RASC on the run March - April 1941

[MarkN]

MarkN,

Field evidence #1 (after 2SptBde have legged it from Mersa el Brega):
Quote (Schorm): "Everywhere abandoned lorries."

Was that for 31 March? Tower Hamlet Rifles recorded the following vehicle losses on 31 March (WO169/1159 - 2 Spt Gp HQ):

"Destroyed by enemy action:- 3 Ford 15 cwt, 4 Carriers, 2 M/Cs, 1 Bedford 30 cwt.

Unaccounted for:- 4 Carriers, 4 Ford 15 cwt."

Regards

Tom

Quite so Tom, quite so.

Regrettably, we don't have any details of what all the other units and sub-units of 2nd Support Group in and around Mersa Brega left behind. I doubt 1TH were the only ones to lose a few vehicles.

I wonder if out friend Mr hardware has realised that that only represents the 1TH losses or whether he thinks it's for all of 2SpGp?

[MarkN]

Tom's point about Schorm shows what seems to be a gross exaggeration compared to the few lost/missing items from what was only half a Support Group to begin with. Was Schorm including MGB2's abandoned/parked Kfzs as well as the listed British vehicles? MGB2 had had considerable losses according to Schorm so a lot of their vehicles could have been seen parked when Schorm got nearer MB.

No, Tom quotes the losses recorded by 1TH and ONLY 1TH. Do you have similar reports from all the other units and sub-units of 2nd Support Group to contradict Schorm's "Field evidence"?

And, I have to point out to the others reading this thread another of your fictional comments. 2nd Support Group was NOT "half a Support Group to begin with". It was, horses for courses, more than up to strength set against the establishments then current.

Nevertheless, most grateful for you posting more documentation for a wider audiance to appreciate. We are all at liberty to interpret what we read as we wish. Those documents show me that the withdrawal was far from orderly and was one disaster after another. Disasters that could have been avoided had the ability of the formation commanders to command, control and communicate (C3) been better. 2 Armd Div had had two dumps set up for them. Both were blown prematurely leaving them begging, borrowing and stealing for everything. That's not an orderly withdrawal, that's near chaos!

[MarkN]

In terms of Mechili - .... that must have left a lot of lorries of one sort or another even though some of them had been shot up from the two escape attempts.

Thanks to Shane for posting this this morning....

240 trucks captured.... Another 150 desstroyed.

I wonder how many of those 240 were back in service, Rommel's service, ferrying his supplies to the front line before the end of the day?

[Tom from Cornwall]

MarkN,

2nd Support Group was NOT "half a Support Group to begin with". It was, horses for courses, more than up to strength set against the establishments then current.

Perhaps not "half a support group" but, hadn't 2 Support Group lost a motor battalion (the Rangers) to the Greek campaign? In fact, didn't they lose many of their supporting arms as well, those with whom they trained on arrival in Egypt? IIRC they only met most of their supporting arms when they arrived in the forward areas.

Does the excerpt from the MG Bn history say that the 240 trucks were captured between Agedabia and Derna?

Cheers

Tom

[ClintHardware]

I will comment properly later - In terms of MB I believe my sources are: Lt.-Col Shipton, 2nd Sp Gp and the 104th but not the 1st THR War Diary. And Schorm did not comment on whose vehicles he was looking at but until now we have all assumed them to be British. Shipton's statement was made later after careful accounting (IIRC). In terms of Mechili numbers I am not surprised but how many were left fully operational - perhaps most if they wanted to be driven away into captivity (rotar arms found from pockets).

It is interesting to see Schorm's statement on the 8th concerning Mechili when he says something like "the Division got away". What was he referring to.......hmmmm. Thank you Schorm.

Can we keep this post to RASC related stuff and Mark do you want to start a Mechili pub fight topic or are you afraid "the Division got away"? Put your wibble down on the table and lets all look at it and its references.

Laters

PS The units from 2nd Support Group that were with W Force or kept in Egypt and therefore not present were:

1st Rangers (9th King’s Royal Rifle Corps)
2nd Royal Horse Artillery
102nd L.A.A. and A/Tk Regt (Northumberland Hussars) (later re-organised as 102nd Anti-Tank Regt (Northumberland Hussars))
15th (Isle of Man) Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Not with W Force but kept in Egypt)

The 2nd Support Group had originally included the 2nd and 12th RHAs but the 12th RHA had been removed in August 1940.

2nd Support Group was in effect only half of a Support Group despite the twelve Vickers MGs of 'Y' Company 1st RNF and the rifles and Brens of a Free French company of Marines and only nine anti-tank guns of 'J' Battery 3rd RHA and a Troop of three Bofors 40 mm from 1st LAA.
The fact that half a Sp Gp held Mersa Brega for 12 hours (a perimeter of 5 miles) is of course not to be mentioned in the media and must be denied at every opportunity.

[Urmel]

Does the excerpt from the MG Bn history say that the 240 trucks were captured between Agedabia and Derna?

It's not clear, but I would interpret it as such.

As for the discussion on 2 Support Group's strength, rather than looking at what it did not have, why not look at what it did have, according to the OOB given in Appendix A of the official report posted in the other thread?

1x 25-pdr regiment, 16 guns I presume (104 RHA)
1x AT regiment, 36 guns (?) of unspecified type, presume 2-pdr (3 RHA)
1x Infantry Battalion (1 T.H.R.)
1x Infantry Company (Inf. de Marine)
1x MMG company, 12x Vickers MMG, Y Coy Northumberland Fusiliers
3 sections (6 guns) AT of unspecified type, 16 Austr. Inf. Bde AT Coy
1 Tp R.E.
1 Sec. Fd Amb

Seems light on field guns and infantry.

[MarkN]

2nd Support Group was in effect only half of a Support Group despite the twelve Vickers MGs of 'Y' Company 1st RNF and the rifles and Brens of a Free French company of Marines and only nine anti-tank guns of 'J' Battery 3rd RHA and a Troop of three Bofors 40 mm from 1st LAA.
The fact that half a Sp Gp held Mersa Brega for 12 hours (a perimeter of 5 miles) is of course not to be mentioned in the media and must be denied at every opportunity.

You claim that it was "only half of a Support Group", and to defend that claim you have explained that some of the original units had been sent elsewhere, and other former sub-units were no longer part of the orbat. Tactic no.2 in the ukippers Rules for Political Dialogue handbook: avoid answering the question by overloading the listener/reader with loads of useless and irrelevant data.

Now, I'm looking forward to your mathematics that show how the units and sub-units of 2SptGp on 30-31 March 1941 were half that of the establishment for a support group at that time. This can be done simply by totting up the units and equipment of 2SptGp on 30-31 March 1941 (which I'm sure you know quite well) and comparing that to the establishment of a support group (which you should know if you can 'credibly' claim that only hapf were present).

Sadly, I fear, this is yet another instance of you fictionalising history to fit your historically-false narrative.

[ClintHardware]

How are you not happy with all those significantly missing units from 2nd Support Group especially the missing infantry (1st Rangers) and the second artillery regiment - both seriously needed on the 31st to cover the 5 mile perimeter?

In addition the 16th Anti-Tank company was not present. They had left days before (not with the Australian Brigade withdrawal on the 19th/20th March from Mersa Brega) but they had been relieved by 'J' Battery and left a section of two guns with 3rd Armd Bde and then they left there too without firing a shot. No Australians were engaged in any support on the 31st March or 1st and 2nd April. This is in the War Diaries.

Manipulate as you want but 2nd Support Group is still only half of a British Support Group and it faced a reconnaissance in force/divisional attack without sufficient room to deploy and supported by the Divisionsstabs that needed to be protected by Leutnant Schorm because it was that close to the action.

Well done Brigadier Latham, Lieutenant-Colonel Shipton and all the men present that formed the remaining half of 2nd Support Group you defied those attacks for 12 hours and their Stukas which proved quite ineffective and you shot three German aircraft down one or two of those with your Brens. Well done indeed.

[MarkN]

How are you not happy with all those significantly missing units from 2nd Support Group especially the missing infantry (1st Rangers) and the second artillery regiment - both seriously needed on the 31st to cover the 5 mile perimeter?

In addition the 16th Anti-Tank company was not present. They had left days before (not with the Australian Brigade withdrawal on the 19th/20th March from Mersa Brega) but they had been relieved by 'J' Battery and left a section of two guns with 3rd Armd Bde and then they left there too without firing a shot. No Australians were engaged in any support on the 31st March or 1st and 2nd April. This is in the War Diaries.

Manipulate as you want but 2nd Support Group is still only half of a British Support Group and it faced a reconnaissance in force/divisional attack without sufficient room to deploy and supported by the Divisionsstabs that needed to be protected by Leutnant Schorm because it was that close to the action.

Well done Brigadier Latham, Lieutenant-Colonel Shipton and all the men present that formed the remaining half of 2nd Support Group you defied those attacks for 12 hours and their Stukas which proved quite ineffective and you shot three German aircraft down one or two of those with your Brens. Well done indeed.

You have repeatedly made a claim that "2nd Support Group was ... only half of a Support Group".

Will you please substantiate this claim by evidencing in what way the forces under command 2nd Support Group 30/31 March 1941 were half of the forces that the laid-down establishment proscribed.

Remember, what is of historical interest is how it compared to the laid down establishment NOT the imaginary establishment that you have created in your head.

You can repeat as many times as you like tidbits of information about how units and sub-units came and went over the preceeding days, weeks and months, however, none of this diversion provides any evidence to support your claim.

Ukipper tactic no.2: make wild and uniformed claims that grab attention then, when asked to substantiate them, reel out all manner of trivia to divert attention from the false/untrue claim. You've spent too much time in the 'wrong' company, it seems.

[Aber]

Can you please focus on the history, rather than lobbing insults back and forth?

[Tom from Cornwall]

And of course, we could look have picked up what Rommel himself wrote (Rommel Papers, pp.108-109of the "booty" from Mersa el Brega:

The 5th Light Division's success was not reported to Corps until the morning. The British had apparently beaten a somewhat precipitate retreat, and 50 Bren-carriers and about 30 lorries had fallen into our hands

BTW, MarkN

You claim that it was "only half of a Support Group", and to defend that claim you have explained that some of the original units had been sent elsewhere, and other former sub-units were no longer part of the orbat.

Well, I didn't make the original claim that it was "only half of a Support Group" but I did point out that it had lost much of its original units (including those it trained with in desert conditions) to Greece. It looks like poor Clint is getting flak that I should deservedly have received...

I know,

Wouldn't a good idea be to post up the official War Establishment for a Support Group and the "amended scale of vehicles for desert".

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

WO169/1159

As for the Greek departures, on 24 Feb 2nd Support Group received a signal from 2 AD "directing immediate mobilisation on English scale of W.E. of many units in the Division, including NH less 1 Bty, plus Signal Tp, 1 Rangers, [2] RHA, plus Signal Tp and Ordnance units, but excluding Div HQ, Sp Gp HQ and Sp Gp Sqn Signals. NH were to take 36 guns", etc.

Regards

Tom

[ClintHardware]

Mark

The unit data I have given above is from Joslen and he decribes the unit detachments after arrival in Egypt. Note the word "after".

In terms of Carriers the 1st THR had 44 max but probably less. According to British war diaries which did not have to impress Halder... not more than eight were lost at Mersa Brega because they were still in action on the 1st and 2nd April so Rommel is greatly exaggerating or has been misinformed. All the Carriers were extremely worn out but they were in some difficult action on the 2nd April as covered by the war diairies. On the 30th March Lt Col Shipton gives a written explanation of the worn state of his carriers so it is something of a miracle of maintenance that they attacked the German advance (yes attacked) at about 1000 hours on the 2nd April alongside one or more KDG troops. That attack caused a pause noted by Olbrich/Schorm/Ponath (one of them) but only a pause. Latham later comments on how well they did in that attack too.

The 1st Support Group originally had two field regiments 1939 - 40, the 2nd had two only for a month in 1940 so it could be said that the one regiment was the full 1941 OOB for a Support Group but the 104th contained only two batteries of eight 25 Pdrs instead of three which is what would have been exercised with in the UK and the 104th was given to 2nd Sp Gp by XIII Corps only a week or so before the 31st March having lost the 2nd RHA. The only original units of 2nd Sp Gp arriving at MB were the 1st THR and 2nd Sp Gp HQ - so really it was phuqqall of a Support Group in terms of its original UK - Egypt strength thanks to Wavell not steering Dill and Churchill concerning Greece.

So I standby Half of a Support Group - those other missing original units would have made a significant difference on the 31st March - they might even have helped hold positions with their Lee Enfield and Brens when their other kit got knocked out. Imagine even more "considerable losses" within M2 and Bofors firing in anti-tank roles alongside the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) RHA.

Laters - mayhem to create elsewhere now

[MarkN]

Mark

The unit data I have given above is from Joslen and he decribes the unit detachments after arrival in Egypt. Note the word "after".

In terms of Carriers the 1st THR had 44 max but probably less. According to British war diaries which did not have to impress Halder... not more than eight were lost at Mersa Brega because they were still in action on the 1st and 2nd April so Rommel is greatly exaggerating or has been misinformed. All the Carriers were extremely worn out but they were in some difficult action on the 2nd April as covered by the war diairies. On the 30th March Lt Col Shipton gives a written explanation of the worn state of his carriers so it is something of a miracle of maintenance that they attacked the German advance (yes attacked) at about 1000 hours on the 2nd April alongside one or more KDG troops. That attack caused a pause noted by Olbrich/Schorm/Ponath (one of them) but only a pause. Latham later comments on how well they did in that attack too.

The 1st Support Group originally had two field regiments 1939 - 40, the 2nd had two only for a month in 1940 so it could be said that the one regiment was the full 1941 OOB for a Support Group but the 104th contained only two batteries of eight 25 Pdrs instead of three which is what would have been exercised with in the UK and the 104th was given to 2nd Sp Gp by XIII Corps only a week or so before the 31st March having lost the 2nd RHA. The only original units of 2nd Sp Gp arriving at MB were the 1st THR and 2nd Sp Gp HQ - so really it was phuqqall of a Support Group in terms of its original UK - Egypt strength thanks to Wavell not steering Dill and Churchill concerning Greece.

So I standby Half of a Support Group - those other missing original units would have made a significant difference on the 31st March - they might even have helped hold positions with their Lee Enfield and Brens when their other kit got knocked out. Imagine even more "considerable losses" within M2 and Bofors firing in anti-tank roles alongside the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) RHA.

Laters - mayhem to create elsewhere now

Lots of huff and puff and beaucoup de trivia extraordinaire but still no attempt to compare the actual units and sub-units under 2nd Support Group circa 30/31 March 1941 and the proscribed establishment of a support group at that time. In your own time....

[MarkN]

I take the view that when one makes a claim, the onus is upon that person to substantiate their claim.

Since the poster Clinthardware is unable or unwilling to substantiate his claim that "2nd Support Group was ... only half of a Support Group", and merely floods this thread with his diversionary trivia, and on the suggestion of another poster via PM, I will lay out the facts....

2 Support Group left the UK with the following units (I shall leave out the sub-units that remained unchanged throughout) under command:-
- 1 RANGERS (motor battalion)
- 1 TOWER HAMLETS (motor battalion)
- 2 RHA (FIELD arty regiment)
- 102 RHA (ATK and LAA regiment)

This accorded with the establishment for a support group issued in April 1940. It should be noted that an RHA field regiment consisted of 2 batteries of 8 guns each. Please note this differed to the holdings of an RA field regiment who had 2 batteries of 12 guns each. The ATK and LAA regiment consisted of 4 batteries: 2 with 12 each 2-pdr atk guns and 2 with 12 each Bofors 40mm LAA.

However, in October 1940, just days before they sailed, the establishment of the support group was altered to the following:-
- 1 x lorried infantry battalion
- 1 x RHA FIELD arty regiment (of 2 bty each 8 guns)
- 1 x RHA ATK regiment (of 3 bty each 12 guns)
- 1 x RHA LAA regiment (of 3 bty each 12 guns)


On 30/31 March 1941, 2 Support Group had under command the following:-
- 1 TOWER HAMLETS (motor battalion)
- Y/1 NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
- 2/1 French Marine Battalion
- 104 RHA (FIELD arty regiment) : 16 guns
- J/3 RHA (ATK bty) : 12 guns
- elements of 16 Aus Anti-tank Coy : 4 or 6 guns
- elements of 1 LAA Bty RA : 2 or 3 guns

The Report, the 2SptGp WD and the Brig LATHAM's report each differ on the exact composition, thus I have had to make some slightly intuitive steps to produce the above. For example, LATHAM makes no mention of the Australian anti-tank gunners! The Report suggests the whole of 3RHA was present. There is confusion as to whether there were 2 or 3 bofors under command, 4 or 6 Australian 2-pdrs. This is down to repeated changes of whether these sub-sub-units were commanded by the support group or the division directly.

What's the difference?

A) Instead of a single lorried infantry battalion, they had a motorised battalion AND 2 additional infantry companies attached. CREDIT
B) The RHA regiment was different by name by exact by mature - 16 guns. EQUAL
C) With only 18 or 20 off 2-pdr anti-tank guns, they were 6/4 short of what they left the UK with or 18/16 short of establishment. DEBIT
D) With only 2 or 3 off 40mm Bofors, they were 22/21 short of what they left the UK with or 34/33 short of establishment. DEBIT

Please bear in mind that the 2nd Armoured Division commander (Gambier-Parry) had decided to place the bulk of two LAA batteries (about 20 guns), some 2-pdr ATK and one of the French Marine companies directly under his own command. Had they been with 2 Support Group as per establishment, 2SptGp would only have been 12 LAA guns short of establishment, 3 companies over establishment in infantry and about 14 2-pdrs short.

So, to sum up, excess of infantry, par with field artillery and a deficit in anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.

In the round, not far off full compliment in the area. How the poster Clinthardware can claim "2nd Support Group was ... only half of a Support Group" makes no sense: whether compared against what they arrived with or against establishment.