RASC on the run March - April 1941

[Urmel]

As I said, KTB D.A.K., which you have, states that 'unuebersehbare Beute an Fahrzeugen, Waffen und Munition, und Verpflegung' was made. 'Immense/incalculable/inestimable booty of vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and rations'. If you have something in the Kew documents contradicting this claim, by all means show it.

It is a claim but not backed up by British documents.

It is also not contradicted by British documents. I seriously doubt you find many if any documents where a QM is giving an honest assessment along the lines of 'and then we left 15,000 tons of rations fall into the hands of the Germans. Pity.'

I very much doubt the German statement because the Australians would have needed the weapons and everyone needed the vehicles - so why would they be stored?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_herring

[Gooner1]

As I said, KTB D.A.K., which you have, states that 'unuebersehbare Beute an Fahrzeugen, Waffen und Munition, und Verpflegung' was made. 'Immense/incalculable/inestimable booty of vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and rations'.

Did they state anywhere how much of this booty was formerly Italian?

[Urmel]

No.

[Urmel]

But why would that matter?

[Gooner1]

Well if much of the stuff left behind had not even been theirs in the first place, its not such a biggie is it?

I'd imagine most of the best stuff the Italians had lost had been filched already - especially with the Australians in charge.

[Urmel]

Now you're presuming that it was all Italian stuff.

Also, it's still supplies, so yes it is a biggie. Any kilo of rations captured there reduces the need to ship them over and truck them in.

But before we go off on chasing this particular red herring, maybe someone can drag out the information on how much the RASC had been able to build up the Mechili depot during the almost two months they could use it as a base? And then maybe someone can provide the data that would contradict the German claim.

[Gooner1]

Now you're presuming that it was all Italian stuff.
Also, it's still supplies, so yes it is a biggie. Any kilo of rations captured there reduces the need to ship them over and truck them in.

Nah, I suggested it could be much not all Its not such a biggie because the Brits haven't had to ship and truck them the 8,000 miles and a lot of the Italian stuff would have been of marginal use to the British anyway.

Besides I bet all the decent wine and cheese, uh, all the wine and decent cheese had long been consumed.

[Urmel]

Well it's not so much about what the British lose, but what the Axis gains.

[MarkN]

On 2 April, after taking Agedabia, apart from Aufklabt.3 which was pushed forward to nose around Benghazi (ended up taking it without a shot being fired coz the British had already legged it), 5.leichte was bought to a standstill primarily through lack of fuel.

Late afternoon, 5.leichte reported they only had enough fuel for 150km and said they would need 4 days to bring up enough fuel for a serious push. Rommel ordered all available trucks and vehicles to be press-ganged into a 24hr effort to move fuel forward from Arco dei Fileni.

Now, if 5.leichte had already outrun its supplies by Agedabia, and only a 'special' effort could keep it on the move, how did they manage to get all the way to Tobruk and onwards with no further logistical problem? I'm guessing, they either captured huge Commonwealth stocks of fuel and/or large numbers of trucks to increase the logistic capacity.

Of course, since Mr Clinthardware hasn't found any "field evidence" written by pre-war British professional officers to corroborate this, it must be another of those nasty lies put out by Fritz to confuse us 75 years later.

[Gooner1]

Well it's not so much about what the British lose, but what the Axis gains.

Yes, but that was always going to be the risk they took in sending an expeditionary force off to Greece.

If much of the Italian arty and small arms was never going to be of much use to the British, it would have been bloody useful to the Greeks.

[ClintHardware]

Mark ...nice points

Well....the German moves towards Tobruk after Benghazi had several incidents of no fuel for all German elements of the Axis so Msus and the two other used and destroyed dumps (Magrun and Tecnis?) must have given them bugger all in terms of fuel. This probably contributed latterly to I.PzRgt 5 being too late for the 11th April attack and perhaps not present on the 2nd April. We need some Field evidence (Controversial? Mois?).

Collishaw describes Benghazi as a good place to find Axis shipping so it proved to be more useful for CYRCOM & co when left to the Axis. This was covered in another topic sometime back with a statement from Collishaw.

Field evidence ROCKS !! (but that's only my opinion). The pre-war Regulars that could not make the grade were being retired from 1939 onwards and none were in the Western Desert (this is a pub fight). None of the Donkey Wallopers that could not relate to the new fangled machinery from 1928 onwards (11th Hussars then 12th Lancers then everyone else) ever got to see a Jerry - shame. If you think they did can you list them (in another topic please)? The 3rd County of London Yeomanry mechanised in 1916 (motor-bikes some with side cars, cars, lorries and Vickers MGs) streets and decades ahead of the Regulars (Yay....Go The Sharpshooters !).

I think Fritz could not afford to record the absolute truth because of the need to keep Halder as quiet as possible - but that old bird was on Rommel's trail long before James Mason assumed the sun glasses. This is only an opinion at the moment.

In terms of British cover ups - the QM Staff would not be able to overcome the accountancy procedures, and Tobruk when lost in 42 was one hell of a list of missing stuff and no one has described Tobruk as a cover up - or have they?

Also - (I will try to describe it later from Field sources) the reason El Agheila was not held other than by a platoon of the 1st THR on the 24th March, was because no one could risk losing a forward dump capable of supporting a brigade sized formation or half a Support Group (the other half being on the way to Greece). So with this in mind they would already have been on the ball with Msus not holding more than what was really necessary to get half a Sp Gp and 3rd Armd Bde out whilst the 5 battalions of Aussies moved back along the coast in their Italian trucks alongside two batteries of the British 51st Field Regiment.

Also - (Urmel's point) in terms of leaving storing vehicles at Msus I can't believe that because the 20th and 26th Brigades had only enough transport to move 5 battalions between them and all the units passing through had already lost some vehicles and would take anything useful that could move or be carried.

Very few vehicles were lost at Mersa Brega according to 2nd Sp Gp who listed the missing items, and very few personnel were left to be made POW so I have never understood German claims in respect of that first clash.

Lets try to keep this topic in respect of logistics because we can cover other areas in old or new topics.

Laters

Clint Hardware
Unison Sheriff

[Urmel]

1) The Germans did not claim fuel captured. So this is a non-issue in relation to the OP. It is well known that the petrol dump at Msus was destroyed (too early) - that's what caused the shortage of petrol for 2 Armoured. Please re-read Wavell's despatch and the Red Herring definition.

2) Nobody talked about stored vehicles until you did. Not the Germans, not me. Just vehicles. Most likely the organic vehicle components of whichever units went into the bag at Mechili. 3rd Indian Motorised Brigade alone would have had hundreds of soft vehicles, and they hadn't been in combat. The number of vehicles with the Australians has nothing to do with this. Please re-read the Red Herring definition.

Sorry if this sounds cranky, but your last post is full of speculation, and short on facts. You still have not provided any evidence regarding what was at Mechili, and what was destroyed of that. Instead you keep speculating about why the Germans would lie in their documents. Shrug. Regarding my view on British glossing over what was destroyed, compared to left behind, you completely missed it. There is no accountancy issue. The stuff is gone. The question is whether it was blown up in time, or captured by the advancing enemy. But it's nice to see that you have no trouble believing the Germans would lie through their teeth in their official documentation, while the British wouldn't. If that's your approach to handling your evidence, that's fine, but please don't claim you're just interested in facts.

[MarkN]

Mark ...nice points

...then...

Wibble...

wibble...

wibble...

Laters
Clint Hardware
Unison Sheriff

Mr clinthardware,

What's happened to you this last week? All you seem to be post these days is wibble.

First, you've come up with a demand that everybody else is only allowed to post "field evidence", whilst you continue to dismiss "field evidence" with your stubborn adherence to an unpublished post-war narrative that uses translated extracts from an unpublished post-war German narrative of the events.

Second, you introduce this thread with "This topic is about Field evidence NOT Downing Street Cabinet political crepe which has polluted our understanding for 75 years" - and then produce a word for word facsimile. Why do you get so worked up by a different typesetting, font, and layout on a document?

Third, and a repeat of a few months ago with me, why do you demand others produce evidence to support comments that they haven't made? Have you been hanging around pubs frequented by ukippers? That's Tactic no.7 in their Rules for Political Dialogue handbook.


Field evidence #1 (after 2SptBde have legged it from Mersa el Brega):
Quote (Schorm): "Everywhere abandoned lorries."

Field evidence #2 (after dump at Msus has been (allegedly) destroyed):
Quote (5RTR WD): "Some petrol and a quantity of rations obtained from dump."

Field evidence #3 (after Mechili taken):
Quote (DAK KTB):...

[Tom from Cornwall]

MarkN,

Field evidence #1 (after 2SptBde have legged it from Mersa el Brega):
Quote (Schorm): "Everywhere abandoned lorries."

Was that for 31 March? Tower Hamlet Rifles recorded the following vehicle losses on 31 March (WO169/1159 - 2 Spt Gp HQ):

"Destroyed by enemy action:- 3 Ford 15 cwt, 4 Carriers, 2 M/Cs, 1 Bedford 30 cwt.

Unaccounted for:- 4 Carriers, 4 Ford 15 cwt."

Regards

Tom

[ClintHardware]

OK... now for some more Field sourced wibble

Tom's point about Schorm shows what seems to be a gross exaggeration compared to the few lost/missing items from what was only half a Support Group to begin with. Was Schorm including MGB2's abandoned/parked Kfzs as well as the listed British vehicles? MGB2 had had considerable losses according to Schorm so a lot of their vehicles could have been seen parked when Schorm got nearer MB.

Urmel if vehicles were to be found at a dump it would seem that they would be there as stored for issue. In terms of Mechili - half of 3rd Ind Mot Bde got out along with the Australian A/Tk Batteries and 'M' Battery 3rd RHA and nearly half of the 2nd Armd Div HQ units. Some 2000 troops did not so that must have left a lot of lorries of one sort or another even though some of them had been shot up from the two escape attempts. Some of those who surrendered like Major Cracroft & Captain Constant & Corporal Facer all got out separately in trucks during the surrender.

Mark Msus would have been destroyed as much as Hore-Ruthven and the French felt they needed to judging from HR's statement but at least those that came along used up the remaining/missed fuel. I am surprised any was missed. Brigadier Latham states the KDG took 3000 gallons (not the 5000 I mentioned before) and the KDG also refer to taking 250 gallons but perhaps the lesser amount was taken by a passing troop and the 3000 gallons by their Echelons - I don't know. Frankly I don't know why you trust and like Cabinet stuff - but everyone has a kink.

Anyway, the following Field Sources (all pages from WO 169/1243) are interesting (well I would say that) in that they show the Australians destroying their own dump at Magrun a full day early and then those affected were rescued by the RASC's ad hoc dumping at Ghemines. The RASC then go on to ad-hoc dump and continue to servce other dumps and lift troops such as the rescue of 2/13th Bn at Er Regima. The Aussies were so lucky the British rescued them which of course is a total reversal of the James Mason story.

The pages below go against the bs we get from Wavell trying to placate Churchill and the Cabinet by using words like disaster. It also shows CYRCOM's AQ continuing to operate as expected in combat conditions despite being subject to air attacks and some intermittent W/T problems. The pages do not include panic or collapse despite the Aussies' hurry/confusion. Also note towards the end that CYRCOM HQ becomes the reformed WDF and so its staff are not destroyed in the desert and neither was the eventually tank-less 3rd Armd Bde or the 2nd Sp Gp (until closed down by GHQ).

Another point is that the RASC were working as they had planned to do from the late 1920s and their methods were RASC developed from Field experience servicing the Empire and various emergencies (e.g. Shanghai) to support other units and they pre-date O'Connor and his attack on the X Armata. This is covered in their four inch thick Corps history which is a fascinating read for background.

And another point is that with these RASC troops and their organisation the divisions of CYRCOM could have retreated to Mersa Matruh to fight the main battle there.

And a final point is that they (Lavarack and Harding) felt that they did not need to fall back towards Mersa Matruh from Tobruk because Tobruk was already far enough to have given Rommel a difficult run to be followed by damaging concentrations of artillery which is what he got. Not only did they think they could hold Tobruk but they did. Why were they so confident? And Gott took over elements of 2nd Sp Gp outside Tobruk supported by the RASC to fall back to the border and fight there.

Mark if you have some Cabinet prepared wibble please tie it up outside.