Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

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MarkN
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#181

Post by MarkN » 13 Apr 2016, 16:48

Moving on for the benefit of other readers....

Although it may be a wee bit difficult to discern, due to the regrettable adversarial nature, the discussion so far has covered several points.

In recent weeks it has focussed primarily on the actions and efforts of the Greeks in Albania. The discussion has identified that there is no published recording of the stated objective to the Greek effort in Albania - thus we can only speculate as to whether it was one thing or another. It has also identified that discussions about a withdrawal from Albania as part of a revised defensive posture in the face of the impending German attack were held and that clearly a decision was made by Papagos himself as Commander in Chief, or the Greek High Command as a body, not to adopt a defensive posture that concentrated on defending Greece itself. He/they chose to remain in Albania defending their limited territorial conquests at the expense of Greece itself.

Again, we can only speculate who exactly made the decision to remain in Albania and on what basis the proposals to withdraw to defenisve lines in Greece were rejected. The absence of any detail in both Papagos' book and the Greek official history on these two key points is informative in itself.

Moving on to the other front: the Bulgarian border.

Papagos' book contains two discrete elements: reproductions of contemporary documents and his post war narrative. Interestingly, there are occasions where his post war narrative does not coincide with the reproductions of the contemporary documents he presents. One such instance is his understanding and appreciation of the defensive requirements on the Bulgarian border.

In his 11 January 1941 appreciation (the contemporary document) he defines the defensive line to defend Salonika and Western Macedonia as being the fortified Metaxas Line from Beles to Volaks on the Nestos river then following the Nestos river itself to the Aegean. He states that this line required the fortress troops and 9 divisions (of which he only had three in situ). He further states that to protect a German flanking movement down the Vardar valley, an additional 3 divisions are required. Thus, a total of 12 divisions are determined as the minimum required to defend against a German attack. The point I wish to draw your attention to is that he has decided not to leave forces east of the Nestos river to defend Western Thrace and thus no allocation of forces for that territory is made in his calculation.

The decision to withdrawal from Western Thrace is repeated/proposed by Papagos in his discussions with the British on 22/24 February and the second round 2-4 March. It is also noted in the Greek official history (para. 241).

However, in the post war narrative part of his book, he discusses the need for forces to defend Western Thrace as well and seems to indicate that the same 12 division minimum can accomplish that. This part of his narrative is effectively a (bitter) lament that the British were not willing to provide the scale of forces that he wants to defend the line he would like to defend. The fact that he has now misrepresented his own appreciation at the time (the 11 January 1941 paper) and his own contemporary proposals and decisions in negotatiations with the British is probably obscured and lost to the casual reader.

History records that Papagos left 7 battalions east of the Nestos river in Western Thrace at the expense of defending the lines that he proposed (Vermion) and claimed a desire (Metaxas-Nestos) to hold.

This dispersal of forces crops up in many post war discussions. The military logic is utterly unsound and incoherent. The Greek official history notes (para.248) that, "the deployment of the Greek-British forces in two areas constituted, naturally, a serious disadvantage. These forces, which were insufficuent to confront the enemy in one area, were forced to be divided between two..." Although quite accurate in military logic, this is not telling the whole truth. In reality, the Greek forces on 6 April were dispersed forces across not two but FOUR separate areas: 15 divisions and 1 brigade in Albania; 2 divisions in Western Macedonia; 4 divisions in Eastern Macedonia; and, 2 brigades (7 battalions) in Western Thrace.

It is not published anywhere whether this defensive posture was Papagos' decision alone as Commander in Chief or whether it was the product of a collective decision of the Greek High Command.

Papagos' post war narrative barely touches on this. He makes no comment on the military logic and immediately goes into a misdirect of suggesting it was all down to the lack of information from Belgrade. This relates to the 2 March timeframe. He then follows this up by encouraging the reader to think it was sound policy to have left forces east of the Vardar against his own military analysis on the basis that a Yugoslav military officer arrived for an official chat just 6 days later.

As I wrote, we cannot be sure whose decision it was to persevere with this "serious disadvantage". However, that decision resides entirely within the Greek decision making sphere. Whilst some may argue that the British refused to take up the Metaxas Line, they ignore the fact that their stand on the Vermion Line was specifically requested by Papagos in the first place and allied to his (Papagos') appreciation that that line was, the "only one possible ... from the military point of view".

Without going into detail here, the evidence seems to point to it being Papagos's decision himself rather than a collective one by the Greek High Command. The absence of any detail in his post war narrative on this matter is, perhaps, informative.

And finally, whilst researching another matter last week, I bumped into a British Chiefs of Staff paper to the War Cabinet (COS(39)146) from early December 1939. An excerpt...
Image
Image


To recapitulate this post, discussions about a withdrawal were held and decisions made to maintain the 14+ divisions in Albania at the expense of defending Greece itself and in the full knowledge that an attack by the Germans from Bulgaria was imminent and their efforts in Albania were going nowhere (unless they had already achieved their onjective). Furthermore, the dispersal of forces was again a decision wholly within the powers of the Greeks to adjust or remove. The defensive posture that existed and which guaranteed the rapid collapse of Greek military resistance and speedy elimination of Greece as a sovereign and independent state was entirely a Greek affair. Although we cannot be certain who exactly was responsible for this choices, the weight of evidence points to Papagos himself. Moreover, the absence of any substantial discussion of these issues in the Greek official history and, most pointedly, in Papagos' book is quite informative.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#182

Post by MarkN » 18 Apr 2016, 15:11

While it is not particularly surprising that a post-war narrative doesn't entirely match the contemporary evidence, what is a bit unusual is that history records the events being a closer match to the post-war narrative than the contemporary evidence; Papagos chose to leave significant forces east of the Nestos despite his own military appraisal to Metaxas of 11 January and his proposals and offers to the British in February and March.

This suggests that there were perhaps two sides to Papagos: the responsible military commander in communication with his peers; and, the irresponsible military commander making decisions on his own. When dealing with others who understand the military situation he is able to speak with military coherence and rationality; when acting on his own his decision-making loses coherence and rationality. Or, perhaps, it is evidence of that what he was proposing to his peers was never his intent - regardless of the outcome of the discussions and events.

Consider the deployment of the Greek forces at three key time frames: the 6th of January 1941, the 14th of February and the 6th of April. The first is the official end (temporarily) of major offensive operations in Albania and the time that the likelihood of a German attack became a reality in the Greek High Command's thinking. The 6th of April is, of course, the date of the German attack. The 14th of February represents the mid-point of the two but also falls neatly into the timeframe of the Greek High Command having all the relevant strategic pieces of the jigsaw in place. They accepted a German attack was inevitable; they understood their efforts in Albania were going nowhere; Metaxas was no longer pulling the strings; their approach to the Yugoslavs had been rebuffed; their approach to the British had not yielded anywhere near the military support they required to implement their desired defensive posture; their own military had reported on the prevailing situation and made their recommendations.

On 6 January 1941, the Greek Army was deployed as follows:-
  • - In Albania: 12 infantry divisions (I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XIV and XVII)
    - In GHQ reserve: 1 infantry division (XVI in Florina) and the Cavalry Division (in Epirus on the Albanian border)
    - West of the Nestos: 2 infantry divisions (VI in Sidirokastro and VII in Drama) and 1 infantry brigade (VII in Kavala)
    - East of the Nestos: 2 infantry division (XII in Komotini and XIV in Xanthi) and 7 battalions in Western Thrace according to Greco-Turkish military accord.
MarkNote:
The VI Division was preparing to move to Albania too and in its place the XVIII Division had been created. A commander was appointed in December, but it only seems to have stood up as a functionning headquarters on 11 February 1941.



On 14 February 1941, the Greek Army was deployed as follows:-
  • - In Albania: 14 infantry divisions (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XIV, XVI and XVII) and the Cavalry Division.
    - In GHQ reserve: 1 infantry division (20th in Florina) and the 19th Mechanised Division
    - West of the Nestos: 2 infantry divisions (XVIII near Sidirokastro and VII in Drama) and possibly the VII Brigade too.
    - East of the Nestos: 2 infantry division (XII in Komotini and XIV in Xanthi) and 7 battalions in Western Thrace according to Greco-Turkish military accord.
MarkNote:
The 19th Mechanised Division had only just been created (24 January) and the HQ was located in Athens shortly to move to Larissa in Thessaly.
The 20th Division had been created just 2 days earlier (12 February) in Florina and was to be the GHQ reserve for the Albanian front.
The XIV Division moved from Xanthi to Sidirokastro in the days leading to 24 February. For the purpose of the Anglo-Greek discussions of 22 February it was assumed to already be behind the Metaxas-Nestos Line.



The Anglo-Greek meetings of 22-23 February produced a proposal from Papagos to stand on the Vermion Line and the Greek contribution would be 35 battalions from east of the Vardar (VII, XIV and XVII Divisions providing 22, XII Division providing 6 and the 7 battalions held in Western Thrace) PLUS the 19th Mechanised Division in Larissa AND possibly the 20th Division from GHQ reserve in Florina. In effect an offer of 5 divisions, potentially 6. The line allegedly require 8 and one in reserve, the British were offering over 3.

MarkNote: Nothing moved.


The Anglo-Greek meetings of 3-5 March revealed that Papagos was in no mood to move anything off the Bulgarian border as he considerred it too risky in inviting a German attack. Nevertheless, he didn't think it too risky to move the XII Division from Komotini to the Struma Line to make a total of 4 divisions between the Vardar and the Nestos (VII, XII, XIV and XVIII) and that part of the 19th Mechanised Division would move forward to Salonika. The 7 battalions held in Western Thrace were to remain where they were.

The subsequent discussions which Eden wrote, "painfully resembled the haggling of an oriental bazaar", first saw Papagos offer the XII Division, the 19th Mechanised and the Cavalry Division in GHQ reserve in Albania for the Vermion Line (6 infantry battalions only). This was refused and thus later revised the following day when Papagos proposed the 20th Division in Florina instead of the Cavalry Division and the 7 battalions in Western Thrace - thus increasing the number of infantry battalions now offered from 6 to 22. Still short of the original 35 though.

MarkNote: The XII Division moved (6 battalions only); the 7 battalions in Western Thrace did not.


On 6 April 1941, the Greek Army was deployed as follows:-
  • - In Albania: 14 infantry divisions (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XIV, XVI and XVII), the Cavalry division and 1 infantry brigade (21st).
    - In Western Macedonia: 2 infantry divisions on the Vermion Line (XII and 20th)
    - West of the Nestos: 3 infantry divisions (XIV in Sidirokastro, XVIII near Sidirokastro and VII in Drama), the 19th Mechanised Division (Kilkis) and
    - East of the Nestos: 5 battalions in Western Thrace
MarkNote:
The Greco-Turkish military accord for the 7 battalions in Western Thrace had been rescinded by 5 March and thus there was no international political/diplomatic need to keep them there.
Evidence suggests that at the last moment before the Germans struck, General Bakopoulos moved 2 (or 3) of the battalions east of the Nestos to the west bank leaving just 5 battalions east of the Nestos.



The evidence presented above, culled primarily from the English version of the Greek official history and the minutes of the Ango-Greek Meetings, shows that Papagos left Greece with almost the very same distribution of forces at the time of the German attack as existed 3 months earlier. Greek forces were spread across 4 separate geographic areas in similar numbers.

Moreover, the promise and then arrival of the British forces changed nothing in his stance. Before discussions he intended for 4 divisions to stand on the Metaxas-Nestos Line and 7 battalions further east. When the German attack came, there was 4 divisions standing on the Metaxas-Nestos line and 5 battalions further east. The difference was that he had traded the 6 infantry battaions of the XII Division for the 19th Mechanised Division.

Whilst he, Papagos, repeatedly expressed concern to the British of the dispersal of forces, he was the chief architect of that dispersal. One thus has to question whether his concern was real or feigned and whether is was merely part of the wider deception of his true intent. Unsurprisingly, none of this is covered in his post war narrative and only the merest hint in the English version of the Greek official history.


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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#183

Post by jwsleser » 20 Apr 2016, 22:51

I recently obtained and finished reading a copy of Stockings and Hancock’s Swastika over the Acropolis. If anyone wishes to understand why I disagree with Mark, read that book. It addresses every one of Mark’s points with detailed discussion and research. For one such example, after discussing the Greek options and plans for 12 pages (pages 77-88), the authors offer this conclusion:
What might be said then in summary about the evolution of Greek defensive planning and strategic/operational thinking in March and early April 1941? Traditional English-language narratives of the Greek campaign are reasonably consistent in this regard. The dominant interpretation is that it was a grave mistake for Papagos to insist, with almost dogmatic resolve, not to withdraw from Albania, and in keeping the EMFAS forward in the Doiran-Nestos Line. It would have made much more military sense, so the story goes, to withdraw south to reinforce the proposed British line in the vicinity of the Aliakmon and perhaps even extend it across the Greek peninsula to the Adriatic. There were certainly a sound set of military considerations, from a British perspective, that might make such Greek withdrawals and re-deployments an attractive operational option.

Papagos was not, however, an operational commander. Rather his focus was on the strategic level of war. Given the balance of forces arrayed against it, Greece could not be saved by clever operational positioning. Its only slender hope lay with a wider political-military strategy that might even the odds—however marginally—and this meant full-blown Yugoslav military involvement on the Allied side. Yugoslavia was the key. Due to the perceived importance in Belgrade of holding Salonika as a potential logistic lifeline, Yugoslavia kept the Greeks in the Doiran-Nestos Line. Yugoslavia offered the potential for helping W Force hold the Germans in the east. Yugoslavia might help end the war in Albania. The smallest chance of enticing Yugoslavia into the coming conflict effectively locked Papagos into the deployments he chose. This was not a ‘mistake’, nor the product of stubbornness or pride. This was Greece’s best and perhaps only hope. As the British Military Mission tried to make clear to W Force headquarters, ‘the vast possibilities offered in Albania should explain the reluctance of Papagos prematurely to withdraw’.27 It is worth quoting the July 1941 British inter-service committee report on the campaign in Greece, a report that was severely criticized by senior British and dominion officers in Greece. According to that committee, as long as the ‘faintest hope’ of holding the Doiran-Nestos Line, or achieving victory in Albania (thus freeing up Greek forces to face the Germans) remained, then it was ‘considered that General Papagos was justified in his great but unhappy gamble’. 28 ‘Few commanders’, noted the report, ‘can have been faced with a greater dilemma than was General Papagos.’ 29 (pages 88-89)

Fns:
26 Telegram, Heywood to Wavell, TNA CAB 120/564; ‘Comments on General Heywood’s telegram’, 21 March 1941, TNA CAB 120/564; An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, p. 185; McClymont, To Greece, p. 152; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 67.
27 McClymont, To Greece, p. 200.
28 Report, ‘Inter-services committee on the campaign in Greece’, July 1941, TNA WO 106/3161.
29 Ibid.

There many more examples. If any of the followers of this thread still have an interest in Greece’s war 1940-1941, read the book.

Mark’s latest posts have numerous factual errors. I no longer feel the need to correct them unless asked. So here is a big one as it is repeated numerous times in Mark’s post: The forces in Western Thrace. There were only 7 screening companies, one recce team, and the garrisons of Fort Nymphaea and Echinos. The Evros Bde was assigned as the headquarters to control the bulk of the sector, but didn’t have any forces besides these screening companies and Fort Nymphaea’s garrison. The Nestos Bde was the headquarters for the eastern end of the Beles-Metaxas-Nestos Line and Fort Echinos. The five field battalions were holding the west bank of the Nestos River and only the recce team and the fort were in western Thrace.

This was exactly as Papagos stated in all the planning with the UK in Feb-April. There were no field forces in Western Thrace.

From the Greek official history pages 183-184.
GreekHistoryPages182-183a.jpg
GreekHistoryPages182-183a.jpg (263.31 KiB) Viewed 1352 times
GreekHistoryPages184b.jpg
GreekHistoryPages184b.jpg (280.39 KiB) Viewed 1352 times
Here is a map showing the location of the Nestos Bde (between the tan arrows) and the Echinos Fort (lt blue arrow).
GreekHistoryMap22a.jpg
All of this information is in the sources Mark cited.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#184

Post by MarkN » 21 Apr 2016, 17:05

jwsleser wrote: Mark’s latest posts have numerous factual errors. I no longer feel the need to correct them unless asked. So here is a big one as it is repeated numerous times in Mark’s post: The forces in Western Thrace. There were only 7 screening companies, one recce team, and the garrisons of Fort Nymphaea and Echinos. The Evros Bde was assigned as the headquarters to control the bulk of the sector, but didn’t have any forces besides these screening companies and Fort Nymphaea’s garrison. The Nestos Bde was the headquarters for the eastern end of the Beles-Metaxas-Nestos Line and Fort Echinos. The five field battalions were holding the west bank of the Nestos River and only the recce team and the fort were in western Thrace.
The English version of the Greek Official History can be both a help and a hinderance. The more carefully you read the book, the more you appreciate how unreliable it is. Unfortunately for you, you've chosen to pick pages which are a hinderance. For example.

1) Page 183 - entry for XVIII Division.
In the first paragraph it says XVIII has seven (7) infantry battalions. In the following detail of their location, it only mentions five (5). Has the book managed to deny two battalions their history, simply forgotten about them, decided to exclude them for justifiable reasons or ????? Or was there only 5 and the mention of seven is a misprint of two too many?

Hardly the most reliable presentation of 'facts' when the information contradicts itself immediately.

2) Page 184 - entry for XII Division.
It states that the division consisted of 4 regiments each of two battalions and a recce group. That makes a total of 8 infantry battalions and the recce groups. This contradicts contemporary evidence. On 4 March Papagos clearly stated it consisted of 6 battalions only. Documents in the various Australian unit war diaries state there were only 6 battalions. In one document I have dated 7 April and refering to discussions and agreements of 5 April, they are identified as I/82, II/82, I/86, II/86, I/87 and II/87. Several documents note one or two of the battalions and they are always from that list of six. No other.

So, is the book in error or did the Greeks manage to have 2 additional battalions in the line with XII Division that neither Papagos nor the Australians knew about?

3) Page 183-4 - entry for Nestos Brigade.
The text suggests the five battalions and HQ of the Nestos Brigade are all located west of the Nestos River. Now go to page 314 of the same book (see below). According to that entry, the HQ of the Nestos Brigade was still in Xanthi when the Germans first attacked and only set up shop elsewhere on 7 April. Moreover, look at sketch map 20 rather than 22 which you posted ... it places the Nestos Brigade HQ at Xanthi too. Moreover, look carefully at sketch map 22 that you posted ... notice the battalion AO boundaries marked east of the river.

If you consult other sources, more detail is presented (see image below). Looking very closely, one can identify that within the Nestos Brigade AO, there were 3 battalions of the 37th Regiment, 2 battalions of the 93rd Regiment and the 14th Border Battalion - a total of 6, not 5, battalions. All three battalions of the 37th Regiment were west of the river, but one of them, II/37 was outside the main defensive line along with a cavalry company.

So, is the official history in error or just worded in a misleading way to catch out the less knowledgeable and experienced? It seems to have caught out the authors of Swastika over Acropolis too as they claim that XVIII only had 5 battalions. Has it caught you out?

Image
Image
Source:
Image


4) Page 184 - entry for Evros Brigade.
Have another look at page 314 of the same book (see above). According to that page of the Greek Official History, the Evros Brigade ceased to exist as of 7 March 1941. Completely contradicting the information on page 184. Clearly an error on page 314.

But just how many errors are there in this book?

And on and on it goes...

***

Remember, these are just the errors that lept out at me as I was reading these two/three pages. Gross errors and ommissions. And remember, this is just related to the 2 pages you posted. The book is full of them.

The value of the Englisg version of the Greek Official History is that it is an easy read for someone who only understands the English language and is not too bothered about historical accuracy or getting too deep into the subject matter.

***

Reading around and beyond the English language versions of Greek literature, the Evros Brigade consisted of 3 battalions. The fortress troops and the various screening companies were part of those battalions. Here's one quote I picked up and found easy to cut&paste:
Υπό την ταξιαρχία υπάγονταν τα τάγματα προκαλύψεως Κομοτηνής, Σουφλίου και Διδυμοτείχου, δηλαδή επτά (7) λόχοι τυφεκιοφόρων και λόχος πυροβόλων, συνολικής δύναμης εκατό (100) αξιωματικών και δυο χιλιάδων (2.000) οπλιτών.
Combining those troops with the 3 battalions under Nestos Brigade command located east of the Nestos River and you have more than the 5 battalions I noted in my previous post.

To remind you of one of your recent comments.
jwsleser wrote: It demonstrates that you lack the knowledge and the experience to participate in this discussion. Not ad hominem, just plain fact.
Of course, if you have more reliable information, I'm always happy to learn more.
Last edited by MarkN on 22 Apr 2016, 16:25, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#185

Post by MarkN » 21 Apr 2016, 17:22

Regardless of what I have just posted above, there is another way to come at this...

On 22 February, Papagos proposes a stand on the Vermion Line and that the Greek contribution will be 35 infantry battalions (made up of the 3 infantry divisions then on the Metaxas-Nestos line and 13 battalions in Western Thrace [ie east of the River Nestos]), the 19th Mechanised Division and possible one other (presumably the 20th Division then in GHQ reserve in Florina).

On 4 March, Papagos initially offers just the 6 battalions of the XII Division which was at the time based in Komotini Western Thrace. We can deduce that there were another 7 battalions to remain in Western Thrace.

Later on the same day, Papagos revises his offer and it now consists of
(a) The 20th Division from Florina
(b) The 12th Division from Western Thrace
(c) The 19th Motorised Division from Larissa
(d) The seven battalions from Thrace if the Turks released them
MarkNote:
The 20th Division consisted of 9 battalions, the XII consisted of 6 battalions and word that the Turks had released the 7 other battalions in Western Thrace came the following day.


The point is not about whether they were (named) "field" battalions or border battalions, the point is whether Papagos proposed to redeploy them to the Vermion Line or not.

If anybody can positively identify those 7 battalions and where they were located on 6 April 1941, then we will have a far better understanding of whether Papagos did relocate them as he proposed and offered - or whether they remained in situ contrary to those proposals and offers.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#186

Post by jwsleser » 23 Apr 2016, 21:53

I had a hold placed on the library’s copy of Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece 1933-1947 so I could check Mark’s cites and read what he conveniently didn’t mention. The library e-mailed on Thursday and I pick up the book that same day.

Here is what MacVeagh offers on the Greek war aims/strategic objective.

Dec 7 page 259.
MacVeagh1a.jpg
Dec 20 page 265. Note that Metaxas’s speech stating the Greek goal was given on November 23.
MacVeagh2a.jpg
Christmas Day letter to Roosevelt page 269.
MacVeagh3a.jpg
Dec 29 page 272. Note the use of the words "Greek war aims"
MacVeagh4a.jpg
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#187

Post by MarkN » 25 Apr 2016, 12:17

jwsleser wrote: Here is what MacVeagh offers on the Greek war aims/strategic objective.
I had expected you to run through this line several weeks ago. Better late than never I suppose!

Why did you stop at 29 December? Is it because that is the day MacVeagh changed his mind completely?

What you have posted clearly demonstrates that, up until his diary entry of 29 December 1940, Ambassador MacVeagh believed the Greek war aims aligned with what Metaxas had said in his radio announcement of 23 November and in private coversations between the two.

However, he (MacVeagh) seems to have had an 'epiphany moment' that evening or early on the morning of 30 December based upon reading a telegram sent by the US Ambassador in Berlin to the State Department and subsequently copied to Athens a week later.

How do we know this? Simple. Just read on in MacVeagh's diary....

Monday 30 December he goes to the Greek Foreign Office and asks 'Director General Delmouzo' what are the Greek war aims. What was Delmouzo's response?
Image

The following day, 31 December, he is back at the Foreign Office asking the same questions to 'Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mavroudis'. What was the outcome?
Image

Why would MacVeagh ask the question, twice, if he already knows and understands what the answer is?

After these meetings, and to respond to the telegram he had been sent by Washington, he responded:
Image
Image

Although it is now clear that MacVeagh no longer accepts that the Greek war aim is to "drive the Italians out of all of Albania for the sake of the entire Balkans", it is unclear as to whether he is now doubting whether the Greeks ever intended to do so or whether he feels that their war aim may have had to change given their manifest failure to eject the Italians and their inability to do so in the future.

According to these two senior Greeek Foreign Ministry officials, Greece is fighting in Albania as a foreign conquorer seeking territorial adjustments and war reparations. They are not "fighting to liberate Albania" as MacVeagh first thought, understood and reported. Moreover, they seem to indicate that, in their opinion, the war has already been won and they are already "victors".

Putting this alongside a quote from the English version of the Greek Official History:
Greek Official History, page 117 wrote:The liberation of Himara from the Albanian occupation, for the third time, ...
Notice who they are claiming territory from: not from the temporary illegal occupation by the Italians but the permanent and legal sovereignty of the Albanians!

***

Moving on...

The excerpts you so kindly posted - or what immediatly follows them - also demonstrate contemporary thoughts on another couple of issues previously under discussion in this thread.

Much earlier on you suggested that Metaxas negotiating some form of ceasefire and peace agreement via German mediation was possibly the only alternative to a German attack and Axis occupation. You will notice that MacVeagh attributes the rejection of German diplomatic advances in this respect to Metaxas. Do you think Metaxas could really have pulled off that sort of political and diplomatic u-turn successfully?

Secondly, you will notice that as early as 6 or 7 December (diary entry for the 7th), MacVeagh quotes Metaxas as saying, "Let us not fool ourselves, the Germans will attack in the spring...". It is then followed by "if" statements which indicate the need for urgency in resolving the Italian front. This seems to demonstrate that Metaxas at least was already aware that their military progress to that date was not moving quickly enough and was thinking of the likely consequences to a prolonged conflict in Albania. This line is supported in his diaries of which excerpts appear in Koliopoulos' paper.

At some point military and political leaders need to recognise that what they desire is not achieveable and make tough decisions. They needed an alternative to the pedestrian efforts in Albania and wishful thinking.

Carr wrote, page218:
Image

The most senior military commanders on the Albanian front didn't know what the Greek war aims were. The senior staff at the foreign office thought the war aims were territorial adjustments and war reparations.

Is that coherent, sound, credible and rational military and political policy and effort?

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#188

Post by jwsleser » 25 Apr 2016, 15:53

Why would I present MacVeagh’s speculation in the last week of December when Metaxas’s 15 January quote clearly states the Greek strategic goal? It is interesting that that that you equate MacVeagh speculations as better than Metaxas’s own statements two weeks later. Last time I checked, Metaxas set Greek strategic policy, not MacVeagh.

You are trying to win an argument. You have no desire to follow the facts to determine the truth.

When this discussion began, you argued that Greece’s strategic goal in Albania was merely limited territorial gains. Your ‘evidence’ for this was nothing more than that Greece lacked the ways and means to defeat Italy (i.e. hindsight). You stated that if the Greeks actually had defeating the Italians as their strategic goal, their decision was irrational and was nothing more than “wishful thinking”.

Here we are four months later. We know that defeating Italy was seen as the solution to the Greek strategic problem in their prewar thinking. We have direct and ample evidence that after the initial shock of the Italian invasion, Greece set a national strategic goal of defeating Italy. They held to this goal into April as demonstrated by the planning and actual execution of the Yugo-Greek attack in Albania. You have yet to provide any evidence to counter this understanding. You have gone as far as to ignore the facts presented in the very sources you introduced into the discussion (Stockings and Hancock; Koliopoulos; MacVeagh).

Defeating Italy before Germany attacked was the Greek strategic goal. Rational or irrational, wishful thinking or not, it was their goal. I have stated this before.

For anyone that understands and practices strategic and operational planning, your ‘irrational and wishful thinking’ argument will always flounder due to the lack of a significantly better course of action to choose. You have yet to present a different COA that has any possibility of being successful. You continue to avoid this issue. Defeating the Italians, thus freeing the bulk of the Greek Army to face Germany, is a viable solution to Greece’s strategic dilemma. The fact that it ultimately failed doesn’t make it irrational if no other viable option existed. Without a viable alternative, the Greeks made a rational decision to pursue defeating the Italians. Stockings and Hancock make exactly this argument in their book.

All you have provided is that some believed the policy would fail. So what if they believed that? There wasn't a viable option. Their doubts didn't change the Greek strategic goal. Their doubts didn't make the decision to defeat Italy irrational. You just can't get around the fact that there wasn't another option.

You continue to demonstrate that you lack the knowledge and the experience to participate in this discussion.

My statements about Metaxas? Go back and reread what I said. Post some quotes of mine that support your statement. Keep the context if you do so. Please post the date/time so others can find and read the originals.

All you care about is being right. Being correct is something you abandon when it conflicts with your public position.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#189

Post by MarkN » 26 Apr 2016, 12:26

I thought we had got past your false allegations and straw men tactics attempting to enhance your arguments. Sadly, it seems we haven't.

To quote you again, "you are trying to win an argument. You have no desire to follow the facts to determine the truth."
jwsleser wrote:When this discussion began, you argued that Greece’s strategic goal in Albania was merely limited territorial gains.
False allegation. I have repeatedly stated that I do not know what the Greek strategic goal was in fighting in Albania - especially from January onwards.

However, I have presented evidence that three senior foreign office officials in the second half of December 1940 are stating that the Greek war aims are permanent territorial adjustments in their favour and war reparations. These statements were made to the US Ambassadors in Athens and Berlin.

Now, you may wish to argue that these three Greek officials: the Greek Ambassador to Germany, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mavroudis) and Director General of the Foreign Office (Delmouzo) are all lieing or being deliberately deceitful. You could also argue that the two US Ambassadors (MacVeagh and Morris) have not understood correctly what has been said or are themselves not recording and relaying the correct message and are just plain incompetent.

Or you could just come up with some nonsense....
jwsleser wrote:Last time I checked, Metaxas set Greek strategic policy, not MacVeagh.
Straw man. Your argument is not enhanced by arguing against the bizarre notion that the US Ambassador set Greek policy. Just plain daft.
jwsleser wrote:Why would I present MacVeagh’s speculation in the last week of December when Metaxas’s 15 January quote clearly states the Greek strategic goal? It is interesting that that that you equate MacVeagh speculations as better than Metaxas’s own statements two weeks later.
They are not MacVeagh's speculation (more straw men). They are the statements of 3 senior Greek officials. Moreover, one of them was recorded by the US Ambassador in Berlin.

Remind us please. What did Metaxas say on 15 January?

To quote you again, "you continue to demonstrate that you lack the knowledge and the experience to participate in this discussion.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#190

Post by MarkN » 26 Apr 2016, 13:43

Moving on for the benefit of others....

The thread has discussed the possible motives and intentions of the Greeks fighting in Albania and the sense in contining to fight there when a far greater threat was looming on the opposite front. The thread has also discussed the deployment of the very limited Greek forces across a wide area and who was primarily responsible for that.

The element that has not yet been discussed is the 'Yugoslav' factor. I have neither the time, nor the energy, to do this key subject true justice. To cover it comprehensively is a book in its own right. However, a brief intro as to the credibility of some of the assumptions made then, and by post war historians and narratives.

I had planned to start this post with the passage by Stockings and Hancock in Swastika over the Acropolis. I am most gratefyl to jwleser for taking the time to retype it and post it here already. I am saved the bother and can simply cut&paste (my highlighting).
What might be said then in summary about the evolution of Greek defensive planning and strategic/operational thinking in March and early April 1941? Traditional English-language narratives of the Greek campaign are reasonably consistent in this regard. The dominant interpretation is that it was a grave mistake for Papagos to insist, with almost dogmatic resolve, not to withdraw from Albania, and in keeping the EMFAS forward in the Doiran-Nestos Line. It would have made much more military sense, so the story goes, to withdraw south to reinforce the proposed British line in the vicinity of the Aliakmon and perhaps even extend it across the Greek peninsula to the Adriatic. There were certainly a sound set of military considerations, from a British perspective, that might make such Greek withdrawals and re-deployments an attractive operational option.

Papagos was not, however, an operational commander. Rather his focus was on the strategic level of war. Given the balance of forces arrayed against it, Greece could not be saved by clever operational positioning. Its only slender hope lay with a wider political-military strategy that might even the odds—however marginally—and this meant full-blown Yugoslav military involvement on the Allied side. Yugoslavia was the key. Due to the perceived importance in Belgrade of holding Salonika as a potential logistic lifeline, Yugoslavia kept the Greeks in the Doiran-Nestos Line. Yugoslavia offered the potential for helping W Force hold the Germans in the east. Yugoslavia might help end the war in Albania. The smallest chance of enticing Yugoslavia into the coming conflict effectively locked Papagos into the deployments he chose. This was not a ‘mistake’, nor the product of stubbornness or pride. This was Greece’s best and perhaps only hope. As the British Military Mission tried to make clear to W Force headquarters, ‘the vast possibilities offered in Albania should explain the reluctance of Papagos prematurely to withdraw’. It is worth quoting the July 1941 British inter-service committee report on the campaign in Greece, a report that was severely criticized by senior British and dominion officers in Greece. According to that committee, as long as the ‘faintest hope’ of holding the Doiran-Nestos Line, or achieving victory in Albania (thus freeing up Greek forces to face the Germans) remained, then it was ‘considered that General Papagos was justified in his great but unhappy gamble’. ‘Few commanders’, noted the report, ‘can have been faced with a greater dilemma than was General Papagos.’ (pages 88-89)
The argument that Papagos 'got it right' is entirely predicated on the fragment of a sentence that I have highlighted. To repeat, "Due to the perceived importance in Belgrade of holding Salonika as a potential logistic lifeline."

To understand just how important this is to Stockings and Hancock's arguement, and more importantly the survival of Greece as a sovereign and independent state in 1941, consider the opposite to be true. If Belgrade did not perceive Salonika as being central to their policy, military planning and strategic efforts, then what does that say about the Greek defensive posture and political-diplomatic strategy? The Greek defensive posture was entirely dependent upon Yugoslavia securing their northern border by preventing anybody from penetrating in that direction. The Greek political-diplomatic strategy of leaving their forces east of the Vardar was allegedly, at least that's how their theory goes, to encourage the Yugoslavs to come onboard and provide that defensive/military guarantee. If Salonika is not central to Belgrade's thinking, then the Greek political-diplomatic strategy is a complete farce and their troops east of the Vardar dangerously exposed.

You will notice that Stockings and Hancock make no reference as to what evidence they have to support this key assumption. A read through their bibliography shows their Yugoslav sources to be, essentially, non-existant. Given that this is a serious academically focussed historical narrative, not lightly entertaining historical story, this is a serious flaw for them to have made. It seems they just assumed this to be accurate because every other English language text/author seems to have made the very same assumption. It's a shame they didn't read some Serbo-croat language books and texts!

Of course, the Yugoslav position on Salonika was neither extreme; Salonika was not the primary and/or sole concern nor was it completely irrelevant. Its importance lay somewhere between the two extremes. But where? And was it far enough towards the 'key concern' end of the scale to justify the Greek choices and strategies employed?

Before I look at the Yugoslav angle itself, it's worth reiterating the risk that the Greeks were taking. How do you consider their risk analysis on this? The rewards were, as Stockings and Hancock wrote, a "slender hope" and "might even marginally even the odds". The consequence of failure was the possibility of military collapse in quick order and complete loss of sovereignty and independence. The potential cost was sublime, the likely rewards marginal. No doubt, like an inveterate gambler, the Greeks were probably looking at the huge theoretical rewards rather than the likelihood of them being achieved. Bookies get rich by enticing punters into making absurd wagers with the lure of huge rewards. The Greeks lured themselves into just such a gamble. The risk was infinite, and they knowingkly walked into it.

So, what of the Yugoslav position. First a quote by Papagos.
The German Attack on Greece, London, 1946, p.23 wrote:...it was not possible to foresee the unprecedented bad faith of the then Yugoslav government.
Wasn't it? And what was this bad faith?

This quote by Papagos follows a passage where he lays out chronologically 4 points where he believes he was mislead. Or, perhaps it is better interpreted as how he (Papagos) misinterpreted, misunderstood and completely failed to grasp Yugoslav intentions, motives and policy.

That passage starts with his noting that the Yugoslav Prince Regent initially expressed friendship and sympathy towards Greece when Italy first attacked. He then follows it by noting that the Yugoslav givernment exiled a former PM by kicking him out of the country at the beginning of 1941 via Salonika because he was pro-German. Then he notes the signing of the Tripartite Pact 16 days after sending Major Perisic to Athens and finally the negotiation with Germany for Yugoslavia to gain Salonika as a reward for joining the Axis.

Where Stockings and Hancock have a complete void as to evidencing Yugoslav motivations and intentions, Papagos notes two that relate to the timeframe prior to the German entry into Bulgaria. The key point in time that Papagos claimed was the point at which redeployment was impossible. So, just to repeat, the two indicators worthy of being noted by Papagos in his 1946 publication of Yugoslav motivations, intentions and likely actions that allowed him to keep his forces east of the Vardar were:
- The Yugoslav Prince Regent expressed friendship and sympathy towards Greece at the end of October 1941; and,
- They exiled a former PM for pro-German feelings via Salonika.

Was the Greek military and political strategy, and subsequent loss of sovereignty and independence, modelled around assumptions based upon these two 'signals'? It seems so. No doubt that other 'minor' signals were also interpreted similarly. But so 'minor' that Papagos couldn't remember them of felt no need to mention them.

Now, it can not be expected that Papagos and the Greeks at the time would know that Yugoslavia was planning and had already mobilised forces in Yugoslav Macedonia in November 1940 to march into Greece and seize Salonika. Nor can it be expected that Papagos and the Greeks at the time would know that the Prince Regent and his government were wavering so close to the Germans that they would actually join them and take Salonika as a reward.

However, the reality that Yugoslavia under Prince Paul had steadfastly refused throughout to join Greece in military action against the Italians in Albania, that the Yugoslavs never responded to any Greek questions about their stance (see Papagos, The Battle for Greece, Part I, Chapter II), that the Yugoslavs did not follow Papagos' hopes that they would adopt a defensive posture that sacrificed Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to the Axis in order defend Serbia - and by definition Greece too, and so on. These are major indicators of Yugoslav intent and motivation that were ignored in favour of the minor indicators listed by Papagos.

Credible?

Sound?

Responsible?

Rational?

Stockings and Hancock's argument that Papagos 'got it right' is based entirely upon a flawed and false assumption that they have failed to evidence. Papagos and the Greeks could only be certain of Yugoslav military support and cooperation at the late night meeting held on 3-4 April 1941. Not only was it far too late then, but that that military support and cooperation was completely insufficiant to make good the holes in Greek military and political strategy. Up until that time, refusal to redeploy forces out of Albania to defend Greece itself and leaving forces east of the Vardar was the ultimate gamble with little, if any, credible justification (assuming Yugoslavia was "the key") to support these choices.

Of course, perhaps the decision was not a rational military or political decision at all, but an irrational one based upon pride.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#191

Post by jwsleser » 26 Apr 2016, 17:35

To others. Read the books and the articles. Judge for yourself. You will discover that all the sources support Stockings and Hancock's presentation of the facts.
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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#192

Post by MarkN » 27 Apr 2016, 14:32

jwsleser wrote:To others. Read the books and the articles. Judge for yourself.
I suspect that anybody truly interested in the subject has already done so as best they can.

However, it is of course a fantastic idea that others read up themselves and form their own opinions.

For those that follow the theory and/or belief that Yugoslavia was central to everything concerning the Greek military and political strategy, then understanding the motives, intent and efforts of the Yugoslavs themselves is crucial.

To that end, perhaps you could compile a list of reading material that you recommend others persue to better understand this subject and be able to form their own opinion.

I shall do the same. And, given this...
jwsleser wrote:You will discover that all the sources support Stockings and Hancock's presentation of the facts.
... I will focus on literature from the Yugoslav perspective.

I look forward to your recommended reading list.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#193

Post by MarkN » 29 Apr 2016, 17:15

As promised...

I have yet to find a Yugoslav language book (I'll use Yugoslav as shorthand for the numerous languages and peoples of Yugoslavia) written about the 'Battle for Greece' nor specifically about Yugoslav-Greek relations of the period. It seems Yugoslav historians have been more preoccupied by their own history of the period to look further afield. Nevertheless, there is a wealth of material within books focussed on Yugoslavia's efforts leading up to and during the war.

This is all material that I have read and know contains something useful to the subject matter. There is plenty more that I have not yet got around to reading which may or may not contain something of interest.

These books equate to 'official histories'...
- Ferdo Culinovic, Slom Stare Jugoslavije, Skolska knjiga, Zagreb, 1958
- Dusan Gvozdenovic, Aprilski rat 1941. Zbornik dokumenata, Knjiga 1, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1969
- Velimir Terzic, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941. volume 1, Partizanska Knjiga, Ljubljana, 1984
- Velimir Terzic, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941. volume 2, Partizanska Knjiga, Ljubljana, 1984
- Antun Miletic, Aprilski rat 1941. Zbornik dokumenata, Knjiga 2, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 1987

These books focus on the events leading up to and around the military coup but, by default, cover a wider subject matter...
- Danilo Gregoric, Samoubistvo Jugoslavije, Luc, Beograd, 1942
- Zivan Knezevic, 27. mart 1941., self-published, New York, 1979
- Nikola Milovanovic, Vojni puc i 27. mart 1941., Sloboda, Beograd, 1981
- Prof dr Branko Petranovic i Mr Nikola Zutic, 27. mart 1941. Tematski zbirka documenta, Nicom, Beograd, 1990
- Miodrag Jankovic i Veljko Lalic, Knez Pavle: Istina o 27. martu, UnaPress, Beograd, 2007
- Kosta Nikolic i Bojan Dimitrijevic, Danilo Gregoric i 25. mart 1941., Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2007
- Various, 27. mart 1941., Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2012

In addition to the above, a huge amount of material was produced in the years after the war in the form of articles and newsletters by various members of the Yugoslav emigree community in London, Paris and North America. Often these texts were written by the prinicples involved in the decisionmaking and the events.

For example, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia up to 26 March 1941 was Cvetkovic (Tsvetkovitch) who wrote a series of 9 or 10 'pamphlets' between 1945 and 1953 whilst in exile in Paris. He also wrote articles for the newspapers and journals. These contain a vast amount of information - albeit with a somewhat biased agenda. They attempt to explain how, why the process and events leading to Yugoslavia signing the Axis Tripartite Pact. These are almost impossible to come by and I was lucky to borrow a set of them about 15 years ago to read. Regrettably I have no access to them now.

To counter Cvetkovic, a number of authors representing the government 27 March 1941 onwards, mainly exiled in London and various parts of the US, published their responses and thoughts in their emigree newsletters. The most relevant of these was Poruka published in London 1950-1959. A total of 57 editions were published. Poruka served for a long while as the newsletter of the alternative Yugoslav government in exile. A wealth of information is contained within - mostly written by participants on the other side of the poltical fence to Cvetkovic. These also contain a significant bias. I have the majority of the Poruka editions to hand.

A number of journal articles exist of which the following 3 are worth reading..,
- Radoje Knezevic, Prince Paul, Hitler and Salonica, in International Affairs 27/1, London, January 1951, pp.38-44. (This is in English but I have a copy of the original Yugoslav text).
- Dragisha Tsvetkovitch, Prince Paul, Hitler and Salonica, in International Affairs 27/4, London, October 1951, pp.463-469.
- Dragan Aleksic, General Petar Pesic o Paktu 25. marta 1941., in Casopis Arhiva Jugoslavije XII broj 1-2, Beograd, 2011, pp.114-130

Should be a good starting point for those interested in the Yugoslav angle from the Yugoslav perspective rather the (wroing) presumptions seen in English language literature and narratives.

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#194

Post by MarkN » 29 Apr 2016, 17:55

Returning to the discussion.

Papagos in his book, and at the time, makes a big thing about Yugoslavia being the key to everything the Greeks did militarily. It need not have been that way. It was his, or collectively the Greek High Command's, choice that Yugoslavia was such an important factor.

Since it was his/their own choice to allow Yugoslav efforts to play such an important role in the survival of their own state, it seems reasonable to assume that they made every effort to correctly understand what Yugoslavia was up to. For if they didn't, they risked losing their own country in quick order. Which was, of course, exactly what happened.

To give a flavour of how wrong they got it ('it' being the understanding of what Yugoslavia intended and was likely to do), I'll present a single example now and try to explain to what extent the Greeks (Papagos) got it wrong.

Papagos had produced his military study of what would/could/should (insert modal verb of choice) happen in the Balkans in March 1940. In that study, he makes some rather generous predictions/recommendations (insert noun of choice) as to what the militaries of other (allied) countries would do. Effort over which neither he, nor the Greek government, could assume would ever take place let alone have any control over. At best, all he/they could do was hope that the political and military leadership of these other countries agreed with his analysis, assumptions and recommendations. Wishful thinking?

In respect of the Italians in Albania, the solution Papagos described involved the Greek and Yugoslav militaries jointly overcoming the Italians and 'pushing them into the sea'. The Yugoslavs were to provide half the effort and take half the territory. It seems fair to assume that Papagos didn't include the Yugoslavs in this out of diplomatic protocol but because he recognised and understood that Greece couldn't do it alone.

Yugoslavia becomes key to military success in Albania as far as the Greeks are concerned because they choose - based upon Papagos' own study - a course of action that requires Yugoslavia's participation. On what basis can Papagos, or the Greek High Command, assume that Yugoslav participation will be forthcoming?

This assumption seems to be based around the 'Salonika Theory' that the port of Salonika was of such vital importance to Yugoslavia that it would go to war with the Axis to prevent it falling into Axis hands.

Not only did Papagos and the Greeks make that calculation in error, but they also were in error in understanding what the Yugoslavs intended as a solution to the issue.

There can be no doubt that Salonika was important to the Yugoslavs, but not to the extent that they were prepared to go to war with the Italians and the Germans over it. And their solution to a threat to Salonika by the Italians was the complete opposite of what Papagos and the Greeks assumed.

Where Papagos had assumed that the Yugoslavs would join them in attacking the Italians in Albania, the Yugoslavs had started the mobilisation of up to 9 of their divisions to take and occupy Salonika from the Greeks in advance of an Italian capture. The planning and mobilisation started the moment that Belgrade heard of the Italian offensive on 28 October. The forces were only stood down when, in November, it became apparent that the Italians wouldn't be threatening Salonika.

The Yugoslavs were prepared to do battle with the Greeks over Salonika not the Italians!

Now, while it cannot be assumed that Papagos and the Greeks knew and understood the true purpose of the mobilisation in Southern Serbia in October-November 1940, they cannot have failed to grasp the significance of Yugoslavia's decision not to join them in attacking Albania. The Greeks made multiple diplomatic efforts to ascertain the Yugoslav stance, and they never received a proper or meaningful response.

And despite these constant rebuffs, Papagos and the Greeks continued to persue political strategies and military effort that was wholly predicated upon the Yugoslavs particpating in the exact manner that Papagos had written about in his March 1940 study. An exact manner that was already, and quite manifestly, not happening. All easily recognisable at the time.

Credible?

Sound?

Responsible?

Rational?

Since it was so easy to recognise - how difficult is it for the Greeks to see that Yugoslavia is not attacking the Italians in Albania as Papagos' study assumed and required - why did the Greeks continue to persist with political and military strategies that required Yugoslavia to act exactly in the manner that Papagos had written about?

Was Yugoslavia really the key factor in the Greek decisionmaking and the choices they made? Or was Yugoslavia the convenient excuse that they used to 'justify' the choices that they had made for other reasons?

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Re: Anglo-Greek Meeting at Tatoi – 22 February, 1941

#195

Post by MarkN » 05 May 2016, 17:09

Another question to be considered is whether what the Yugoslavs were doing was impossible for the Greeks to reasonably ascertain even in the event of a lack of dialogue.

In my opinion, it should have been pretty easy for the Greeks to work it out since it was, for all intent and purpose, almost exactly the same approach as they themselves had taken and would have preferred to take.

In April 1939, when Italy invaded and occupied Albania, both Greece and Yugoslavia faced the very same question: what to do about it? Essentially, they both opted for the same solution: do nothing and live with it. Although there was one slight difference and that was that Greece found itself drawn closer to Britain and France as potential saviors.

In September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland and WW2 effectively began, both Greece and Yugoslavia publically pronounced their neutrality as their chosen strategy to avoid war. Maintaining that neutrality was a little more tricky for Greece given the agreement that it had entered into with Britain and France five months earlier. However, both sought to avoid antagonising both Italy and Germany.

In October 1940 Greece found itself at war with Italy but still sought to avoid conflict with Germany. Yugoslavia remained committed to avoiding conflict with both. No doubt Greece would have done the same had Italy not attacked.

From January 1941, pressure from Germany upon both was gradually ratcheted up - albeit in different ways. Yugoslavia, under Prince Paul, decided the best way to avoid war was to join the Tripartite Pact. For Greece, it was too late for that.

So was Yugoslavia's poltical and diplomatic strategy that difficult to grasp?

Greece sought Yugoslavia to give up over half its territory and concentrate its army in a manner that would protect Greece (and Serbia) not Yugoslavia. The Greeks were not prepared even to withdraw its army from Albania to defend Greece let alone withdraw from the border to concentrate force.

Greece sought Yugoslavia to enter the war against Italy and Germany - as an aggressor - so as to relieve pressure on themselves. Something they were not prepared to do themselves. Remember, the 'best' time to try to lever the Italians out of Albania would have been early in 1940 when their forces there were at a minimum.

Credible?

Sound?

Responsible?

Rational?

What Yugoslavia was doing, right or wrong, was no different to what Greece was doing and would have liked to have done too had Italy not attacked them. Was it that difficult for Papagos and the Greek High Command to work it out and understand that Yugoslavia was not going to act as he/they desired and had risked their own country's survival as a sovereign and independent state upon.

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