A quote from Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht, Walter Warlimont, Athäneum Verlag 1964 pp 248-249 on the conference in Berchtesgaden april 1942 and its aftermath.
'Again discussions limited to days and hours which in addition came much too late and at which both sides also played with hidden cards, should replace the carefull preliminary work of a common staff which was still lacking. The foundations as well as the result of the discussion -which was only attended by Jodl from the Wehrmachtführungsstab- where in this case also especially burdened by the fact that the Italians put the taking of Malta above all other objectives whithout however being prepared for this alone with it its own forces or only at a given point in time ,while on the german side one did not even agree in the own camp: Rommel urged-without knowing how it stood with Malta-on the renewing of the offensive to the Suez Canal because otherwise an english attack would forestall him; Kesselring thought that one could,yes must take Malta by surprise together with the running out of the air offensive; Hitler finally,who as earlier , so also now did not want to believe in the success of a landing on Malta,tended much more towards the attack to Egypt for that reason. Maybe becoming temporarily undecided , or maybe for apprearances sake , he agreed to a compromise proposal which planned to stop Rommel's army at the latest at the Libyan-Egyptian border to be prepared for the landing on Malta around mid july,at the latest mid august, in both months at full moon.
Already ten days later,soon after the 10th may when Kesselring reported his mission of destructing the island installations as accomplished, Hitler gave Göring the free hand to transfer parts of Luftflotte 2 to the east , and declared besides that one had to take into account the possibility of the transfer of further air assets wheN there was the slightest noticeable danger in the west or Norway.
These and repeated other 'very sceptical' utterances about his own decision, made a definitive clearing of the issue seem the more urgent to the Wehrmachtführungsstab- only three weeks after the arrangment with the italians-as meanwhile the selected german assault troops with the corresponding assault means were pulled together on Sicily.
As frequent in case of such indecisiveness, Hitler at first only decided to get General der Flieger Student, experienced in airdrop operations, to the headquarters in East Prussia for an oral report. In his presentation on 21 may Student showed himself firmly convinced of a success and was unreservedly supported by the chief of the general staff of the Luftwaffe Jeschonnek,although the disapproving attitude of Göring could not be unknown to them.
The Kriegsmarine and the german and italian offices in Rome-where meanwhile a Malta staff manned by both allies,a first in the war, had had gone to work- urged in the same direction.
All that did not hinder Hitler, still in the presence of Student and highly infuriated by the opinions which went against him,to throw away all plans and arrangements unceremoniously.
For Jodl, who had maintained a deliberate restrained attitude until then, it was because of this too late, at least to have the for and against examined again in his staff, let alone that the Italians would be heard or even informed before this decision which was most important for their Mediterranean theatre. Without further examination,Hitler brought only forward as new argument that later when Rommel was at the Libuan-Egyptian border, the logistic support could be conducted past Malta to Tobruk; therefore one did not need Malta and the assaultlanding should - for the deception of the Italians- only be prepared mentally.
With this the OKW order of 4 may which had been issued subsequent to the arrangement with the Italians at Berchtesgaden, became invalid in its essential parts, although the preparations, also to deceive the Italians,were continued.
German-italian decisionmaking on the attack against Malta
Re: German-italian decisionmaking on the attack against Malt
A quote from the chapter contributed by Walter Warlimont (Die Entscheidung im Mittelmeer 1942 pp 233-268)
to the book Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges , Bernard & Graefe 1960 .
This quote concerns the decisionmaking at the time of the taking of Tobruk.
"The speed and the dimension of this success were not in the least suited on the german side to remenber the previous arrangements and to make them more important than the impression of the victorious instance.
While the Italian high command , in concordance with the commonly defined plan, tried to banish the army of Rommel to the defense near the Egyptian border by measured orders, and while Mussolini on the proposal of Cavallero , -in a premonition of what would come-urged the german commander in chief by letter of 21st june again, to consolidate the successes and take Malta first, the thoughts of the german headquarters had ran for long in a totallly different direction.
Hitler had, ,taking up the repeatedly renewed negative decision of 21st may,immediately after the news of the taking of Tobruk , in front of his military evironment, again unalterably rejected the landing on Malta and linked to this at the same time the decision to continue the pursuit of the british in the direction of the Suez Canal .
Therefore neither the strong urging of the victorious commander in Africa nor an agreeing utterance from the Wehrmachtführungsstab and the Oberkommando of the Kriegsmarine had been needed to move Hitler in his answer already transmitted by telex on 21st june to Mussolini ,to commit the total weight of his 'advice' in this sense.
Without dealing even with one word on Malta, he let the enthusiasm of the hour run its course by writing that a 'historical turning point ' had been reached 'which could be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war'. The british army was 'practically destroyed'. The 'quickest and completest exploitation of this situation, which would in no case present itself a second time in the same theatre' demands a pursuit without pause until the complete destruction of the british troops' , before through the arrival of new reserves 'a change unfavourable for us would occur'. 'This time' he thought, 'Egypt could be taken from England' , while the simultaneous taking of Sebastopol freed the way to also over the Caucasus 'advance to the fall of the whole eastern construction of the english empire'.
Under further referral to the 'historical hour', Hitler rose subsequently to a solemn - when also not quite original and successfull- form of speech with the words ' the Goddess of fortune in war approaches the commander only once. When one does not hold onto her in such a moment,one will very often not reach her anymore'.
Behind the accessory of this exchange of correspondance which in the decisive hour had to makeshiftly replace the forwardlooking planning of a common staff, in the first place became visible again the contrast between the strategic objectives of both coalition partners and also closely entwined in there the differences in the method of warfighting.
'In opposition to the dynamic striving of the german command which kept looking far to the Middle East after the intial successes in the east and the south, Rome insisted on its demand , at first to thoroughly secure the base in the Mediterranean and with this simultaneously the Italian colonial empire. In the area of the local command, these contrasts worked further, because the Italians were,after the earlier experiences ,not prepared to seek success once again in unlimited storming forward as long as the logistics were not secured. In the german headquarters on the other hand one trusted firmly that with the supposed routing of the british 8 th army, the tactical conditions were given for a successfull advance into Egypt.
One also considered the logistics better secured as ever before, when Rommel declared that he could base his support for the general needs of the troops on the big british supply dumps , for ammunition and fuel on the near port of Tobruk, for the whole transport over land on the high numbers of captured trucks and besides that on the small railroad into Egypt.
If one got to Alexandria and the Suez Canal , driven the same way by success as before, then Malta would, lonely behind the front , fast lose its former importance.
On the other side, the Italians were in no way prepared for the jump to take away the island. The preparations were far advanced, Mussolini wrote on 21st june, however demanded simultaneously not less than 70000 tons of fuel for the collaboration of the Italian navy. Already alone for that reason, not taking into account the interference by the enemy ,especially the airforce on Malta again stronly reinforced by flying over from aircraftcarriers, it had to be highly doubtfull, even excluded that the best, but also last time which the Italian high command now wanted to see in August could really be used. But otherwise,so Mussolini's letter declared, one must wait for the assaultlanding until next spring.
The comparison of the given possibilities shows in full clarity that the command of the Axis powers in those late days of june 1942 did not have to choose between Malta and Suez but only between the halting or moving forward of Rommel's army. However, halting meant , also when one put the objectives less far forward, the giving up of the full exploitation of the victory and would thereby constitute a gross violation of one of the most important foundations of german tactics. By this one would give freedom of action back to the enemy and lose the intiative oneself sooner or later. It should by the way not be saying too much, that the german commander who already twice, in the spring of 1941 and in january 1942 , had enlarged a probing attack in a fully fledged offensive, would also in this situation and in the exhiliration of victory , no matter what orders reached him, alone out of himself have found ways to push through his will. Actually Rommel, who could not act differently,had already early on the 22nd june, ordered the continued pursuit to Sidi Barrani , 90 km beyond the Libyan-Egyptian border. Mussolini now showed himself extremely worried for the first time that 'one would not know how to exploit the success to the utmost' and seemed more and more inclined to put his confidence more in Rommel than the own advisers. Hitler's answering letter therefore hit open doors, to become the last reason for the Commando Supremo to give up further resistance . Even more strengthened by intercepted US reports from Cairo on the strong prospects of Rommel and by radio messages from the interned french warships in Alexandria to their Admiralty, according to which the clearing of the harbour by the british was imminent, the Italian High Command from 23rd june on, gave in quick succession its new orders for the pursuit against the Suez Canal.'
to the book Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges , Bernard & Graefe 1960 .
This quote concerns the decisionmaking at the time of the taking of Tobruk.
"The speed and the dimension of this success were not in the least suited on the german side to remenber the previous arrangements and to make them more important than the impression of the victorious instance.
While the Italian high command , in concordance with the commonly defined plan, tried to banish the army of Rommel to the defense near the Egyptian border by measured orders, and while Mussolini on the proposal of Cavallero , -in a premonition of what would come-urged the german commander in chief by letter of 21st june again, to consolidate the successes and take Malta first, the thoughts of the german headquarters had ran for long in a totallly different direction.
Hitler had, ,taking up the repeatedly renewed negative decision of 21st may,immediately after the news of the taking of Tobruk , in front of his military evironment, again unalterably rejected the landing on Malta and linked to this at the same time the decision to continue the pursuit of the british in the direction of the Suez Canal .
Therefore neither the strong urging of the victorious commander in Africa nor an agreeing utterance from the Wehrmachtführungsstab and the Oberkommando of the Kriegsmarine had been needed to move Hitler in his answer already transmitted by telex on 21st june to Mussolini ,to commit the total weight of his 'advice' in this sense.
Without dealing even with one word on Malta, he let the enthusiasm of the hour run its course by writing that a 'historical turning point ' had been reached 'which could be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war'. The british army was 'practically destroyed'. The 'quickest and completest exploitation of this situation, which would in no case present itself a second time in the same theatre' demands a pursuit without pause until the complete destruction of the british troops' , before through the arrival of new reserves 'a change unfavourable for us would occur'. 'This time' he thought, 'Egypt could be taken from England' , while the simultaneous taking of Sebastopol freed the way to also over the Caucasus 'advance to the fall of the whole eastern construction of the english empire'.
Under further referral to the 'historical hour', Hitler rose subsequently to a solemn - when also not quite original and successfull- form of speech with the words ' the Goddess of fortune in war approaches the commander only once. When one does not hold onto her in such a moment,one will very often not reach her anymore'.
Behind the accessory of this exchange of correspondance which in the decisive hour had to makeshiftly replace the forwardlooking planning of a common staff, in the first place became visible again the contrast between the strategic objectives of both coalition partners and also closely entwined in there the differences in the method of warfighting.
'In opposition to the dynamic striving of the german command which kept looking far to the Middle East after the intial successes in the east and the south, Rome insisted on its demand , at first to thoroughly secure the base in the Mediterranean and with this simultaneously the Italian colonial empire. In the area of the local command, these contrasts worked further, because the Italians were,after the earlier experiences ,not prepared to seek success once again in unlimited storming forward as long as the logistics were not secured. In the german headquarters on the other hand one trusted firmly that with the supposed routing of the british 8 th army, the tactical conditions were given for a successfull advance into Egypt.
One also considered the logistics better secured as ever before, when Rommel declared that he could base his support for the general needs of the troops on the big british supply dumps , for ammunition and fuel on the near port of Tobruk, for the whole transport over land on the high numbers of captured trucks and besides that on the small railroad into Egypt.
If one got to Alexandria and the Suez Canal , driven the same way by success as before, then Malta would, lonely behind the front , fast lose its former importance.
On the other side, the Italians were in no way prepared for the jump to take away the island. The preparations were far advanced, Mussolini wrote on 21st june, however demanded simultaneously not less than 70000 tons of fuel for the collaboration of the Italian navy. Already alone for that reason, not taking into account the interference by the enemy ,especially the airforce on Malta again stronly reinforced by flying over from aircraftcarriers, it had to be highly doubtfull, even excluded that the best, but also last time which the Italian high command now wanted to see in August could really be used. But otherwise,so Mussolini's letter declared, one must wait for the assaultlanding until next spring.
The comparison of the given possibilities shows in full clarity that the command of the Axis powers in those late days of june 1942 did not have to choose between Malta and Suez but only between the halting or moving forward of Rommel's army. However, halting meant , also when one put the objectives less far forward, the giving up of the full exploitation of the victory and would thereby constitute a gross violation of one of the most important foundations of german tactics. By this one would give freedom of action back to the enemy and lose the intiative oneself sooner or later. It should by the way not be saying too much, that the german commander who already twice, in the spring of 1941 and in january 1942 , had enlarged a probing attack in a fully fledged offensive, would also in this situation and in the exhiliration of victory , no matter what orders reached him, alone out of himself have found ways to push through his will. Actually Rommel, who could not act differently,had already early on the 22nd june, ordered the continued pursuit to Sidi Barrani , 90 km beyond the Libyan-Egyptian border. Mussolini now showed himself extremely worried for the first time that 'one would not know how to exploit the success to the utmost' and seemed more and more inclined to put his confidence more in Rommel than the own advisers. Hitler's answering letter therefore hit open doors, to become the last reason for the Commando Supremo to give up further resistance . Even more strengthened by intercepted US reports from Cairo on the strong prospects of Rommel and by radio messages from the interned french warships in Alexandria to their Admiralty, according to which the clearing of the harbour by the british was imminent, the Italian High Command from 23rd june on, gave in quick succession its new orders for the pursuit against the Suez Canal.'
Re: German-italian decisionmaking on the attack against Malt
Another quote from the chapter Walter Warlimont contributed to 'Entscheidungssschlachten des zweiten Weltkieges', this one on the decisons after the offensive into Egypt stalled in july 1942.
'While Mussolini returned to Rome from his waiting position near Derna on the 20th july and Chirchill could state on the next day that Egypt was out of danger, the german commander began, with the same emphasis which he used only a month before for the continuance of the offensive, now to urge breaking off the battle and retreat to the position on the border. Rommel felt the reversal of the situation so strongly that he even took into account for the first time the loss of the whole of Italian North Africa if his proposals were refused and substantial reinforcements did not arrive.
His proposals met with the firm refusal of the german and almost even more of the Italian high command . Both were unwaveringly confident to conserve the intiative and to reach the objectives in a new attempt, when only first the necessary reinforcements had arrived. In the abscence of other possibilities the Commmando Supremo and OKW had decided together at the end of july that in the first place the forces assembled against Malta would be sent as fast as possible to Egypt.
The operation staff Malta had already on 7th july been instructed by Cavallero to put aside the attackplans against the island and instead prepare a crossing to Tunis.
The Commando Supremo now feared after the pursuit into Egypt had stalled, even more than before it started, that the british could start a landing operation in French North Africa and from there advance into Tripolitania .The last prospect to take away Malta was hereby done away with
In concordance with the orders meanwhile received from the Commando Supremo, at the end of july Rommel also showed himself convinced of the necessity to resume the offensive shortly , during a visit by the author on his commandpost 12-15km west of El Alamein, There was no talk of retreat anymore. '
'While Mussolini returned to Rome from his waiting position near Derna on the 20th july and Chirchill could state on the next day that Egypt was out of danger, the german commander began, with the same emphasis which he used only a month before for the continuance of the offensive, now to urge breaking off the battle and retreat to the position on the border. Rommel felt the reversal of the situation so strongly that he even took into account for the first time the loss of the whole of Italian North Africa if his proposals were refused and substantial reinforcements did not arrive.
His proposals met with the firm refusal of the german and almost even more of the Italian high command . Both were unwaveringly confident to conserve the intiative and to reach the objectives in a new attempt, when only first the necessary reinforcements had arrived. In the abscence of other possibilities the Commmando Supremo and OKW had decided together at the end of july that in the first place the forces assembled against Malta would be sent as fast as possible to Egypt.
The operation staff Malta had already on 7th july been instructed by Cavallero to put aside the attackplans against the island and instead prepare a crossing to Tunis.
The Commando Supremo now feared after the pursuit into Egypt had stalled, even more than before it started, that the british could start a landing operation in French North Africa and from there advance into Tripolitania .The last prospect to take away Malta was hereby done away with
In concordance with the orders meanwhile received from the Commando Supremo, at the end of july Rommel also showed himself convinced of the necessity to resume the offensive shortly , during a visit by the author on his commandpost 12-15km west of El Alamein, There was no talk of retreat anymore. '
Re: German-italian decisionmaking on the attack against Malt
By the metrics that Kesselring established at beginning Malta was far from destructed. For example AA was still strong.Already ten days later,soon after the 10th may when Kesselring reported his mission of destructing the island installations as accomplished
Re: German-italian decisionmaking on the attack against Malt
A quote from 'Erinnerungen' ,Siegfried Westphal Hase & Koehler 1975 pp 159-160
'Mid april Rommel proposed, in a memorandum to the OKW, to take Malta in order to create the preconditions for better securing the supply over sea. Thereupon he wanted to proceed to the attack against Tobruk. Whether after the fall off the fortress, the attack should be continued into Egypt ,would depend on the situation that would occur. We expected a new British offensive from the beginning of june. To forestall this, the Panzergroup had to attack end may.Consequently ,the attack on Malta had to happen early enough so that a rearranging of Luftflotte 2 from the target Malta to the objective Tobrouk could be realised. If the preparations for the attack on Malta could not be finished in time, then it was bearable to attack Tobruk first. But Malta had to be taken immediately afterwards.
Temporarily Rommel hesitated to decide on the attack on Tobruk on the end of may. Actually all-including General Gause-advised him to wait untill the fall. In the blazing heat of the African summer the british would not attack, in september we would be better off from the viewpoint of logistics and forces. The only supporter of a possible early attack was I. Rommel was undecided which happened seldomly with him. Then the alllies unexpectedly decided him. An emissary of Bastico, his chief of staff Count Barbasetti arrived. His beard was an honour to his name. With a torrent of words he tried to convince Rommel of the inpracticability of a summer offensive. He brought forward the same arguments as the german supporters. However, he made a psychological error when he said it was 'irresponsible' to proceed already to the attack on Tobruk. That was too much for Rommel. To suppose irresponsability in him who was consumed day and night in the fight for the holding of Libya , went too far. This visit decided the issue. His sense of contradiction had been called out.
Hitler did not have much confidence in the success of an attack on Malta, in which besides parts of Luftflotte 2 german and Italian paratroups would have the decisive role. Even so, he and Mussolini approved this intention. From the beginning of april to middle may geram bombers attacked the island almost daily with strong forces. Soon it turned out that the preparations for the Malta venture could not be ended before june. The attack on Tobruk therefore got priority.
When after the taking of Tobruk our main forces had reached the Egyptian border, the german airforce would turn on the objective Malta because it could only support one operation effectively.'
'Mid april Rommel proposed, in a memorandum to the OKW, to take Malta in order to create the preconditions for better securing the supply over sea. Thereupon he wanted to proceed to the attack against Tobruk. Whether after the fall off the fortress, the attack should be continued into Egypt ,would depend on the situation that would occur. We expected a new British offensive from the beginning of june. To forestall this, the Panzergroup had to attack end may.Consequently ,the attack on Malta had to happen early enough so that a rearranging of Luftflotte 2 from the target Malta to the objective Tobrouk could be realised. If the preparations for the attack on Malta could not be finished in time, then it was bearable to attack Tobruk first. But Malta had to be taken immediately afterwards.
Temporarily Rommel hesitated to decide on the attack on Tobruk on the end of may. Actually all-including General Gause-advised him to wait untill the fall. In the blazing heat of the African summer the british would not attack, in september we would be better off from the viewpoint of logistics and forces. The only supporter of a possible early attack was I. Rommel was undecided which happened seldomly with him. Then the alllies unexpectedly decided him. An emissary of Bastico, his chief of staff Count Barbasetti arrived. His beard was an honour to his name. With a torrent of words he tried to convince Rommel of the inpracticability of a summer offensive. He brought forward the same arguments as the german supporters. However, he made a psychological error when he said it was 'irresponsible' to proceed already to the attack on Tobruk. That was too much for Rommel. To suppose irresponsability in him who was consumed day and night in the fight for the holding of Libya , went too far. This visit decided the issue. His sense of contradiction had been called out.
Hitler did not have much confidence in the success of an attack on Malta, in which besides parts of Luftflotte 2 german and Italian paratroups would have the decisive role. Even so, he and Mussolini approved this intention. From the beginning of april to middle may geram bombers attacked the island almost daily with strong forces. Soon it turned out that the preparations for the Malta venture could not be ended before june. The attack on Tobruk therefore got priority.
When after the taking of Tobruk our main forces had reached the Egyptian border, the german airforce would turn on the objective Malta because it could only support one operation effectively.'