Only yesterday you conceeded that you understand that it is Drew's statement not that it was his statement.ClintHardware wrote:Drew stated that he saw 50 - 60 panzers at about 1730 ....
The 5RTR WD for March and early April is NOT the original. It is a reconstruction created afterwards due to the original being destroyed during the supposed planned and orderly withdrawal. It is likely that the reconstruction was created from a number of contributors using their combined notes and memories. It is likely to have been written in Tobruk towards the end of April. Lt.Col Drew may well have been one of the contributors.
However, if you read carefully the entry for 2 April to which you refer, there is a very strong indication that the contributor for that part was a member of C Squadron. Here it is...
Note these words... "... of the 4 tanks remaining from this squadron...". The word "this" gives it away. As CO, Lt.Col Drew would not write "this squadron".
You will also notice the entry states the claim those 40-60 tanks are "mostly M.13" - which we all agree was not true.
My apologies to neutral readers of this tread. However, for the sake of historical accuracy, I think it right and proper to point out where some posters are passing off their own (poor) analysis and beliefs as historical fact - especially when it is not!
The Schorm diary appears very credible in its accuracy. It details which units were in the area, how they lined up in formation, and which actually took part in the engagement. We can even extrapolate from his words exactly how many tanks were in that engagement. Putting that alongside the 5RTR WD and Maj Lister's report, it should be clear to all objective readers interested in historical fact that 11 Cruiser IVAs of 5RTR were laying in ambush hull down awaiting the approaching pantser formation. They were engaged by elements of 6.Kp of II/PzRegt.5 consisting of 8 Pz.III and 5 Pz.II. In effect 11 v 13. The casualties in each side are also well described.
What is not entirely clear is the relevence of A/B Sqn 5RTR and 8.Kp of II/PzRegt.5 in this engagement if any. There is a possibility that the two had a minor clash to the right (as seen by the British, left if your visualising this from a pantser) of the main event. At the time, A/B Sqn 5RTR consised of 6 Cruiser IVAs and 8.Kp of II/PzRegt.5 would have had a maximum of 6 Pz.IV and 5 Pz.II. I say a maximum, because this assumes that not a single pantser had fallen out of the march mechanically up to this point. Again, considering armament, hardly a completely one-sided affair.
Additionally, the II Abt.HQ and PzRegt HQ were in the vicinity. Combined, this may have had a maximum (assuming not a single pantser had dropped out during the march) of 5/BefWg, 16/I, 13/II, 3/III and 0/IV. 37 tanks may look fearsome when blowing up a sandstrom, but 3 gun tanks amongst them is not such a fearsome opponent. But, the key point of this is that there is ZERO evidence that any of these were engaged at all. In fact, the evidence points to the contrary - they were not involved.
Similarly, and at an equivalent distance to the actual firefight, was 3H with their tanks. In particular A/6RTR with 7 M.13 could not have been more than about 2 miles distant from A/B Sqn 5RTR at the time. Their WD entry notes they watched the engagement and observed AFV casualties.
In the interests of historical accuracy, if you include II Abt.HQ and PzRegt HQ in the calculation, you should rightly include the 3H and attachments given the geographical separation. If one's interest is only in the firefight itself, then 11 Cruiser IVAs of 5RTR versus 8 Pz.III and 5 Pz.II pf 6.Kp of II/PzRegt.5 is your answer. 11 v 13. The relevance/non-relevance of A/B Sqn 5RTR and 8.Kp of II/PzRegt.5 is open to discussion.