The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

[David W]

Thanks guys.

Finally, who got the 52 Lt VI b that 1KDG gave up in Jan 1941?

[Gooner1]

Yes.
If you have the appopriate WDs, you can either confirm or deny the following. All numbers refer to totals, not runners. The serviceability state being a moving target that changed by the hour.

When doing a force comparison crocks don't count.

By my analysis, the orbat forward ran something like this...
--2Armd Div HQ: 3 A13
----3Armd Bde HQ: 3 A13 and 3 light tanks
------3Hussars: HQ 4 light tank, A/3H 14 light, C/3H 14 light, B/6RTR 14 light and A/6RTR 15 M.13 (total 46 light and 15 M.13 of which 42/43 lights are fit)
------5RTR: 32 A13 (28 fit?)
------6RTR: HQ 4 M.13, C/6RTR 15 M.13, B/3H 15 M.13 (total 34 M.13) Ignoring the A10CS for now.

The Chadwick article has C/3H dismounted, Woollcombe says 29 Lights with 3H on the 31st, Raugh says 35.

By the 31st 5RTR had less than 28 fit tanks - 'A' Squadron went forward with just six tanks and lost two of them to mechanicals.
6th RTR may have had 30-odd M13s but they were at Beda Fomm, 90 miles from Mersah Brega and given their unreadiness can they even be considered the forward zone?

[Gooner1]

My point is i) that the advance to the border had a highly detrimental impact on the supply situation of the Axis forces, as recognised by Halder and also seen as a major error in the German Official History; and ii) that the capture of Benghazi, while mitigating this did not make up for it; and iii) that there was no possibility for the Axis to only capture Benghazi and maybe a bit of ground east of it.

Which begs the question what were the Axis even doing there?
If they were still just a blocking force they were better off doing it several hundred miles east of El Agheila IMO.
If the idea was patience whilst building up for a crack at the Delta, fair enough, but the British were building up too. No guarantee that waiting a few weeks would have enabled them to achieve more.

[MarkN]

Hello Gooner,

When doing a force comparison crocks don't count.

True.

But unless you know exactly how many are crocked on both sides, any comparison is discredited. Started with the totals, then work down.

The Chadwick article has C/3H dismounted,

Who is Chadwick? What article? Where does he/she get the information from?

Woollcombe says 29 Lights with 3H on the 31st, Raugh says 35.

I know. Doesn't make them correct. As I have pointed out, that number could refer soley to those held by 3H squadrons.

Let's look at Raugh...

Where are the tanks held by 3rd Brigade HQ? Oooops!
Where are A/6RTR M.13 which are under command 3H? Oooops!
Where are B/3H M.13 which are under command 6RTR? Oooops!

It seems Raugh has excluded from his note the tanks held by A and B/6RTR under 3H command and the tanks held by B/3H under 6RTR and the tanks held by 3rd Armoured Brigade HQ and 2nd Armoured Division HQ. Still, perhaps one of these 5 ommissions is not an ommission if 'Chadwick' is on the ball.

I don't have, or have read, Woollcombe's book to comment on?

By the 31st 5RTR had less than 28 fit tanks - 'A' Squadron went forward with just six tanks and lost two of them to mechanicals.

Indeed. But why ignore those A13s held by 3rd Armoured Brigade HQ and 2nd Armoured Division HQ? Just because so many authors have done so up till now doesn't mean you have to do so.

6th RTR may have had 30-odd M13s but they were at Beda Fomm, 90 miles from Mersah Brega and given their unreadiness can they even be considered the forward zone?

Their location and employment is indeed very relevent and goes a long way to understanding the performance of Neame, Gambier-Parry, Latham and Rimington.

[MarkN]

My point is i) that the advance to the border had a highly detrimental impact on the supply situation of the Axis forces, as recognised by Halder and also seen as a major error in the German Official History; and ii) that the capture of Benghazi, while mitigating this did not make up for it; and iii) that there was no possibility for the Axis to only capture Benghazi and maybe a bit of ground east of it.

Which begs the question what were the Axis even doing there?
If they were still just a blocking force they were better off doing it several hundred miles east of El Agheila IMO.
If the idea was patience whilst building up for a crack at the Delta, fair enough, but the British were building up too. No guarantee that waiting a few weeks would have enabled them to achieve more.

The Germans found themselves on the Egyptian border because Rommel disobeyed his orders. The German/Italian high command plan was indeed to maintain a blocking force at el Agheila and, when 5th PzDiv, Trento and other Italian formations had arrived, to push forward with the intention of tieing down as many British and Commonwealth forces at minimum cost (ie drain on resources needed for Barbarossa) to themselves. I suspect the intention was to retake the whole of Cyrenaica (ie including Tobruk) and then 'threaten' Egypt itself.

[Gooner1]

But unless you know exactly how many are crocked on both sides, any comparison is discredited. Started with the totals, then work down.

Or just make a best guess on serviceable tanks from what we know.

Who is Chadwick? What article? Where does he/she get the information from?

I don't have, or have read, Woollcombe's book to comment on?

Chadwick article I linked to earlier, Robert Woollcombe, The Campaigns of Wavell 1939-1943 (London: Cassell, 1959) reference in "The Lost Battle Mersah El Brega .."

Indeed. But why ignore those A13s held by 3rd Armoured Brigade HQ and 2nd Armoured Division HQ? Just because so many authors have done so up till now doesn't mean you have to do so.

I didn't. I gave the Brits 30-odd Cruisers. Which is *still* optimistic.

[Gooner1]

The Germans found themselves on the Egyptian border because Rommel disobeyed his orders. The German/Italian high command plan was indeed to maintain a blocking force at el Agheila and, when 5th PzDiv, Trento and other Italian formations had arrived, to push forward with the intention of tieing down as many British and Commonwealth forces at minimum cost (ie drain on resources needed for Barbarossa) to themselves. I suspect the intention was to retake the whole of Cyrenaica (ie including Tobruk) and then 'threaten' Egypt itself.

If Rommel hadn't of disobeyed his orders we would, maybe, have less to criticize in the 'performance of Neame, Gambier-Parry, Latham and Rimington.'

[MarkN]

Or just make a best guess on serviceable tanks from what we know.

Best guesses don't help much when serviceability states were changing by the hour.

But, just out of interest, what is your "best guess" on the number and types of tanks that 5.Leichte had on 31st March?

Chadwick article I linked to earlier

OK. Found it. Who is Frank Chadwick?
This is what he has to say for 5RTR...

... came to Cyrenaica with its full complement of 44 A13 cruisers and 9 A9 close support tanks.

Utter, utter garbage! Does he make up his stories as he goes along? He maybe right about C/3H being dismounted, he may be quite wrong like he is with his 5RTR analysis.

Robert Woollcombe, The Campaigns of Wavell 1939-1943 (London: Cassell, 1959) reference in "The Lost Battle Mersah El Brega .."

I know the book. Just don't have a copy, and haven't read it, in order to understand the context in which he quotes his numbers.

I don't expect you or anybody to believe a word I write; the words of an anonymous internet poster. What I do hope is people take the time to think about and analyse my words - and do the very same for other references you find. Just because some data appeared in a book, and the author has a good name, doesn't make it accurate or true. Wavell's own report on the events, published publically in 1946, quotes KDG as being a horsed cavalry unit before converting to armoured cars. This inaccuracy has been copied by many an author too lazy to confirm the information. The numbers he quotes for tanks available are the most pessimistic of all.

I didn't. I gave the Brits 30-odd Cruisers. Which is *still* optimistic.

Aha! So that's your "best guess" of those serviceable. I thought you were saying that was the total number forward irrespective of their state. When you write of the 'enemy', you only quote the maximums.

[MarkN]

If Rommel hadn't of disobeyed his orders we would, maybe, have less to criticize in the 'performance of Neame, Gambier-Parry, Latham and Rimington.'

Very true. However, we would then look at the decisions and actions of Neame et al when he attacked, with the appropriate authority, in May. A time when he, Rommel, had a significant materiel and personnel advantage rather than the broad equivalence at the beginning of April.


Having decided to have a bit more of a laugh with Frank Chadwick's musings, I found this refering to 5.Liechte.

... division spearheaded the attack into the Agedabia area and was immobilized there for lack of fuel until April 4th.

True or false? If true, what a wonderful opportunity - in the exact position - that the CYRCOM 'plan' had selected to as the best place to counter-attack. A fully serviceable tank is a effective crock without fuel. Less effective than a worn-out A13 or a Italian M.13 with a novice British crew.

[Urmel]

My point is i) that the advance to the border had a highly detrimental impact on the supply situation of the Axis forces, as recognised by Halder and also seen as a major error in the German Official History; and ii) that the capture of Benghazi, while mitigating this did not make up for it; and iii) that there was no possibility for the Axis to only capture Benghazi and maybe a bit of ground east of it.

Which begs the question what were the Axis even doing there?
If they were still just a blocking force they were better off doing it several hundred miles east of El Agheila IMO.
If the idea was patience whilst building up for a crack at the Delta, fair enough, but the British were building up too. No guarantee that waiting a few weeks would have enabled them to achieve more.

A few weeks later they would have had the whole of 15. Panzer. The point is not that they should wait a few weeks before attacking. The point is they should not attack. End of.

[ClintHardware]

As you know I don't hold with the simplistic post-war bashing of the CYRCOM officers. They were professionals not buffoons and they were following long thought over tactics.

I found the following in the regimental history of the Manchesters 1922 - 1948 and it has some fascinating 1935 Western Desert Force details about how to fight the Italians. The details about the Orsona set on fire to attack Alexandria indirectly I had not read before. The details of the transport problems to the border highlights the strategy of not developing the road to Libya from Mersa Matruh, the units involved and the details of the RASC lifting of the Manchesters highlight the British Army tackling issues of fighting in the desert long before 10th June 1940. The first two paras set the scene of the Abyssinian Emergency arising from the 1st Battalion, The Manchesters' perspective:

Quote Begins
THE MANCHESTER REGIMENT
On arrival at the wharf they embarked on HMS Dorset­shire and sailed early on September 27. The first day at sea was most unpleasant as the troops were battened down due to the rough sea; but the second and third days were calm. The fourth day the hurricane swept round in a circle and the Dorsetshire had a bad time, being blown some fifty miles off her course. On October I she arrived in Hamilton Harbour, Bermuda, where the Jamaica detachment was dis­embarked and marched across the island to bathe. The same night the band and drums beat Retreat on the Bermudiana Water Front before His Excellency the Governor-General, Sir T. Astley Cubitt. On October 3, having embarked the Bermuda detachment, the whole battalion sailed for Southampton en route for Egypt.

At about 2 p.m. on October 13 the Dorsetshire dropped anchor in Southampton Water. Almost immediately the embarkation staff arrived on board and, due to the political situation in the Middle East, families were ordered to dis­embark the following morning. At 6 a.m. the following morning the Dorsetshire berthed at the New Dock, South­ampton. Here two customs sheds had been taken over for a reunion and thanks to the excellent work put in by Major R. F. G. Burrows, commanding the regimental depot, and his staff the reunion was most successful. At about 9 a.m. the first special train from Manchester arrived, bringing friends and relatives to the party; this train, appropriately enough, was drawn by the new L.M.S. engine The Manchester Regiment. All troops were disembarked but, due to the short stay, were not allowed out of the docks. Lunch was served to everyone on shore, and a good time was had by all. At 2.30 p.m. the battalion fell in and marched back on board; at the final roll call not one man was missing. At 4 p.m., with the band playing " Auld Lang Syne ", the Dorsetshire sailed for Egypt.

The situation in the Middle East at this period was some­what tense. Earlier in the year Mussolini, making as an excuse some border incident, had ordered the Italian army to invade Abyssinia. The British and French governments had decided to apply sanctions in order to deprive Italy of certain essential war commodities. In reply the Duce had placed a large and well-equipped army in Cyrenaica, on the border of the western desert of Egypt, and threatened to Invade the Nile valley should Britain and France carry out their threat. It was towards this turmoil that the Dorsetshire was slowly ploughing her way.

Whilst passing the coast of Spain one of the ship's propel­lers became fouled and it was decided to put into Gibraltar for inspection and repair. A route march was organized, but on entering the harbour the offending propeller became cleared and the ship was able to proceed on her way.

On October 23 Alexandria was reached and the harbour presented a formidable sight. In this harbour were concen­trated practically the whole of the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets, whilst aground on the breakwater was the Italian liner Orsona on fire. It was said that she had been deliberately set on fire and that attempts had been made to link her in the only deep-water entrance, in order to bottle up the British Fleet.

The battalion advance party under Captain R. H. H. Stewart, who had joined the unit at Southampton, was dis-embarked when the Dorsetshire sailed for Port Said, where the following morning the battalion disembarked and entrained for Moascar. Due to the situation the battalion found that the unit they were to have relieved was remaining and the only accommodation was a tented camp in the desert. On the first day the Brigade Commander of the Canal Brigade, Brigadier Sir Frederic Pile, Bt., addressed the whole battalion on the political situation. In spite of the rather uncomfortable conditions of the camp the battalion settled down quickly and a good liaison was soon established with the 1st Battalion the Royal Scots Fusiliers and 1st Battalion the Middlesex Regiment. The stay, however, was not for long, as on December 17 the first half of the battalion left for Mersa Matruh, followed the next day by the remainder.

Mersa Matruh was the chief town of the western desert of Egypt and lay on the coast about midway between Alexandria and the Italian border. The only method of getting to it by land was by rail to Fuka and thence by M.T. convoy to the town itself. The role of the battalion was to be the infantry unit with the Mobile Force which consisted of the 7th, 8th, and 11th Hussars, 6th Battalion the Royal Tank Corps, and later the 2nd Battalion Royal Tank Corps from England. In order to make the battalion mobile 19 (Lifting) Company, R.A.S.C., with 187 vehicles all told, was affiliated to it, and thus unknowingly was sown the seed of the modern Lorried Infantry Brigade with the Armoured Division.

The early part of 1936 was spent in digging slit trenches, sandbagging tents, and platoon and company training with 19 Company R.A.S.C. Several long-range patrols were carried out to give practice in using the improvised sun com­pass and mapping the desert, whilst others were used to bury petrol at night near the Italian border in case advanced landing grounds were required by the R.A.F.

(January - early July not quoted)

On July 20 the following letter was received from Major-General G. W. Howard, Commanding 5 Division in Mersa Matruh, on the final breaking up of the mobile force:

Now that the Western Desert Force has done its job, and is being broken up, I hasten to write and thank you and all your ranks for the magnificent way in which you have all played up throughout the emergency. Although, fortunately, you have not been called upon to do anything more than withstand hardships, these have been very definite and unpleasant, the dust storms and flies, particularly, being most trying. The cheerful way in which you have all borne these conditions is most creditable. Moreover, the small amount of crime which there has been is at testimony of the excellent spirit pervading your unit.

I shall be glad if you will convey to all ranks my high appreciation of their behaviour, and say how proud I feel to have had you under my command.
(Signed) G. W. Howard.

On October 30, due to a minor revolution in Baghdad, the lion was placed at twelve hours notice to fly to Iraq.

Quote Ends

[MarkN]

Thank you for taking the time to type that up and allowing a wider audiance to access the information.

How are sales of your book going?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Another interesting letter from WO169/952, this time a letter from Creagh of 7 Armd Div to Gambier Parry of 2 Armd Div:

7th Armoured Division
14th Mar. 1941.
O.13.
Many thanks for your letter of the 6th and apologies for not replying to it before.

1. I quite agree with you. I dislike mixed light and cruiser tank organisation within the regiment and have had this altered.

2. I quite agree with you that the Brigade is the keystone of our fighting organisation.

3. I have no use for the Light Tank against the Germans Armoured forces and the following is that which I have put up to the D.C.G.S., and which has been accepted by the Commander-in-Chief. This, I think, will put you wise as to how I feel and I think you will agree with it, too.

“Use of the Light Tank”.
Employed against German Armoured Divisions the Light Tank is useless. We are admittedly short of equipment and must make the best use of what we have. On the other hand it is wrong to sacrifice good trained personnel in bad tanks.
To fight the German I consider that the maximum degree of inefficiency we can accept is 1 Light Regiment to 2 Cruiser in the Brigade, and that there should be 1 Cruiser Squadron or anyway ½ Squadron in the Light Regiment.
If there are surplus Light Tanks, these would be better utilised with Divisional Cavalry Regiments since they have a strong support behind them and a firmer bases to work from”.

4. I think that this summing up of my opinion is in agreement with what you have in mind and I look forward to the day when we shall have sufficient Cruisers to go on to the Home organisation.

5. I also put up the following to the D.C.G.S. re Divisions:

“The splitting up of Divisions is to be strongly deprecated because equipment will come later, and Armoured Divisions on account of their great mobility and dependence on voice control instructions rather than orders, are much more sensitive to any disturbance of their organisation. It takes a long time to train the team.
If Brigade Groups have to be used they are not really economical nor are their staff and communications normally adequate to deal with the additional troops required to make them function.”

6. D.C.G.S. agreed with this in principle, but actually when it comes to practice it is more difficult to stick to. You will get under a separate letter a forecast shewing when units will be equipped and how they will be utilised and you will notice
(a) that you will eventually have three cruiser Regts and two Lights, whilst
(b) I am left with two Lights,
(c) the remainder being with Rolly.

The situation will not arise for some-time in the interval circumstances may alter – but if it materialises in full then you will probably want more than one Brigade Headquarters and it may be necessary to find you another H.Q. in this Division. Later on I will come and talk with you on this subject.

7. I saw Phillip Neame on the Indian Motor Brigade and he wanted us to undertake it’s training, until it could be

- 2 -

7. Cont.
geographically nearer to you. He would like to train on Support Group lines and when Strafer returns on Sunday I will put him on to the job. I gather that this Brigade’s training is not of a very high standard but I will let you know what Strafer reports to me. In the meantime if you have any particular points you would like us to emphasise, let me know, and I will do my best.

8. When Rimmington took over from this Division, before it was decided that you and your Division H.Q. would take over, we left certain A.C.Vs behind to help him out. I would like to get this lot back as soon as we can as we are very short, ourselves.

We also left rather a lot of wireless sets in Cyrenaica. Units are fearfully short down here and if you can spare any we should be more than grateful.

Hope all goes well. I will make a point of coming out and seeing you when you are settled.

Yours

Sgd. M. O’M Creagh.

Major-General M.D. Gambier-Parry, M.C.
H.Q.
2 Armoured Division.
CYRCOM.

I particularly noted "On the other hand it is wrong to sacrifice good trained personnel in bad tanks." Does anyone fancy facing German armour in a second hand Italian M13?

Regards

Tom

[ClintHardware]

I have been away from this forum covering stuff so I am not up to speed with criticisms levelled at things I have stated. If anyone wants to give me a numbered list to answer in turn please do so because it would be interesting to test and check this stuff and correct anything that needs correcting. I am happy to correct my stuff.

In a general response I would state that: 1) the British and Australian officers were adapting to circumstances they knew about when they knew about them. The underlying intentions of retreat and the position of dumps were logical and understood sufficiently for troops to know to head out of danger and reform. MarkN you referred to an Op Inst that was not lived upto but surely it was out of date. Below is Op Instn No. 6

and 2) I believe General Halder was correct because Rommel should not have been tempted to follow the retreat without sufficient logistics,

and 3) Ad hoc dumping was expected under the conditions of battle when plans usually fail. The RASC met the challenge with limited exceptions just as they did in 1935. Post-war writers have seriously under-reported the role of the ASCs in the rapid and long retreat that denied the DAK the chance to capture 2nd Sp Gp, 3rd Armd Bde, 20th Bde and 26th Bde. The REs and RAEs similarly so.

CYRCOMOpInstNo6.pdf

(231.39 KiB) Downloaded 89 times

A numbered list would really be useful to deal with in turn please.

[ClintHardware]

In respect of my book I have received a proof copy which I have been checking over and improving. I have five more being printed with corrections but it will be in mid - late May that a version on general sale will be ready to buy. It does not contain statements like "I believe General Halder was correct" or "CYRCOM's officers have been slagged off". The statement "I believe" and the word "indeed" do not appear in the 401,000 words unless spoken by a quoted veteran. Lord of the Rings was 481,000 words but my book is based on what those who were there stated rather than wine and remarkably good weed.

If any of you buy it and see something to be corrected I will be happy to do that and credit you in the text with the correction and I will replace your copy with the corrected version. Be constructive and let me know something is wrong so I can do something about it. Try not to be Robert Barone's brother-in-law (Everybody Loves Raymond).