Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

I’m hoping that someone might be able to help with Greek sources?

There is a discrepancy in British and Greek reporting of the agreement that was reached at the series of meetings on 22 February 1941 between Greek and British politicians and military commanders as to whether the Greek forces in the Metaxas Line should be withdrawn immediately to a position alongside the British Commonwealth forces along the “Aliakmon Line” or only preparations made until the views of the Yugoslav Government had been clarified.

According to British foreign office sources (FO/371/331/33145 quoted by van Creveld in his article ‘Prelude to Disaster: the British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940-41 (1974), Journal of Contemporary History) it was agreed that:

“preparations should at once be made and put into execution to withdraw the Greek advanced troops in Thrace and Macedonia to the line which we should be obliged to hold if the Yugoslavs did not come in”.

This agreement is also printed word for word in the subsequent report on the Eden/Dill Mission to the Middle East (PREM3/294/1).

This all seems to be straightforward enough, however, in a contemporary record sent to the New Zealand government by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (25 Feb 41 – quoted in Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: Volume I, p.239) they were told that the agreement was that:

“Greece immediately should begin preparations to withdraw her advanced troops from the Bulgarian frontier to the line in Macedonia, which, in the event of a Yugoslav refusal to join us against Germany, would have to be held initially, and to improve communications to facilitate the occupation of that line.”

The obvious discrepancy being the reference in the original minutes to “put into execution”.

I know that the Greek C-in-C, General Papagos, disputed the British version after the war, arguing that it had been agreed to delay the withdrawal until after an attempt had been made to get the Yugoslavians to agree to fight with Greece and Britain.

I would imagine that the Greek’s also took minutes of these meetings for their own records and wondered if they have been opened up to public scrutiny.

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

Hello Tom,

Much confusion reigned over what was expected of various parties and when those expectations were supposed to happen. However, look closely at the two quotes you presented.

The first describes how "preparations ... to withdraw" "should at once be made and put into execution" not that a withdrawal itself should commence.

No different to the second, "begin preparations to withdraw".

If anybody assumed that meant the withdrawal would commence as of 22 February, then it must have come from conversations not from the paperwork.

Moreover, you will notice the caveat regarding Yugoslavia. The defensive line starting at Mount Olympus was assumed to come into play if Yugoslavia didn't join in. This brings up a number of thoughts.

As of 22 February, Yugoslavia was definitely not in and claiming complete neutrality. So, did the various British and Greek talking heads see neutrality as being in or out? What exactly did they believe the Yugoslavs would and could contribute. What I mean by that is, if we look at it from a military point of view, the Metaxas Line is still in play if the Germans only attack from Bulgaria. The threat of an attack from Yugoslavia came about because they finally opted in and were overrun so quickly. If they'd stayed out, perhaps Germany would have had to come soley through the Metaxas Line.

The Yugoslav position changed considerably from 22 February to 6 April, and they only entered into formal - but secret - military negotiations after 27 March. Whatever was written in a document on 22 February could easily have been adjusted and changed over the next weeks.

It's also worth mentionning, that whilst Britain was negotiating with Greece over where to put up the defence line, it was also offering a bribe to Yugoslavia to join the war on the allied side. The bribe? Salonika and a large chunk of Thrace!!!! The exact details of this 'offer' remain clouded, and the paperwork I have is not conclusive. But there you go.

The point(s)?
The written agreement is closely tied to the Yugoslav position. That only became known at the very end of March at the earliest and thus, according to the written agreement, the actual withdrawal should only have commenced then if at all. And remember, as I pointed out, their participation would suggest the Greeks could/should remain in the Metaxas position.

In effect, what has been discussed at length by historians post war starts from a false premise and the various official and semi-official histories seem more interest in finding blame for poor effort than understanding the true situation.


PS.
I have the extract from Papagos' post-war history regarding these meetings. However, it's written in Serbo-croat, so if you want it you'll have to do with my amateur translation.

PPS.
The official Greek history comes in 6 or 7 parts - in Greek of course. I have the part related to the events under discussion on order and hope to see it sometime in the coming weeks. I have a Greek speaker who will decipher when necessary. They also have a condensed single-volume issue in English. That too is on order. Will let you know when they arrive.

[xristar]

The relevant tome of the Greek official history that I have (published 1956) notes that although official minutes were kept they could not be found in the archives, so it quotes directly from Papagos.

[jwsleser]

FM Papagos discusses the 22 February meeting on pages 322-325 in the English translation of his book (The Battle of Greece 1940-1941 Athens 1949). Here he states:

After reviewing the available information regarding the general military situation in the Balkans, I went on to say that, on the assumption that Yugoslavia would remain neutral and would not allow the passage of German troops through her territory, I had arrived at the conclusion that, given the small means at our disposal, the defence of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace was not advisable. I added that only sufficient forces should be left there to man the fortifications, for the purpose of delaying the advance of the enemy. The rest of the Greek divisions there should be withdrawn to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus position, not withstanding the fact that a withdrawal, to a point far removed form the Bulgarian front, of troops recruited entirely locally, so that hence to them the step entailed the abandonment of their homes to the enemy, was bound to affect the morale of the men. The British reinforcements, as they arrived in Greece, would also be moved up to positions on the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus line.

Further I stated that the removal of the war material and supplies for Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, together with the transfer of the Greek forces there to the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus line, pending the arrival of the British troops, would take at least 20 days. Consequently the movement of material and men would have to be carried out in good time, so as to avoid the danger of the enemy attack finding us still engaged in this operation.

I insisted, however, that before taking such a grave decision as would involve the evacuation of the whole region to the east of the Axios (Vardar) and the abandonment of this part of our national territory, the attitude of Yugoslavia should first be be completely clarified, and I purposed that the Yugoslav government should be informed of the decisions we were prepared to take depending on the policy they intended to adopt.

This suggestion of mine was accepted, and it was decided that the British Foreign Secretary should send an urgent code message to the British Minister in Belgrade. Depending on the nature of the reply the order for evacuation and withdrawal would be issued or not, as the case may be. This was agreed upon by all, and the next day Mr. Eden, General Dill, and General Wavell left for Ankara. They were to pass through Athens again on their way back.

During the period with intervened between the Tatoi Conference of 22nd February and the return of Mr. Eden and generals Dill and Wavell on the evening of 2nd March, I repeatedly enquired of Maj-Gen. Heywood, who was the liaison officer of the Imperial General Staff with Greek General Headquarters, whether any reply had been received for the British Minister in Belgrade to the British Foreign Secretary’s urgent cable. On each occasion I was assured by Maj-Gen. Heywood that no such reply had been received. I was thus unable to reach a conclusion for which I lacked the necessary data. I could not take such a decision nor indeed was it for me to do so when the necessary basis for taking it, which was within the sole competence of those in charge of the political side, had not been given me.

After Eden returns (2 March), the Greeks were asked whether the Greeks forces had been withdrawn. Papagos states:

I replied that this had not been done, in as much as we had agreed at the Tatoi Conference of 22nd February, as expressly recorded in the minutes that before issuing orders for the withdrawal of these forces I must know the answer of the British Minister in Belgrade to the British Minister Foreign Secretary's cable asking for full clarification of Yugoslavia's attitude.

Papagos then continues to state it was too late to issue the orders.

In The Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek German War 1940-1941 (Athens 1997), the conference is only briefly touched upon. Here it states

[Page 172-173, paragraph 239] During a meeting, chaired by the King, the Commander in chief Alexandros Papagos agreed to evacuate the entire Greek region east of Axios River and to transfer the forces to the area of Vermio, where the British reinforcements would also be deployed, on the condition that every hope for Yugoslavia entering the war by the side of the Allies would be exhausted.

[Page 173 paragraph 240] The evacuation of th e above region was considered untimely and unprofitable, after the Germans had entered Bulgaria on march 2, and also due to the yet unclarified attitude of Yugoslavia.

Pista! Jeff

[Tom from Cornwall]

Many thanks to you all for your replies,

MarkN,

The phrase "preparations should at once be made and put into execution" is certainly ambiguous. I think you read it as planning and making ready preparations to withdraw, whereas I read it initially as make plans for a withdrawal and actually do it. The more I read it, however, the more I tend to lean to your reading.

Hmmm, I'll have to go back to the minutes of the meetings in early March at which the British expressed surprise that the Greeks hadn't moved back. I'll see if I can find anything from the British Military Mission to suggest that they were asked to help make such preparations. Of course, the fact that General Heywood was killed in a plane crash during the war, makes the Military Mission a convenient scapegoat for all sorts of misunderstandings and misconceptions. Wilson blames them directly for not informing Cairo of the exhausted (and somewhat primitive) state of the Greek Army, although I think there are several signals which point this out very clearly.

the various official and semi-official histories seem more interested in finding blame for poor effort than understanding the true situation.

I quite agree with that statement, I think a recent academic article called it the military explaining (or explaining away) the completeness of their defeat in Greece.

Xristar,

Thanks for looking in the Greek Official History for me. I guess my next lead could be in Greek military archives to see whether the agreement to "make preparations" for a withdrawal resulted in the production of an Operation Order that detailed how a withdrawal would be conducted. I know when the British came back they immediately suggested that British transport be used, only for the Yugoslavia Coup to overtake these discussions.

Jeff,

Many thanks for the extracts from Papagos and the Official History. I note that Papagos says that he was willing to withdraw all forces whilst

only sufficient forces should be left there to man the fortifications, for the purpose of delaying the advance of the enemy

I thought the three Greek divisions in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace were already regarded as insufficient to man the fortifications , so who exactly was Papagos intending to withdraw?

All very perplexing!

Regards

Tom

[jwsleser]

Tom

Three divisions were over-kill in terms of the forts. The Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek German War 1940-1941 states that only 10,000 men were needed to man the forts (page 176). In the discussion of the defense of the Metaxas Line on pages 183-184, the screening companies and the troops of the forts are listed separately from the field forces. In total, there were 21 fort units and 15 screening companies in addition to the 3 divisions and 2 brigades along the Bulgarian border.

The official history lays out the three possibilities on page 172 (assessment as of 8 Feb).

-Yugoslavia as an ally: The Metaxas Line would be held. This position covers the southern flank of Yugoslavia.

-Yugoslavia neutral/no passage of Axis forces: Defend the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas line. The forts would be manned but only to delay the enemy advance. No attempt to hold the ground between forts. This moves the defense into better defensive terrain and requires less forces.

-Yugoslavia joins Axis/or allows passage: Withdrawal to the Greek-Albanian border - Smolikas Mountains - Orliakas Mountains - Aliakmonas River - Olympus Mountains. This basically gives up most of northern Greece.

So the forces were inadequate to hold the Metaxas Line as a defensive position, but sufficient to hold the individual forts as impediments to an Axis advance (as what historically happened). So presumably up to 3 divisions and 2 brigades could have been withdrawn.

Pista! Jeff

[MarkN]

Op. Instruction No. 1 of 1 Armd Bde dated 22 March 1941 states...
GREEK army of East MACEDONIA comprise 3 Divs, a Bde Gp and Fortress Tps.

This contemporary reference dovetails with the post-war narrative posted by jwsleser above.

Together they suggest the 3 divs and bdes were additional to the actual troops required to man the Metaxas line defences. They were, of course, a sensible reserve as well as manouver (albeit with limited mobility) force should a break through occur. Arguably, not a very big reserve either.

Interestingly, Papagos writes post war that it would take 20 days to move these troops to new positions. That, to me, sounds like more historical revisionism which appears prolific in his and others' writings on the matter. Nevertheless, it was not an overnight task and needed a fair amount of time to effect satisfactorily. Something they never started. In fact, the sent an additional division to strengthen the East Macedonian army!

At the same time, it appears the British leadership were being their normal perfidious selves and had deluded themselves about almost everything practically possible both politically and militarily.

I suggest when considering this tale of woe, you pay close attention to the Yugoslav angle and what it was they were supposed to bring to the table and how. I'd also suggest, it was not the non withdrawal of the East Macedonian forces that were the 'real' issue, but the delayed withdrawal of the West Macedonian and Eperius armies from Albania. Barely mentionned and yet of far greater significance to the issue. And that absence speaks volumes on how the post war narratives have dealt with the subject.

[MarkN]

Tom,

Thought these may interest you...




I have plenty more along these lines. If you're interested, let me know and I'll upload them via our normal channel.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Jeff, MarkN,

Thanks again for all the help - apologies but I'm unable to look in too much detail until next week, as I've got an essay deadline this weekend. But briefly, in contrast to the Greek Staff History, I've got this reference to the numbers of troops needed to man the Frontier Line which suggests that the 10,000 Fortress troops were regarded as inadequate for manning the Metaxas Line and that this explains the need for the Greeks to leave the additional 3 divisions there:

WO201/52
12 Feb 41
1. Having been informed that I [General Heywood] was coming over to CAIRO to see the Commander-in-Chief, General PAPAGOS sent for me to give me his latest appreciation of the situation which he desired me to communicate with General WAVELL...

4. To meet this [German concentration on Bulgaria-Greek border], the GREEKS had some 10,000 Frontier troops backed up by three Divisions (twenty-seven Battalions).

5. He expected that the main GERMAN effort would be on the GREEK left, i.e. in the RUPEL – NEVROKOP area, as a successful operation in this area would cut off everything to the East. [A good appreciation!!]

6. LINES OF DEFENCE

(a) Frontier Line: This is strong, partially prepared with some permanent defences, but it would require eighty Battalions for its effective defence.

[...]

I'll dig further and come back with more.

the delayed withdrawal of the West Macedonian and Eperius armies from Albania. Barely mentioned and yet of far greater significance to the issue. And that absence speaks volumes on how the post war narratives have dealt with the subject.

Wilson complains about this, but then suggests that the slow manoeuvre of Greek forces was a surprise to him even though 27 Military Mission had pointed out their lack of transport several times!

the British leadership were being their normal perfidious selves and had deluded themselves about almost everything practically possible both politically and militarily.

I agree completely that the British deluded themselves - and would only add that they seem to have successfully muddied the water for historians as well!

Regards

Tom

[xristar]

The forts were not independent but were under command of the infantry divisions, along with other infantry and artillery units. If you read the course of the battle you'll realise that the forts without interval troops would have very limited value. I don't know if Papagos ever intented to withdraw the three divisions (besides the two that he withdrew, namely the 12th and 20th), but in my opinion it wouldn't make sense.

[jwsleser]

Good discussion.

I've got this reference to the numbers of troops needed to man the Frontier Line which suggests that the 10,000 Fortress troops were regarded as inadequate for manning the Metaxas Line and that this explains the need for the Greeks to leave the additional 3 divisions there:

The question is what does manning mean, especially when discussing defense or delay? Pagagos statement in his book...

I had arrived at the conclusion that, given the small means at our disposal, the defence of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace was not advisable. I added that only sufficient forces should be left there to man the fortifications, for the purpose of delaying the advance of the enemy.

...that I quoted above is clear (to me) that defending wasn't the plan. Since defending the line was "not advisable", any troops outside the forts themselves were excessive to the needs of the delay. Any penetration of the line immediately places mobile troops in peril. The fort's garrisons are protected by their forts and the forts themselves were designed for all-around defense, but the mobile troops can be cut off and surrounded. If the mobile troops are adequate to defeat any penetration, then the line can be defended. Everything I have read is that the needs of the Epirus Front took too many forces away from eastern Greece.

The placement of the forts and their built-in protection provided the means for the delay. These forts were placed to cover likely avenues of approach with artillery and machine gun fires. Many of the forts were mutually supporting while the screening companies help cover the outer defenses. German combat units might be able to infiltrate and bypass them, that took time and causalities. The logistical tail doesn't have that luxury. Note the main advance into Greece was made by the Germans forces through Yugoslavia, not through the Metaxas defenses.

The historical resistance of the forts demonstrated what they could do.

Pista! Jeff

[MarkN]

The Metaxas defensive line was created to repel a Bulgarian and/or Turkush assault; the Wehrmacht was a completely different proposition. Was the 10,000 establishment based on its conceptual requirement (Bulgaria and/or Turkish) or its practical requirement to deal with the Germans?

Behind the line, a Greek infantry division was a decent match for its Bulgarian or Turkish counterpart; against the motorised Heer and Luftwaffe, the Greeks were on a hiding to nothing.

I still don't understand why the Germans put so much effort into assaulting the Line. Once they had decided to outflank the Line via South Serbia (what is now Macedonia), it was just wasted and costly effort.

If l understand it correctly, xristar can correct me if necessary, the divisions in the East, 7th, 14th and 18th were made up entirely of local reservists whose motivation to defend another part of the country after being told to evacuate their homeland was questionnable.

The defence of the Greek core rested not on those three divisions, nor the fortress troops, but the withdrawal of the 14 divisions in Albania.

[jwsleser]

The Metaxas defensive line was created to repel a Bulgarian and/or Turkush assault; the Wehrmacht was a completely different proposition. Was the 10,000 establishment based on its conceptual requirement (Bulgaria and/or Turkish) or its practical requirement to deal with the Germans?

No, the 10,000 men was the authorized manning for the forts and screening troops (for discussion I will call these forces 'fortress troops', although the Greek history doesn't use the term). Note that the garrisons of these forts are in the 300-600 man range. With 21 forts and 15 screening companies of about 200-250 men each, the number 10,000 is easily reached. The manning for the forts is separate from the field army. Xristar stated that the forts were under the command of the infantry division, but note that this was an administrative/operational decision and not a relationship defined by unit TO&Es or other permanent organizational structure.

The defense of the line required both the 'fortress troops' and the use of elements of the field army to cover the intervals (see the French plans for the Maginot Line, same concepts). If adequate forces were allocated by the field army, I don't see why the line couldn't have been held against the Germans for a period of time. The actual attack demonstrated the staying power of the forts, it was the lack of interval troops that eventually caused the forts to fall. Of course, the Germans, with their resources, would eventually break the line. The problem was that the defense of Epirus required forces from western Thrace/eastern Macedonia and led to the situation in April 1941. The Greek Army wasn't large enough to handle both Italy and Germany at the same time.

I still don't understand why the Germans put so much effort into assaulting the Line. Once they had decided to outflank the Line via South Serbia (what is now Macedonia), it was just wasted and costly effort.

Lines of operations (LOOs), underestimating the Greek resistance, and overestimating Yugoslavian resistance. The terrain restricted options (LOOs) and limited the number of units that could be deployed. If the Yugoslavians could have held their eastern front, the main German axis of advance would have been through the Metaxas Line. The Germans, with their motorized units, were able to leverage the rapid collapse of the Yugo Army. As the operation unfolded, there wasn't a reason to stop the attack as it pinned Greek units.

If l understand it correctly, xristar can correct me if necessary, the divisions in the East, 7th, 14th and 18th were made up entirely of local reservists whose motivation to defend another part of the country after being told to evacuate their homeland was questionnable.

Xristar will need to answer the local question. The EMFAS had the VII, XIV, and XVIII inf Divs, the 19th Motorized Div, and the Evros and Nestos brigades. The CMFAS had the XII and 20th Divisions (plus the BEF), The XVIII was raised in late December, the 19th, 20th and Evros in February, the Nestos in March.

The morale question was more than just whether the men were locally recruited. Greece had fought very hard and sacrificed a lot to beat back the Italians. The Germans were seen as unbeatable, so giving up any ground was seen as the same as surrendering. If the Germans could be held somewhere, there was hope, but once a retreat started, it was assume the army's morale would break. This was basically happen in Epirus, although there is still debate on whether the army's will or merely that of the general's broke. The break-down of the V (Cretan) Division is one indication that the army was affected by the retreat.

The defence of the Greek core rested not on those three divisions, nor the fortress troops, but the withdrawal of the 14 divisions in Albania.

Yes and no. If the Kaimaktalan-Vermio-Aliakmonas line could be occupied with sufficient forces (the BEF, the CMFAS and EMFAS minus the fortress troops) and Yugoslavia held, there was a chance. The key was occupying the line and the UK delivering the necessary forces. Thinning the EFMAS/WMFAS wasn't an option. The Italian Primivera offense strained the Greek Army. Summer would only be worst.

Without Yugoslavia, the Greek-Albanian border - Smolikas Mountains - Orliakas Mountains - Aliakmonas River - Olympus Mountains would work, but required the retreat of both the EFMAS and WMFAS as well as all the forces to the east. The EFMAS was able to completely disengage in April, so such a withdrawal would work.

Pista! Jeff

[MarkN]

I undestand the political and troop morale arguments why withdrawing from Albania was not effected until it was too late.

However, with the wonderful tool which is hindsight, it's difficult to defend the decision to have 14 divisions in Albania at a stand still with nothing left to defend the rest of Greece other than the fortress troops. Remember, which of the 6 divisions and 2 brigades in the Central and East Macedonian Armies existed prior to Feb 1941 when the Germans were building their forces in the Balkans? At some point, the Greek command ought to have shifted focus from west to east rather than just creating makeshift units at the last moment.

If the Epirius and West Macedonian Armies were knocking the Italians out of Albania, it may have made sense.

Or did the Greeks think they could fight off the Germans with a handful of scratch divisions?

[jwsleser]

I undestand the political and troop morale arguments why withdrawing from Albania was not effected until it was too late.

I don’t, but this is rooted in my recognition of the real ‘elephant in the room’ (explained below).

However, with the wonderful tool which is hindsight, it's difficult to defend the decision to have 14 divisions in Albania at a stand still with nothing left to defend the rest of Greece other than the fortress troops. Remember, which of the 6 divisions and 2 brigades in the Central and East Macedonian Armies existed prior to Feb 1941 when the Germans were building their forces in the Balkans? At some point, the Greek command ought to have shifted focus from west to east rather than just creating makeshift units at the last moment.

They couldn’t shift divisions. The Primavera offensive was very rough on the Greek Army. Don’t be deceived by the lack of Italian success. Both sides fought very hard and the Greeks were fortunate that the Italians didn’t expand the offensive to other parts of the front. As I previously stated, the Greeks lacked the forces to counter both threats simultaneously. Any German/Bulgarian intervention could only be defeated by Greece if Greece was successful in gaining allies.

If the Epirius and West Macedonian Armies were knocking the Italians out of Albania, it may have made sense.

Or did the Greeks think they could fight off the Germans with a handful of scratch divisions?

No they didn’t. Look again at the three options outlined by Pagagos. All three options were based on the UK support that was beginning to flow. Also note that until Germany moved into Bulgaria, Germany wasn’t a threat. The latter meant you couldn’t write-off the impact of political decisions on Germany’s decision whether to become involved or not. Keeping Germany out of the war was the best solution, but the one that Greece had little control over

-The Greeks couldn’t abandon their forward positon if Yugoslavia entered the war as an ally. Such a rearward move would uncover the southern flank of any Yugoslavian defense. With Yugoslavia in the war, any step back would allow Germany to defeat Yugoslavia separately and still uncover northern Greece.

-The second is really the best as it allows Greece to shorten it lines while maintaining its forward position in Albania. It requires that Yugoslavia maintains its territorial integrity. Pagagos needed an answer from Yugoslavia to determine whether this was a viable option.

-Historically, the conditions identified by third option happen. While Yugoslavia attempted to fight, its efforts were so ineffective that Germany gained nearly free passage. Only a withdrawal to the proposed southern-most defensive line offered a chance under these conditions. The time just wasn’t there.

Note the rearward withdrawal was more than moving units. A lot of war material had been painfully moved forward. Painfully because of the lack of motor vehicles and road infrastructure. It needed to be well forward due to the lack of transport capacity to distribute the materials to units in the front line (mostly manpower and pack animals). Greece was already experiencing an ammo shortage. Losing this material would compromise any defense as Greece couldn’t quickly replace this material. That is why 20 days is important. Boxes of ammunition don’t have legs to march themselves south.

The ‘elephant in the room’ was Greece’s inability to bring the Italo-Greek War to an end. Italy had survived the best Greece could throw at it. It wasn’t pretty but the Italian Army was still on the battlefield and was gaining capability. Summer of 41, even without the Germans, was going to be very hard on Greece.

I believe the death of Metaxas in January was critical. He had the insight to understand that a military solution wasn’t possible and to see a political solution was needed. A political solution would mean Greece biting the bullet on several things, but ending the war was more important than saving face. He had the stature to make the best of a bad deal and get the Greek people to accept it. He could deal directly with Hitler. The Greek success in Albania ensnared the Greek leaders after his death and prevented any political solution to the military problem. I feel Pagagos understood this, but he didn’t have the personal connections/political role to work with Hitler on such a deal.

IBWs, there was no military solution short of the UK becoming a major military player in the Balkans. I am not sure that could ever happen.

Pista! Jeff