Suda Bay. To the best of my knowledge any lost potential for the RAF Bomber Command attacking Ploesti from Crete was not mentioned.

Was this a real possibility anyway? One of the other posts to this thread argued (successfully in my mind) that the potential to develop Crete as a major airbase was limited and would require massive resources, time and money.

You don't need to turn it into a major base. Just make it a fuel stop. That approach was used by the RAF in the western desert, where the major bases were in the Delta, and fuel stops would be made near the Libyan/Egyptian border on the way to Tripoli or Benghazi.

If there was a strategic consideration involving Ploesti on the German side you would probably find it in the official German history. It's too long that I have read it, and I can't remember.