The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

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nmao
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#256

Post by nmao » 04 May 2015, 00:18

About the "CYRENAICA COMMAND OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO.6", it seems they failed in every task:
a) 2nd AD did not impose a significant delay on the enemy and didn't cause significant casualties
b) 9th AUS DIV did not deny access to any area
c) 3rd IND MOT BRI did not stop advances on Mechili or Tobruk

The british retreat as always seemed to me like a "Dunkirk" by truck.
Apart from 9th AUS DIV they left behind most of the fighting vehicles, supplies and heavy weapons.

Am i being to harsh? :)

regards,

-Nuno

PS: waiting for the book!

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#257

Post by ClintHardware » 04 May 2015, 07:02

Nmao

Thanks for the numbered points - I am running short of time but I will explain and counter each point later today. I am glad you used the phrase Dunkirk in trucks and I will explain why we can't safely use that comparison.

Laters

Clint
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#258

Post by Urmel » 04 May 2015, 08:44

This Op Inst is very poor in my view, in a number of ways:

1) This is a curious statement. So there is no evidence that he is planning an offensive. But is there evidence that he isn't? If so, why isn't that mentioned explicitly? The way it is written it conveys a false belief of CyrCom that is being conveyed to the subordinate formations. It would have been better to simply say 'we have no clue what the enemy is up to and you need to be prepared for any eventuality'.
2)
a) Failure to tell 2 Armd Division where to stop. This is only implied in the next points, but crucially doesn't apply to 2 Armd Div. Based on this instruction it could retreat all the way to Cairo, as long as it makes the enemy pay for it. It also doesn't give an operational area of focus to the division.
b) Is contradictory with 5. So 9 Aus Div is supposed to hold WADI GATTARA, but in 5. it is only supposed to be held if sufficient troops are available.
c)
i) So if 3 Ind Mot Brig is supposed to be south of Mechili holding off the enemy, is it supposed to do that by itself? That seems a stupid instruction for an infantry formation.
ii) If the alternative is for it to join 2 Armd Div, is that Div then not supposed to be south of Mechili? Where is it supposed to be then? See also 2.a.
3) Now this is the first time that a line in the sand is implied. But why not be clear about it? So if the FSDs are being established at Msus and Mechili, it stands to reason that the enemy must be held south and west of them. But why not spell it out in 2.a.?
4. Sensible.
5. Contradicts 4. So how will Fortress Benghazi be informed whether and when troops are available?
6. Stupid. Just be clear to all formations that you are on the backfoot and that the situation is serious, rather than hand wave about offensive action.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#259

Post by MarkN » 04 May 2015, 15:52

Hello Tom,
Tom from Cornwall wrote:Another interesting letter from WO169/952, this time a letter from Creagh of 7 Armd Div to Gambier Parry of 2 Armd Div:

I particularly noted "On the other hand it is wrong to sacrifice good trained personnel in bad tanks." Does anyone fancy facing German armour in a second hand Italian M13?
A great document that gives fantastic insight into comtemporary tactical thinking etc etc. What struck me was the determination to avoid combined arms below divisional level. The Wehrmacht was light years ahead in doctrinal C3 and put that to great practical effect over and over again.


ClintHardware wrote: Below is Op Instn No. 6
CYRCOMOpInstNo6.pdf
Even more damning evidence of Neame's generalship and Gambier-Parry, Latham and Rimington's tactical decision making. At what point were they to stop withdrawing: Cairo, Bombay or London?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#260

Post by MarkN » 04 May 2015, 16:21

nmao wrote: The british retreat as always seemed to me like a "Dunkirk" by truck.
Perhaps "Dunkirk by tank" is more apt. Second Armoured elected to use their tanks as taxis rather than AFVs.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#261

Post by ClintHardware » 04 May 2015, 17:51

NMAO asked the following:

About the "CYRENAICA COMMAND OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO.6", it seems they failed in every task:
a) 2nd AD did not impose a significant delay on the enemy and didn't cause significant casualties
b) 9th AUS DIV did not deny access to any area
c) 3rd IND MOT BRI did not stop advances on Mechili or Tobruk

Below are my responses to NMAO and I will have a look at other responses tomorrow - sorry short of time at the moment.

Firstly let me state that I do agree that losing Cyrenaica was a defeat in terms of lost aerodromes and landing grounds and I say so clearly in my book. I then describe the circumstances of the defeat in detail sometimes minute by minute hence the size of the book - it has only a handful of photos sorry.

CYRCOM OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO.6 Failure
Op Instn No.6 begins with the assumption based on very limited available intelligence and Wavell’s asumptions that a heavy Axis operation was not likely. It was then made redundant by the force encountered compared to those units present to offer resistance.

From the 1920s the only threat to the Nile from the west was expected to be Italian ground troops from Libya and they were made significant by 1935 reinforcements reaching a total of roughly 250,000 troops. The underlying plan was to encourage the Italian advance to Mersa Matruh across the rough tracked terrain, damaging them on the way and then eliminate and cut off whatever managed to reach Mersa Matruh and then repeat the process as required. El Alamein was the next considered fall back point and it was exercised to and from in the interwar years but it was not prepared significantly.

So leading upto March 1941 the underlying strategy above was still understood and it was what had been exercised for some years but the initial plan was to hold, then it changed about the 20th March to hold and withdraw if they had to and attack the flanks. The OP Instn No.6 is the hold element of the plan but the underlying plan/strategy is retreat if you must and at this point there had been no decision to hold Tobruk – that was not decided upon until the 6th April in a meeting where de Guingand was present with Wavell and Eden etc

Therefore in one sense the Op Instn No.6 was failed but it became redundant because of the forces that were now expected to outflank and capture 2nd AD wholesale if no withdrawal took place. What was coming at the remaining half of 2nd Sp Gp appeared to be a Tsunami of German and Italian motorised units. The Tsunami did not happen and 1st April nothing but the 2nd April seemed again to be the Axis mass approaching. For some hours a huge dust cloud marked the German advance and it was very concerning. 3rd April nothing, however the retreat was on despite being extremely mixed up because two plans were being followed and communications were limited because of the movements of units using any route that seemed usuable to get east.


a) 2nd AD did not impose a significant delay on the enemy and didn't cause significant casualties.

The significant delays imposed were: 31st March 14 hours of battle, the 1st April (no DAK ground contact with 2AD in its new positions), 2nd April another damaging contact and another withdrawal, 3rd and 4th April (no DAK ground contact with 2AD), the 5th – 8th April Axis focus on Mechili allowing 20th and 26th Brigades to get out. Axis troops held at Mechili for the whole of the 7th April and failed to get move on during the 8th and 9th. Light elements that had advanced achieved no significant damage on CYRCOMs units or their retreat.

On the 4th April the 2/13th fought off the attack at ErRegima all day and got out. There was no significant German or Italian contact after that with the Australians.

Mechili was a significant waste of Axis resources for the cost of some HQ elements of 2nd AD (not the whole division) and elements of 3rd Ind Mot Bde. The 3rd RHA and the 2/3rd A/Tk Regt batteries and half of those present got out and reached Tobruk. The losses did not stop 2nd Sp Gp or 3rd AB getting to Tobruk to be re-equipped and reinforced.

Why did Rommel not reach Tobruk in 3 days? It took 11 days and even by the 15th day (14th April) his forces could not take the town or the port. CYRCOM stopped the Axis at Tobruk.

On the 14th Lavrack’s CYRCOM HQ (Adv and Rear CYRCOM H.Q.) joined the 6th Infantry Div H.Q. elements at Mersa Matruh to re-form the Western Desert Force H.Q. under Lieutenant-General Evetts then handed onto Beresford-Pierse. So the AXIS troops on reaching Tobruk were fighting (9th, 10th, 11th 12th, and 14th ) now concentrated and reinforced (18th Inf Bde + 107th RHA) CYRCOM units. Lavarack handed over Tobruk to Morshead on the 13th/14th. The still equipped figthing elements of 2nd Support Group were outside the perimeter under Gott and had been reinforced by the 11th Hussars and 4th RHA and ‘D’ Battery 3rd RHA had taken over from ‘J’ Battery (now in Tobruk). The 104th RHA remained in the perimeter and covered the south and south-west as well as the east in the actions that followed.

In Section 2 a) of the Op Instn there is provision for 2nd AD to retreat and extract as much damage as possible. 2a) was executed as far as it could be. They did not get in their trucks and run to Tobruk or Cairo which is what a Dunkirk by truck would have looked like.


b) 9th AUS DIV did not deny access to any area
2/13th Battalion’s stand allowed 20th Brigade to get out and 26th Brigade joined them. 2nd AD caused the delay at Mechili to assist their retreat and it worked to the extent that DAK could not take Tobruk. Op Instn No.6 had been made redundant by the force encountered compared to those present to offer resistance.

At the moment of attack the Australians were not equipped to deny ground – they lacked their three field artillery regiments and had been given the 51st Fd Regt from XIII Corps to give at least some support. The 51st had eight 18 Pdrs and eight 4.5-inch Howitzers but could not replace the 48 25-Pdrs they needed and later got.

c) 3rd IND MOT BRI did not stop advances on Mechili or Tobruk
Two under-equipped regiments and some Engineers from 3rd Ind Mot Bde got to Mechili and waited for 2nd AD to arrive there.
From a 30th March perspective: had only light forces reached 3rd Ind Mot Bde they could have held them and in fact they did from the 5th - 6th and during the 7th . By the morning of the 8th the escape plan worked out at 9pm the night before was put into effect and half of those present got out – some got out after the surrender. 3000 did not surrender at Mechili it was about half that or less despite Leutnant Schmidt’s comments.

Dunkirk in trucks comparison
At Dunkirk those that got into a boat stayed in it till it sank or transfered to a boat that reached the English coast. The retreat from Mersa Brega included a series of getting out of trucks to make stands (1st April (no DAK), 2nd April (lots of DAK), 4th April Er Regima, 7th April Derna airfield with Ponath all day, 6th – 8th April Mechili and then the 9th April bombarding Brescia’s feint afternoon attack/demonstration. The 10th April was the first Tobruk perimeter stand against Prittwitz’s unfortunate and terminal gamble.

Dunkirk was not followed by a series of ground actions but the 31st March was.

Missing
What is missing from surviving German reports are any explanations of their dwindling infantry numbers (they were not wearing body armour) and numbers of panzers not repaired yet from mechanical and to a lesser extent battle damage. We have some references to written-off panzers. So to see the effect of CYRCOM and the underlying strategy of eliminating Italians circa 1920s - 1935 - 1941 you have to count numbers still seen in each next action to understand the damage done. Rommel would have thrown in everything to hand to take Tobruk and even on the 1st May he still could not.

If Tobruk had been blocked with HMS Centurion (23,000 tons) sunk and wrecked beyond refloating on the sea bed beside the San Giorgio what DAK units would have reached CYRCOM and 22nd Guards Bde at Mersa Matruh and when could they have got there?
Last edited by ClintHardware on 05 May 2015, 08:33, edited 4 times in total.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#262

Post by nmao » 04 May 2015, 19:12

ClintHardware wrote: If Tobruk had been blocked with HMS Centurion (23,000 tons) sunk and wrecked beyond refloating on the sea bed beside the San Giorgio what DAK units would have reached CYRCOM and 22nd Guards Bde at Mersa Matruh and when could they have got there?
You mean Tripoli, right? ;)
AFAIK there were plans to block Tripoli, but i don't know about Tobruk.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#263

Post by MarkN » 04 May 2015, 21:43

ClintHardware wrote: Therefore in one sense the Op Instn No.6 was failed but it became redundant because of the forces that were now expected to outflank and capture 2nd AD wholesale if no withdrawal took place.
Are those outflanking forces the same forces that used routes that Neame neglected to cover because he had convinced himself that they would trundle up the Via Balbia and no other route? The same outflanking forces that Neame had convinced himself did not exist until the garrison at Mechili confirmed they were under attack? Oooops!

Those outflanking forces, were they the same forces that 2nd Armoured was supposed to entice up the Via Balbia and then strike in the flanks and the rear? To strike at them from the desert using the supplies so carefully pre-positionned at Msus? Were they the same forces that came to a halt for a couple of days, perhaps due to lack of fuel, in the very place the counter-attacking was supposed to occur? Were they the same outflanking forces that 2nd Armoured succeeded in not engaging as they were too busy 'strategically withdrawing according to proceedures laid down in 1935'? Oooops!

How on Earth did those outflanking forces get past 2nd Armoured? Was it because Gambier-Parry had decided to take his division up the route that allowed them to be outflanked, rather than taking the desert route himself? Oooops!

How many unfortunate and 'unlucky' pieces of the puzzle does one need before one accepts that 'failure' and poor decisionmaking was systemic?

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#264

Post by ClintHardware » 05 May 2015, 08:17

Nmao the plans were for Tripoli in early 1941 but Cunningham knew the approach run of 180 miles had to partly be completed in daylight and Centurion would not have been likely to make it before sinking. I have not found a plan for Tobruk and it may not have been feasible but it is much nearer than Tripoli if approached via Suez Canal and Alexandria. However, the logic would be to encourage the AXIS forward beyond Tobruk and bomb them as far as resources allowed. Then use Tobruk to find Axis shipping and sink them and/or ram Centurion into the Harbour and detonate charges. Depending on how far the Axis were east of Tobruk the distance east would dictate how rapidly they had to retreat with the fuel they still had or surrender or both. The military logic of not holding Tobruk in 1942 was overruled by political logic - I am not up to speed on the 1942 decision concerning Tobruk but it did become a useful place to find and sink shipping just as it had been for the Axis. In a much lesser sense the 11th Hussars found Fort Capuzzo similarly useful 1940 - 41 and thus Empire troops did not bother to hold Capuzzo but only raid it.

Hi MarkN I am short of time but will look properly at your contris and respond.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#265

Post by Gooner1 » 05 May 2015, 14:34

MarkN wrote: Best guesses don't help much when serviceability states were changing by the hour.
Because the precise number of serviceable tanks is not known hour by hour, we ignore comparisons based on serviceable tanks?
But, just out of interest, what is your "best guess" on the number and types of tanks that 5.Leichte had on 31st March?
I believe Jentz has pretty precise numbers for them. My best guess is 5th Panzer Regiment had most of their tanks operational before they attacked.
Aha! So that's your "best guess" of those serviceable. I thought you were saying that was the total number forward irrespective of their state.
I am bewildered why anyone would find the total number of tanks forward a useful measure?
Especially as this measure of 'forward' seems so elastic.
Last edited by Gooner1 on 05 May 2015, 14:42, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#266

Post by Gooner1 » 05 May 2015, 14:41

MarkN wrote: Very true. However, we would then look at the decisions and actions of Neame et al when he attacked, with the appropriate authority, in May. A time when he, Rommel, had a significant materiel and personnel advantage rather than the broad equivalence at the beginning of April. :wink:
Rommel had a very significant materiel and personnel advantage when he attacked. Unless we want to count British units that were hundreds of miles away in the ratios?
... division spearheaded the attack into the Agedabia area and was immobilized there for lack of fuel until April 4th.[/i]
True or false? If true, what a wonderful opportunity - in the exact position - that the CYRCOM 'plan' had selected to as the best place to counter-attack. A fully serviceable tank is a effective crock without fuel. Less effective than a worn-out A13 or a Italian M.13 with a novice British crew.
[/quote]

I'd say true that they lacked fuel for operational moves but not tactical moves :wink:

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#267

Post by Gooner1 » 05 May 2015, 18:09

Urmel wrote: A few weeks later they would have had the whole of 15. Panzer. The point is not that they should wait a few weeks before attacking. The point is they should not attack. End of.
With that sort of attitude, it's hardly any point in them even going to war! :D

Seriously, without attacking the Axis are likely to get booted out of Africa a year earlier than historically, perhaps even late 1941. IMO.

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#268

Post by Urmel » 05 May 2015, 21:39

Highly unlikely.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#269

Post by ClintHardware » 06 May 2015, 09:29

MarkN wrote:
ClintHardware wrote: Therefore in one sense the Op Instn No.6 was failed but it became redundant because of the forces that were now expected to outflank and capture 2nd AD wholesale if no withdrawal took place.
Are those outflanking forces the same forces that used routes that Neame neglected to cover because he had convinced himself that they would trundle up the Via Balbia and no other route? The same outflanking forces that Neame had convinced himself did not exist until the garrison at Mechili confirmed they were under attack? Oooops!

Those outflanking forces, were they the same forces that 2nd Armoured was supposed to entice up the Via Balbia and then strike in the flanks and the rear? To strike at them from the desert using the supplies so carefully pre-positionned at Msus? Were they the same forces that came to a halt for a couple of days, perhaps due to lack of fuel, in the very place the counter-attacking was supposed to occur? Were they the same outflanking forces that 2nd Armoured succeeded in not engaging as they were too busy 'strategically withdrawing according to proceedures laid down in 1935'? Oooops!

How on Earth did those outflanking forces get past 2nd Armoured? Was it because Gambier-Parry had decided to take his division up the route that allowed them to be outflanked, rather than taking the desert route himself? Oooops!

How many unfortunate and 'unlucky' pieces of the puzzle does one need before one accepts that 'failure' and poor decisionmaking was systemic?
3rd Armd Bde had the south covered on the 31st March but for unexplained reasons Leutnant Schorm and co could not follow the tracks of the KDG and 5th RTR and 3rd Hussars towards 3rd Armd Bde on the 31st March. I would love to know why.

After that the Axis mostly followed the road until late on the 3rd April when they also drove towards Mechili which was about to be covered by some of 3rd Ind Mot Bde and elements heading that way from 2nd AD. And 2nd AD were incompletely covering the south of 20th Bde down the escarpment and patrolling at least towards Mechili and they were not passed by anything significant (i.e. nothing that could stop them). The Axis did not drive beyond Mechili until the 9th because of 2nd AD HQ, two batteries of the 2/3rd A/Tk Regt, M Battery 3rd RHA and two battalion sized regiments from 3rd Ind Mot Bde equipped as Motor Battalions.

I don't understand your last sentence in terms of what happened. If systemic failure is appropriate how did Axis forces not reach Mersa Matruh when all they had to confront was CYRCOM. How could Rommel fail to crush and capture Neame's forces? All he got were some fragments and then his forces got seriously hammered by CYRCOM using some of the 250,000 shells stacked at Tobruk.

Even upto the 17th April and beyond the AXIS ground forces were still not fully known. CYRCOM on the 31st March thought it was being approached by two armoured divisions (a German Colonial with panzers and the Italian Ariete) with unknown OOBs and half understood unit titles. Where is the systemic failure?

The history of the deployments and the ground level fighting are fascinating except for those in a hurry to look at Operation BREVITY and beyond. BUT CYRCOM's history and the used up/damaged resources on both sides are the foundations of what happened in BREVITY and later operations.
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Re: The "lost" battle of Mersa el Brega, Libyan desert, 31 March

#270

Post by MarkN » 08 May 2015, 20:09

ClintHardware wrote: After that the Axis mostly followed the road until late on the 3rd April when they also drove towards Mechili which was about to be covered by some of 3rd Ind Mot Bde and elements heading that way from 2nd AD. And 2nd AD were incompletely covering the south of 20th Bde down the escarpment and patrolling at least towards Mechili and they were not passed by anything significant (i.e. nothing that could stop them). The Axis did not drive beyond Mechili until the 9th because of 2nd AD HQ, two batteries of the 2/3rd A/Tk Regt, M Battery 3rd RHA and two battalion sized regiments from 3rd Ind Mot Bde equipped as Motor Battalions.
You seem to be following in Neame's footsteps and showing an incredible lack of situational awareness.

As I wrote earlier, Neame had deluded himself that the enemy would conveniently trundle up the Via Balbia and set his forces for that - and ONLY that - eventuality. To compound that mistake, Gambier-Parry and 2nd Armoured failed to carry out the role that Neame had allotted them.

It was O'Connor on the 3rd, when he flew into el Adem that ordered 3rd Indian Motor Brigade forward to Mechili. Would Neame have got around to it? For CYRCOM, the 3rd was a day of communication and movement disaster. It was a day where the wrong plan went from bad to worse.

On the 4th, at 0800, Neame issues his orders stating that the enemy's effort was against Benghazi and how his forces should deploy to meet them. Those orders caused even greater communication and movement disaster as Gambier-Parry and subordinates lost the plot. This contrasts with the reality that Rommel himself is on the Trigh Abid with his advance forces issuing instructions!

Nevertheless, the 4th was a relatively quiet day in Cyrenaica with the only major engagement being a recce probe by Pz.Auf.Abt 3 at er Regima. Given that this accorded with Neame's (deluded) assumption, one would have thought he'd make his stand given that his forces held locally at least a 3 to 1 advantage. Still, that probe caused him to order a general withdrawal to the Wadi Cuff line.

The 5th was an even 'quieter' day. Neame was building his defences at Wadi Cuff convinced the enemy was either halted in and around Benghazi or coming from that direction. In reality, by the end of the day, Gp Fabris was just outside Mechili, advance elements of Gp Schwerin were at Tengeder and advance elements of Ariete are approaching Tobruk!!!

First thing on the 6th, Neame is HQ 9th Australian Division ordering them forward again to the Barce line. Still convinced he's got the enemy covered. 2nd Armoured are all over the place and no use to anyone. Gp Fabris has a stab at Mechili. O'Connor, just 30 mins after Neame's instructions to move forward orders a withdraw to the Derna-Mechili line. Chaos. And just to prove more evidence of the complete lack of situational awareness, the Italians hit an RAF post at Acoma - just outside Tobruk.

On the 7th, the Germans had forces on the Mechili-Derna road and near to Martuba!!!

The enemy was well beyond Mechili on the 6th and 7th because of the decision by Neame not to protect the desert flank and by 2nd Armoured Division becoming hopelessly disorganised and inceasingly irrelevant over the previous week. An irrelvance largely caused by incompetence and C3 failure.

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