A question that has floated around in other discussions is whether the Allies (Greece and the UK) could craft a defense that could successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941. My intent for starting this thread is to explore that question. Due to the lack of primary sources and the need to explore ‘what ifs’, we will never definitively answer the question. What I do hope is that readers will come away with a better understanding of the issues/factors involved in the discussion/decisions that were made during the period 22 February-4 March.
In reviewing the available scholarship (both English and foreign sources), this question is never addressed. What is provided is the fact that the Allies had agreed on a defensive plan on 22 February, by 2 March the Greeks wished to change the plan and the British disagreed, and a compromise plan was finally agreed to and implemented on 4 March. What is implied by this manner of presentation is that the Allies, by agreeing to a plan, had selected the best option for the defense and the Greek change doomed the defense. What is not discussed is whether it was the best plan, whether the Allies could have implemented the plan, or whether the evolving situation between 22 February and 2 March made that plan invalid and a change was required. I hope to touch on these points as the thread moves along.
I will present my research/thoughts incrementally to allow readers time to comment and/or offer new research.
A reminder that we will never answer the questions. Speculation is fine, but note the incremental approach will build off the earlier discussions.
The Plan: The Allies agreed to defend what was called the Aliakmon Line (some sources use the Vermion-Olympus Line). We have few details of the plan except the position of the line itself and the required forces to hold it.
I will start with the UK forces. The agreement stated that 9 divisions would be needed: 8 to hold the line and one in reserve. The Greeks would provide 35 battalions, the UK would provide the rest. 9 divisions translates into 81 battalions (9 infantry battalions in a Greek and/or UK division). The mix was therefore 35 Greek and 46 UK battalions.
The UK promised the following forces moved to Greece in three echelons:
-One division, one armoured brigade group.
-One division, one Polish brigade group
-One division, and if required, one armoured brigade group.
This force totals 32 infantry battalions. I have not counted the armoured battalions due to the nature of the ground (the line was selected for its difficult terrain) and the fact that armored units don’t hold ground. I have not counted the MG battalions because these usually reinforce other units and also lack a significant ability to hold ground. So the defense as planned is already lacking 14 battalions, which is equal to 1 and ½ divisions.
The Germans attacked on 6 April. One division and the Polish Group was never sent. 4 Australian battalions had yet to leave Egypt. So another 2 divisions weren’t on the line. Assuming the Greek 35 battalions and the actual 20 UK battalions present on 6 April, only 55 (68%) of the required 81 battalions would have been present on the Aliakmon Line on 6 April.
Next post will discuss the Greeks.
Defense of Greece 1941
Defense of Greece 1941
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
The Greek forces.
Recreating what Greeks forces would have been used based in the Tatoi Agreements of 22 February is a challenge. As the Aliakmon Line defense as outlined in the agreement was never implemented, we don’t have an historical record on the units that were planned to participate in its defense.
The various records of the meeting states that after the withdrawal of forces from eastern Macedonia/W. Thrace, the Greeks would have 35 battalions on the Aliakmon Line, plus a motorized division and possibly one more division from the Army reserve. The fortress units and the covering companies would remain on the Beles-Metaxas line to delay any attack. No units would be moved from the Albanian front to help occupy the Aliakmon Line.
Papagos states that the Greeks had the VI, VII, XII, and XIV Divisions in E. Macedonia and W Thrace in January 1941. The VI was scheduled to move to W Macedonia and did so in late January. Several new units were raised between December 40 and March 41: XVIII, 19th Mech, 20th Divs and the Nestos Bde.
In late February the following units and their battalion strength were available for the Aliakmon Line:
VII Div – 5 bns
XII Div – 6 bns
XIV Div – 6 bns
XVIII Div – 5 bns
19th Mech – 3 bns (called regiments, these were actually battalion sized units; the division total manning was only ~2000 men).
Dodecanese Rgt - 3 battalions (volunteers formed in Athens in November 1940 and moved to W. Macedonia in February 41).
The 20th Division would be added from the Army reserve, with 6 battalions.
I will note at this time that none of these Greek divisions were at full strength. Besides the infantry shortage indicated above, many had only 3 instead of 6 batteries of artillery (12 guns instead of 24). These guns were mainly pack artillery pieces with reduced range when compared to field artillery pieces of the same caliber. These units had limited mobility and could not relocate rapidly. Observing the march of the Greek XII Division to its positions, General Freyberg commented “their first line transport was composed entirely of ox wagons and pack animals which of course could only travel a very limited distance in a day at a very slow speed – actually at a slower pace than troops could march”. [To Greece page 122]. These units also tended to be used as depots to replace personnel and equipment losses in units fighting in Albania, impacting their combat effectiveness.
A total of 34 Greek battalions were available, leaving the Greek contribution to the Aliakmon Line 1 battalion short. The Nestos Bde would be formed in March, possibly adding another 3 battalions as it is unclear whether it would remain on the Metaxas Line (It was formed from local resources and covering units). The 21st Inf Bde was forming in March and had 3 battalions. This brigade was held in the Army reserve.
This number doesn’t provide the motorized division and the possible another division as separate from the 35 battalions. Nor is it clear whether these two additional division were meant to be part of the 9 divisions needed to defend the line or meant to be Army reserves. From their positioning (Larissa), they appear to be army reserves that could be employed where needed within the Greek theater of operations. In either case, these units are listed above to meet the promised 35 battalions.
In recapping the available Allied strength on 6 April, the Greeks could provide 34 of their 35 battalions, while the UK could provide 20 of their 46 battalions. This gives a total of 54 battalions or 67% of the forces the Tatoi Agreement stated were needed to defend the Aliakmon Line.
I have not addressed artillery, aircraft, or tanks as the Axis had a considerable advantage in all of these areas. The main weakness of this force is mobility. As long as the Greeks could occupy and fight from established positions, these units could be effective. Forced to move, the Greek units wouldn't be able to keep up with the operational tempo the German attack would generate.
My next post will look at the Aliakmon Line.
Recreating what Greeks forces would have been used based in the Tatoi Agreements of 22 February is a challenge. As the Aliakmon Line defense as outlined in the agreement was never implemented, we don’t have an historical record on the units that were planned to participate in its defense.
The various records of the meeting states that after the withdrawal of forces from eastern Macedonia/W. Thrace, the Greeks would have 35 battalions on the Aliakmon Line, plus a motorized division and possibly one more division from the Army reserve. The fortress units and the covering companies would remain on the Beles-Metaxas line to delay any attack. No units would be moved from the Albanian front to help occupy the Aliakmon Line.
Papagos states that the Greeks had the VI, VII, XII, and XIV Divisions in E. Macedonia and W Thrace in January 1941. The VI was scheduled to move to W Macedonia and did so in late January. Several new units were raised between December 40 and March 41: XVIII, 19th Mech, 20th Divs and the Nestos Bde.
In late February the following units and their battalion strength were available for the Aliakmon Line:
VII Div – 5 bns
XII Div – 6 bns
XIV Div – 6 bns
XVIII Div – 5 bns
19th Mech – 3 bns (called regiments, these were actually battalion sized units; the division total manning was only ~2000 men).
Dodecanese Rgt - 3 battalions (volunteers formed in Athens in November 1940 and moved to W. Macedonia in February 41).
The 20th Division would be added from the Army reserve, with 6 battalions.
I will note at this time that none of these Greek divisions were at full strength. Besides the infantry shortage indicated above, many had only 3 instead of 6 batteries of artillery (12 guns instead of 24). These guns were mainly pack artillery pieces with reduced range when compared to field artillery pieces of the same caliber. These units had limited mobility and could not relocate rapidly. Observing the march of the Greek XII Division to its positions, General Freyberg commented “their first line transport was composed entirely of ox wagons and pack animals which of course could only travel a very limited distance in a day at a very slow speed – actually at a slower pace than troops could march”. [To Greece page 122]. These units also tended to be used as depots to replace personnel and equipment losses in units fighting in Albania, impacting their combat effectiveness.
A total of 34 Greek battalions were available, leaving the Greek contribution to the Aliakmon Line 1 battalion short. The Nestos Bde would be formed in March, possibly adding another 3 battalions as it is unclear whether it would remain on the Metaxas Line (It was formed from local resources and covering units). The 21st Inf Bde was forming in March and had 3 battalions. This brigade was held in the Army reserve.
This number doesn’t provide the motorized division and the possible another division as separate from the 35 battalions. Nor is it clear whether these two additional division were meant to be part of the 9 divisions needed to defend the line or meant to be Army reserves. From their positioning (Larissa), they appear to be army reserves that could be employed where needed within the Greek theater of operations. In either case, these units are listed above to meet the promised 35 battalions.
In recapping the available Allied strength on 6 April, the Greeks could provide 34 of their 35 battalions, while the UK could provide 20 of their 46 battalions. This gives a total of 54 battalions or 67% of the forces the Tatoi Agreement stated were needed to defend the Aliakmon Line.
I have not addressed artillery, aircraft, or tanks as the Axis had a considerable advantage in all of these areas. The main weakness of this force is mobility. As long as the Greeks could occupy and fight from established positions, these units could be effective. Forced to move, the Greek units wouldn't be able to keep up with the operational tempo the German attack would generate.
My next post will look at the Aliakmon Line.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
The Aliakmon Line
I have marked the attached map (from the Australian official Greece, Crete and Syria) with the various defensive lines. Green is the Aliakmon Line, Blue is the Metaxas Line, purple is approximately where the front line was in Albania, red are the Axis LOAs that affected the situation (the Florina and Axios LOAs).
The prewar defense of eastern Greece was based on the Metaxas Line. This was a series of fortifications that started at the eastern end of the Beles Mountain Range near the junction of the borders of Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and ran eastward to the Nestos River in Western Thrace. Construction started in 1936 and was basically completed by 1940. The line was a system of 19 forts, supported by field works and was well integrated into the terrain. A secondary system of improved field works (concrete trenches, artillery positions, bomb proofs) then followed the west bank of the Nestos until it reached the Aegean Sea just east of Kavala. Western Thrace was left unprotected with only two additional forts built to secure a bridgehead for Turkish troops to support Greece under the Balkan Treaties.
The Italian occupation of Albania, the start of the war, and changes in the relationships/positions between the various Balkan nations caused the Greek High Command to reassess the defense of Greece. The 48km gap between the junction of the three borders and the western most Metaxas Fort (Popotlivitsa Fort) was seen as a vulnerability. While the Beles Ridge itself provided defensive strength (it was over 3000m in height in places), it was decided to fortify the ridge with field works. A second line (the Krousia Area) was also begun behind the Beles ridge between the Doiranis and Kerkini lakes. As the political position of Yugoslavia was now seen as uncertain, the Axios River valley west of Lake Doiranis also was identified as vulnerable and field works were started in this area.
The Italian invasion completely changed the dynamics of the Greek defense. Whereas previously the bulk of the Army would face Bulgaria, the Italian attack began to draw Greek forces to the west. By February 1941, the Greeks had committed 11 divisions and one cavalry division against an Italian force of 18 divisions and one armored division. By March these numbers would be 14 Greek and 28 Italian divisions. Without allies, the Greeks recognized they couldn’t successful defend both fronts if attacked in eastern Greece.
With the offer of UK assistance, the Allies (Greece and the UK) discussed the defensive options at the Tatoi meeting (22 Feb). General Papagos identified the Aliakmon Line as the best option under the current situation.
The Aliakmon Line was located in northeastern Greece in Macedonia. Its eastern end was anchored on the Aegean Sea near Katerini, then west to the ridge south of the Aliakmon River, then generally northwards along the eastern face of the various ridges to the west of Veria and Edessa and into the mountains on Yugoslavian border.
The strength of the line was seen as its shorter length (112k vice 161k of the Metaxas Line), terrain generally unfavorable to vehicles, and that it moves the defense west of the Axios valley, eliminating that enemy LOA as a threat. There were four major gaps in the line, one on each side of Mount Olympus, the Aliakmon River valley, and the Edessa gap. Note that the terrain is passable all along its length by dismounted forces and vehicles; the ground severely restricting vehicles to roads and trails. The broken nature of the ground also requires a higher density of defending forces due to limited fields of fire, as compared to more open terrain that offered wide fields of fire.
The disadvantages were that it abandoned Thessaloniki, the best port in Greece and the means to logistically support Yugoslavia if that country should join the Allies. It also abandoned the best airfields and the main supply route that supported the Greek forces in Albania. While the position eliminated the Axios River LOA, the Aliakmon Line was still vulnerable to an Axis move south from Monastir through Florina and Kozani. No defensive work had been done on this line. The abandonment of the Metaxas Line (the troops manning the forts and the covering units would remain) could trigger earlier action by the Axis. The Greeks estimated that 20-25 days would be needed to fully man the line.
The next post will examine what the defense might have looked like if the plan had been executed.
I have marked the attached map (from the Australian official Greece, Crete and Syria) with the various defensive lines. Green is the Aliakmon Line, Blue is the Metaxas Line, purple is approximately where the front line was in Albania, red are the Axis LOAs that affected the situation (the Florina and Axios LOAs).
- MapGreeceAliakmon1.jpg (367.29 KiB) Viewed 2195 times
The Italian occupation of Albania, the start of the war, and changes in the relationships/positions between the various Balkan nations caused the Greek High Command to reassess the defense of Greece. The 48km gap between the junction of the three borders and the western most Metaxas Fort (Popotlivitsa Fort) was seen as a vulnerability. While the Beles Ridge itself provided defensive strength (it was over 3000m in height in places), it was decided to fortify the ridge with field works. A second line (the Krousia Area) was also begun behind the Beles ridge between the Doiranis and Kerkini lakes. As the political position of Yugoslavia was now seen as uncertain, the Axios River valley west of Lake Doiranis also was identified as vulnerable and field works were started in this area.
The Italian invasion completely changed the dynamics of the Greek defense. Whereas previously the bulk of the Army would face Bulgaria, the Italian attack began to draw Greek forces to the west. By February 1941, the Greeks had committed 11 divisions and one cavalry division against an Italian force of 18 divisions and one armored division. By March these numbers would be 14 Greek and 28 Italian divisions. Without allies, the Greeks recognized they couldn’t successful defend both fronts if attacked in eastern Greece.
With the offer of UK assistance, the Allies (Greece and the UK) discussed the defensive options at the Tatoi meeting (22 Feb). General Papagos identified the Aliakmon Line as the best option under the current situation.
The Aliakmon Line was located in northeastern Greece in Macedonia. Its eastern end was anchored on the Aegean Sea near Katerini, then west to the ridge south of the Aliakmon River, then generally northwards along the eastern face of the various ridges to the west of Veria and Edessa and into the mountains on Yugoslavian border.
The strength of the line was seen as its shorter length (112k vice 161k of the Metaxas Line), terrain generally unfavorable to vehicles, and that it moves the defense west of the Axios valley, eliminating that enemy LOA as a threat. There were four major gaps in the line, one on each side of Mount Olympus, the Aliakmon River valley, and the Edessa gap. Note that the terrain is passable all along its length by dismounted forces and vehicles; the ground severely restricting vehicles to roads and trails. The broken nature of the ground also requires a higher density of defending forces due to limited fields of fire, as compared to more open terrain that offered wide fields of fire.
The disadvantages were that it abandoned Thessaloniki, the best port in Greece and the means to logistically support Yugoslavia if that country should join the Allies. It also abandoned the best airfields and the main supply route that supported the Greek forces in Albania. While the position eliminated the Axios River LOA, the Aliakmon Line was still vulnerable to an Axis move south from Monastir through Florina and Kozani. No defensive work had been done on this line. The abandonment of the Metaxas Line (the troops manning the forts and the covering units would remain) could trigger earlier action by the Axis. The Greeks estimated that 20-25 days would be needed to fully man the line.
The next post will examine what the defense might have looked like if the plan had been executed.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
So what might the Aliakmon Line defense looked like if it had been executed?
My previous posts used well established facts to provide a simple analysis of the forces available and a quick overview of the line itself. This post will need to move into the realm of assumptions and speculation as little is known on how the line would have been manned. There are a few statements and, along with the later occupation of the line under the compromise plan, offer some insight. None of this should be considered definitive, but this post is merely a ‘best guess’ of what might have been.
What we do know. From the Tatoi Agreement and the statements by the participants in various written sources:
-The Greeks would position their forces to cover the British deployment to Greece. As Thessalonika had been ruled out as a debarkation port, the Greeks would need to cover the ports of Piraeus and Volos.
-The Greek forces would be moving from the Metaxas Line, so they needed to move in such a manner as to cover the ports.
-The Greeks would start movement before any UK forces were present in Greece.
-That Greek units wouldn’t be used forward of the Line due to their lack of mobility.
-That UK units, based on time and the development of suitable plans, might operate forward of the LIne.
-That it might be difficult to find “sectors of the line that were suitable for the high degree of mechanisation of the British forces, and in deploying so large a number of motor-drawn guns”.
From the actual occupation of the line under the compromise plan:
-1st Ar Bde would be used forward in a covering role. Likely would be pulled back into reserve after the initial combats to act a rearguard if the Allies retreat from the Line. The terrain of the line precludes it being used as a counterattack force.
-The Greeks would occupy the northern end of the line. The northern end was vulnerable to an early Axis attack; the UK forces arriving in Greece can quickly occupy the southern end; and the need to cover the UK debarkation.
-The UK forces would occupy the southern end of the line. Part of this is the really of deploying these forces to Greece (timeline and force flow) and the need to quickly occupy the line. There is IMHO an undercurrent of protecting the UK forces so they could be withdrawn. This can be debated if anyone wishes to, but for now it is pretty clear that the UK forces would be used in the south.
-The Monastir-Florina Gap would not be initially defended. While there was discussion of the threat, neither the 22 Feb plan or the Compromise plan discussed any intent to initially defend this LOA. Historically forces were not present and decisions to defend the gap were made as the campaign unfolded.
-No defensive works would be in place except what could be done by the individual units as they occupied their sectors.
The math. An infantry battalion is very stretched to cover 1.5k of front and requires good fields of fire to do so (plus a lot of heavy weapons). Using that number, a 112k long front requires 75 battalions. The Allies have 54 battalions and are intentionally defending in broken terrain. There are likely some places that could be considered ‘impassable’ (but military leaders always need to be careful about that), but at the same time some of these forces are needed in reserve. Doctrine normally states 2:1 ratio in the defensive, giving 36 battalions to hold the front (a little over 3k per battalion) with 18 in reserve. I am not claiming the Allies would do this, but noting that there is a significant issue between covering the front and possessing reserves.
At this point I will again comment that the Axis has a significant mobility advantage, air superiority, and the initiative. Moving Allied forces in react to a rapidly changing situation would be a challenge, especially given the lack of Greek mobility.
My next post will look at a possible defensive laydown.
My previous posts used well established facts to provide a simple analysis of the forces available and a quick overview of the line itself. This post will need to move into the realm of assumptions and speculation as little is known on how the line would have been manned. There are a few statements and, along with the later occupation of the line under the compromise plan, offer some insight. None of this should be considered definitive, but this post is merely a ‘best guess’ of what might have been.
What we do know. From the Tatoi Agreement and the statements by the participants in various written sources:
-The Greeks would position their forces to cover the British deployment to Greece. As Thessalonika had been ruled out as a debarkation port, the Greeks would need to cover the ports of Piraeus and Volos.
-The Greek forces would be moving from the Metaxas Line, so they needed to move in such a manner as to cover the ports.
-The Greeks would start movement before any UK forces were present in Greece.
-That Greek units wouldn’t be used forward of the Line due to their lack of mobility.
-That UK units, based on time and the development of suitable plans, might operate forward of the LIne.
-That it might be difficult to find “sectors of the line that were suitable for the high degree of mechanisation of the British forces, and in deploying so large a number of motor-drawn guns”.
From the actual occupation of the line under the compromise plan:
-1st Ar Bde would be used forward in a covering role. Likely would be pulled back into reserve after the initial combats to act a rearguard if the Allies retreat from the Line. The terrain of the line precludes it being used as a counterattack force.
-The Greeks would occupy the northern end of the line. The northern end was vulnerable to an early Axis attack; the UK forces arriving in Greece can quickly occupy the southern end; and the need to cover the UK debarkation.
-The UK forces would occupy the southern end of the line. Part of this is the really of deploying these forces to Greece (timeline and force flow) and the need to quickly occupy the line. There is IMHO an undercurrent of protecting the UK forces so they could be withdrawn. This can be debated if anyone wishes to, but for now it is pretty clear that the UK forces would be used in the south.
-The Monastir-Florina Gap would not be initially defended. While there was discussion of the threat, neither the 22 Feb plan or the Compromise plan discussed any intent to initially defend this LOA. Historically forces were not present and decisions to defend the gap were made as the campaign unfolded.
-No defensive works would be in place except what could be done by the individual units as they occupied their sectors.
The math. An infantry battalion is very stretched to cover 1.5k of front and requires good fields of fire to do so (plus a lot of heavy weapons). Using that number, a 112k long front requires 75 battalions. The Allies have 54 battalions and are intentionally defending in broken terrain. There are likely some places that could be considered ‘impassable’ (but military leaders always need to be careful about that), but at the same time some of these forces are needed in reserve. Doctrine normally states 2:1 ratio in the defensive, giving 36 battalions to hold the front (a little over 3k per battalion) with 18 in reserve. I am not claiming the Allies would do this, but noting that there is a significant issue between covering the front and possessing reserves.
At this point I will again comment that the Axis has a significant mobility advantage, air superiority, and the initiative. Moving Allied forces in react to a rapidly changing situation would be a challenge, especially given the lack of Greek mobility.
My next post will look at a possible defensive laydown.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
The map below is just one way the occupation of the Aliakmon Line might have looked on 6 April 1941. Given a start date of 28 February, there was more than enough time to complete the move prior to the German attack on 6 April. Because of this, I will not address the sequence of movement of the Allied forces into their new locations. The single red arrows indicate the German LOAs used during the campaign. The double arrows indicate the passes through the Aliakmon Line positions. Note that the entire line can be crossed by infantry and vehicles in column in many locations, the nature of the terrain precluding the deployment of vehicles. The ground is broken, creating dead zones that allow the passage of infantry safe from direct fires. This terrain requires a greater density of infantry forces than open areas.
EDIT: The first map I posted had an error (two 5NZ). The map has been corrected.
Comments on this defense. Note that such a significant change in the Allied defense would likely cause an equally significant change to the Axis attack. It is possible the Germans would weight the attack more to west given the uncontested nature of their movement. The participation of Yugoslavia, weak as it actually was, might not happen which further facilitates German movement.
-The western end of the Strymonas Valley LOA is left completely undefended. This was historically covered by the Greek XVIII Division. There would be no resistance to the historical movement of the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions.
-The Axios Valley LOA is completely undefended. Historically the 19th Mech was moved to block this LOA. Now there is no reason to to do so.
-The most capable and mobile Allied units are at the southern end of the line. Reaction to German moves would be similar to the historical reactions.
-The Monastir Gap is still basically unprotected. I have positioned the 19 Mech to react to
that threat. It is possible that the positions of the 19th Mech and 1st Armoured Bde would be reversed. Historically the 19th Mech was used in the Axios Valley while 1st Armoured moved to the Monastir Gap. Given that the Axios valley wouldn’t be defended (to defend the valley was the reason the 19th was placed there), I have placed the 1st Armoured in the position articulated at Tatoi.
My next post will discuss the possible impact of these changes during the campaign.
EDIT: The first map I posted had an error (two 5NZ). The map has been corrected.
-The western end of the Strymonas Valley LOA is left completely undefended. This was historically covered by the Greek XVIII Division. There would be no resistance to the historical movement of the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions.
-The Axios Valley LOA is completely undefended. Historically the 19th Mech was moved to block this LOA. Now there is no reason to to do so.
-The most capable and mobile Allied units are at the southern end of the line. Reaction to German moves would be similar to the historical reactions.
-The Monastir Gap is still basically unprotected. I have positioned the 19 Mech to react to
that threat. It is possible that the positions of the 19th Mech and 1st Armoured Bde would be reversed. Historically the 19th Mech was used in the Axios Valley while 1st Armoured moved to the Monastir Gap. Given that the Axios valley wouldn’t be defended (to defend the valley was the reason the 19th was placed there), I have placed the 1st Armoured in the position articulated at Tatoi.
My next post will discuss the possible impact of these changes during the campaign.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
As I previously commented, such a significant Allied change would have generated a change in the Axis plan. This would involve pure speculation, so I will limit any such changes to the obvious.
The main change would be the role of 2Pz Div and the 72nf Inf Div. As the Greek Field Forces have moved west of the Axios and Thessalonika is undefended, the need to for a rapid advance towards Thessaloniki to cut off the Field Forces is gone. The 2Pz would be oriented to move towards the Aliakmon Line while the capture of Thessaloniki would be handled by the 72 Div.
By the same rationale, the operational mission for the XVII Mtn Corps would be towards the Aliakmon Line rather than Thessaloniki. The gaps at E#dessa, Veria and the Olympus Passes would be the operational objectives.
Give the remainder of the Axis plan is unchanged, the attack would likely unfold as follows.
Everything east of the Fort Rupel would remain unchanged. Without the field forces, the forts would likely fall a day earlier than they historically did. The 72 Div would enter Thessaloniki on 9 April.
The main operational maneuver change would be the role of the two German Mountain Divisions. These divisions attacked west of the Metaxas Line forts and historically fought the XVIII Division. That Greek division is no longer holding the Beles Ridge so the two German divisions have unimpeded movement south. The 6 MTN historically reached Edesaa on 10 April. Without any Greek resistance, they both would reach the Edessa area on 8 April.
This is a significant operational impact. The Allies recognized the threat of the Axis operations in Yugoslavia on 8 April and only issued orders on that day to reduced their vulnerability. This involved abandoning the northern end of the Aliakmon Line by folding back to hold a line Vevi-Edessa. Historically this move was done without any enemy pressure, but now the German Mountain divisions are in place to impede or follow that movement.
Two possibilities exist:
-An Allied withdrawal as historical would likely open the Edessa gap on 9 April. This would in effect force the abandonment of any defense of the Vevi gap, initiating the retreat southward of the Allied forces.
-The Allies could hold the northern end of the line. This would reduce the forces available to defend the Vevi Gap which was historically forced by the Germans between 11-13 April, with the Germans at Ptolemais on the latter date. The mountain divisions would likely be on the offensive on 9 Apr, and best case is that the Greeks could hold for two days. This is generous as the Greek held the Beles for two days, but they had occupied those positions for months with the time used to build defenses that had been started back in 1940. These condition don’t exist on the Aliakmon Line.
In either case, the defense would be broken by the 10th at the latest. The Allies are withdrawing and the Greek units are breaking up in the retreat. There is no opportunity to occupy the Vernion-Aliakmon Line. The SS still is able to advance to Koritza and threaten the Greek forces in Albania. At this point the historical narrative is likely as good as any for the conclusion of the campaign.
The unopposed advance from the border allows the Germans to gain a better operational situation against the Aliakmon LIne as the threat from Monastir develops. Instead of two separate operations (breaching the Metaxas Line and turning the Aliakmon Line), the German are now able to synchronize both LOAs to defeat the Aliakmon Line. As soon as the Germans are able to force Allied movement/redeployment, the Allied position quickly crumbles.
-The Allied plan insures that the Greek units will face the German by themselves.
-The Greeks lack firepower and troops to hold a defensive position for more than a day or two.
-They lack mobility to rapidly adjust to German threats or successfully retreat once their position is forced/turned.
-The UK forces are still arriving, they poorly positioned to use their mobility (placed in the south), and their overriding concern for a safe route of withdrawal limits their options.
Best case is the Allies achieve the historical timeline. Worst case is the German achieve their objectives roughly two-three days earlier than before. Note the 19th Aus Bde is arriving on 12 April and played a role in the defensive of the Aliakmon River. That likely doesn’t happen under this timeline.
I will next look at the options that were discussed during the period 4 March-4 April.
The main change would be the role of 2Pz Div and the 72nf Inf Div. As the Greek Field Forces have moved west of the Axios and Thessalonika is undefended, the need to for a rapid advance towards Thessaloniki to cut off the Field Forces is gone. The 2Pz would be oriented to move towards the Aliakmon Line while the capture of Thessaloniki would be handled by the 72 Div.
By the same rationale, the operational mission for the XVII Mtn Corps would be towards the Aliakmon Line rather than Thessaloniki. The gaps at E#dessa, Veria and the Olympus Passes would be the operational objectives.
Give the remainder of the Axis plan is unchanged, the attack would likely unfold as follows.
Everything east of the Fort Rupel would remain unchanged. Without the field forces, the forts would likely fall a day earlier than they historically did. The 72 Div would enter Thessaloniki on 9 April.
The main operational maneuver change would be the role of the two German Mountain Divisions. These divisions attacked west of the Metaxas Line forts and historically fought the XVIII Division. That Greek division is no longer holding the Beles Ridge so the two German divisions have unimpeded movement south. The 6 MTN historically reached Edesaa on 10 April. Without any Greek resistance, they both would reach the Edessa area on 8 April.
This is a significant operational impact. The Allies recognized the threat of the Axis operations in Yugoslavia on 8 April and only issued orders on that day to reduced their vulnerability. This involved abandoning the northern end of the Aliakmon Line by folding back to hold a line Vevi-Edessa. Historically this move was done without any enemy pressure, but now the German Mountain divisions are in place to impede or follow that movement.
- GermanMoveAliakmon1a.jpg (399.02 KiB) Viewed 2056 times
-An Allied withdrawal as historical would likely open the Edessa gap on 9 April. This would in effect force the abandonment of any defense of the Vevi gap, initiating the retreat southward of the Allied forces.
-The Allies could hold the northern end of the line. This would reduce the forces available to defend the Vevi Gap which was historically forced by the Germans between 11-13 April, with the Germans at Ptolemais on the latter date. The mountain divisions would likely be on the offensive on 9 Apr, and best case is that the Greeks could hold for two days. This is generous as the Greek held the Beles for two days, but they had occupied those positions for months with the time used to build defenses that had been started back in 1940. These condition don’t exist on the Aliakmon Line.
In either case, the defense would be broken by the 10th at the latest. The Allies are withdrawing and the Greek units are breaking up in the retreat. There is no opportunity to occupy the Vernion-Aliakmon Line. The SS still is able to advance to Koritza and threaten the Greek forces in Albania. At this point the historical narrative is likely as good as any for the conclusion of the campaign.
The unopposed advance from the border allows the Germans to gain a better operational situation against the Aliakmon LIne as the threat from Monastir develops. Instead of two separate operations (breaching the Metaxas Line and turning the Aliakmon Line), the German are now able to synchronize both LOAs to defeat the Aliakmon Line. As soon as the Germans are able to force Allied movement/redeployment, the Allied position quickly crumbles.
-The Allied plan insures that the Greek units will face the German by themselves.
-The Greeks lack firepower and troops to hold a defensive position for more than a day or two.
-They lack mobility to rapidly adjust to German threats or successfully retreat once their position is forced/turned.
-The UK forces are still arriving, they poorly positioned to use their mobility (placed in the south), and their overriding concern for a safe route of withdrawal limits their options.
Best case is the Allies achieve the historical timeline. Worst case is the German achieve their objectives roughly two-three days earlier than before. Note the 19th Aus Bde is arriving on 12 April and played a role in the defensive of the Aliakmon River. That likely doesn’t happen under this timeline.
I will next look at the options that were discussed during the period 4 March-4 April.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
What were the other options at this time?
The Western Macedonian Field Army Section (WMFAS) submitted a plan on 4 March. The plan was to pull the WMFAS back to occupy a line along (from west to east) the Pindos Mountains-Venetikos River-Aliakmon River. The Epirus Field Army Section (EFAS) would hold it current positons in the west but confront with the Vijase River eastward to link with the WMFAS on the Pindos Mountains. The Aliakmon Line (Kajmakealan Mountains-Edessa-Veria-Mount Olympus) would still be held.
The operational concept was to pull back the Greeks force in western Greece so a successful German attack in the east would not flank the EFAS and WMFAS. The challenges to this plan were numerous.
-A major Italian offensive was known to start sometime in the near future (it started 9 March and would end on 26 March). The time needed to execute this move likely wasn't available (Germany attacked on 6 April). Given the withdraw of the Albania positions under the Tatoi Agreement would happen after the occupation of the Aliakmon Line and after Germany attacked, there would not be any time for such a move.
-The proposed line is ~169km long. The current line in Albania is 76km long. This proposal increases the length of the front by 93km. Adding the Aliakmon Line defenses (112km), the Allied forces are now holding 281km instead of 187km. With the planned strength of 22 Greek and 3 UK divisions, each division will hold 11 km of front before units are pulled for reserve.
-This defense doesn’t solve the Monastir gap problem. This plan still has the Allies holding the Aliakmon Line, meaning that defense will still be outflanked. The likely result will be the loss of four-five Greek divisions through combat or breaking-up during the retreat. That will leave ~20 divisions to hold a 257km long line (Aliakmon River-Katerini) after the positons north of the Aliakmon Line are abandoned.
-The Albania defensive line was holding 28 Italian divisions with 14 Greek divisions on a 76km front (~5km per Greek division before taking-out reserves). As noted above, this proposed line would increase the frontage of a defending Greek division while providing more deployment/maneuver space for the larger number of Italian divisions.
In all, there was no advantage to adopting this COA.
The Western Macedonian Field Army Section (WMFAS) submitted a plan on 4 March. The plan was to pull the WMFAS back to occupy a line along (from west to east) the Pindos Mountains-Venetikos River-Aliakmon River. The Epirus Field Army Section (EFAS) would hold it current positons in the west but confront with the Vijase River eastward to link with the WMFAS on the Pindos Mountains. The Aliakmon Line (Kajmakealan Mountains-Edessa-Veria-Mount Olympus) would still be held.
The operational concept was to pull back the Greeks force in western Greece so a successful German attack in the east would not flank the EFAS and WMFAS. The challenges to this plan were numerous.
- Map 4 March (1).jpg (324.92 KiB) Viewed 2020 times
-A major Italian offensive was known to start sometime in the near future (it started 9 March and would end on 26 March). The time needed to execute this move likely wasn't available (Germany attacked on 6 April). Given the withdraw of the Albania positions under the Tatoi Agreement would happen after the occupation of the Aliakmon Line and after Germany attacked, there would not be any time for such a move.
-The proposed line is ~169km long. The current line in Albania is 76km long. This proposal increases the length of the front by 93km. Adding the Aliakmon Line defenses (112km), the Allied forces are now holding 281km instead of 187km. With the planned strength of 22 Greek and 3 UK divisions, each division will hold 11 km of front before units are pulled for reserve.
-This defense doesn’t solve the Monastir gap problem. This plan still has the Allies holding the Aliakmon Line, meaning that defense will still be outflanked. The likely result will be the loss of four-five Greek divisions through combat or breaking-up during the retreat. That will leave ~20 divisions to hold a 257km long line (Aliakmon River-Katerini) after the positons north of the Aliakmon Line are abandoned.
-The Albania defensive line was holding 28 Italian divisions with 14 Greek divisions on a 76km front (~5km per Greek division before taking-out reserves). As noted above, this proposed line would increase the frontage of a defending Greek division while providing more deployment/maneuver space for the larger number of Italian divisions.
In all, there was no advantage to adopting this COA.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
In all the discussions of how to defend Greece in 1941, one COA is usually overlooked - Defending the Beles-Metaxas Line. The post war English language accounts all provide reasons why the line shouldn’t be held, but never offer a serious examination of any advantages to defending the line. Some authors have noted that the most effective defensive fights during the campaign were executed by the under strength Greek units manning the line. Could holding the Beles-Metaxas Line be a viable option?
At least some experts believe so. In their postwar history for the US Army, The German Campaigns In the Balkans (Spring 1941), the authors (two German generals and a civilian historian) stated:
Note the logical step mentioned here (west of the Metaxas Line) was occupying the vulnerable area between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers with the UK/CW forces.
Stockings and Hancock in their book ‘Swastika over the Acropolis’ also ask this same question.
A likely defense could have been the following:
To keep changes to a minimum, the actual defense on 6 April remains basically unchanged. The XII and 20th Greek Divisions would be placed to reinforce the critical areas of the line: the western end and Stymonos Valley. Providing these two divisions adds depth to the defense and critical counter attack capability. The defense east of the Stymonas Valley is left as is because a German penetration doesn't result in trapping the bulk of EMFAS. Units in the eastern areas now can retreat (as they historically attempted to do) as the Germans can't quickly cut-off those forces. The 19th Motorized can use used by the Greeks as a mobile reserve to reinforce weakened sectors.
The major change are with UK forces. The NZ Division takes responsibility for the Axios Valley. This places a mobile, A/T equipped unit in terrain suitable for movement and on the likely enemy armored LOA. The 6th Aus can be held in reserve to cover the Greek withdrawal, to set a blocking position, or to move (as 19th Aus Bde historically did) to cover the Monastir Gap. The Greek Cavalry Division and the 21st Bde are moved into the gap as they historically did. Instead of only one brigade trying to stop the Germans in the later area, there are now 2+ divisions, with the Australians providing critical A/T capability. The 1st Ar Bde can be used as a mobile reserve/delaying force.
Does this prevent the Germans from penetrating the Allied defense? No, because the strategic situation has remained unchanged. What it does is places the bulk of the Greek forces into a defense they are best suited for, places the UK/CW forces on the armored LOAs, and allows the Allies to exploit the mobility of the CW units. In all, it likely provides a better defense.
At least some experts believe so. In their postwar history for the US Army, The German Campaigns In the Balkans (Spring 1941), the authors (two German generals and a civilian historian) stated:
“The British fully realized the vulnerability of the Greek border defense system; it was bound to collapse in the event of a German thrust between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers. However, they let the Greeks have their way without taking the logical step of moving their forces up to the frontier into the sector west of the Metaxas Line.” (page 77, my italics).
Note the logical step mentioned here (west of the Metaxas Line) was occupying the vulnerable area between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers with the UK/CW forces.
Stockings and Hancock in their book ‘Swastika over the Acropolis’ also ask this same question.
Another significant question posed by Greek tenacity on the Doiran-Nestos Line was what might have happened if W Force had chosen to reinforce the EMFAS as the Greeks had so often pleaded? For their part the Germans were surprised that the British had chosen not to do so. So too, American observers later concluded failure to reinforce the western wing the Doiran-Nestos Line was a ‘fatal and inexplicable blunder’.56 (pages 174-175) fn 56: ‘War for the Passes’, an extract from American Infantry Journal, October, 1941, AWM 3DRL6643 3/42.
A likely defense could have been the following:
- Map Beles-Metaxas.jpg (251.17 KiB) Viewed 1980 times
To keep changes to a minimum, the actual defense on 6 April remains basically unchanged. The XII and 20th Greek Divisions would be placed to reinforce the critical areas of the line: the western end and Stymonos Valley. Providing these two divisions adds depth to the defense and critical counter attack capability. The defense east of the Stymonas Valley is left as is because a German penetration doesn't result in trapping the bulk of EMFAS. Units in the eastern areas now can retreat (as they historically attempted to do) as the Germans can't quickly cut-off those forces. The 19th Motorized can use used by the Greeks as a mobile reserve to reinforce weakened sectors.
The major change are with UK forces. The NZ Division takes responsibility for the Axios Valley. This places a mobile, A/T equipped unit in terrain suitable for movement and on the likely enemy armored LOA. The 6th Aus can be held in reserve to cover the Greek withdrawal, to set a blocking position, or to move (as 19th Aus Bde historically did) to cover the Monastir Gap. The Greek Cavalry Division and the 21st Bde are moved into the gap as they historically did. Instead of only one brigade trying to stop the Germans in the later area, there are now 2+ divisions, with the Australians providing critical A/T capability. The 1st Ar Bde can be used as a mobile reserve/delaying force.
Does this prevent the Germans from penetrating the Allied defense? No, because the strategic situation has remained unchanged. What it does is places the bulk of the Greek forces into a defense they are best suited for, places the UK/CW forces on the armored LOAs, and allows the Allies to exploit the mobility of the CW units. In all, it likely provides a better defense.
Jeff Leser
Infantrymen of the Air
Infantrymen of the Air
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
Have you finished now or is there still more to come?
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
With the benefit of hindsight, most if not all people interested in this subject recognise that the Germans had more than sufficient resources, and Hitler the inclination and determination to succeed in his Balkan aims, to overcome the Allies irrespective of whatever defensive posture they took. In effect, no serious scholar has addressed the question "[could the] Allies (Greece and the UK) ... craft a defense that could successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941" because it is a question that will only result in academic ridicule.jwsleser wrote:A question that has floated around in other discussions is whether the Allies (Greece and the UK) could craft a defense that could successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941. My intent for starting this thread is to explore that question. Due to the lack of primary sources and the need to explore ‘what ifs’, we will never definitively answer the question. What I do hope is that readers will come away with a better understanding of the issues/factors involved in the discussion/decisions that were made during the period 22 February-4 March.
In reviewing the available scholarship (both English and foreign sources), this question is never addressed.
On the otherhand, what is remiss from the historical body of work, is a study of whether a more effective defensive posture could have been implemented that the principles at the time believed would give a better chance of success. This too has not been explored in great detail for, I imagine, two reasons. First, Papagos in his post-war narratives, and all of the official histories (Greek, British, Australian and New Zealand) recognise that the actual posture undertaken -deployment in broadly three separated areas with dispersal of limited resources - was militarily unsound. Ie. there is general acceptance that a better defensive posture certainly did exist. Second, what that better defensive posture was is not discussed primarily because it would impinge on what Carr notes as the "myths" surrounding Greek heroism and military prowess. Why disturb sleeping dogs; let them lie in peace.
Once jwleser commenced his analysis, I assumed that it was going to look at the various alternatives and comment on which was, based on the information available at the time and/or in hindsight, likely to offer the most resistance to Axis penetration and a better chance for success were it to be possible. There are an infinite number of precise variations possible based upon a much smaller number of broad defensive postures.
Unfortunately, jwleser went into great detail, much of it spurious to the objective to which he claimed he was travelling, whilst trying to critique just one of those broad defensive postures. I have been waiting patiently for a similar degree of analysis of the others. But it seems not to be coming. In effect, his analysis has not been to ascertain whether success was possible, nor even whether a better defensive posture was available, he has chosen merely to discredit one of the options as not being able to produce the success that everybody now, with the benefit of hindsight, accepts was elusive.
I was anticipating at the very least, a comparison between the two broad options promulgated by Papagos:
(1) retain the bulk of the Greek Army defending the recently conquored narrow strip of Albanian territory and concentrate the remaining Greek forces and the Empire contingent on the Vermion Line; with,
(2) retain the bulk of the Greek Army defending the recently conquored narrow strip of Albanian territory and concentrate the remaining Greek forces and the Empire contingent on the Metaxas Line.
The first is Papagos' proposal to the British at the 22 February 1941 conference which the British left thinking was going to be implemented (and jwleser has critiqued). The second is the defensive posture that Papagos seems to have desired all along and proposed repeatedly after 2 March 1941 - and which goes completely missing from jwleser's analysis above.
Perhaps the reason why jwleser presented his analysis on only the one broad defensive posture was because he had already pre-determined that that was the best option of all available and was merely trying to confirm what everybody already knows (with the benefit of hindsight) that even that would not have made a difference to the outcome.
If so, the natural progression is to discuss why Papagos was so determined not to develop and implement that posture (despite being the one to propose it) and made every excuse possible to do something else.
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steverodgers801
- Member
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Re: Defense of Greece 1941
Due to the overwhelming German air superiority, the British should never have gone into Greece, but continued the offense into Tunisia.
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
The Allies took how much time to go along the Italian mainland?
I don't see why a wise Allied effort not impeded by Greek idiot stand in Albanian could not last at least a year.
I don't see why a wise Allied effort not impeded by Greek idiot stand in Albanian could not last at least a year.
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
Here is the German view point of the defensive nature of Greece's topgraphy and geography.Dili wrote:The Allies took how much time to go along the Italian mainland?
I don't see why a wise Allied effort not impeded by Greek idiot stand in Albanian could not last at least a year.
It is the exact same page from the same publication used by jwleser above. This is the whole page so you can read it in context and draw your own opinion.
You will notice that the German appreciation was that Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia up to Salonika was "practically indefensible". And yet that is where Papagos was determined to stand.
You will also notice that they seem to believe that the Greeks felt compelled to defend that line in order to protect the logistic effort supporting the bulk of their army in Albania. And that once the Greeks had decided upon this effort, the British should have taken the "logical step" in joining them despite their recognition (in agreement with the Germans) of its vulnerability. jwleser seems to think those two words (logical step) indicate the Metaxas Line was the better one when the passage as a whole suggests the complete opposite. Indeed, from this appraisal, the only logic in standing on the Metaxas Line is derived from a desire to protect the logistics. Unfortunately, the Germans are in error here because the supply lines in Albania were not based on Salonika and its loss would thus not isolate them.
I suggest jwleser completely misunderstood what is written, or cherrypicked thinking nobody would notice.
Re: Defense of Greece 1941
If the British can supply the Greeks fully there no need, otherwise Greeks need that supply came from Black Sea. Black Sea-Turkey-Athens is maybe a solution.